Yoma 64a (סד.) — the Talmud in English

The Gemara returns to discuss the beraita cited above, which found it necessary to derive from the verse that one whose time has not yet arrived is unfit to serve as the goat sent to Azazel [as it is stated: “to”']. [

And we raised an objection: Is this so? The goat sent to Azazel is designated only through a lottery, and a lottery can be conducted only for a goat fit to serve for the Lord. If so, it is self-evident that a lottery cannot be conducted for one whose time has not yet arrived. Why, then, did the verse take the trouble to include this explicitly?]

Two explanations of the beraita have been stated thus far: a. Rav Yosef established the beraita as referring to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says that if one of the goats dies, another goat is brought without a lottery. b. Ravina establishes the beraita in a case where the goat sent to Azazel developed a permanent blemish, and one substitutes another goat for it without a lottery. The Gemara now adds another explanation:

Rava said:

The verse that found it necessary to teach us that one whose time has not yet arrived is unfit to serve as the goat sent to Azazel was speaking of

a case where he had

a

dangerously ill

person

in his home,

and it was necessary to feed him goat meat. Because of the danger to life, he was permitted to slaughter on Yom Kippur,

and he slaughtered

the

mother

of the goat sent to Azazel

on Yom Kippur,

after the lottery had already designated the goat for Azazel.

And it is prohibited to slaughter an animal together with its offspring on the same day, as it is stated [Leviticus 22:28]: “Whether it be cow or ewe, you shall not kill it and its young both in one day.” And it is like one whose time has not yet arrived [since it may not be sacrificed throughout that entire day].

One might have thought that since the goat had already been consecrated, it should nevertheless be sent to Azazel [even though its mother had been slaughtered that day]. The verse therefore teaches us that it is not to be sent.

We ask:

Is such a case prohibited?

Is it prohibited to lead the goat to Azazel and cast it from the cliff because of the prohibition against slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day? But “you shall not kill it and its young”

the Merciful One stated. And this

casting it from the cliff

is not slaughter!

We answer:

This is what they say in the West [

this is what they said in Eretz Yisrael]:

Its being cast from the cliff

is its slaughter!

We learned in the Mishna: And if, after the lottery, one [of the goats] dies, he brings another pair and conducts a lottery over them initially, and says

“If the one designated for the Lord died” [

that is, if the one designated for the Lord died, he says as follows]:

“This upon which

the lottery fell for the Lord shall take its place.” And if the one for Azazel died [he says as follows]: “This upon which the lottery fell for Azazel shall take its place,” while the other shall graze until it becomes unfit, and it shall be sold, and its proceeds shall go to the freewill offerings.

The Mishna did not clarify which goat is the “other” one that shall graze until it becomes unfit.

Now, when the goat for the Lord dies, there are two goats for Azazel here: a. The goat that remains from the first pair. b. The goat from the second pair upon which the lottery fell for Azazel. One of the goats is superfluous.

Similarly, when the goat for Azazel dies, there are two goats for the Lord here: a. The goat that remains from the first pair. b. The goat from the second pair upon which the lottery fell for the Lord. One of the goats is superfluous.

The amoraim disagree as to which goat is the “other” one that shall graze until it becomes unfit:

Rav said: The second [

the second goat that remains alive]

of the first pair shall be sacrificed.

But the

second of the second pair shall graze

until it becomes unfit.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The second of the first pair shall graze

until it becomes unfit,

and the second of the second pair shall be sacrificed .

We inquire:

With regard to what do they disagree

—in what do Rav and Rabbi Yoḥanan disagree? [What is the basis of their dispute?]

In order to explain the subject of the dispute between Rav and Rabbi Yoḥanan, it is appropriate first to explain the law of rejection with regard to consecrated offerings:

An animal that was rejected [rendered unfit] for a time from being sacrificed on the altar is subject to the law of rejection. That is, even if the reason because of which it was rejected subsequently passes, the animal has nevertheless been rejected and rendered permanently unfit .

And when one of the two goats of Yom Kippur dies, it is impossible to sacrifice its counterpart as long as it has no partner. Rav and Rabbi Yoḥanan disagree as to whether the law of rejection applies to it:

Rav holds:

The law of rejection with regard to consecrated offerings applies only after their slaughter. [For example, if after an animal has been slaughtered, its blood is rejected from being sprinkled on the altar, the law of rejection applies to it and it is permanently disqualified.] But consecrated offerings that are

living animals [

while they are still alive]

are not rejected.

Therefore, even though when one goat dies it is impossible to sacrifice its counterpart as long as it has no partner, nevertheless, after another goat is brought in place of the first one that died, it is possible to return and sacrifice the second goat of the first pair .

And Rabbi Yoḥanan holds:

Even consecrated offerings that are

living animals [

while they are still alive]

are rejected—

the law of rejection applies to them.

And when one of the two goats dies, the law of rejection applies to its counterpart, and even after another goat is brought [in place of the goat that died], it is impossible to sacrifice the second goat of the first pair, because the law of rejection has already applied to it.

We explain the reasoning of Rav and Rabbi Yoḥanan:

What is the reason of Rav,

who said that living animals are not rejected?

It is because he

derives [

learns]

from one whose time has not yet arrived—

from any offering before the eighth day of its life:

For

with regard to one whose time has not yet arrived, although it is presently unfit,

as it is not presently fit to be sacrificed on the altar, nevertheless,

when it later becomes fit, it is fully fit;

when the eighth day of its life arrives, it is fit to be sacrificed, and we do not say that the law of rejection had already applied to it and that it was rejected forever.

Here, too, it is no different.

Other disqualifications that occur during the animal’s lifetime are no different from one whose time has not yet arrived, and from this it follows that there is no rejection with regard to living animals.

We ask:

Are the cases comparable?

Is it possible to compare other disqualifications that occur during an animal’s lifetime to one whose time has not yet arrived?!

After all,

there,

in the case of one whose time has not yet arrived,

it was never fit at all—

there was never a moment before the eighth day when the animal was fit to be sacrificed. But

here,

in the case of other disqualifications, the offering had already

appeared [

was fit] for sacrifice,

and

afterward it was

rejected,

and in such a case it is possible that the law of rejection applies . From where did Rav learn that living animals are not rejected?

Rather, this is the reason of Rav,

this is Rav’s reasoning [for saying that living animals are not rejected]:

It is because he

derives [

learns]

from a temporary blemish [

a blemish that is destined to heal]:

For

with regard to a temporary blemish, although it is not presently fit,

as it is unfit while it bears a blemish, nevertheless,

when it later becomes fit, it is fully fit;

when its blemish heals, it may be sacrificed [as will be learned below from a verse], and we do not say that the law of rejection had already applied to it and that it was rejected forever.

Here, too, it is no different—

other disqualifications that occur during the animal’s lifetime are no different from a temporary blemish, and there is no rejection with regard to living animals.

The question still arises:

And there,

with regard to the temporary blemish itself,

from where do we know

that when it heals, the animal may be sacrificed?

The answer is: It is because

it is written [

Leviticus 22:25] concerning a blemished animal:

“For their corruption is in them,

they have a blemish in them; they shall not be accepted for you.” And the Sages expounded: Only when

there is a blemish in them

the law

is that they shall not be accepted [

they are not acceptable for sacrifice], and it follows

that

if their

blemish has passed, they shall be accepted.

The Gemara explains the reasoning of Rabbi Yoḥanan:

And Rabbi Yoḥanan,

who holds that living animals are rejected—why does he not derive from a temporary blemish that it is not rejected?

Because

the Merciful One excluded the phrase, “For their corruption is

in them,”

“in them,”

the Torah added the word “in them” to teach that specifically with regard to

them—

blemished animals—the law

is that when [

when]

their blemish has passed, they shall be accepted.

And it follows

that everything else that is

disqualified from sacrifice,

since it was rejected

for a single moment,

it was rejected

forever.

It was rejected

[and from here it follows that there is rejection with regard to living animals, in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion].

This now presents a difficulty for Rav’s opinion, according to which living animals are not rejected.

And Rav

will answer: The word “in them” stated with regard to blemished animals is not superfluous, for

that “in them”

comes to teach that only when the blemished animals are

in their own state—

by themselves—is the law

that they shall not be accepted.

But

[however,]

through a mixture,

where the limbs of a blemished burnt offering became mixed with the limbs of unblemished burnt offerings,

they are accepted—

they are fit for sacrifice and effect acceptance.

As we learned

[Zevahim 77b]:

The limbs

of

unblemished animals

that became mixed

with the limbs

of

blemished animals, Rabbi Eliezer says: If

already

the head of one of them was sacrificed

before it became known that one of the burnt offerings was blemished,

they may sacrifice

the

heads, all of them,

because according to Torah law there is no prohibition against sacrificing a mixture containing a majority of unblemished animals and a minority of blemished animals, since the minority is nullified in the majority; it is only by rabbinic decree that it is prohibited to sacrifice them.

But if they already sacrificed [inadvertently, in violation of the rabbinic prohibition] the head of one of them, they did not impose a decree upon the other heads, because we can “ascribe” and say that the head that was already sacrificed was the blemished one, while the other heads belong to the unblemished offerings .

And if they already sacrificed

the legs of one of them, they may sacrifice

the

legs, all of them,

because we say that the legs that had already been sacrificed belonged to the blemished animal, while the remaining legs belong to the unblemished animals.

And the Sages say: Even if

if

all of them except one had been sacrificed,

that one

shall go to the place of burning,

because according to the Sages, blemished animals are prohibited by Torah law even when they are in a mixture.

Rav follows Rabbi Eliezer, who says that blemished animals are not prohibited by Torah law when in a mixture, and he derives this from the word “in them”; that is, only when they are by themselves are they prohibited . [ Therefore, one cannot derive from here that specifically blemished animals whose blemishes have passed are accepted; rather, living animals are never subject to rejection].

But the other one—

and Rabbi Yoḥanan [who derived from the word “in them” that specifically with regard to blemished animals, if their blemishes pass, they are accepted]

derives

that living animals are not prohibited when in a mixture

from

the fact that the verse could have said

“in them”

but instead said

“in them” .

But the other one—

Rav derives only one teaching from the word “in them” [that a blemish in a mixture is permitted], and he does not derive that everything rejected from sacrifice is rejected forever, because from the change in wording from

“in them” to

the wording

“in them,” he does not derive anything.

Thus far, the Gemara has explained that Rav and Rabbi Yoḥanan disagree as to whether there is rejection with regard to living animals:

According to Rabbi Yoḥanan, the law of rejection applies to living animals. Therefore, if one of the two goats of Yom Kippur dies, the law of rejection applies to the remaining goat, and it shall graze until it becomes unfit, while the two goats of the second pair shall be sacrificed.

According to Rav, living animals are not rejected. Therefore, if one of the two goats dies, its counterpart may be sacrificed after another goat is brought [through a lottery] in place of the goat that died.

We raise an objection to Rav’s opinion:

And according to Rav—granted even

that it is indeed true

that living animals are not rejected,

and it is possible to sacrifice the second goat of the first pair. But Rav should nevertheless have said:

If he wishes, he sacrifices this one, and if he wishes, he sacrifices that one

—if he wishes, he sacrifices the second goat of the first pair, and if he wishes, he sacrifices the second goat of the second pair! Why, then, did Rav say: “The second of the first pair shall be sacrificed, and the second of the second pair shall graze”?

Rava said

a resolution:

Rav held in accordance with Rabbi Yosei, who said

a general principle with regard to sacred offerings: when a person designates an animal or money twice for the same offering

, it is a mitzva

to offer his offering

with

what was designated

first.

Therefore, it is a mitzva to offer the second goat of the pair that was designated first.

And we raised the question:

Which Rabbi Yosei

—upon which statement of Rabbi Yosei was Rav basing himself?

If you say

that Rav is basing himself on the words of

Rabbi Yosei with regard to the collection boxes

as follows, then Rav’s statement can be rejected.

And what are the words of Rabbi Yosei with regard to the collection boxes?

As we learned [Shekalim 3:2] concerning the collection from the Chamber: It is a mitzva for every Israelite to give a half-shekel each year, and the shekels were given to the Chamber in the Temple for the purpose of offering communal offerings. There were more shekels there than were needed for the communal obligatory offerings, and they would collect [set aside] some of them three times a year for the communal obligations. Each time, they would place the collection into three boxes

as follows:

And we learned in the Mishna: There were

three boxes

with a capacity

of three se'a each

—each one—

in which

they would

collect from the Chamber. And it was written on them:

On one box,

aleph,

on the second,

bet,

and on the third,

gimel.

And it was taught

in a beraita:

Rabbi Yosei said: Why was aleph, bet, gimel written on them?

In order

to know which of them was collected

[the money was placed into it]

first

[first], and

to bring from it

offerings

first

before the other boxes, because

the mitzva is with the first.

The Gemara is attempting to say that Rav, who said that the second goat of the first pair should be offered, learned this from the aforementioned statement of Rabbi Yosei concerning the boxes, from which it follows that it is a mitzva to bring an offering that was designated first.

And we reject this:

Perhaps there it is different

—it is possible that the collection from the Chamber differs from the goats of Yom Kippur, and Rabbi Yosei said that it is a mitzva with the first specifically with regard to the collection from the Chamber, because

at the time when the first became fit

—when it was appropriate to offer offerings from the first box [immediately when they placed money into it]—the latter

had not yet become fit

[they had not yet placed money into the last box, and it was not yet fit for offerings to be brought from it]. Therefore, there is a mitzva to offer the first.

But with regard to the goats of Yom Kippur, the goat of the first pair was not fit to be offered before the latter goat. For the goat designated for God is not fit to be slaughtered before the blood of the bull is placed in the Holy of Holies. In the meantime, its fellow died , and they brought two goats and cast lots over them [before the blood of the bull was placed]. And afterward, once they had placed some of the bull’s blood in the Holy of Holies and the time for slaughtering the goat arrived, the latter goat was already also standing ready.

And since the time for offering the two goats arrives at the same moment, it is possible that the first has no precedence over the second.

Rather,

it must be said that Rav [who said that the second goat of the first pair should be offered] based himself on the words of

Rabbi Yosei with regard to the Paschal offering

[who spoke about the Paschal offering]:

As it was taught: One who designates

a lamb for

his Paschal offering, and it was lost

before the time for slaughtering the Paschal offering [i.e., before midday on the fourteenth of Nisan]],

and he designated another in its place, and afterward the first was found, and

when the time for slaughtering the Paschal offering arrived [midday on the fourteenth of Nisan],

both of them were standing

before him.

Whichever of them he wishes, he may offer. These are the words of the Sages.

Rabbi Yosei says:

It is a mitzva with the first.