Yoma 64a — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara returns to discuss the earlier beraita, which needed to learn from the verse that one lacking time is unfit for the scapegoat [as it is stated, “for”].

And we raised an objection: Behold, they designate the scapegoat only through a lottery, and one may conduct a lottery only for a goat fit for the Lord. If so, it is self-evident that one cannot conduct a lottery for one lacking time; why, then, did the verse trouble to include this explicitly?

Two explanations have been stated thus far for the words of the beraita: a. Rav Yosef established the beraita according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, that if one of the goats dies, he brings another goat without a lottery. b. Ravina establishes the beraita in a case where the scapegoat developed a permanent blemish, and he substitutes it with another goat without a lottery. And now the Gemara adds another explanation:

Rava said:

The verse that needed to teach us that one lacking time is unfit for the scapegoat spoke of

a case where he had

a

dangerously ill

person

inside his house,

and he needed to feed him the meat of a goat; and because of preservation of life, it was permitted for him to slaughter on Yom Kippur,

and he slaughtered

the

mother

of the scapegoat

on Yom Kippur,

after the lottery had already fallen upon the goat for Azazel .

And it is prohibited to slaughter an animal together with its young on one day, as it is stated [there, Leviticus 22:28]: “And an ox or a sheep, it and its young, you shall not slaughter on one day.” And it is like one lacking time [since it may not be sacrificed throughout that entire day].

And one might have thought to say that since the goat had already been consecrated, it should then be sent to Azazel even though its mother had been slaughtered today; therefore the verse came and taught us that it is not sent.

And we raise a difficulty:

And in such a case, is it prohibited?

Is it prohibited to lead the goat to Azazel and cast it from the cliff because of the prohibition of “its mother and its young”? But “its mother and its young”

“you shall not slaughter,” the Merciful One said. But this

casting from the cliff

is not slaughter!

And we answer:

But they say in the West [that is, they said in the Land of Israel]

that is what they said in the Land of Israel—

its casting from the cliff—

this is its slaughter!

We learned in the Mishna: And if, after the lottery, one [of the goats] died, he shall bring another pair and conduct a lottery over them at the outset, and say

“If the one for the Name died” [that is, if the one for the Name died, he says as follows]:

that is, if the one designated for the Lord died, he says as follows:

“This upon which

the lottery fell for the Name shall take its place.” And if the one for Azazel died [he says as follows]: “This upon which the lottery fell for Azazel shall take its place.” And the second shall graze until it becomes unfit, and it shall be sold, and its money shall fall to the free-will offerings.

The Mishna did not explain which goat is the “second” that shall graze until it becomes unfit.

Now, when the goat for the Name dies, there are two goats for Azazel here: a. The goat that remained from the first pair. b. The goat from the second pair upon which the lottery fell for Azazel. And one of the goats is superfluous.

And likewise, when the goat for Azazel dies, there are two goats for the Name here: a. The goat that remained from the first pair. b. The goat from the second pair upon which the lottery fell for the Name. And one of the goats is superfluous.

The amoraim disputed which goat is the “second” that shall graze until it becomes unfit:

Rav said: The second

goat, the second one remaining alive,

of the first pair shall be sacrificed.

But

the second of the second pair shall graze

until it becomes unfit.

Rabbi Yohanan said: The second of the first pair shall graze

until it becomes unfit,

the second of the second pair shall be sacrificed .

And we inquire about it:

Over what do they disagree—

what is the basis of the dispute between Rav and Rabbi Yohanan? [What is the reason for their dispute?]

And in order to explain over what Rav and Rabbi Yohanan disagree, it is appropriate first to explain the law of rejection with regard to consecrated things:

An animal that was rejected [rendered unfit] for one hour from being sacrificed upon the altar acquires the status of rejection; that is, even if afterward the reason on account of which it was rejected passes, nevertheless the animal remains rejected and unfit forever .

And when one of the two goats of Yom Kippur dies, it is impossible to sacrifice its fellow as long as it has no mate. Rav and Rabbi Yohanan disputed whether the law of rejection takes effect upon it:

Rav held:

The law of rejection with regard to consecrated things was stated only after their slaughter. [For example, if after the slaughter of the animal, the blood was rejected from being sprinkled upon the altar, the law of rejection takes effect upon it and it becomes unfit forever.] But consecrated animals

that are living [while they are alive]

while they are still alive

are not rejected.

Therefore, even though when one goat dies it is impossible to sacrifice its fellow as long as it has no mate, nevertheless, after they bring another goat in place of the first one that died, it is possible to return and sacrifice the second of the first pair .

And Rabbi Yohanan held:

Even consecrated animals

that are living [while they are alive]

while they are still alive

are rejected—

the law of rejection takes effect upon them.

And when one of the two goats dies, the law of rejection takes effect upon its fellow. Even after they bring another goat [in place of the goat that died], it is impossible to sacrifice the second goat of the first pair, because the law of rejection has already taken effect upon it.

And we explain the reasons of Rav and Rabbi Yohanan:

What is the reason of Rav,

who said that living animals are not rejected?

Because he

learns [learned]

[learned] this principle

from one lacking time—

from every offering before the eighth day of its life:

For behold,

one lacking time, although now it is not fit,

since now it is not fit to be sacrificed upon the altar, nevertheless

when it again becomes fit, it is entirely acceptable,

when the eighth day of its life arrives it is fit for sacrifice, and we do not say that the law of rejection had already taken effect upon it and that it was rejected forever.

Here too, it is no different.

Other disqualifications that occur during the animal’s lifetime are likewise no different from one lacking time, and from here it follows that there is no rejection with regard to living animals.

And we raise a difficulty:

Are they comparable?

Can other disqualifications that occur during the animal’s lifetime be compared with one lacking time?!

For

there,

with regard to one lacking time,

it was never fit at all—

there was never a moment when the animal was fit for sacrifice before the eighth day, whereas

here,

with regard to other disqualifications, the offering had already

appeared [was fit] for sacrifice,

[been fit] for sacrifice,

and

afterward it was

rejected,

and in such a case it is possible that the law of rejection takes effect . And from where did Rav learn that living animals are not rejected?

Rather, this is the reason of Rav,

this is Rav’s reason [who said that living animals are not rejected]:

Because he

learns [learned]

this principle

from a transient blemish [a blemish that is destined to heal]:

[a blemish that will eventually heal]:

For behold,

a transient blemish, although it is not fit now,

since it is not fit while it has a blemish, nevertheless

when it again becomes fit, it is entirely acceptable,

when its blemish heals it may be sacrificed [as will be learned below from a verse], and we do not say that the law of rejection had already taken effect upon it and that it was rejected forever.

Here too, it is no different—

other disqualifications that occur during the animal’s lifetime are likewise no different from a transient blemish, and there is no rejection with regard to living animals.

And it still must be asked:

And there,

with regard to a transient blemish itself,

from where do we know—

from where do we know that when it heals it may be sacrificed?

Your answer: because

it is written [Leviticus 22:25] concerning a blemished animal:

[Leviticus 22:25], concerning an animal with a blemish:

“For their corruption is in them, a blemish is in them;

they shall not be acceptable for you.” And the Sages expounded: specifically when

“a blemish is in them,”

the law

is that they shall not be acceptable

[they are not acceptable for sacrifice], and it implies

but

if their

blemish has passed, they shall be acceptable.

And the Gemara explains the reason of Rabbi Yohanan:

And Rabbi Yohanan,

who holds that living animals are rejected, why does he not learn from a transient blemish that it is not rejected?

Because

the Merciful One excluded “for their corruption is

in them

,”

the Torah added the word “in them,” to teach that specifically with

them—

with blemished animals—the law

is that when

their blemish has passed, they shall be acceptable.

has passed, they shall be accepted.

And it implies

but all other

other animal

rejected things

from sacrifice,

since they were rejected

for one hour,

they are rejected

forever. And from here it follows that there is rejection with regard to living animals. [As Rabbi Yohanan holds.]

And now there is a difficulty against Rav’s opinion, who said that living animals are not rejected.

And Rav

will answer: “in them,” which is stated concerning blemished animals, is not superfluous, for

that “in them”

comes to teach that specifically when the blemished animals are

by themselves—

on their own—the law

is that they shall not be acceptable.

But

when they are

through a mixture,

where the limbs of a blemished burnt offering became mixed with the limbs of unblemished burnt offerings,

they are acceptable—

they are fit for sacrifice and effect acceptance.

As we learned [Zevachim 77b]:

[Zevaḥim 77b]:

Limbs

of

unblemished animals that became mixed

that became mixed

with limbs

of

blemished animals, Rabbi Eliezer says: If

already

the head of one of them had already been sacrificed,

before it became known that one of the burnt offerings was blemished,

they shall sacrifice

the

heads, all of them,

because according to Torah law there is no prohibition against sacrificing a mixture containing a majority of unblemished animals and a minority of blemished animals, since the minority is nullified by the majority; it is prohibited to sacrifice them only by rabbinic decree.

But if they had already sacrificed [unwittingly, in violation] the head of one of them, they did not decree against the other heads, because we can “attribute” and say that the head that had already been sacrificed was the blemished one, and the other heads belong to the unblemished offerings .

And if they had already sacrificed the

legs of one of them, they shall sacrifice

the

legs, all of them,

because we say that the legs that had already been sacrificed belong to the blemished animal, and the other legs belong to the unblemished animals.

And the Sages say: Even if

all but one of them

had been sacrificed,

that one

shall go to the place of burning,

because according to the Sages, blemished animals are prohibited by Torah law even when they are in a mixture.

And Rav holds like Rabbi Eliezer, that blemished animals are not prohibited in a mixture by Torah law, and he derives this from “in them”: that is, only when they are by themselves are they prohibited . [Therefore, one cannot derive from here that specifically when the blemish of a blemished animal has passed it shall be acceptable; rather, there is never rejection with regard to living animals.]

And the other one—

and Rabbi Yohanan [who learned from the word “in them” that specifically with regard to blemished animals, if their blemish passed they shall be acceptable]

derives it

that living animals are not prohibited in a mixture

from

what the verse could have said

“in them”

but said

“in them” .

And the other one—

Rav derives only one exposition from the word “in them” [that a blemished animal in a mixture is permitted], and he does not derive that everything rejected from sacrifice is rejected forever, because from the change of wording

“in them”

to the wording

“in them,” he does not expound.

Up to this point the Gemara has explained that Rav and Rabbi Yohanan disagree whether there is rejection with regard to living animals:

According to Rabbi Yohanan, there is the law of rejection with regard to living animals. Therefore, if one of the two goats of Yom Kippur dies, the law of rejection takes effect upon the remaining goat, and it shall graze until it becomes unfit, while the two goats of the second pair shall be sacrificed.

But according to Rav, living animals are not rejected. Therefore, if one of the two goats dies, it is possible to sacrifice its fellow after they bring another goat [through a lottery] in place of the goat that died.

And we raise an objection against Rav’s opinion:

And according to Rav, granted even—

it is indeed true

that living animals are not rejected,

and it is possible to sacrifice the second goat of the first pair. But Rav should still have said:

If he wishes, he sacrifices this one, and if he wishes, he sacrifices that one—

if he wishes, he sacrifices the second goat of the first pair, and if he wishes, he sacrifices the second goat of the second pair! And why did Rav say: “The second of the first pair shall be sacrificed; the second of the second pair shall graze”?

Rava said

an answer:

Rav agrees with Rabbi Yosei, who says

a general law concerning sacred offerings: when a person designates an animal or money twice for the same offering,

it is a mitzva

to offer his offering

with

what was designated

first.

Therefore, it is a mitzva to offer the second goat of the pair that was designated first.

And we raised it:

Which Rabbi Yosei—

upon which statement of Rabbi Yosei did Rav base himself?

If you say—

if we say that Rav is basing himself on the words of

Rabbi Yosei of the collection boxes

as follows [then Rav’s words are to be rejected].

And what are the words of Rabbi Yosei of the collection boxes?

For it was taught [

Shekalim 3:2 ] concerning the collection of the chamber: It is a mitzva for every Israelite to give half a shekel every year, and the shekels were given to the chamber in the Temple for the sake of offering the communal offerings. There were many shekels there, more than the needs of the communal obligatory offerings, and they would collect [set aside] from them a portion three times a year for the communal obligations. Each time they would place the collection into three boxes as follows:

And we learned in the Mishna: There were

three boxes

with a capacity

of three seahs each

each,

in which

they would

collect the chamber. And it was written on them:

On one box—

aleph,

on the second—

bet,

and on the third—

gimel.

And it was taught

in a beraita:

Rabbi Yosei said: Why was aleph, bet, gimel written on them?

In order

to know which of them was collected [

into which they had placed money ]

first [

the first one ]. And

to bring from it

offerings

first

before the other boxes, because

the mitzva is with the first.

And the Gemara is attempting to say that Rav, who said that the second goat of the first pair is to be offered, learned this from the aforementioned words of Rabbi Yosei concerning the boxes, from which it follows that it is a mitzva to bring an offering that was designated first.

And we reject this:

Perhaps there it is different—

it is possible that the collection of the chamber is different from the goats of Yom Kippur, and specifically concerning the collection of the chamber Rabbi Yosei said that the mitzva is with the first, because

at the time when the first one became fit

when it was fit to offer offerings from the first box [immediately when they placed money into it],

the latter had not yet become fit [

they had not yet placed money into the last box, and it was not fit for offerings to be offered from it ]. Therefore, there is a mitzva to offer the first one.

But concerning the goats of Yom Kippur, the goat of the first pair was not fit for offering before the last goat. For the goat of the Lord is not fit to be slaughtered before the blood of the bull is placed in the Holy of Holies. Meanwhile, its fellow died, and they brought two and cast lots over them [before the blood of the bull was placed]. And afterward, after they had placed some of the blood of the bull in the Holy of Holies, and the time for slaughtering the goat arrived—the last goat was already also standing.

And since the time for offering the two goats arrived at the same moment, it is possible that the first does not have precedence over the second.

Rather,

it must be said that Rav [who said that the second one of the first pair is to be offered] based himself on the words of

Rabbi Yosei concerning Pesach [

who spoke concerning the Pesach offering ]:

For it was taught: One who designates

a lamb for

his Pesach, and it was lost

before the time for slaughtering the Pesach [that is, before midday of the fourteenth of Nisan] ,

and designated another in its place, and afterward the first was found, and

when the time for slaughtering the Pesach arrived [midday of the fourteenth of Nisan],

behold, both of them are standing

before him.

Whichever of them he wishes, he may offer. These are the words of the Sages.

Rabbi Yosei says:

The mitzva is with the first.