Yoma 63b — the Talmud in English

The beraita asks:

if

perhaps the word

“offering”

was not written in the Torah in order to exclude one who slaughters non-sacred animals inside, but

I would understand

that from here I should include, concerning one who slaughters sacred animals outside:

that

even

one who slaughters animals of

sacred property designated for Temple maintenance [which are not designated for sacrifice]

outside will be liable.

For

even these

were called “an offering,” as it is stated

[Numbers 31:50]:

“And we have brought an offering of the Lord, gold articles, anklets and bracelets”; and certainly gold articles are not fit for sacrifice, but are fit only for Temple maintenance.

The verse states [for this reason it was stated in the aforementioned verse]:

“And to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting he did not bring it.”

This implies that he could have brought it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting [the courtyard], but did not bring it.

From here, only

everything fit

to be brought

to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting is liable for it

if he slaughtered it

outside.

But

everything that is not fit

to be brought

to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, one is not liable for it

if he slaughtered it

outside.

And the sacred property designated for Temple maintenance was not intended to be brought to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting.

The beraita asks:

“Shall I exclude these”—

indeed, from what is stated, “And to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting he did not bring it,” I understand that one should exclude [exclude] the sacred property designated for Temple maintenance,

which is not fit

to come

to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting

at all.

But

nevertheless, still

I will not exclude [I will not exclude] the

red heifer

and

the scapegoat, which

although it is not slaughtered in the Tent of Meeting, nevertheless

it

is something that is

fit to come to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting

for the lottery

and for confession [which the High Priest confessed over it in the courtyard]. And from where is it known that one who slaughters the scapegoat outside is exempt?

The beraita answers: The verse states: “to sacrifice an offering to the Lord.”

for the drawing of lots and for confession [which the High Priest recited over it in the Temple courtyard]. And from where do we know that one who slaughters the scapegoat outside is exempt?

That is,

those designated for the Lord.

That means the sacred property of the altar, all whose procedures are in the courtyard.

“to the Lord.”

These are excluded [the scapegoat],

which are not designated for that purpose,

because the death of the scapegoat was outside the courtyard.

These are excluded

This concludes the words of the beraita in Torat Kohanim.

And we raise a difficulty concerning the end of the beraita’s words [that the word “to the Lord” excludes the scapegoat, which is not designated for that purpose]:

But

why does “to the Lord” come to exclude the scapegoat?

Is that

what it

comes to do?!

And we raise a contradiction

from another beraita, whose words prove that the scapegoat is included in “an offering to the Lord”:

It is stated [Leviticus 22:27]: “An ox or a sheep or a goat, when it is born, shall be seven days under its mother. And from the eighth day onward it shall be acceptable as an offering made by fire to the Lord.” That is, it is forbidden to sacrifice an ox, sheep, or goat before the eighth day of its life [and this disqualification is called by the Sages: “lacking time”].

And it was taught in a beraita:

“It shall be acceptable as an offering made by fire to the Lord”—

these are the fires,

for it is forbidden to place an offering lacking time on the fire of the arrangement on the altar.

From where is it known that not only is placing it on the fire forbidden, but we were also commanded

not to consecrate it while it is

lacking time [before the eighth day]?

The verse states in the aforementioned verse:

“an offering,”

teaching us that it is forbidden to make it “an offering” while it lacks time. Since when he consecrates it verbally the designation “offering” takes effect upon it, it is therefore forbidden to consecrate it while it lacks time .

not to consecrate it

And why is it stated in the verse

“to the Lord”?

To include the scapegoat—

for it too is sacred to the Lord and is disqualified while it lacks time.

And in this beraita it is explained that the scapegoat is included in the category of an offering “to the Lord.” But in the preceding beraita we learned that the scapegoat is not included in the category of an offering “to the Lord,” because its death was outside the courtyard. Thus the two beraitot contradict one another!

Rava said

a resolution:

The word “to the Lord” does not itself provide a definitive indication [concerning the scapegoat]. Rather, there, in the matter of slaughtering outside, it is expounded

from the context of the verse—according to what emerges from the matter in which it was stated.

And here, in the matter of lacking time, it is expounded

from the context of the verse—according to what emerges from the matter in which it was stated.

And we explain:

There, concerning slaughtering outside,

the fact that from what is stated,

“to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting he did not bring it,” I would learn

to include the scapegoat [because it too is fit to come to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting for the lottery and confession]. There is no need to say “to the Lord” in order to include the scapegoat; necessarily,

“to the Lord”

comes

to exclude it [because its death is not in the courtyard].

But

here, concerning lacking time,

since from the statement

“made by fire” I would learn

to exclude the scapegoat [which is not sacrificed upon the altar’s fire], there is no need to say “to the Lord” in order to exclude it; necessarily,

“to the Lord

comes

to include it.

In the beraita that discusses the prohibition of “lacking time,” we learned that it is forbidden to bring the scapegoat while lacking time.

And we infer from the words of the beraita:

The reason that the Merciful One included it—

the reason that it is forbidden to bring an animal lacking time for the scapegoat is only because Scripture included it [as it is stated, “to the Lord”].

And it follows:

if He had not included it,

if Scripture had not included it,

I would have understood

that

the scapegoat becomes

sacred even

while lacking time!

But this is difficult: the scapegoat is not consecrated by itself. Rather, two goats are taken [for the Lord and for Azazel], and lots are cast over them; the lot determines which will be for the Lord and which for Azazel.

But

is it not the case that

the lot does not determine

the sin-offering goat for the Lord

except with a goat

fit

to be sacrificed

for that purpose, and an animal lacking time is not fit for that purpose? Since at the time when he consecrates the two goats he does not know concerning which of them the lot will rise for that purpose, it is self-evident that neither one of them can be lacking time! Why, then, did Scripture need explicitly to disqualify an animal lacking time for the scapegoat?

Rav Yosef said

a resolution:

Who is the author of this? The beraita that learned from the verse [“to the Lord”] to include an animal lacking time for the scapegoat—who taught it?

It is Hanan the Egyptian.

According to his words, there is a case in which the scapegoat is consecrated by itself, without a lottery, as follows:

We learned in the Mishna: “Rabbi Yehuda further said: If the scapegoat died [after the slaughter of the sin-offering goat for the Lord], the blood [of the goat for the Lord] shall be poured out.”

And why shall the blood be poured out? Because it is impossible to sacrifice the goat for the Lord unless the scapegoat is standing alive, and since the scapegoat died, the blood becomes disqualified.

And even if he returns and brings two other goats and casts lots over them [so that now there is a living scapegoat here], nevertheless it is impossible to sprinkle the blood of the first goat for the Lord, because the law of rejection has taken effect upon it.

Hanan the Egyptian disagrees with Rabbi Yehuda’s words, and it follows from his words that if the scapegoat died, he may bring another goat in its place without a lottery, and sprinkle the blood of the [first] slaughtered goat.

For it was taught: Hanan the Egyptian says: even if

the blood of the goat for the Lord is already found

in the cup, that is, the goat for the Lord was already slaughtered when the scapegoat died , nevertheless

he brings

its

companion [another goat],

and pairs it with it—with the slaughtered goat—and sprinkles its blood, and sends the living goat to Azazel.

But

Accordingly, Rav Yosef establishes the earlier beraita according to the view of Hanan the Egyptian. Scripture needed to include that an animal lacking time is disqualified for the scapegoat in a case where the scapegoat died and another goat must be brought in its place without a lottery. I would have said that since the scapegoat is not sacrificed on the altar, it is possible to bring an animal lacking time; Scripture therefore teaches us that an animal lacking time is disqualified.

And we reject Rav Yosef’s resolution:

You may say that you have heard Hanan the Egyptian say—

you can learn from Hanan the Egyptian’s words only one innovation:

that he does not hold of rejection—

he does not acknowledge the law of “rejection.” Rather, he holds that although when the scapegoat dies the blood is not fit for sacrifice, nevertheless the law of rejection does not take effect upon it, and when he brings another goat [in place of the first, which died], he may sprinkle the blood.

But

that he does not hold of the lottery—who told you that? Can you learn from Hanan the Egyptian’s words that it is possible to bring the second goat without a lottery?!

Perhaps he brings and casts lots—it is possible that he must bring two more goats and cast lots over them. Through the lot the scapegoat will become sacred, and he will sprinkle the blood of the slaughtered goat. The living goat upon which the lot rises for the Lord will graze until it becomes unfit [and is sold, and offerings are brought with its proceeds for the public’s voluntary offerings].

Since it cannot be proven from Hanan the Egyptian’s words that it is possible to designate a goat for Azazel without a lottery, we must assume that he agrees with what we learned in our Mishna [at the beginning of the chapter], that it is impossible to designate the scapegoat without a lottery.

And since it is impossible to designate the scapegoat except through a lottery, it is self-evident that it is impossible to designate an animal lacking time, for at the time of designation we do not know concerning which of them the lot will rise for the Lord [and the sin-offering goat for the Lord is certainly disqualified when lacking time].

The difficulty therefore returns: why did Scripture need to include that an animal lacking time is disqualified for the scapegoat?

Rather, Rav Yosef said

another resolution:

Who is the author of this? The beraita that needed to learn from Scripture that an animal lacking time is disqualified for the scapegoat—who taught it?

It is Rabbi Shimon, according to whom, if the scapegoat dies, another is brought in its place without a lottery.

For it was taught: If one of them died [of the two goats],

he brings

his

companion without a lottery; these are the words of Rabbi Shimon.

And Scripture teaches us that when the scapegoat dies and another is brought in its place without a lottery, an animal lacking time is disqualified.

Ravina said

another resolution:

In reality, the aforementioned beraita agrees with everyone , and the verse that needed to teach us that an animal lacking time is disqualified for the scapegoat speaks of

a case where he cast lots over the two goats, and afterward the

scapegoat

developed a defect [and became disqualified because it had a defect],

and he transferred its sanctity to another goat

that was less than eight days old, without a lottery.

and pairs it with

There is no need for a lottery here, because the sanctity of the second goat, effected through the transfer, derives from the sanctity of the first, and the sanctity of the first was effected through a lottery.

And since at the time of the transfer there is no need for a lottery, I would say that sanctity should take effect upon the goat even though it lacks time. Scripture therefore comes and teaches us that it does not become sacred. And from Ravina’s words it is proven that a defect disqualifies the scapegoat. This is an innovation, for it could have been said that a defect disqualifies only an offering sacrificed on the altar, because it is stated concerning disqualifications due to defects: “And an offering made by fire you shall not place of them upon the altar to the Lord.” [Leviticus 22:22].

And we reject Rav Yosef’s resolution:

And we inquire:

And from where do you say that a defect disqualifies it—

from where do you have grounds to say that a defect disqualifies the scapegoat even though it is not sacrificed on the altar?

And we answer on the basis of a beraita:

For it was taught in a beraita: it is stated [there] concerning disqualifications due to defects:

“And an offering made by fire you shall not place of them

on the altar to the Lord.”

Perhaps he brings them and draws lots

And the beraita expounds the superfluous words in this verse:

a. “And an offering made by fire you shall not place”—

these are the fats

of an offering with a defect, which it is forbidden to burn on the altar .

Rather, Rav Yosef said

another resolution:

Whose view is this?

The beraita that needed to derive from Scripture that an animal not yet of the proper age is disqualified as the scapegoat—who taught it?

It is the view of Rabbi Shimon,

who holds that if the scapegoat dies, another is brought in its place without a drawing of lots.

As it was taught in a beraita: If one of them dies

[of the two goats],

he brings

its

companion without a drawing of lots; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon.

Scripture therefore teaches that when the scapegoat dies and another is brought in its place without a drawing of lots, an animal not yet of the proper age is disqualified.

Ravina said

another resolution:

The above beraita may in fact follow the view of all authorities . The verse needed to teach that an animal not yet of the proper age is disqualified as the scapegoat is speaking of

a case where

lots were drawn for the two goats, and afterward

the

goat

designated as the scapegoat developed a physical defect

[and became disqualified because of its defect],

and he transferred its sanctity to

another

goat

that was less than eight days old, without a new drawing of lots.

Here a drawing of lots is unnecessary, because the sanctity of the second goat, acquired through the transfer, derives from the sanctity of the first goat, and the sanctity of the first goat was established through the drawing of lots.

Since a drawing of lots is unnecessary at the time of the transfer, one might have thought that sanctity would take effect upon the goat even though it was not yet of the proper age. Scripture therefore teaches that it does not become sacred. Ravina’s words also prove that a physical defect disqualifies the scapegoat. This is an innovation, since one might have said that a defect disqualifies only an offering that is offered on the altar, based on the statement concerning animals disqualified because of defects: “You shall not place any of these on the altar as an offering to the Lord.” [Leviticus 22:22]

And we ask about this:

From where do you say that a defect disqualifies it?

From where do you know that a physical defect disqualifies the scapegoat, even though it is not offered on the altar?

And we answer on the basis of a beraita:

As it was taught

in a beraita: concerning animals disqualified because of physical defects, it is stated [in that chapter]:

“You shall not place any of these

on the altar as an offering to the Lord.”

And the beraita expounds the redundant words in this verse:

a. “You shall not place any fire”

—this refers to the fats

of an offering with a physical defect, which may not be burned on the altar .

b.

I have no

source for prohibiting

except

when he comes to burn

all of them

[all the fats of the animal], but if he comes to burn only

some of them,

an olive-bulk of them,

from where

does he violate “You shall not do”?

The verse says

[for this it is stated]

“from them”

[which implies some of them].

c. “On the

altar” —

this is the sprinkling of blood

upon the altar, to teach you that one who sprinkles the blood of a blemished offering upon the altar also violates a prohibition.

d.

“For Hashem” —

to include the scapegoat

that developed a blemish, so that it is disqualified.

And we find that the Torah included the scapegoat with regard to two disqualifications that were stated concerning offerings: a. that it is included in the prohibition of one lacking the proper time; b. that it is included in the prohibition of a blemished animal. And the Gemara explains why the verse needed to include the scapegoat in both places:

And it was necessary to write

and the Scripture needed to include the scapegoat with regard to

a blemished animal, and it was necessary to write

also with regard to

one lacking the proper time:

Because

if the Merciful One had written

that the scapegoat is disqualified as

one lacking the proper time,

I would say that specifically one lacking the proper time is disqualified,

because its time has not arrived,

for its time for offering [ever] arrived,

but a blemished animal, whose time has arrived,

whose time for offering has arrived,

I might say

that it

would not

be disqualified as a scapegoat.

And if the Merciful One had written

that the scapegoat is disqualified as

a blemished animal,

I would say that specifically a blemished animal is disqualified,

because it is repulsive —

there is a defect in its body that causes it to be repulsive,

but one lacking the proper time, which is not repulsive

[there is no defect or repulsiveness in its body],

I might say

that it

would not

be disqualified as a scapegoat.

Therefore —

it is necessary

to include the scapegoat explicitly in both places.