Yoma 63b (סג:) — the Talmud in English

The beraita asks:

If

the word

“offering”

was not written in the Torah to exclude one who slaughters non-sacred animals inside, rather

I would understand

that from here I should include, with regard to one who slaughters sacrificial animals outside:

That

even

one who slaughters animals that are

sacred for Temple maintenance [which are not designated for sacrifice]

outside would be liable.

For

even they

are called “an offering,” as it is stated

[Numbers 31:50]:

“And we have brought an offering of the Lord,

golden vessels, bracelets, and armlets”; and certainly golden vessels are not fit for sacrifice, but are fit only for Temple maintenance.

The verse states

[for this reason it is stated in the aforementioned verse]:

“And he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting.”

This indicates that he could have brought it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting [the Temple courtyard], but did not bring it.

From here it follows that only

anything fit

to be brought

to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting incurs liability for it

if he slaughtered it

outside.

But

anything that is not fit

to be brought

to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting does not incur liability for it

if he slaughtered it

outside.

And animals sacred for Temple maintenance were not intended to be brought to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting.

The beraita asks:

Should I exclude these—

indeed, from the statement “And he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting,” I understand that I must exclude [exclude from liability] animals sacred for Temple maintenance

that are not fit

to come

to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting

at all?

But

nevertheless,

I would not exclude [I would not exclude from liability]

the

red heifer

and

the scapegoat, which

although it is not slaughtered in the Tent of Meeting, nevertheless

it

is something that is

fit to come to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting

for the lottery and confession [which the High Priest recited over it in the courtyard]. And from where do we know that one who slaughters the scapegoat outside is exempt?

The beraita answers:

The verse states: “

to sacrifice an offering

to the Lord.”

That is,

those designated exclusively for the Lord.

That means offerings of the altar, all whose procedures are performed in the courtyard.

These are excluded [the scapegoat],

[the scapegoat],

as they are not designated exclusively for Him,

for the death of the scapegoat took place outside the courtyard.

Thus far are the words of the beraita in Torat Kohanim.

And we raise a difficulty concerning the end of the beraita [that the word “to the Lord” excludes the scapegoat, which is not designated exclusively for Him]:

But

is

“to the Lord” meant to exclude

the scapegoat?

It

comes for that purpose?!

And we raise a contradiction

from another beraita, whose words demonstrate that the scapegoat is included in “an offering to the Lord”:

It is stated [Leviticus 22:27]: “An ox, or a sheep, or a goat, when it is born, shall be seven days under its mother; and from the eighth day onward it may be accepted as an offering made by fire to the Lord.” That is, it is prohibited to sacrifice an ox, sheep, or goat before the eighth day of its life [and this disqualification is called by the Sages: “lacking time”].

And it was taught in a beraita:

“It may be accepted as an offering made by fire to the Lord”—

these are the fires

that it is prohibited to place an offering lacking time on the altar’s fire.

From where

do we know that not only is burning it on the fire prohibited, but we were also commanded

not to consecrate it

while it is

lacking time [before the eighth day]?

The verse states

in the aforementioned verse:

“an offering,”

to teach us that it is prohibited to make it “an offering” while it is lacking time. Since, when he consecrates it verbally, the status of “an offering” takes effect upon it, it is therefore prohibited to consecrate it while it is lacking time .

teaching that it is forbidden to make it “an offering” while it is not yet of the proper age. Since when one consecrates it verbally, the status of “an offering” takes effect upon it, it is therefore forbidden to consecrate it while it is not yet of the proper age.

And why is

“to the Lord” stated in the verse?

To include the scapegoat—

for it too is sacred to the Lord and is disqualified while it is lacking time.

This beraita thus explains that the scapegoat is included in the category of an offering “to the Lord.” But in the previous beraita we learned that the scapegoat is not included in the category of an offering “to the Lord,” because its death took place outside the courtyard. The two beraitot are therefore contradictory!

Rava said

in answer:

The word “to the Lord” does not itself provide a definitive indication [with regard to the scapegoat]. Rather,

there,

in the case of slaughtering outside, it is expounded

from the context of the verse—

according to what is apparent from the context in which it was stated.

And here,

in the case of an animal lacking time, it is expounded

from the context of the verse—

according to what is apparent from the context in which it was stated.

And we explain:

There,

in the case of slaughtering outside,

as

from what is stated,

“to the entrance

of the Tent of Meeting he did not bring it,” I would learn

to include

the scapegoat [because it too is fit to come to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting for the lottery and confession]. And there is no need to state “to the Lord” in order to include the scapegoat; necessarily,

“to the Lord”

comes

to exclude

it [because its death does not take place in the courtyard].

But

here,

in the case of an animal lacking time,

as

from the fact that it is stated

“made by fire,”

I would learn

to exclude

the scapegoat [which is not burned on the altar’s fire]. There is therefore no need to state “to the Lord” in order to exclude it; necessarily,

“to the Lord”

comes

to include

it.

In the beraita discussing the prohibition of an animal lacking time, we learned that it is prohibited to bring a scapegoat that is lacking time.

And we infer from the words of the beraita:

The reason is that Scripture included it—

the reason that it is prohibited to bring an animal lacking time as a scapegoat is only that Scripture included it [as it is stated, “to the Lord”].

And it follows:

Had it not included it,

if Scripture had not included it,

I would have said

that

the scapegoat

becomes

sacred

even

when lacking time!

But this is difficult: one does not consecrate the scapegoat by itself. Rather, one takes two goats [for the Lord and for Azazel] and casts lots for them, and the lottery determines which one will be for the Lord and which for Azazel.

But

surely

the lottery does not determine

the goat of the sin-offering for the Lord

except with

a goat

fit

to be sacrificed

for that purpose,

and an animal lacking time is not fit for that purpose. Since, when he consecrates the two goats, he does not know which of them the lottery will designate for the Lord, it is self-evident that neither of them can be lacking time! Why, then, did Scripture have to explicitly disqualify an animal lacking time as a scapegoat?

Rav Yosef said

in answer:

Whose opinion is this—

the beraita that derives from the verse [“to the Lord”] that an animal lacking time is included with regard to the scapegoat? Who taught it?

It is the opinion of Ḥanan the Egyptian.

For according to his view, there is a circumstance in which the scapegoat is consecrated by itself, without a lottery, as follows:

We learned in the Mishna: Rabbi Yehuda further said: If the scapegoat died [after the slaughter of the goat of the sin-offering for the Lord], the blood [of the goat for the Lord] shall be poured out.

And why must the blood be poured out? Because it is possible to sacrifice the goat for the Lord only when the scapegoat is alive, and once the scapegoat has died, the blood becomes disqualified.

And even if he again brings two other goats and casts lots for them [so that there is now a living scapegoat], it is nevertheless impossible to sprinkle the blood of the first goat for the Lord, because the law of rejection has taken effect upon it.

Ḥanan the Egyptian disagrees with Rabbi Yehuda’s statement. It follows from his words that if the scapegoat dies, one may bring another goat in its place without a lottery, and sprinkle the blood of the slaughtered goat.

As it was taught in a beraita: Ḥanan the Egyptian says: Even

if

the blood

of the goat for the Lord is already

in the cup,

that is, the goat for the Lord has already been slaughtered when the scapegoat died, nevertheless he

brings

its

companion [another goat],

[another goat],

and pairs it with

the slaughtered goat, sprinkles its blood, and sends the living goat to Azazel.

Accordingly, Rav Yosef establishes the earlier beraita according to the view of Ḥanan the Egyptian. Scripture had to include the teaching that an animal lacking time is disqualified as a scapegoat in a case where the scapegoat died and another goat must be brought in its place without a lottery. One might have said that since the scapegoat is not sacrificed on the altar, an animal lacking time could be brought; therefore Scripture teaches us that an animal lacking time is disqualified.

And we reject Rav Yosef’s answer:

You may infer from the words of Ḥanan the Egyptian only

one novel point:

that he does not accept the law of rejection—

that he does not concede the law of “rejection.” Rather, he holds that although when the scapegoat dies the blood is no longer fit for sacrifice, the law of rejection does not take effect upon it, and when another goat is brought [in place of the first, which died], the blood may be sprinkled.

But

who told you that he does not accept the requirement of a lottery?

Can you infer from the words of Ḥanan the Egyptian that the second goat may be brought without a lottery?!

Perhaps he brings another pair and casts lots—

perhaps it is necessary to bring two more goats and cast lots for them. Through the lottery, the scapegoat will become consecrated, and he will sprinkle the blood of the slaughtered goat. The living goat designated by the lottery for the Lord will graze until it becomes unfit [and is sold, and public voluntary burnt-offerings are brought with the proceeds].

Since it cannot be proven from the words of Ḥanan the Egyptian that a goat may be designated for Azazel without a lottery, we must assume that he agrees with what we learned in our Mishna [at the beginning of the chapter], that it is impossible to designate the scapegoat without a lottery.

And since it is impossible to designate the scapegoat except through a lottery, it is self-evident that it is impossible to designate an animal lacking time, since at the time of designation we do not know which of them the lottery will designate for the Lord [and the goat for the Lord is certainly disqualified if it is lacking time].

The difficulty therefore returns: Why did Scripture have to include the teaching that an animal lacking time is disqualified as a scapegoat?

Rather, Rav Yosef said

another answer:

Whose opinion is this—

the beraita that had to derive from the verse that an animal lacking time is disqualified as a scapegoat?

It is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon,

who holds that if the scapegoat dies, another is brought in its place without a lottery.

As it was taught in a beraita: If one of them dies

[of the two goats],

he brings

its

companion without a lottery; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon.

And Scripture teaches us that when the scapegoat dies and another is brought in its place without a lottery, an animal lacking time is disqualified.

Ravina said

another answer:

In reality, the aforementioned beraita agrees with everyone , and the verse that had to teach us that an animal lacking time is disqualified as a scapegoat is speaking

of a case where

he cast lots for the two goats, and afterward

the goat became blemished,

the

scapegoat

[and became disqualified because it was blemished],

and he transferred its sanctity to

another

goat

that was less than eight days old, without a lottery.

Here a lottery is unnecessary, because the sanctity of the second goat, effected through the transfer, derives from the sanctity of the first, and the sanctity of the first was effected through the lottery.

Since a lottery is unnecessary at the time of the transfer, one might have said that sanctity would take effect upon the goat even though it was lacking time. Scripture therefore teaches us that it does not become sacred. Ravina’s words demonstrate that a blemish disqualifies the scapegoat. This is a novel point, since one might have said that a blemish disqualifies only an offering sacrificed on the altar, as it is stated concerning disqualifying blemishes: “You shall not place any of them on the altar as a fire-offering to the Lord.” [Leviticus 22:22.]

And we inquire:

And from where do you say that a blemish disqualifies it—

from where do you know that a blemish disqualifies the scapegoat, even though it is not sacrificed on the altar?

And we answer on the basis of a beraita:

As it was taught

in a beraita: It is stated [there] concerning disqualifying blemishes:

“And you shall not place any of them

on the altar as a fire-offering to the Lord.”

And the beraita expounds the superfluous words in this verse:

A. “And you shall not place any fire-offering”—

these are the fats

of a blemished offering, which it is prohibited to burn on the altar .

b.

I have no

source for prohibiting

except

when one comes to burn

all of them [all the fats of the animal]; but if one comes to burn only

some of them,

some of them,

an olive-bulk of them,

from where

do we know that he violates a prohibition stated as “You shall not do”?

The verse states

[for this purpose it says]

“of them”

[which implies some of them].

c. “Upon the

altar”—

this is the sprinkling of the blood

upon the altar, to teach you that one who sprinkles the blood of an offering belonging to a blemished animal upon the altar also violates a prohibition.

d.

“For Hashem”—

to include the goat sent away

that developed a blemish, rendering it invalid.

And we find that the Torah included the goat sent away with regard to two disqualifications stated concerning offerings: a. It is included in the prohibition against an offering whose time has not arrived. b. It is included in the prohibition against a blemished animal. And the Gemara explains why the verse had to include the goat sent away in both places:

And it was necessary to write

that the verse include the goat sent away with regard to

a blemished animal, and it was necessary to write

also with regard to

an offering whose time has not arrived:

Because

if the Merciful One had written

that the goat sent away is disqualified as

an offering whose time has not arrived,

I would say that specifically an offering whose time has not arrived is disqualified

because its time has not arrived,

for the time of its offering had [ever] arrived

but with regard to a blemished animal, whose time has arrived,

whose time for offering has arrived,

I might say

that it

would not

be disqualified in the case of the goat sent away.

And if the Merciful One had written

that the goat sent away is disqualified as

a blemished animal,

I would say that specifically a blemished animal is disqualified

because it is repulsive—

it has a defect in its body that causes it to be repulsive—

but an offering whose time has not arrived, which is not repulsive

[it has no physical defect or repulsiveness]

I might say

that it

would not

be disqualified in the case of the goat sent away.

Therefore—

it is necessary

to include the goat sent away explicitly in both places].