Yoma 50b — the Talmud in English

According to the words of

Rabbi Meir,

who says

in the Mishna brought on the preceding side:

the bull

of

Yom Kippur

is

an individual offering—

does it

effect a substitution [he took a non-sacred animal and said: “This is in place of that”—does “and it and its substitution shall be sacred” apply],

or does it not effect a substitution [and the Gemara will explain below the basis of the doubt]?

And since Rabbi Elazar says: “According to the one who says,” does this not imply that there is one who says that

it is not the case that there is one who says: that it is an

offering

of the community [and according to this tanna there is no room for doubt, for there is no substitution for a communal offering]?!

And we reject this:

No,

do not infer: “By implication, there is one who says that it is a communal offering”; rather, infer as follows:

By implication, there is one who says: that it is an

offering

of partners [and according to him there is no room for doubt, since there is no substitution for an offering of partners].

The matter itself: Rabbi Elazar raised the question: According to the one who says: The bull of Yom Kippur is an individual offering, does it effect a substitution or does it not effect a substitution?

And we wonder: What

is he asking

Rabbi Elazar?!

For it is certainly obvious to us that his fellow priests attain atonement through it, and an offering of partners does not effect a substitution; so what is there to doubt in this [Rashi]?! [Rashi:

Rashi:

If you say

that

this is what he is asking:

If [does]

whether]

after the one who consecrates

the High Priest, who consecrated it from his own property,

we follow, and he is called the owner of the offering with regard to substitution; and since an individual consecrated it from his own property and not from the property of partners, the offering does effect a substitution?

and he is called the owner of the offering with regard to substitution; and since an individual consecrated it from his own property and not from jointly owned property, the offering does effect a substitution?

If we follow the one who attains atonement—

he, his household, and his fellow priests—

we follow, and they are called the owners of the offering with regard to substitution; and since many attain atonement through it, it has multiple ownership by partners and does not effect a substitution?

they are called the owners of the offering with regard to making a substitution offering; since many people achieve atonement through it, it has many owners in partnership and does not create a substitution offering?

It is impossible to explain it this way, for

it is obvious that we follow the one who attains atonement—

For

indeed

Rabbi Abbahu said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan:

A. There is a distinction in the redemption of consecrated property between owners who redeem their consecrated property and others who redeem it: the owners add a fifth to their redemption, whereas others do not add a fifth. This law applies both to consecrated property for the maintenance of the Temple, which is initially intended for redemption, and to offerings that developed a blemish and are therefore redeemed.

B. Only the owners can effect a substitution, but another person cannot substitute.

C. One who gives his teruma may give it to any priest he wishes, and he even has in this a benefit of pleasure from an Israelite who says to him: “Here is this sela; give this teruma to my daughter’s son, who is a priest.”

A. If a person consecrated an animal so that another person would attain atonement through it and fulfill his obligation through it [Rashi], then—

the one who consecrates

is called the “owner” with regard to redemption, and thus

adds a fifth

when he redeems it after it develops a blemish; but the other person who attains atonement through this offering is merely like any other person and does not add a fifth—

And the reason is: for it is written: “And if the one who consecrated it redeems his house, he shall add a fifth of the money of your valuation to it, and it shall be his”; we learn from this that the one who consecrates adds a fifth, but not the one who attains atonement.

And the one who attains atonement,

and not the one who consecrates, is the one who

effects a substitution with it,

for he is called the “owner of the offering” with regard to substitution. B.

And one who gives from his own produce for

the pile

of his fellow

in order to permit it, the right to give the teruma to any priest he wishes belongs to him—and therefore

its benefit of pleasure belongs to him,

for if an Israelite comes and says: “Here is this sela; give the teruma to my daughter’s son, who is a priest,” the sela belongs to him, since he has the ability to give it to any priest he wishes [Rashi].

And the reason is: for it is stated: “When you have finished tithing all the tithe of your produce in the third year, the year of the tithe, and you shall give it to the Levite,” etc.; thus Scripture made the giving dependent upon the one who tithes from his own property.

We have therefore learned: with regard to substitution, the one who attains atonement is called the owner of the offering; and the same applies to Rabbi Elazar’s question concerning substitution: the one who attains atonement is considered the “owner of the offering,” and since they are partners, it does not effect a substitution [explained according to the implication of Rashi’s language; and see note 83].

And we explain:

It is always obvious to Rabbi Elazar

that

we follow the one who attains atonement, and this is what he is asking:

Do

his fellow priests

and the household of the priest who attain atonement through the bull—

attain atonement in a fixed manner [their atonement is fixed], meaning, like other people who attain atonement for whom others set aside an offering, whereby the animal was transferred to them for atonement; here too, a share in it was transferred to them, “and it thereby becomes a sin-offering of partners with regard to substitution” [Rashi’s language]—

that is, like other people who achieve atonement through an offering that someone else set aside for them, in which case the animal was transferred to them for their atonement; here too, a share in it was transferred to them, “and it is a partnership sin-offering with regard to a substitution offering” [Rashi’s wording]—

Or perhaps:

his fellow priests and his household [Tosafot] attain atonement only

in a floating manner [their atonement floats], meaning: their atonement is not fixed in it, but floats upon the atonement of the High Priest like something floating on water, “and the offering is not called by their name, but is an individual offering” of the High Priest with regard to substitution [Rashi].

that is, their atonement is not fixed in it, but depends on the atonement of the High Priest, like something floating on water; “the offering is not called by their name, and with regard to a substitution offering it is an individual offering” of the High Priest [Rashi].

Come and hear:

There is a stringency in a sacrifice

whose sanctity comes to it through the consecration of the owners [the initial consecration]—

over a substitution

of that sacrifice;

and there is a stringency in

an offering whose sanctity comes to it through

substitution—

over a sacrifice, as it explains and proceeds:

as the beraita proceeds to explain:

There is a stringency in a sacrifice

over a substitution: A.

The sacrifice—

as it explains below which sacrifice the beraita is discussing—

applies to an individual and to a community.

B.

And

the sacrifice

repels Shabbat and ritual impurity,

C.

And

the sacrifice

effects a substitution.

Unlike substitution,

for substitution does not apply to a community; and the offering of the substitution does not repel Shabbat or ritual impurity, since its offering has no fixed time; and it does not make others into a substitution, since it is written: “And it and its substitution shall be sacred,” and we expound: “It and its substitution,” but not the substitution of a substitution.

There is a stringency in substitution over a sacrifice:

For substitution applies to a permanent blemish,

and the animal becomes sanctified with bodily sanctity,

and

this sanctity benefits it in that if one comes to redeem it,

it does not leave for non-sacred status

to become permitted

to be shorn

of its wool

or to be worked [to perform labor with it]; and it is permitted only for slaughter and eating.

to perform work with it]; it is permitted only for slaughter and eating.

Unlike a sacrifice

that had a blemish at the time of its consecration [its blemish preceded its consecration], which is not sanctified with bodily sanctity but only with monetary sanctity, and is redeemed and leaves for complete non-sacred status, and even shearing and working are permitted; [but if its consecration preceded its blemish, it too is not made permitted by redemption for shearing and working].

And now we prove that the bull of Yom Kippur effects a substitution, for:

This sacrifice

about which the beraita is speaking,

what are its circumstances?

If you say

that it is a sacrifice

of an individual —

it is impossible to explain it thus:

For

does

a sacrifice of an individual

repel Shabbat and ritual impurity?! And the beraita states: There is a stringency in a sacrifice, that it repels Shabbat and ritual impurity.

Yet the beraita states: “The offering has a stringency in that it overrides Shabbat and ritual impurity.”

Rather, come and explain: the beraita is speaking of a sacrifice

interpret it as referring to an offering

of the community; but this too is impossible:

—but this too is impossible:

For

does

a sacrifice

of the community

effect a substitution?! And the beraita states: And it effects a substitution.

Yet the beraita states: “And it effects a substitution.”

Rather, is it not

that is, is it not compelled to explain that the beraita is speaking of a sacrifice

of the bull of Yom Kippur, since everything stated in the beraita applies fittingly to it:

of Yom Kippur, since all that is stated in the beraita applies fully to it: “Applies to both an individual and the community,” since it is a sin-offering, and a sin-offering applies both to an individual and to the community.

“And it applies to an individual and to a community,” since it is a sin-offering, and a sin-offering applies to an individual and to a community.

“And it repels Shabbat and ritual impurity,”

since

a time is fixed for it

on Yom Kippur and it has no compensation; and every offering whose time is fixed repels Shabbat and ritual impurity, even an individual offering, as was explained on the preceding side.

And it effects a substitution

because

it

may be said that this tanna holds

it is an individual offering.

We have therefore learned: the bull of Yom Kippur effects a substitution, and Rabbi Elazar’s question has been resolved.

Rabbi Sheshet

said, rejecting this:

No,

not as you said—that this beraita is speaking of Aaron’s bull on Yom Kippur; rather,

Aaron’s ram,

on Yom Kippur, for this offering, through which only Aaron attains atonement, certainly effects a substitution.

This too is logically compelling,

as Rabbi Sheshet explained, that the beraita is speaking of Aaron’s ram—which is a burnt-offering—and not of Aaron’s bull, which is a sin-offering:

For if it enters your mind that the beraita is speaking

that the beraita is discussing

of the bull of Aaron, which is a sin-offering, how can the beraita state: There is a stringency in a sacrifice over a substitution, that the sacrifice repels Shabbat and ritual impurity, unlike substitution?!

of Aaron, which is a sin-offering, how could the beraita state: “There is an additional stringency with an offering over a substitution offering, because the offering pushes aside Shabbat and ritual impurity, unlike a substitution offering”?!—

But is it so that

the substitution of the bull,

which is a sin-offering,

does not repel Shabbat and ritual impurity, but on a weekday it may be offered?!

And

it is the substitution of a sin-offering, and the substitution of a sin-offering

indeed

goes to death

and not to offering, for it is one of the five sin-offerings that die.

And we reject the proof that compelled the Gemara to say that the beraita is not speaking of Aaron’s bull:

No,

not as you said; rather,

it is always possible

to say that it is speaking of

the bull

of Aaron, and as for what is difficult for you—how can it state: There is a stringency in a sacrifice “over a substitution,” implying that the substitution is not offered on Shabbat but is offered on a weekday—this is not difficult:

For

what

is the stringency in a sacrifice over

“substitution”

that the beraita states? It does not mean, as we understood until now, that it refers to the substitution of that sacrifice—

Rather:

the category of substitution—that is, those matters that apply to a sacrifice, namely Aaron’s bull, do not apply to something whose name is substitution; for substitution, even when it is offered—such as the substitution of a burnt-offering—does not repel Shabbat or ritual impurity.

that is, the laws that apply to an offering—in this case, Aaron’s bull—do not apply to something called a substitution offering. Even when a substitution offering is offered, such as the substitute of an elevation-offering, it does not push aside Shabbat or ritual impurity.

And we wonder: All of the Gemara’s discussion until now was based on the assumption that the beraita is speaking of one sacrifice in which all the details stated in the beraita exist, and because of this we were forced to press that the beraita is speaking of Aaron’s bull or of the ram; but according to your words, this is difficult:

If so, since “substitution” stated in the beraita does not necessarily mean a particular substitution, and one may explain it as “the category of substitution”—

then

“sacrifice” also

can be explained as not referring to a particular sacrifice, and the intention of the beraita is to say that among the matters upon which there is

“the category of sacrifice”

all the stringencies stated in the beraita exist, some in one sacrifice and some in another sacrifice; and this is what it says:

There is a stringency in a sacrifice, some of which apply both to an individual and to a community—

and there are sacrifices that repel Shabbat and ritual impurity, such as a communal offering or an individual offering whose time is fixed—

and there are sacrifices that effect a substitution—

unlike everything whose name is “substitution,” in which these matters do not apply.

And we answer: From the beraita itself it can be proved that

“the category of sacrifice”

is not what it states,

for it does not state,

but, on the contrary, the beraita is speaking of a particular sacrifice—

From where?

From the fact that it states

in the beraita:

“There is a stringency in substitution, that substitution applies to a permanent blemish and does not leave for non-sacred status to be shorn or worked,

unlike a sacrifice.”

And if it enters your mind: what is meant by “sacrifice”—“there is a sacrifice”,

then perforce the intention of the beraita is that there is no sacrifice whatsoever upon which the sanctity takes effect when it has a permanent blemish, and it does not go out to non-sacred status to be shorn and worked —