Yoma 40b (מ:) — the Talmud in English

As it is taught in a beraita:

It is stated [Leviticus 16:10]: “And the goat upon which the lot came up for Azazel ”

“shall stand alive before the Lord, to effect atonement through it.”

The verse emphasized that it “shall stand alive,” to teach that if the goat dies before it has effected atonement, another goat must be brought in its place. The tanna’im in the beraita disagreed as to what atonement is mentioned in the verse:

Until when shall

the goat sent to Azazel

be required to stand alive?

Until the time when the blood of its counterpart is applied—

until they apply the blood of the goat for the Lord in all the applications prescribed for it. This is because the atonement mentioned in the verse is the application of blood, as follows—

the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.

Rabbi Shimon says: “To effect atonement through it”—

the verse is speaking

of verbal atonement, the confession made over the goat sent to Azazel itself

.

And the Gemara explains:

With regard to what do they disagree

—upon what does their dispute depend? [How do we know what “atonement,” mentioned in the verse, refers to?]

And we explain: The basis of their dispute is

as it is taught in a beraita,

as we learned in a beraita:

The verse states: “To effect atonement”

—

the verse is speaking of atonement through blood, the applications of the blood of the goat for the Lord

.

And so

the verse

says

later in the passage [Leviticus 16:20]:

“And when he has finished

[the High Priest]

effecting atonement for the Sanctuary

and the Tent of Meeting and the altar.” The atonement of the Sanctuary is through the sprinkling of the blood mentioned in the preceding verse.

From here it follows that “atonement” is through the application of blood,

the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.

Rabbi Shimon says:

It is stated: “He shall stand alive before the Lord”

“to effect atonement through it,”

which implies that the atonement is effected “through it,” through the goat sent to Azazel itself. But according to the Sages, who interpreted it as referring to atonement through the blood of its counterpart [the goat for the Lord], the atonement is not through the goat sent to Azazel!

Rather,

the verse is speaking of verbal atonement,

the confession over the goat sent to Azazel

—

for the confession is made over the goat for Azazel itself.

The Gemara now returns to discuss the two formulations of the opinion of Rabbi Yannai and Rabbi Yoḥanan [regarding the lottery].

Ta shma,

a proof for the first formulation from a beraita:

As it is taught:

Rabbi Akiva’s disciples asked

Rabbi Akiva

Rabbi Akiva:

If it happened that

the lot came up

for the Lord

on the left,

may it be returned to the right?

Is it permitted to take the lot for the Lord that came up on the left and place it upon the goat standing on the right?

He said to them,

Rabbi Akiva:

Do not give an opening

[an opportunity]

for the Sadducees to dominate,

to rule over you [to defeat you in their arguments], so that they will say that the Pharisees alter the words of the verse.

Therefore, it is prohibited to transfer the lot that came up on the left and place it upon the goat on the right.

And the Gemara infers from the words of the beraita:

The reason,

the reason Rabbi Akiva prohibited placing the lot for the Lord [which came up on the left] on the goat on the right is only

“Do not give an opening for the Sadducees to dominate.”

And it implies:

Were it not so,

were it not for the concern about the Sadducees, indeed

we would return it to him—

we could take the lot for the Lord that came up on the left and place it upon the goat standing on the right!

But—

yet according to the second formulation above,

you said

that according to Rabbi Yannai

the lottery is indispensable

even according to Rabbi Yehuda [and all the more so according to Rabbi Neḥemya].

And

if so,

since the left has been designated,

since the lot for the Lord designated the goat on the left

how could we return it!?

How could one alter matters so that the goat on the left would be for the Lord through speech alone, without the lot coming up?

If so, Rabbi Akiva’s statement proves contrary to the second formulation above.

And we reject this:

Rava said: This is what they meant,

this is what the disciples asked Rabbi Akiva:

If the lot came up on the left—

may he

leave the lot on the goat on the left as required, and afterward

return it, together with its goat, to the right,

taking the goat on the left with the lot for the Lord upon it and transferring them to the right?

And

he said to them,

Rabbi Akiva:

Do not give an opening

[an opportunity]

for the Sadducees to dominate,

to rule over you [to defeat you in their arguments, so that they will say about the Pharisees: These people do everything according to their own wishes].

Until this point, the Gemara attempted to prove against Rabbi Yannai’s view according to the second formulation. From here onward, the Gemara brings proofs establishing the second formulation: according to Rabbi Yannai, even Rabbi Yehuda concedes that the coming up of the lot is indispensable.

Ta shma,

come and hear a proof from that which is taught:

It is stated [Leviticus 16:9]: “And Aaron shall present the goat upon which the lot came up for the Lord.”

And it was taught in a beraita:

Had it been stated

in the verse

“the goat upon which it is”

[and the word “came up” had not been stated],

I would say that he should

that he

place it upon it—

that he should place the lot for the Lord upon the goat.

The verse therefore states,

for this reason it says

“came up”—

to teach:

Once it has come up

from the lottery box,

he no longer needs

to place it upon the goat.

And we raise a difficulty concerning the beraita:

For what purpose,

with regard to what matter does the verse speak by saying “came up”? Is it referring to the mitzva ab initio, or is it referring to indispensability?

If you say,

if it is said that the verse speaks

with regard to

the matter of

the mitzva

ab initio [that one should conduct the lottery initially, but after the fact, if he did not conduct the lottery and merely designated the sacrifices verbally, they are valid].

If so,

by inference,

it is evident that the beraita excludes from the word “came up”

the placing

of the lots upon the goats—

it is not even a mitzva!

There is not even a mitzva, initially, to place the lots upon the goats!

But this cannot be, for it is explicitly stated: “And Aaron shall place lots upon the two goats”!

Rather, no,

necessarily the beraita interprets the word “came up” with regard to

indispensability.

The meaning of the beraita is that the coming up of the lot is indispensable, but placing it upon the goats is not indispensable.

And

consequently,

infer from it,

one may learn from the words of the beraita that

the lottery is indispensable,

while

the placing is not indispensable.

This is therefore a proof against the first formulation of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion, according to which even Rabbi Neḥemya concedes that the coming up of the lot is not indispensable [because the lottery is not considered a sacrificial service, as stated above, 39b].

And we reject this:

Rava said:

The beraita interpreted the verse “came up” as referring merely to the mitzva.

And this is what it says,

this is what the tanna in the beraita said:

Had it been stated

in the verse, “the goat

upon which it is”

and it had not said “came up,”

I would say that he should

that he

place it upon it—

that the lot for the Lord must remain placed upon the goat

until the time of

the

slaughter.

The verse therefore states,

the verse comes and says

“upon which it came up,”

to teach:

Once it has come up,

once the lot has already emerged from the lottery box, and it is already known which goat is for the Lord and which is for Azazel, after he places the lots upon them [to fulfill the wording of the verse, “And Aaron shall place lots upon the two goats”]—

he no longer needs

the lots to remain placed upon them until the time of slaughter, even as a mitzva ab initio.

Ta shma,

a proof for Rabbi Yannai’s opinion according to the second formulation—that even Rabbi Yehuda concedes that the coming up of the lot from the lottery box is indispensable:

It is stated [Leviticus 16:9]: “And Aaron shall present the goat upon which the lot came up for the Lord, and he shall make it a sin-offering.” And this verse is expounded in a beraita [in Sifra]:

“And he shall make it a sin-offering”—

the lot

[mentioned in the preceding verse] is what

makes it

[the goat]

a sin-offering.

And it is not

the verbal designation of

the name that makes it

[the goat]

a sin-offering.

For

I

could

say:

Is this not an a fortiori inference,

to derive the opposite by means of a kal va-chomer:

And just as in a case where the lot does not sanctify,

in the case of other sacrifices, when two sacrifices are consecrated together and it is necessary to distinguish one from the other [for example, the nests of zavim, zavot, and women after childbirth, in which two birds are consecrated, one as a sin-offering and one as a burnt-offering], if one writes “sin-offering” on one lot and “burnt-offering” on the other, we do not find that the lot designates them.

And nevertheless,

the name sanctified

them,

the designation,

for if he called one bird a sin-offering and the other a burnt-offering, his words take effect.

In a case where the lot sanctifies,

with regard to the sin-offering goat for the Lord, which the lot itself sanctifies,

is it not an inference

that it should be stated

that the designation sanctifies

it

by name,

through a kal va-chomer from other sacrifices?!

The verse therefore states,

for this reason it says

“and he shall make it a sin-offering”—

to teach us that only

the lot

[mentioned in the preceding verse]

makes

it

a sin-offering, and it is not

the verbal designation of

the name that makes

it

a sin-offering.