Yoma 40a — the Talmud in English

But according to the latter formulation,

the last one,

which says that they disagree,

that Rabbi Yannai and Rabbi Yohanan disagreed according to the method of Rabbi Yehuda [and Rabbi Yannai’s view is that the lottery is indispensable], one must raise an objection against this formulation from the beraita [which says that if he did not conduct the lottery, it is valid]:

Granted, according to the one who says

[Rabbi Yohanan] that the drawing of the lot

is not indispensable, this—

this beraita—

whose is it—

who taught it?

It is Rabbi Yehuda

[who holds that a service performed outside in white garments is not indispensable].

But—

however,

according to the one who says

[Rabbi Yannai] that the drawing of the lot

is indispensable

even according to Rabbi Yehuda, because Scripture repeated it with the intent that it be indispensable, it is difficult:

this—

this beraita, which says that if he did not conduct the lottery, it is valid after the fact—

whose is it,

who taught it?

And we answer:

Teach—

the words of the beraita should be understood as though they were written in a different formulation:

“It is a mitzva to place

the lots upon the goats, and if he did not place them, it is valid.”

And in this matter everyone agrees: Even though according to Rabbi Yannai [in the second formulation] the lottery is indispensable even according to Rabbi Yehuda, because Scripture repeated it with the intent that it be indispensable, nevertheless placing the lots upon the goats is not indispensable, because Scripture did not repeat it with the intent that it be indispensable.

[Rather, placing is stated only once: “And Aaron shall place upon the two goats lots.” Leviticus 16:8.]

Ta shma

a proof for the first formulation:

We learned in a beraita:

It is a mitzva to conduct the lottery

for the goats,

and to confess

over the goat sent to Azazel. And if

he did not conduct the lottery and did not confess,

the offering is

valid

after the fact.

And from here there is proof for the first formulation, that everyone agrees, according to Rabbi Yehuda, that the lottery is not indispensable.

And from here there is a difficulty against the second formulation, that Rabbi Yannai holds that the lottery is indispensable after the fact according to everyone [even according to Rabbi Yehuda].

And if you would say

perhaps you would wish to answer and say:

So too here,

we shall interpret the words of the beraita: “It is a mitzva

to place

[the lots] and to confess. And if he did not place them and did not confess, it is valid” [just as we explained regarding the earlier beraita].

It is impossible to answer in this way:

For

say its latter clause,

I will bring you a proof from the end of the words of the beraita:

Rabbi Shimon says:

If

he did not conduct the lottery—

it is valid,

as the first tanna said. But if he did not

confess—

it is disqualified,

unlike the words of the first tanna.

And Rabbi Shimon is referring to the words of the first tanna, and therefore one must ask:

What

is the meaning of

“he did not conduct the lottery”

which Rabbi Shimon said?

If you say,

if we interpret it as meaning that he

did not place

the lots upon the goats, as we explained according to the first tanna [that Rabbi Shimon is referring to his words].

If so, one can infer from this:

It follows that Rabbi Shimon held

that specifically placing them upon the goats is not indispensable, but the

lottery

itself

is indispensable.

And this is not possible. For one can prove from a beraita that Rabbi Shimon certainly holds that even the lottery is not indispensable!

And it was taught

in a beraita:

If one of them died

of the two goats, after the lottery, and only one goat remained [for the Lord or for Azazel], and one must bring another goat to make up what is lacking.

And it is impossible to conduct the lottery again for the two goats [after they brought another goat in place of the goat that died], since the goat remaining from the first lottery has already had the sanctity of an offering [for the Lord or for Azazel] bestowed upon it, and it is impossible to change it through a second lottery.

How, then, shall they act?

He brings

the

other one,

the missing goat,

without conducting a lottery for it.

For example, if the goat designated “for the Name” died, he brings another goat and consecrates it for “Azazel” without a lottery,

the words of Rabbi Shimon.

And it is proven that Rabbi Shimon holds that the lottery is not indispensable. And necessarily this is what the beraita above said: “Rabbi Shimon says: If he did not conduct the lottery, it is valid [as the first tanna said]. But if he did not confess, it is disqualified [unlike the words of the first tanna].”

And since Rabbi Shimon is referring to the words of the first tanna, necessarily the first tanna himself, who said “if he did not conduct the lottery,” intended to say that he did not draw a lot from the lottery box [and he did not intend to say that he did not place the lots upon the goats]!

And now the difficulty that we raised from the words of the first tanna against the second formulation returns [which holds that according to Rabbi Yannai, if he did not draw the lots from the lottery box, it is disqualified according to everyone]. For the first tanna in the beraita said that if he did not draw the lots, it is valid! And who taught the words of the first tanna in the beraita?

And we answer: One may indeed say as we answered above, that the first tanna spoke about placing the lots upon the goats, and not about the drawing of the lot from the lottery box.

And what we proved from the words of Rabbi Shimon, who spoke about the drawing of the lot from the lottery box—that the first tanna also spoke about this—can be rejected:

Rabbi Shimon

was uncertain regarding the words of the Sages, and

did not know what the Sages were saying in “It is a mitzva to conduct the lottery and to confess; if he did not conduct the lottery and did not confess, it is valid”—whether they were speaking about the drawing of the lot from the lottery box or about placing the lot upon the goats.

in the phrase, “It is a mitzva to conduct the lottery and to confess; if he did not conduct the lottery and did not confess, the offering is valid”—whether they were speaking about drawing the lot from the receptacle or about placing the lot on the goats.

And

therefore Rabbi Shimon

said this to them:

If,

if, when you said

“lottery”

[which is not indispensable after the fact],

lottery

from the lottery box

is exactly what you meant—

I disagree with you in one matter.

Then I disagree with you in only one matter [regarding confession]. And this is what Rabbi Shimon said in the beraita: If he did not conduct the lottery, it is valid [after the fact, according to the opinion of the Sages]. But if he did not confess, it is disqualified [unlike their opinion].

But,

if the “lottery” of which you speak is,

your intention is

placing

alone, and only regarding placing did you say that if he did not place them, it is valid, but regarding the lottery you [the Sages] hold that if he did not conduct the lottery, it is disqualified—then

I disagree with you in two matters.

I disagree with you in two matters:

a. Regarding the drawing of the lot from the lottery box, which you disqualify after the fact—I deem it valid.

b. Regarding confession, which you hold is valid after the fact if he did not confess—I disqualify it.

Ta shma

a proof from a beraita, from which one can prove against the second formulation:

The beraita before us discusses the High Priest who changes the order of the services of the bull and the goat performed inside.

And in order to understand the words of the beraita, we shall first state that the services of the bull were not performed one after another. Rather, the High Priest began with the services of the bull, and before he completed the services of the bull, he proceeded to the services of the goat [and additional services], as follows.

We learned in a beraita:

The bull makes the goat indispensable!

The service of the bull has the power to make the service of the goat indispensable [to disqualify it].

For if he performed the later service of the goat before the earlier service of the bull, the service of the goat is disqualified, and he must perform it again after he performs the service of the bull.

And

if

the goat does not make the bull indispensable!

The service of the goat does not have the power to make the service of the bull indispensable [to disqualify it].

For if he performed a later service of the bull before performing the service of the goat that precedes it, the service of the bull is not disqualified [and below we shall explain the matter].

And this law applies

to the applications

of the blood

that are inside,

in the Holy of Holies [as will be explained below]. [This is the end of the words of the beraita.]

[And from the words of the Gemara [below] it is explained that there is no fundamental difference between the services of the bull and the services of the goat. Rather, the beraita holds that the rule is: Regarding services performed in the Holy of Holies, “a statute” was stated, and therefore their order is indispensable. But regarding services performed outside the Holy of Holies, “a statute” was not stated concerning them, and their order is not indispensable, [in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda above, 39b].]

And now the Gemara begins to explain the difference between the services of the bull and the goat in light of this rule:

And we deliberate about it:

Granted,

what the beraita said in its first clause:

“The bull makes the goat indispensable”

is understandable, as it is speaking of the applications that are inside [as mentioned at the end of the beraita].

And the intention of the beraita is to say:

For if he advanced the

application of the blood of the

goat before the bull,

if he advanced the application of the blood of the goat in the Holy of Holies before the application of the blood of the bull, —

he did nothing

he did not perform

anything at all,

since regarding services performed inside, “a statute” was stated, and their order is indispensable.

But,

what the beraita said in its latter clause,

“The goat does not make the bull indispensable

[does not disqualify]

the bull”—

what is it?

What are the services of the bull that are not disqualified by changing the order [in the applications that are inside]?

If you say,

if this is the intention of the beraita:

For if he advanced,

if he advanced to give the

applications of the bull in the Sanctuary

opposite the curtain

before

he gave the

applications of the

blood of the

goat inside

in the Holy of Holies [and thereby changed the proper order, for he should first have sprinkled the blood of the goat in the Holy of Holies, and only afterward sprinkled the blood of the bull in the Sanctuary]. It is impossible to say this. For why would the goat not make the bull indispensable? After all,

“a statute” is written concerning them,

regarding the applications of the goat inside, just as regarding the applications of the blood of the bull inside!

And since he delayed and performed the applications of the goat inside only after giving the applications of the blood of the bull in the Sanctuary, they disqualify the applications of the bull that preceded them, since the applications of the bull caused the order of the services in the Holy of Holies to be changed.

Rather, is it not

necessarily the intention of the beraita:

that he advanced

[that he advanced]

the applications of the bull inside

in the Holy of Holies, and performed them

before

[before] the

lottery

for the two goats, which is performed outside.

And the beraita teaches that in this case the applications of the bull are not disqualified, even though they are performed inside [and concerning services performed inside, “a statute” was stated].

And now the Gemara proves:

And since the order does not make it indispensable,

since we learned in the beraita that one who changes the order of the lottery does not thereby make the applications of the blood indispensable [disqualify them], it follows that

the lottery itself likewise does not make it indispensable,

the lottery itself also is not indispensable. For if he refrained from conducting the lottery and consecrated the goats verbally, they are valid.

[And since the lottery itself is not indispensable for this reason, the beraita said that if he advanced and performed the applications of the bull inside before the lottery, it does not make it indispensable, because this is not considered changing the order of the service. According to Tosafot Yeshanim.] And we learned from the words of the beraita that the lottery itself is not indispensable. And from here there is a proof against the second formulation, which holds that according to Rabbi Yannai the lottery is indispensable according to everyone, even according to Rabbi Yehuda!

And we reject this:

No!

The beraita is not speaking of advancing the applications of the bull inside before the lottery. Rather, the lottery itself is always indispensable, and therefore its order is also indispensable.

And what does the beraita speak of?

It speaks of a situation

in which he advanced the applications of the bull at the altar

the inner one, and performed them

before

before

the applications of the goat in the Sanctuary,

as both of these are services outside.

And

the beraita is according to the method of

Rabbi Yehuda.

For he says: Services performed in white garments outside

outside the Holy of Holies,

are not indispensable

their order is not indispensable [because “a statute” was not stated concerning them].

But immediately the Gemara asks:

But it teaches, “regarding the applications that are inside”—

after all, the beraita explains that it is speaking of the applications that are inside! If so, how can the beraita be interpreted as referring to applications that are outside!?

And by virtue of this objection, the Gemara retracts its position and concludes that it is necessary to establish the words of the baraita as referring to placing the bull’s applications inside before the drawing of the lots, as we explained above [in the Gemara’s objection].

And if so, the objection against Rabbi Yannai according to the second wording returns, for according to his view even Rabbi Yehuda concedes that the drawing of the lots is indispensable. And if so, even when he changes the order, it should be indispensable!

And concerning this we answer:

Rather, whose opinion is this—

who taught this baraita?

It is Rabbi Shimon, who says

above in the baraita:

The drawing of the lots is not indispensable.

And if you wish, say

another answer:

Actually, it is Rabbi Yehuda,

and not Rabbi Shimon.

But we objected above to the second wording, according to Rabbi Yannai’s opinion, that according to him even Rabbi Yehuda concedes that the drawing of the lots is indispensable, and if so, it is appropriate that the order, too, should be indispensable, whereas in the baraita we learned that the order of the drawing of the lots is not indispensable!

Concerning this we answer:

And although the order is not indispensable,

indeed, in the baraita we learned that the order of the drawing of the lots is not indispensable [and if he performed the bull’s applications inside before it, it did not invalidate], it is nevertheless possible to say that

the drawing of the lots itself is indispensable—

for the drawing of the lots itself is indispensable, because Scripture repeated the phrase twice: “which came up,” “which came up”; from here it follows that the lot’s coming up is indispensable, as above].

And now the Gemara retracts what we stated above, that if the drawing of the lots is indispensable, necessarily its order should also be indispensable. Rather, these matters cannot be made dependent upon one another. Actually, the drawing of the lots is indispensable, and nevertheless its order is not indispensable. .

We learned in the baraita above: “It is a mitzva to draw the lots and to confess. If he did not draw the lots and did not confess, it is valid. Rabbi Shimon says: If he did not draw the lots, it is valid; but if he did not confess, it is invalid.”

And now the Gemara explains the dispute between the Sages and Rabbi Shimon concerning the confession:

And they follow their own positions—

the Sages and Rabbi Shimon in the baraita above follow their own positions, as will be learned in the following baraita: