Yoma 36b — the Talmud in English

And we explain:

Rabbi Yirmeya said: ![](pamud.bmp "

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They disagree with regard to the prohibition of an animal carcass.

That is, everyone agrees that the prohibitions stated with regard to leket, shikheḥa, and pe'a, which Rabbi Yosei HaGelili mentioned, are not in the category of a prohibition whose remedy is a positive mitzva. Although it is stated with regard to them: “You shall not finish off the corner of your field when harvesting, and you shall not gather the fallen produce of your harvest” [Leviticus 19:9], which is a prohibition, and afterward it is stated: “You shall leave them for the poor and the stranger” [ibid., 10], which is a positive mitzva, nevertheless, the positive mitzva does not come to rectify the prohibition, since this positive mitzva applies to a person even if he has not violated the prohibition.

Rather, leket, shikheḥa, and pe'a are mitzvot resembling the case of an animal carcass, with regard to which it is stated: “You shall not eat any animal carcass” [Deuteronomy 14:21]—this is a prohibition—“you shall give it to the stranger [who resides among you] who is within your gates”—this is a positive mitzva. And this positive mitzva certainly does not come to rectify the prohibition, since if he has already eaten the carcass, he can no longer give it to the resident stranger.

And it is with regard to this that Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yosei HaGelili disagree:

Rabbi Akiva holds:

Since the positive mitzva does not come to rectify the prohibition, it follows that it is

a bona fide prohibition—

a complete prohibition—

.

One who eats an animal carcass, or one who gathers leket, shikheḥa, and pe'a for himself, is flogged. And the ola offering does not come to atone for them.

But

if

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds:

Although the positive mitzva stated with regard to an animal carcass was stated only before one violated the prohibition, nevertheless, since a positive mitzva is also stated with regard to an animal carcass, it follows that the prohibition stated with regard to it

“is not a bona fide prohibition”,

and is not a complete prohibition, and one is not flogged for violating it. [The same applies to leket, shikheḥa, and pe'a.]

And since one is not flogged for violating them, the ola offering atones for them. [The reasoning of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili and Rabbi Akiva is explained in the note .]

[Рассуждения рабби Йоси hа-Глили и рабби Акивы объяснены в примечании] .

Abaye said

another explanation of the dispute between Rabbi Yosei HaGelili and Rabbi Akiva:

Everyone—

everyone agrees that

the prohibition of an animal carcass is not a bona fide prohibition—

a complete prohibition—

,

since the positive mitzva stated with regard to an animal carcass does not come to rectify the prohibition, and therefore one is flogged for violating it.

But here,

in the beraita, the issue is the positive mitzva stated with regard to leket, shikheḥa, and pe'a: “You shall

leave

them for the poor and the stranger” [Leviticus 19:10].

They disagree

with regard to this:

Rabbi Akiva holds:

Although this positive mitzva was stated after the prohibition, nevertheless,

“you shall leave”—

from the outset

it

indicates.

That is, before one violated the prohibition and took the gifts of the poor for himself, Scripture said to him: “You shall not gather the fallen produce of your harvest”; rather, “You shall leave them for the poor and the stranger” [and you shall not gather them].

It follows that leket, shikheḥa, and pe'a resemble the prohibition stated with regard to an animal carcass, and one is flogged for violating them.

But

if

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds:

«

now

now

indicates,

that is, after he gathered them in violation of the prohibition, Scripture commanded him to leave them and render them ownerless. These prohibitions are therefore remedied by a positive mitzva, and one is not flogged for violating them; rather, they are atoned for by an ola offering.

We learned in the Mishna that the High Priest confessed and said: “I have committed iniquity, transgressed, and sinned before You—I and my household.” The tannaim disagree about this in a beraita [Tosefta 2:1]:

The Sages taught:

How does the

High Priest

confess

over his bull?

“I have sinned, committed iniquity, and transgressed.”

And likewise with regard to the scapegoat

for Azazel

it

[Scripture]

says

[Leviticus 16:21]:

“And he shall confess over it all the iniquities of the Children of Israel, and all their transgressions with regard to all their sins.”

The verse lists the iniquities first, then the transgressions, and then the sins.

And likewise in

the Thirteen Attributes of Mercy that

Moses said, he says

[Exodus 34:7]:

“Forgiving iniquity and transgression and sin.”

These are

the words of Rabbi Meir.

And the Sages say:

There is proof that the order of the confession was not as Rabbi Meir stated.

For

“iniquities”—

these are willful sins,

[one who commits sins deliberately].

And so it

[Scripture]

says

[Numbers 15:31]:

“That soul shall be utterly cut off; his iniquity is upon him.”

And the punishment of karet applies only to one who acts deliberately.

“Transgressions”—

these are rebellious sins,

[one who commits a sin as an act of rebellion, to provoke God].

And so it

[Scripture]

says

[II Kings 3:7]:

“The king of Moab has rebelled against me,”

that is, he rebelled against me.

And

Scripture also

says

[ibid., 8:22]:

“Then Livna rebelled at that time,”

that is, at that time Livna rebelled against the king of Judah. From here it follows that pesha means rebellion.

“With regard to all their sins”—

these are unwitting sins,

[one who commits sins inadvertently].

And so it

[Scripture]

says

[Leviticus 4:2]: “If a person sins unwittingly.”

This is proof against Rabbi Meir’s statement [that the order of the confession is: “I have sinned, committed iniquity, and transgressed”]. For according to Rabbi Meir, there is a difficulty:

And since

he has already

confessed for

the sins that are

willful sins, and for

the transgressions that are

rebellious sins,

which are severe offenses,

does he return and confess for unwitting sins,

which are minor offenses? If the severe offenses have been forgiven, there is no need to request forgiveness for the minor ones!

Rather, this is how he confessed: “I have sinned

[unwittingly]

and committed iniquity

[willfully]

and transgressed

[to provoke You]

before You—I and my household, and so on.”

And likewise in

the confession that

David said, he

[Scripture]

says

[Psalms 106:6]:

“We have sinned with our fathers, we have committed iniquity, we have acted wickedly.”

Thus, he mentioned sins before iniquities.

And likewise in

the confession mentioned in the prayer of

Solomon, he

[Scripture]

says

[I Kings 8:47]:

“We have sinned and committed iniquity; we have acted wickedly.”

And likewise in

the confession that

Daniel said, he

[Scripture]

says

[Daniel 9:5]:

“We have sinned and committed iniquity, acted wickedly and rebelled.”

But

[this is] difficult:

What is the meaning of Moses’ statement, “Forgiving iniquity and transgression and sin,”

in which he mentioned sins last?

Thus

Moses said before the Holy One, blessed be He: “Sovereign of the Universe, when Israel sins before You and repents, make their willful sins like unwitting sins.”

The meaning of the verse is: “Forgiving iniquity and transgression” as though they were “sin”—an unwitting sin.

Rabba bar Shmuel said that Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the statement of the Sages,

who mention the sins first [and not in accordance with Rabbi Meir].

And we raise a difficulty:

Is it obvious!

Why was it necessary to teach us this? We have a general principle:

When an individual and the majority

disagree,

the halakha follows the majority!

And we answer:

Lest you say

perhaps you would say:

Rabbi Meir’s reasoning appears sound, for Scripture supports him,

since the wording of the verse discussing the Yom Kippur confession itself, concerning the scapegoat—“And he shall confess over it all the iniquities of the Children of Israel, and all their transgressions with regard to all their sins”—supports him, we might rule in accordance with him.

Therefore,

it teaches us

that Rav teaches us that the halakha follows the Sages.

There was an incident involving

a certain

prayer leader who

went down,

who descended before the ark,

before Rabba,

before Rabba.

And

when he arranged in his prayer the order of the High Priest’s service,

he performed

[did]

in accordance with Rabbi Meir,

who said the High Priest’s confession in the wording: “I have committed iniquity, transgressed, and sinned.”

Rabba said to him: “You have abandoned the Sages”,

you have abandoned the position of the Sages,

and acted

and performed

in accordance with Rabbi Meir!

[And it is not proper to do so!]

He said to him,

the prayer leader said to him:

“I hold in accordance with Rabbi Meir”

[this is my opinion],

as it is written

[as it is written]

in the Book of the Torah of Moses

in the order of the Yom Kippur service, that sins are mentioned last [based on the Ritba].

And now the Gemara cites a beraita discussing the source from which the Sages learned that one confesses over the bull mentioned in our Mishna.

The Sages taught:

It is stated [Leviticus 16:6] with regard to the High Priest’s sin-offering bull:

“And he shall atone

for himself and for his household.” What is this “atonement”?

It is speaking of atonement through words,

atonement that comes through speech [that is, confession],

the verse is speaking.

And the beraita asks:

You say

that the verse is speaking

of atonement through words,

but from where do you know this?

Or

perhaps

it is not

speaking

rather of

а

atonement through blood,

atonement through placing the blood on the corners of the altar?

The beraita answers:

I derive

a gzera shava:

It is stated here,

with regard to the High Priest’s bull, the expression

“atonement”

“And he shall atone for himself,”

and it is stated there,

[Leviticus 16], with regard to the scapegoat, the expression

“atonement”

“It shall remain alive before the Lord, to make atonement through it.”

What

is the

atonement stated with regard to the scapegoat?

Confession

through words!

[For the scapegoat is not slaughtered in the Temple courtyard, and its blood is not placed on the altar.] From here we learn that

the atonement stated with regard to the bull as well

refers to confession

through words.

And the beraita adds:

And if

still

your mind

[your desire]

is to say

that the atonement stated with regard to the bull is atonement through blood, I will bring you another proof from the verse itself, contrary to your position, for

behold,

so

does

the verse

say

[there, verse 11]:

“And Aaron shall bring the sin-offering bull that is his, and he shall atone for himself and for his household.” And

necessarily,

the bull has not yet been slaughtered,

since only afterward does the verse state: “And he shall slaughter the sin-offering bull that is his.”

And we inquire:

What

is the meaning of the beraita’s statement—

and if

still

your mind

[your desire]

is to say

that the atonement stated with regard to the bull is atonement through blood? We already learned at the beginning of the beraita, through a gzera shava from the scapegoat, that the atonement stated with regard to it is atonement through words!

And we answer: This is the meaning of the beraita:

And if you would say,

if you would say that also with regard to the inner sin-offering goat the expression “atonement” is stated [“And he shall atone for the Sanctuary from the impurities of the Children of Israel” (Leviticus 16:16)], and therefore

let us learn

let us derive it

from the goat

the sin-offering

performed inside, whose atonement is through blood,

and not through confession, since the verse states: “And he shall sprinkle it upon the cover and before the cover, and he shall atone for the Sanctuary.” This indicates that the sprinkling itself is the atonement.