Yoma 23a — the Talmud in English

And Rabbi Yohanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak: Any Torah scholar ![](pamud.bmp "

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who does not take revenge

for what was done to him,

and does not harbor

enmity in his heart

like a snake —

is not a Torah scholar.

And we raise a difficulty:

But is it not written: “You shall not take revenge or bear a grudge”?

And we answer:

That verse was stated with regard to money.

When someone wronged him financially. But if someone wronged him physically, for example, by striking or insulting him, he is permitted to take revenge and bear a grudge.

As it was taught in a baraita: What is taking revenge, and what is bearing a grudge?

Taking revenge—

if one said to another: “Lend me your sickle,” and he said

“No.”

“I will not

lend it to you.”

The next day, the owner of the sickle said to him

—

“Lend me your ax.” He said to him: “I will not lend it to you, just as you did not lend yours to me!”

This is taking revenge.

And what is bearing a grudge?

If one said to another: “Lend me your ax.” He said to him: “No.”

The next day he said to him: “Lend me your garment.” He said to him: “Here, I am lending it to you. I am not like you, who did not lend yours to me!”

This is bearing a grudge,

because the matter remains stored in his heart and he has not dismissed it from his mind. [Rashi]

And we raise a difficulty:

B

ut regarding

physical pain, is it not prohibited?

Is it not prohibited to take revenge and bear a grudge over pain or over anything other than money?

But it was taught: Those who suffer insult but do not insult others in return, who hear themselves reviled but do not respond, who perform

mitzvot

out of love and rejoice in their suffering—

the verse says about them: “Those who love Him are like the sun emerging in its might”!

And we answer:

Actually, he may hold it in his heart.

A Torah scholar himself may not take revenge against one who wronged him, but he is permitted to retain the matter in his heart. If another person comes to take revenge on his behalf, he should remain silent and not prevent him.

And we raise another difficulty:

But Rava said: Anyone who overlooks what was done to him is forgiven for all his sins

—which indicates that he must completely remove the matter from his heart?

And we answer: Rava’s statement applies

when the offender appeases him,

when those who wronged him ask him for forgiveness,

and he is appeased.

He then overlooks the offense and forgives. But when they do not ask him for forgiveness, he should take revenge and bear a grudge like a snake.

We learned in the Mishna:

“And how many fingers do they extend—one or two?”

The Gemara considers this:

Now, if they extend two

fingers

without concern

for cheating,

is it necessary to say that one

may be extended, since there is certainly no concern that they will cheat?

And we answer:

Rabbi Hisda said: This is not difficult: Here it is referring to a healthy person,

and a healthy koen may extend only one finger.

Here it is referring to a sick person,

a sick koen whose fingers are not fully under his control, so that when he extends one, the other extends with it as well; he is permitted to extend two.

But was it not taught:

[as an uncontested statement]:

They extend one.

They may not extend two. When does this apply

—that they may not extend two—

to a healthy person.

But a sick person may extend even two.

And those in isolation

[a designation for sick people, because they lie separately from the others]

extend two.

But they count them as only one

—the two fingers are counted as one only.

And we raise a difficulty:

B

ut

do they count him as only one

at all?

But it was taught: They may not extend:

the third finger

—the third, middle finger, so that he will not add it in addition to the other finger, as explained below.

or the thumb,

even by itself. [Rashash]

Because of the cheaters,

who might extend an additional finger beside the thumb in order to be counted as two.

But if he extended the third finger

in addition to the other finger,

they count him.

But if he extended

the thumb, they do not count him.

Moreover, he is flogged

for this

by the official with a whip,

by the official who administers lashes with straps.

It might have entered our minds that when he extended the third finger, they counted him as two, creating a difficulty against the earlier baraita, which states that they count him as only one.

And we answer:

What does “they count him”

mean, as stated with regard to one who extended the third finger?

Also, one,

only one.

Although he acted improperly, nevertheless they do not remove him from the count, because he is not a cheater: he cannot spread his fingers apart enough for them to appear as two people. But when he extends the thumb, they do not count him at all; rather, they remove him from the count.

And we explain:

What is the meaning of “whip”?

Rav said: A whip.

What is the meaning of “a whip”?

Rav Pappa said: The whip of the Arabs,

a strap that the Ishmaelites use as a whip for horses,

whose head is split,

so that it divides at its end into thin straps, causing the horse to feel it more. [The word for “whip” is related to splitting and cracking, as below: “From the worn-out trousers of the koanim they split,” meaning that they tear them.]

Abaye said: At first,

in the beginning,

I thought that what we learned

in tractate Shekalim:

Ben Bivai,

the name of a man, was

appointed

in the Temple

over the whips—

I thought

I understood that this meant

wicks, as we learned: “From the worn-out trousers of the koanim

—from their worn-out trousers—

and from their worn-out belts,

they would split

some of them,

making wicks.

And with them they would kindle

the lamps during the Celebration of the Place of the Drawing of Water in the Temple.

But

once I heard what was taught: “Moreover, he is flogged by the official with a whip,”

I said: “What is a whip?”

It is a strap,

a strap used for lashes.

We learned in the Mishna:

“An incident occurred in which the two were equal, and they ran and ascended the ramp.”

The Sages taught: There was an incident involving two koanim who were equal, and they ran and ascended the ramp. One of them reached the area within four cubits of the other,

arriving first within the four cubits adjacent to the altar, and thereby meriting the removal of the ashes.

The second took

the

knife and thrust it into his heart

of the first.

Rabbi Tzadok stood on the steps of the colonnade

and said: “Our brothers, the house of Israel, listen!”

“It is stated

in the passage concerning the calf whose neck is broken:

‘If someone slain is found on the ground, and your elders and judges shall go out’”

to measure which city is nearest to the slain person, and that city must bring a calf whose neck is broken.

“For whom must we bring a calf whose neck is broken

—who is obligated to bring it?—

for the city,

meaning the residents of the city,

or for the Temple courtyards?”

Or perhaps the koanim who guard the courtyard?

All the people cried out,

they shouted,

in weeping.

The father of the young koen came,

the koen who had been killed,

and found him

still

trembling in his final moments.

He said

to them:

“Here he is your atonement!”

His death will atone for you, but

“my son is still trembling, and the knife has not become impure!”

Hurry and remove the knife from his heart before he dies, so that the knife will not contract the ritual impurity of a corpse. [Ritva]

This teaches you that, in their eyes, the purification of vessels was more difficult than bloodshed!

And similarly it says: “And Manasseh also shed much innocent blood, until he filled Jerusalem from one end to the other”

[from gate to gate].

Thus, bloodshed was considered insignificant in their eyes.

The Gemara considers this:

Which incident came first—

which incident occurred earlier: the incident in the Mishna, in which the koen’s leg was broken, or the incident in the baraita, in which the koen was killed?

If you say

that the incident

involving bloodshed

came first, this is difficult:

Now, if they did not institute a lottery because of bloodshed,

since even after this incident they continued running toward the altar until the koen’s leg was broken—

because his leg was broken

alone,

did they institute

a lottery?

Rather,

perhaps you should say that the incident

in which his leg was broken came first.

If so, this is difficult:

And once they had

already

instituted a lottery

because his leg had been broken, what was the significance of

the four cubits

and the incident in which one person reached within four cubits, followed by bloodshed—

what role did they have?

How could this have happened, since there was already a lottery?

And we answer:

Rather, in fact, the incident

of

bloodshed came first.

Initially, they thought it was merely an isolated accident,

and there was no concern that it would happen again.

Once they saw

that

even on its own,

even without such an isolated incident, they

could come into danger

in the incident involving the breaking of the leg,

the Sages instituted

then

a lottery.

We learned in the baraita:

“Rabbi Tzadok stood on the steps of the colonnade and said: ‘Our brothers, the house of Israel, listen.

It is stated: ‘If someone slain is found on the ground.’

For whom must we bring it—for the city or for the Temple courtyards?’”

The Gemara considers this:

B

ut

is Jerusalem subject to bringing a calf whose neck is broken?

Jerusalem does not bring a calf whose neck is broken at all for a slain person found in the area surrounding the city. For:

A baraita was taught: Ten matters were stated concerning Jerusalem.

And this is one of them: