Yoma 11b (יא:) — the Talmud in English

I might have thought that I should include as liable for a mezuzah

the

also

gatehouse,

which is a small structure before the courtyard gate, through which one enters the courtyard, and likewise

a portico,

which is a passageway before the house,

and

likewise

a balcony,

which is constructed as a passageway before the entrances to the apartments on the upper floors?

The verse states: “Upon the doorposts of your house.”

This teaches us that the obligation of mezuzah applies only to a

“house”:

Just as a house

is

designated for dwelling,

and this is what renders it liable for a mezuzah,

so these

all

are excluded, as they are not

themselves

designated for

the use of

dwelling,

but are merely an entrance and passageway to the house; therefore, they are exempt from mezuzah.

I might have thought that I should include

as liable

even a lavatory, a tannery, a bathhouse, and a ritual bathhouse?

The verse states: “House.”

And these too are not like a house. For

just as a house intended for

the performance of uses of

honor,

so too every

house intended for honorable use

is liable for a mezuzah.

These are excluded, as they are not intended for

uses of

honor.

The use of a lavatory and a bathhouse is degrading because of their filth; a tannery is excluded because its smell is bad; and a ritual bathhouse is excluded because people immerse there unclothed. Therefore, there is no obligation of mezuzah in them.

I might have thought that I should include

as liable

even

the

Temple Mount, the chambers, and the courtyards,

for mezuzah?

The verse states: “House.”

And we derive:

Just as an ordinary house

is

secular, so every

house is liable only when

it

is

secular.

These are excluded, as they are sacred,

and they are not considered a house so as to be liable for a mezuzah.

And here we have a tanna who holds that ordinary storehouses and cattle sheds are liable for mezuzah.

This is difficult in light of what was said above according to Rav Yehuda: that when their use is unspecified, everyone agrees that they are exempt.

And we conclude: Indeed,

this is a tీయuvta

against him!

Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda taught before Rava: There are six gates

that

are exempt from mezuzah.

And these are they:

The four gates of

a hay storehouse, a cattle shed, a woodshed, and a storehouse.

And the Median gate,

whose lintel was made round like an arch. Consequently, at the height of the entrance—where the opening of the entrance becomes rounded by the lintel—the width of the opening is reduced, becoming less than four handbreadths, which is the required width of an entrance liable for mezuzah.

And a gate that

is open at the top and

is not roofed

by a lintel.

And

likewise

a gate that is not ten

handbreadths high.

Rava said to him,

to Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda:

You began

your statement

with six

gates

and concluded

your statement with seven exempt gates.

He said to him: Not all the gates listed in the beraita are exempt according to everyone. Rather,

the Median gate is

a dispute among

the tannaim.

As it was taught:

A gate whose lintel is made in a rounded shape, like

an arch:

Rabbi Meir holds it liable

for mezuzah.

And the Sages exempt it.

And Rabbi Meir and the Sages agree

that

if at its base—

in the doorway of the arched gate—there is a height of

ten

handbreadths before the curve begins to reduce the width of the opening to less than four handbreadths,

this arch is liable

for a mezuzah

for mezuzah,

since this entrance has an opening ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide, which is the required measure of an entrance liable for mezuzah.

Thus, Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagree concerning the Median gate. Therefore, Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda began his statement with the number of gates that are exempt according to everyone, which are only six, and then continued by saying that there is also a seventh gate, concerning which there is a dispute.

And

Abaye said

in explanation of the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Sages: Rabbi Meir’s statement, that he holds an entrance liable even when the width of its opening has been reduced by the curve of the lintel, does not apply in every case.

For, as will be explained below, Rabbi Meir’s reasoning is not that he disputes the requirement that an entrance liable for mezuzah must be four handbreadths wide and ten handbreadths high.

Rather, he holds that at times the reduction in the opening caused by the curve at the top of the entrance is not considered a reduction; instead, we regard it as though the wall had been hollowed out and the opening extended.

This principle applies only when the lower part of the entrance is open to a width of four handbreadths.

Therefore,

everyone agrees

that where the arch is indeed

ten handbreadths high,

but the curve of the lintel begins immediately from the bottom of the entrance,

and at its base there is not

in the doorway of the arch even a height of

three

handbreadths that is open to a width of four handbreadths,

since there is no beginning of an entrance here at the bottom—for an area less than three handbreadths high above the ground is considered part of the ground itself—

and

it follows that there is no entrance here at all that is four handbreadths wide, therefore

it is of no consequence

so as to be liable for mezuzah.

Alternatively, even if

there is in

the length of

its base

of the arch a height of

three

handbreadths open to a width of four handbreadths—so that the width of the entrance has not been reduced by the curve at that height of three handbreadths—but the entire opening is low,

and

because it

is not ten handbreadths high,

it is not considered an arch having an entrance,

and it is of no consequence

so as to be liable for mezuzah.

Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagree

only concerning

an

arch that is

ten handbreadths high,

handbreadths high,

and there is in

the length of

its base

a height of

three

handbreadths before the curve begins to reduce the width of the opening to less than four handbreadths.

And

above this height, the opening begins to narrow in width, until

its width is not four

handbreadths throughout the upper seven handbreadths of the entrance,

and

there

is

in this arch a wall on the sides of the entrance containing sufficient space

to hollow out

it,

and

by hollowing it out

to complete it to

a width of

four

handbreadths.

For

Rabbi Meir holds:

Since at its bottom it has an entrance four handbreadths wide and three handbreadths high, we regard the entrance as though they were

hollowing it out

in the wall on both sides, making its entire height appear to be four handbreadths wide, like its bottom, and this will serve

to complete

the required measure so as to render it liable for mezuzah.

“They hollow it out” [

we regard the wall as though it had been hollowed out on both sides, making its entire height four handbreadths wide, like its bottom, in order

to complete

the measure of an entrance; therefore, it is liable for mezuzah].

And the Rabbis hold: They do not hollow it out to complete

the measure of the entrance; therefore, it is exempt from mezuzah.

The Sages taught: A synagogue, a woman’s house, and a house belonging to partners—

are liable for mezuzah.

And we raise an objection:

Is this obvious?

They are certainly liable, for why should we exempt them?

And we answer:

Lest you say,

perhaps the house of a woman is excluded because it is written

“your house”

in the masculine form, and the verse comes to exclude

“and not her house”

of a woman.

Likewise, there would be reason to exclude a synagogue because it belongs to the public, and a house belonging to partners, since it is written

“your house”

in the singular, and the verse comes to exclude

“and not your house”

belonging to the public.

Therefore,

it teaches us

the tanna in the beraita that these too are liable.

And we object:

But say the same here—

that they were excluded by this verse and are indeed exempt; from where does the tanna derive that they are liable?

And we answer:

The verse states: “And you shall write them upon the doorposts of your house and upon your gates—

in order that your days and the days of your children may be lengthened.”

“In order that your days and the days of your children may be lengthened.”

And we derive from the juxtaposition of the verses that the obligation of mezuzah applies to everyone who desires life.

From this point it is obvious that even a woman’s house and a house belonging to partners are liable for mezuzah.

For we can say: Is it only

these [

the men and individuals]

who desire life, while these [

the women and partners]

do not desire life!?

Surely everyone desires life.

And we object:

But

if so, the exclusion derived from

“your house”—

why do I need it?

And we answer: There is no exclusion here; rather, this verse is expounded

in accordance with Rava’s teaching.

For Rava said:

From where is it derived that the mezuzah must be affixed on the right side of the entrance? As it is stated: “Your house.” And we derive:

the way of your entering.

And when a person lifts his foot [

when a person lifts his foot and begins to walk],

he lifts his right foot first.

Another beraita was taught

concerning the ritual impurity of lesions afflicting houses:

A synagogue, a house belonging to partners, and a woman’s house—

become impure through lesions.

And we raise an objection:

Is this obvious?

These houses too become impure through lesions like other houses; why did the tanna need to teach this?

And we answer:

Lest you say,

perhaps, since it is stated in the passage concerning lesions afflicting houses,

“And he whose house it is shall come,”

the house of a woman is excluded by the word “his,” which is masculine, teaching us:

and not “the house

that

belongs to her

house.”

Likewise, one might expound “his” and not “theirs,” to exclude a house belonging to the public.

It teaches us

that these houses too become impure through lesions.

And we object:

But say the same here,

that they do not become impure, on the basis of the exclusion from the verse.

And we answer:

The verse states: “And I shall place the affliction of leprosy

in the

house of the land of your possession.”

This implies the inclusion of every house, including one belonging to partners and one belonging to women.

And we object:

But

if so,

“his”—

why do I need it!?

And we answer: This verse teaches us that lesions come as punishment for stinginess. For anyone who

designates his house

as “his,” refusing to lend his utensils

to others,

and says

to someone who comes to ask him to lend him a utensil

that he does not have

that utensil, is punished:

The Holy One, blessed be He, publicizes him,

by sending a lesion upon his house, and thereby publicizing that he does possess the utensils,

when he empties his house

so that his utensils will not become impure.

And the verse’s use of “his” teaches us:

excluding

one who

lends his utensils to others,

who is not punished with lesions afflicting houses.

And we object:

Does a synagogue become impure through lesions?

But it was taught in a beraita: I might have thought that synagogues and study halls become impure through lesions?

The verse states: “And he whose house it is shall come.”

And we derive:

one whose

house

is designated exclusively for him.

These are excluded, as they are not designated exclusively for him,

that is, for a particular person, since they serve the needs of the public.

And we answer:

There is no difficulty.

This

beraita, which holds that a synagogue becomes impure through lesions, is the opinion of

Rabbi Meir

who stated it.

And this

beraita, which holds that synagogues do not become impure through lesions, is the opinion of

the Rabbis

who stated it.

As it was taught

with regard to the obligation of mezuzah:

A synagogue that contains a dwelling for the synagogue attendant [

the attendant]

is liable for mezuzah.

And

a synagogue

that does not contain a dwelling, Rabbi Meir holds liable

for mezuzah, while the Rabbis exempt it.

The term “your house” is stated with regard to mezuzah, just as “whose house it is” is stated with regard to lesions. Therefore, according to the Rabbis, who exempt a synagogue from mezuzah because they expound “your house” as referring to a house designated for you, and not to a synagogue, which is not designated for him, they likewise hold concerning lesions that it does not become impure.

Whereas Rabbi Meir, who holds it liable for mezuzah, holds that it becomes impure through lesions.

And if you wish, say:

Since we compare the law of lesions with the obligation of mezuzah, it is possible to say that the two beraitot do not disagree. Rather,

both this and that

hold in accordance with

the Rabbis,

who maintain that a synagogue is not a house designated exclusively for him.

And

in any event

there is no difficulty.

This

beraita, which says that it becomes impure through lesions, is discussing a synagogue

that contains a dwelling

for the synagogue attendant. Just as everyone agrees that it is liable for mezuzah because of the attendant’s dwelling, through which it is considered designated for a particular person as a dwelling, so too it becomes impure through lesions.

And this—

the beraita that says that it does not become impure through lesions—is discussing a synagogue

that does not contain a dwelling.

And if you wish, say: Both this and that are discussing one that does not contain a dwelling.

Even so, it is possible to reconcile the beraitot and say that there is no contradiction between them.