Yoma 11a — the Talmud in English

All the gates that were there

in the Courtyard,

did not have a mezuzah,

except

the Gate of Nicanor,

because

inside it

was

the Chamber of Parhedrin.

And every gate through which one enters into a house is obligated in mezuzah.

Shall we say

that

this beraita is the method of

the Rabbis, and not

the method of

Rabbi Judah?

For if it is Rabbi Judah,

he holds that the chamber itself is not obligated in mezuzah by Torah law, and if

it itself

itself is not obligated in mezuzah except by force of

a decree—

and

why

should we stand

[stand]

and decree a decree, to

add to the

decree?

And we conclude:

Even if you say

that the beraita holds like

Rabbi Judah,

these are not two decrees.

Rather,

it is all one decree.

Since by rabbinic law they consider the chamber a dwelling for the obligation of mezuzah, and consequently even the Gate of Nicanor—through which those entering the Chamber of Parhedrin would enter—is obligated in mezuzah, as is the law of a house-gate obligated in mezuzah.

The Sages taught:

It is written in the Torah, “And you shall write them upon the doorposts of your house

and in your gates.”

And we expound:

both the gates of houses and the gates of courtyards

through which one enters into houses,

and the gates of provinces

which are surrounded by mountains and forests, and one enters the province through those gates,

and the gates of towns—

in all of them

there is in them an obligation of the mitzva to the Omnipresent,

to affix a mezuzah in them,

because it is stated, “And you shall write them upon the doorposts of your house and in your gates.”

Abaye said to Rav Safra: These gates [gates]

[that is, gates]

of Meḥoza,

which was a city whose majority was Jewish—

for what reason did the Sages not make a mezuzah for them?

For after all, the gates of towns were included for the obligation of mezuzah.

He said to him: Those

gates were not made as an entrance to the city, but rather

for

the purpose of

support for

the building constructed above the gate, called

“Akra DeKhubei,”

that is what they were made for.

they were made.

He said to him,

Abaye:

But

after all, because they are a gate to

“Akra DeKhubei” itself—

they require a mezuzah

for those gates, since one enters through them into this building.

And this house itself should be obligated in mezuzah,

for it has in it [since it has in it]

[that is, it has]

a dwelling for the prison guard.

For it was taught: A synagogue that has in it a dwelling for the synagogue attendant [attendant of the]

house of prayer

—

the dwelling is obligated

the dwelling

in mezuzah.

And even though the synagogue itself is not obligated in mezuzah.

And it is proven that the guard’s dwelling is considered a dwelling to obligate it in mezuzah.

Rather, Abaye said:

the reason that they did not make a mezuzah on the gates of Meḥoza is

because of

a concern of

danger,

lest they say about the mezuzah that it is witchcraft that the Jews made at the gates of the city. And there was an incident such as this.

For it was taught: The mezuzah of an individual

one is concerned about it, lest over the passage of time it became invalid, and therefore they ordained that it be

examined

whether it exists and is valid

twice in seven years [seven years].

[that is, every seven years].

But

if it were a mezuzah

belonging to the public,

they did not burden them excessively, lest because of excessive trouble they become negligent and not fulfill their obligation, since each one would rely upon his fellow.

And therefore they required examination of a public mezuzah only

twice in a Jubilee.

And Rabbi Judah said: There was an incident involving Artavin [the name of a person, or the name of his occupation]

[this was either his name or the name of his profession]

one who was examining mezuzot in the upper market of Sepphoris.

And

at the time of the incident

one royal officer found him [a policeman appointed by the king],

[a royal officer],

and took from him

on the pretext that he was practicing witchcraft,

one thousand dinars.

And we wonder: Are we concerned about danger at the time of fulfilling a mitzva?

But Rabbi Elazar said: Those sent to perform a mitzva are not harmed.

And we answer:

Where the damage is established,

as, for example, in cities where fabricators of accusations are common,

it is different.

And one is concerned even while fulfilling a mitzva.

For it is written

“And Samuel said [to her]:

[to Him]:

‘How shall I go [to anoint David],

[to anoint David],

‘when Saul hears, he will kill me.’”

And yet he went by divine command, and even the Holy One, blessed be He, did not answer him that he need not be concerned, but rather

“And the Lord said: Take a heifer with you, and say: ‘I have come to sacrifice to the Lord.’”

And the reason Samuel was concerned was because this was a common concern.

And Rav Kahana taught before Rav Judah:

a straw house, whose use is to store straw and which is not intended as a human dwelling,

and

likewise

a cattle house, and a

storehouse

of wood, and a

storehouse

of produce

of wine, oil, or grain—

are exempt from mezuzah.

And the reason for the exemption is

because women use them for bathing.

And

Rav Kahana explains

What does “use” mean?—

They bathe

there.

Since the women stand there naked, it is a place of disgrace, and it is not honor of Heaven that there should be a mezuzah there.

Rav Judah said to him:

According to you, that

the reason

that those places are exempt from the obligation of mezuzah is only because

they bathe

women there, one must examine this:

These

storehouses

ordinarily,

where women do not bathe—

are obligated

in mezuzah!

But it was taught

in another beraita:

a cattle pen is exempt from mezuzah.

And it is not mentioned in it that the exemption is only in a case where they bathe there.

By necessity, we must explain also in the first beraita that a straw house and a cattle house, even in a place where women do not bathe, are exempt from mezuzah.

And the reason for the exemption is another one—because they are not made for human dwelling.

But rather, what

is this that Rav Kahana taught before Rav Judah, “because women

use

them”?

His intention is to say that women

adorn themselves

there.

And this is what it teaches:

these places are entirely exempt from mezuzah. And

even though

there is also human use in them,

for

after all

women adorn themselves in them,

this use is not significant with regard to dwelling, and therefore they are

exempt

from mezuzah.

Rav Kahana said to him: But

is this indeed the law, that even though

women adorn themselves in them—

they are exempt

from mezuzah?

But it was taught

in an additional beraita:

a cattle pen—

is exempt from mezuzah.

And

if it was a pen

in which women adorn themselves—

it is obligated

it

in mezuzah!

Rather

necessarily,

what can you say

according to you, in order to reconcile the contradiction between the beraitot: that the law of

“adorn themselves”—

is a dispute of

the tannaim,

as will be explained.

If so,

for me too

it can be said that the obligation in mezuzah of a pen

ordinarily,

where women do not bathe there—is a dispute of

the tannaim.

For it was taught:

It is written in the Torah, “And you shall write them upon the doorposts of

your house.”

And we expound:

“Your house””—

only the house is obligated in mezuzah

that is specially yours

for dwelling.

To exclude a straw house, a cattle house, a wood house, and storehouses.

For

since their use is not for human dwelling—

they are exempt from mezuzah.

And there are those who obligate

these places in mezuzah.

But

in truth they said

everyone, that

a privy, a tannery, a bathhouse, and a ritual bath,

and likewise the places

that women use for bathing—

are exempt from mezuzah.

And the Gemara explains:

Rav Kahana explains [interprets] this beraita

[this beraita]

according to his reasoning.

And Rav Judah explains

it

according to his reasoning.

Rav Kahana explains according to his reasoning,

that the first tanna expounds from the word

“your house”

that it should be

your house that is specially yours

for dwelling.

And we exclude:

to exclude a straw house, a cattle house, a wood house, and storehouses, which are exempt from mezuzah,

and even

ordinarily

when there is no disgraceful use in them.

And there are

other tannaim

who obligate in an ordinary case.

In truth they all said

that

a privy, a tannery, a bathhouse, and a ritual bath, and

likewise houses

that women use for bathing.

And what

is the meaning of

“use”—

they bathe in them.

All these

are exempt from mezuzah.

It follows, according to Rav Kahana’s explanation, that the beraita that he taught before Rav Judah—which states that storehouses are not exempt except because women bathe in them, but ordinarily they are obligated—holds like the tannaim who obligate in this beraita.

And the beraita that Rav Judah cited, which states that a cattle pen is exempt even ordinarily, holds like the first tanna of this beraita.

And we raise an objection:

If so,

since “use” means “bathe,” what did the beraita add by teaching us this law that women bathe in them?

After all,

this is

the

bathhouse,

which was already mentioned earlier.

And we answer:

It teaches us

the bathhouse that is

a public bathhouse.

And afterward

it teaches us

the storehouses in which women bathe, which are

a private bathhouse.

And there is an additional novelty, for

it might enter your mind

that only

a public bathhouse

is exempt because

its filth is abundant [its dirt is abundant], and it is a great disgrace.

[its uncleanness is extensive], and it is a place of great disgrace.

But concerning a private bathhouse, whose filth is not abundant, say

that this is not a disgraceful dwelling, and

it should be obligated in mezuzah.

It teaches us that even this bathhouse is exempt.

And Rav Judah explains according to his reasoning:

that

this is what it teaches:

The first tanna expounds from the word

“your house”

that one is obligated only in

your house that is “specially yours”

for a complete dwelling, and therefore he excludes a straw house, a cattle house, a wood house, and storehouses—which are not considered an actual dwelling—

which are exempt from mezuzah.

And even

in a situation where there is also human use in them, such as where women

adorn themselves

in them.

And there are

other tannaim who

obligate

also

in

such a house, since

they adorn themselves

in it.

But

storehouses

ordinarily,

where women do not adorn themselves in them—

according to everyone, it is exempt.

In truth they all said

all:

a privy, a tannery, a bathhouse, and a ritual bath,

in these, whose primary use is for disgrace,

even though the women

also

adorn themselves in them—

they are

exempt from mezuzah,

because their filth is abundant.

It follows, according to Rav Judah’s explanation, that the first beraita that Rav Kahana taught before him holds like the first tanna, who exempts storehouses even if women adorn themselves in them. Whereas the additional beraita that Rav Kahana mentioned, to obligate in such a case, holds like the tannaim who disagree with the first tanna.

And we raise an objection:

But

if

according to Rav Judah,

straw houses, cattle houses, wood houses, and storehouses

ordinarily—

according to

everyone, are exempt!?

But it was taught:

what is written in the mezuzah

“and in your gates”—

we expound it to include:

both the gates of houses, the gates of courtyards, the gates of provinces, and the gates of towns, and

likewise

a cattle pen

of cattle,

and chicken coops

of chickens,

and a straw house [a straw house],

[hay storehouses],

and storehouses of wine and storehouses of oil—

all of them

are obligated in mezuzah.