Yoma 11a (יא.) — the Talmud in English

All the gates that were there

in the Temple courtyard,

they did not have a mezuzah,

except

for the Gate of Nicanor,

because

inside it

was

the Chamber of Parhedrin.

And every gate through which one enters a house is obligated in mezuzah.

Can

we say

that this beraita is in accordance with the view of

the Rabbis, and not

with the view of

Rabbi Yehuda?

For if it is according to Rabbi Yehuda,

he maintains that the chamber itself is not obligated in mezuzah by Torah law, and if

it itself

is not obligated in mezuzah except by means of a

decree—

and

why should

we arise

stand]

and enact a decree, to

add to the

decree?

And we conclude:

Even if you say

that the beraita follows the view of

Rabbi Yehuda,

these are not two separate decrees.

Rather,

it is all one decree.

Since, by rabbinic enactment, the chamber is considered a dwelling with regard to the obligation of mezuzah, it follows that the Gate of Nicanor—through which those entering the Chamber of Parhedrin would enter—is also obligated in mezuzah, like the gate of a house that is obligated in mezuzah.

The Sages taught:

It is written in the Torah: “And you shall write them on the doorposts of your house

and on your gates.”

And we derive:

Both the gates of houses and the gates of courtyards

through which one enters houses,

and the gates of provinces

surrounded by mountains and forests, through which one enters the province,

and the gates of towns—

in all of them

there is an obligation of the mitzva toward the Omnipresent,

to affix a mezuzah on them,

because it is stated: “And you shall write them on the doorposts of your house and on your gates.”

Abaye said to Rav Safra: These gates

gates]

of Meḥoza,

which was a city whose majority was Jewish—

for what reason did the Sages not affix a mezuzah to them?

After all, the gates of towns were included in the obligation of mezuzah.

He said to him: Those

gates were not made as an entrance to the city, but rather

for

the purpose of

reinforcing

the building constructed above the gate, called

“Akra DeKubi,”

that is what they were made for.

for that is what they were made.

He said to him,

Abaye:

And

since they are gates to

“Akra DeKubi” itself—

they should require a mezuzah

for those gates, since one enters this building through them.

And this building itself should be obligated in mezuzah,

as it has [

for it has]

a dwelling for the prison warden.

For it was taught in a beraita: A synagogue that has a dwelling for the synagogue attendant [

attendant of the]

synagogue—

the dwelling

is

obligated in mezuzah.

Even though the synagogue itself is not obligated in mezuzah.

This demonstrates that the warden’s dwelling is considered a dwelling sufficient to create an obligation in mezuzah.

Rather, Abaye said:

The reason they did not affix a mezuzah to the gates of Meḥoza is

because of

the concern of

danger,

lest people say that the mezuzah is a form of sorcery that the Jews performed at the city gates. And there was indeed such an incident.

As it was taught in a beraita: With regard to an individual’s mezuzah,

there is concern that over the course of time it may become invalid, and therefore the Sages instituted that it be

examined

to ascertain that it is present and valid

twice in seven years [

seven years].

But if it is a mezuzah

belonging to

the public,

they did not trouble them excessively, lest because of the burden they become negligent and fail to fulfill their obligation, each relying on the other.

Therefore, they required the mezuzah of the public to be examined only

twice in a Jubilee.

And Rabbi Yehuda said: There was an incident involving Artavin [

the name of a person, or the name of his profession]

who was examining mezuzot in the upper marketplace of Tzippori.

And

during the incident,

he encountered a certain royal officer [

a policeman appointed by the king],

who took from him

on the pretext that he was practicing sorcery

one thousand dinars.

And we raise an objection: Do we really fear danger while performing a mitzva?

But Rabbi Elazar said: Those sent to perform a mitzva are not harmed.

And we answer:

Where the danger is established,

as, for example, in cities where informers are common,

it is different.

There is concern even while one is performing a mitzva.

As it is written:

“And Samuel said [

to Him]:

How can I go [

to anoint David],

when Saul will hear and kill me?”

Yet he went at the command of God, and even the Holy One, blessed be He, did not answer him that he had no reason to fear. Rather, He said to him:

“You shall take a heifer with you, and say: I have come to sacrifice to the Lord.”

And the reason Samuel was concerned was that this was an established and common danger.

And Rav Kahana taught before Rav Yehuda:

A barn for straw, whose use is for storing straw and which is not intended as a human dwelling,

and

likewise

a cattle barn, and a

storage house for

wood, and a

storage house for

storerooms

of wine, oil, or grain—

are exempt from mezuzah.

And the reason for the exemption is

because women adorn themselves in them.

And

Rav Kahana explains:

What is the meaning of “adorn themselves”?

They bathe

there.

Since the women stand there unclothed, it is a place of disgrace, and it is not an honor to Heaven for a mezuzah to be there.

Rav Yehuda said to him:

According to you,

the reason

that these places are exempt from the obligation of mezuzah is only

because women bathe

there. This requires scrutiny:

But ordinary

storage houses,

presumably,

where women do not bathe—

are obligated

in mezuzah!

But it was taught

in another beraita:

A cattle pen is exempt from mezuzah.

And it does not mention that the exemption applies only when women bathe there.

We are compelled to explain that even in the first beraita, a barn for straw and a cattle barn are exempt from mezuzah even where women do not bathe.

The reason for the exemption is different: because they are not made for human dwelling.

But what then

is the meaning of what Rav Kahana taught before Rav Yehuda: “because women

adorn themselves

in them”?

His intention was to say that women

adorn themselves

there.

And this is what he taught:

These places are entirely exempt from mezuzah.

Even though

they also serve for human use,

as

indeed

women adorn themselves in them,

this use is not considered significant with regard to dwelling; therefore, they are

exempt

from mezuzah.

Rav Kahana said to him: And

is this indeed the law—that even though

women adorn themselves in them, they are

exempt

from mezuzah?

But it was taught

in another beraita:

A cattle pen—

is exempt from mezuzah.

But if it was a pen

in which

women adorn themselves—

it is obligated

it

in mezuzah!

Rather,

necessarily,

what can you say

according to you, in order to reconcile the contradiction between the beraitot? That the law of

adornment

is a dispute among the

tannaim,

as will be explained.

If so,

I too

can say that the obligation in mezuzah of an ordinary cattle pen,

presumably,

where women do not bathe there, is a dispute among the

tannaim.

As it was taught:

It is written in the Torah: “And you shall write them on the doorposts of

your house.”

And we derive:

“Your house”—

a house is obligated in mezuzah only if it is

specifically yours

for dwelling.

This excludes a barn for straw, a cattle barn, a wood storehouse, and storehouses.

For

since their use is not for human dwelling, they are

exempt from mezuzah.

And there are those who obligate

these places in mezuzah.

But

in truth they said

that everyone agrees that

a bathroom, a tannery, a bathhouse, and an immersion bath,

as well as places

where women adorn themselves—

are exempt from mezuzah.

And the Gemara explains:

Rav Kahana explains [

interprets] this beraita

according to his own reasoning.

And Rav Yehuda explains

it

according to his own reasoning.

Rav Kahana explains it according to his own reasoning:

The first tanna derives from the word

“your house”

that it must be

specifically your house

for dwelling.

And we exclude:

a barn for straw, a cattle barn, a wood storehouse, and storehouses, which are exempt from mezuzah,

even

in an ordinary case

where they are not used for disgraceful purposes.

And there are

other tannaim

who obligate them in an ordinary case.

In truth they all said

that

a bathroom, a tannery, a bathhouse, and an immersion bath, and

likewise houses

where women adorn themselves.

And what

is the meaning of

“adorn themselves”?—

They bathe in them.

All these

are exempt from mezuzah.

It follows, according to Rav Kahana’s interpretation, that the beraita he taught before Rav Yehuda—which states that storehouses are exempt only because women bathe in them, but that in an ordinary case they are obligated—follows the tannaim who obligate them in this beraita.

And the beraita that Rav Yehuda cited, which states that a cattle pen is exempt even in an ordinary case, follows the first tanna of this beraita.

And we challenge this:

If so,

if “adorn themselves” means “bathe,” what did the beraita add by teaching us this law concerning places where women bathe?

After all,

this is

the

bathhouse,

which was already mentioned above.

And we answer:

It teaches us

that the bathhouse is

a public bathhouse.

And afterward,

it teaches us

that storehouses in which women bathe are

a private bathhouse.

And there is an additional novelty:

It might have entered your mind

that only

a public bathhouse

is exempt because

its filth is abundant [

its dirt is extensive], and it is a great disgrace.

But concerning a private bathhouse, since its filth is not abundant, say

that this is not a disgraceful dwelling, and

it should be obligated in mezuzah.

It therefore teaches us that even this bathhouse is exempt.

And Rav Yehuda explains it according to his own reasoning:

that

this is what he taught:

The first tanna derives from the word

“your house”

that one is obligated only in

“your house specifically”

for complete dwelling. Therefore, he excludes a barn for straw, a cattle barn, a wood storehouse, and storehouses—which are not considered a true dwelling—

as exempt from mezuzah.

Even

when they also have human use, such as when women

adorn themselves

in them.

And there are

other tannaim who

obligate

even

a

house of this sort, since

women adorn themselves

in it.

But ordinary

storehouses,

in general,

where women do not adorn themselves—

everyone agrees that they are exempt.

In truth they all said

that

a bathroom, a tannery, a bathhouse, and an immersion bath—

in these places, whose primary use is disgraceful,

even though the women

also

adorn themselves in them—

they are

exempt from mezuzah,

because their filth is abundant.

It follows, according to Rav Yehuda’s interpretation, that the first beraita that Rav Kahana taught before him follows the view of the first tanna, who exempts storehouses even when women adorn themselves in them. The additional beraita that Rav Kahana mentioned, which obligates such a place, follows the view of the tannaim who disagree with the first tanna.

And we raise an objection:

But

if so,

according to Rav Yehuda,

barns for straw, cattle barns, wood storehouses, and storehouses

in general—

are

according to everyone exempt!?

But it was taught:

The phrase written with regard to mezuzah,

“and on your gates,”

is expounded to include:

Both the gates of houses, and the gates of courtyards, and the gates of provinces, and the gates of towns, and

likewise

a cattle pen,

for cattle,

and a chicken coop

for chickens,

and a straw barn [

a house for straw],

and wine storehouses and oil storehouses—

all of them

are obligated in mezuzah.