Yevamot 98a — the Talmud in English

Is there in fact a prohibition

because of concern that one might come to confuse them with an Israelite

?

And it is proven that two brothers from the father and from the mother [like twins who are brothers from the father and from the mother] have no prohibition between them; and all the more so when they were brothers only from the mother. And this is difficult for Rav Aḥa bar Yaakov according to both formulations above.

And we reject this

: The same law applies: there is not even a prohibition.

And since [

by way of ]

the tanna wished

the tanna

to teach

in the

latter clause—

concerning two brothers whose conception was not in sanctity but whose birth was in sanctity—

“they are liable”

for them on account of the wife of a brother, and to teach us that there is in their case the prohibition of a brother’s wife by Torah law, and one is liable to karet for it.

The tanna also taught in the first clause, “they are not liable”

; therefore the tanna also taught in the first clause the language of liability. But in truth they do not even have a rabbinic prohibition, and this is in accordance with Rav Aḥa bar Yaakov.

Rava said: This that the Sages said: There is no father for an Egyptian [

a gentile ].

Do not say

that the reason should be explained

as being that they are steeped

in licentiousness

the gentiles, and

that it is not known [

it is not known ] who his father is, since perhaps his mother committed adultery with another.

But

if

it is known

who his father is—for example, his father and mother were imprisoned in a prison-house, and certainly no other man had intercourse with her—then

we are concerned

with paternal kinship even in the case of a gentile.

Do not say this;

rather, even if it is known

who his father is,

we are likewise not concerned

with paternal kinship.

And the proof is from the beraita mentioned above,

for these two twin brothers—

the beraita is dealing with them—

whose one drop was and was divided into two;

and it is certainly known to us that they are brothers, even from one father,

and

nevertheless

it teaches in the latter clause:

“Their conception was not in sanctity but their birth was in sanctity,”

they do not perform ḥalitza and they do not perform levirate marriage,

since there is no father for an Egyptian.

Infer from it

from this beraita:

That

the Merciful One has declared the seed of the gentile ownerless

of a gentile [the Torah declared the seed of the gentile ownerless], and it is not considered the kin and family of his father.

For it is written: “

And she multiplied her fornications, remembering the days of her youth, when she committed fornication in the land of Egypt. And she lusted after their concubines [her desire was to be among the concubines of the Egyptians], whose

flesh is the flesh of donkeys [

the organ of intercourse of the Egyptians ], and

their emission is the emission of horses [

the flow of the semen of the Egyptians, from the expression ‘flow’ ]”

Therefore, the father’s insemination does not bring him close to his son, just as the emission of a horse does not make the offspring born from it close to the father-horse.

Come and hear, for Rabbi Yosei said:

An incident involving Giptיים [

the name of a person ]

the convert, who married

the

wife of his maternal brother

who had also converted;

and the incident came before the Sages, and they said: A convert has no marital bond.

And we raised it:

But if a convert betrothed, is it also so

that

betrothal does not take effect with her?

Would it be that if a convert betroths a woman, betrothal does not take effect with her? But he is like a complete Israelite in all his laws!

Rather, say

that the Sages said this:

There is no prohibition of a brother’s wife for a convert,

as it explains and proceeds.

Is it not so

that the intention is concerning the woman

who married a brother when he was a convert [

who married another brother after his conversion ], and she is fully his wife, yet she is permitted to his brother because there is no brotherhood for a convert, since he is like a newborn, and we are not concerned even with confusion with an Israelite?

And since the beraita stated it without qualification, it follows that it is dealing even with maternal brothers alone, and nevertheless the woman is permitted. This is difficult for Rav Sheshet according to the latter formulation, and according to the first formulation it is difficult even for Rav Aḥa!

And we answer:

No,

it is not as you understood it—that the wife of the brother married another brother after his conversion, and she is his wife—

Rather,

she married him when he was a gentile [

the woman married the brother while he was in his gentile state ], and when he converted his betrothal lapsed, and he did not have intercourse with her after they converted. It follows that she never had the marital status of an Israelite, and the law of a brother’s wife does not apply to her.

And the Gemara wonders: Could it enter your mind that she married him

when he was a gentile!?

But if so,

what is it coming to teach [

what novelty is there in the matter ], that she is permitted!?

And we answer: Indeed, there is a novelty in the matter, for

it might have entered your mind: let us decree

regarding a woman who married a brother

when he was a gentile, lest

a woman who married a brother

when he was a convert,

whose brother is rabbinically forbidden to her.

Therefore

it teaches us

that we do not decree so.

Come and hear,

an objection to Rav Sheshet according to the second formulation, which forbids a maternal brother’s wife, and also to Rav Aḥa according to the first formulation, who agrees with Rav Sheshet concerning a maternal brother’s wife alone:

For ben Yassian said: When I went to the coastal cities, I found a convert who had married the wife of his brother

the convert

from his mother.

I said to him: My son, who permitted you

to marry the wife of your maternal brother!?

He said to me

that convert: Behold before you

a woman,

a female convert,

and her seven sons,

for Rabbi Akiva permitted them to marry one another’s brother’s wife, and I learned from them—

On this bench

—which is before you—

Rabbi Akiva sat and said two things,

one in halakha and the other in aggada:

a.

A convert may marry

the

wife of his maternal brother,

and the woman’s seven sons acted according to his instruction.

b.

And

further

Rabbi Akiva said: It is written: “And the word of the Lord came to Jonah son of Amittai, saying: Arise, go to Nineveh, the great city, and proclaim against it, for their wickedness has risen before Me, etc.”

Rabbi Akiva said: It is written: “The word of the Lord came to Jonah son of Amittai, saying: Arise, go to Nineveh, the great city, and proclaim against it, for their wickedness has risen before Me,” and so on.

And the word of the Lord

came to Jonah a second time, saying: Arise, go to Nineveh, the great city, and proclaim to it the proclamation.

The verse therefore said “a second time” to teach that

And for this reason Scripture said “a second time,” to teach:

a second time

only

did the Divine Presence speak with him,

but

a third time the Divine Presence did not speak with him,

because he demanded the honor of the son [that is, his own honor] and did not demand the honor of the Father [namely, the honor of the Holy One, blessed be He].

At any rate, it teaches

in the beraita:

A convert may marry

the

wife of his maternal brother.

Is it not that she married his brother when he was a convert [

she married another brother after his conversion ], and nevertheless Rabbi Akiva permitted him to marry his brother’s wife even when she was only his maternal brother’s wife? This is in accordance with Rav Aḥa according to the latter formulation, and it is difficult for Rav Sheshet according to both formulations, and for Rav Aḥa according to the first formulation!?

And we answer:

No,

Rabbi Akiva is not speaking of the wife of the brother whom he married after conversion, but of the wife of a brother

who married her when he was a gentile,

as above.

And we ask:

When he was a gentile!?

But if so,

what is it coming to teach!?

And we answer:

It might have entered your mind: let us decree when he was a gentile, lest people confuse it with when he was a convert.

It teaches us.

And since the Gemara brought the beraita, it explains it, and afterward the Gemara returns to the subject of the dispute between Rav Aḥa and Rav Sheshet:

The Gemara raises a difficulty concerning accepting the words of that convert, who said them in the name of Rabbi Akiva:

And is he trustworthy?

Would that convert indeed be trustworthy concerning his words?

But Rabbi Abba said that Rav Huna said that Rav said: Any Torah scholar who teaches a halakhic ruling and comes forward with it—if, before a

case

came

before him, he

had stated it [

he was accustomed to teaching it to students ], then

we listen to him.

But if not,

rather, he stated it only after a case came before him,

we do not listen to him,

because, since it is a novel matter, perhaps it was only because a case came before him that he stated it.

And we answer:

If you wish, say

to resolve it: Indeed, that convert

was one who had already been teaching it,

even before he married his maternal brother’s wife, and therefore they trusted him.

And if you wish, say: Because he said

that convert:

“Behold, a woman and her seven sons.”

And if you wish, say: Here it is different, because he related another incident together with it,

here they trusted him because he also related another incident in the name of Rabbi Akiva [the explanation of the verse in the Book of Jonah]. Since he was trustworthy concerning the second matter, he was likewise trustworthy concerning the halakha he said in the name of Rabbi Akiva, because words of truth are recognizable: he received both statements together.

The Master said

in the beraita in the name of Rabbi Akiva:

It is written:

“And the word of the Lord

came to Jonah a second time, saying,”

a second time the Divine Presence spoke with him; a third time it did not speak with him

the Divine Presence.

And we object:

But it is written: [

“In the fifteenth year of Amaziah son of Joash, king of Judah, Jeroboam son of Joash became king. And he did what was evil in the eyes of the Lord; he did not turn away from all the sins of Jeroboam son of Nebat, by which he caused Israel to sin.” ]

“He restored [

he returned immediately from the hands of the kings of Aram ]

the border of Israel from the entrance of Hamath [

from the place by which one comes to Hamath ]

to the Sea of the Arabah [

toward the Sea of the Arabah, which is the Dead Sea ],

according to the word of the Lord

which He had spoken through His servant Jonah son of Amittai the prophet.”

Thus there was an additional prophecy to Jonah!?

Said

to resolve it

Ravina:

The statement that He did not speak with him a third time applies specifically

concerning the affairs of Nineveh, that is what he

that is what he

was saying.

But Jonah indeed had other prophecies from the Lord concerning other matters.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: This is what the verse is saying

:

“According to the word of the Lord

which He had spoken through His servant the prophet”: Just as the decree concerning Nineveh was transformed from

an evil

to a good, so in the days of Jeroboam son of Joash, what had befallen Israel was transformed for them from evil to good.

Here the Gemara returns to the dispute between Rav Aḥa and Rav Sheshet, and again raises a difficulty against Rav Sheshet according to the latter formulation and also against Rav Aḥa according to the first formulation:

Come and hear:

It was already explained above that although a convert who converted is like a newborn, nevertheless, a convert whose conception was not in sanctity and whose birth was in sanctity—any maternal kin whom his mother has after him, whose conception and birth were in sanctity—is his full maternal kin.

But maternal kin from his mother whose conception and birth were not in sanctity are not forbidden by Torah law, because a convert who converted is like a newborn.

A convert whose conception was not in sanctity but whose birth was in sanctity—

He has

rabbinically

maternal kin

whose conception and birth were not in sanctity [whereas maternal kin whose conception and birth were in sanctity are forbidden to him by Torah law].

But he has no paternal kin

even rabbinically.

How:

If he married

the

maternal sister

even though her conception and birth were not in sanctity, and this convert who converted is like a newborn, nevertheless

he must divorce her,

as a decree lest he marry his maternal sister whose conception and birth were in sanctity, who is forbidden by Torah law.

And if he married his sister

from the father

then

he may remain with her,

because there is no father for an Egyptian, and everyone knows this halakha, so there is no concern of confusion.

And if he married

his paternal half-sister

then

he must divorce her,

although this is only paternal kinship, as a decree because of his maternal sister.