Yevamot 98a (צח.) — the Talmud in English

Is there a prohibition

because of the concern that people might confuse them with Jews

there is.

And it follows that two brothers on both their father's and mother's sides [like twins who are brothers on both their father's and mother's sides] are not subject to any prohibition; and all the more so when they are brothers only on their mother's side. This is difficult for Rav Aḥa bar Ya'akov according to both formulations cited above.

And we reject this:

The same law applies—even no prohibition exists.

And since

because]

the tanna wanted

the tanna

to teach

in the

latter clause—

concerning two brothers whose conception was not in sanctity but whose birth was in sanctity—

“they are liable”

for them on account of a brother’s wife, and to teach us that they are subject to the Torah prohibition against a brother’s wife and that one who violates it is liable to karet,

the tanna also taught in the first clause, “they are not liable,”

and therefore the tanna likewise used an expression of liability in the first clause. In fact, they are not subject even to a rabbinic prohibition, in accordance with Rav Aḥa bar Ya'akov.

Rava said: This statement that the Sages said: “A gentile has no paternal lineage” [

a non-Jew].

Do not say

that the reason should be explained

as being that they are steeped

in licentiousness

the gentiles, and

because it is not known [it is not known]

who his father is, since perhaps his mother engaged in intercourse with another man.

But

if

it is known

who his father is—for example, his father and mother were imprisoned in a prison, and certainly no other man had intercourse with her—then

we are concerned

even for paternal kinship in the case of a gentile.

Do not say so.

Rather, even if it is known

who his father is,

we are likewise not concerned

for paternal kinship.

The proof is from the beraita mentioned above,

as for the two twin brothers—

the beraita is discussing them—

“who originated from one drop that divided into two”;

and it is certainly known to us that they are brothers even through one father.

And

nevertheless,

the latter clause teaches:

“If their conception was not in sanctity but their birth was in sanctity,”

“they do not perform ḥalitza and they do not perform yibbum,”

since a gentile has no paternal lineage.

Conclude from this

from this beraita:

that

the Merciful One has disowned the gentile’s offspring

the Torah has disowned the offspring of a gentile [and his offspring is not considered his paternal relative or kin].

As it is written: “She increased her licentiousness, remembering the days of her youth, when she engaged in intercourse in the land of Egypt. And she lusted after their concubines [she desired to be the concubines of the Egyptians], whose

And she multiplied her fornications, remembering the days of her youth, when she committed fornication in the land of Egypt. And she lusted after their concubines [her desire was to be among the concubines of the Egyptians], whose

flesh is the flesh of donkeys [the sexual organ of the Egyptians],

the organ of intercourse of the Egyptians ], and

and whose emission is the emission of horses [the discharge of the Egyptians’ semen, from the expression ‘a stream’].”

Therefore, the father’s insemination does not create closeness between him and his son, just as the emission of a horse does not make the offspring born from it a relative of the horse, its father.

Come and hear, as Rabbi Yosei said:

There was an incident involving Giptayim

[a person’s name],

the convert, who married

the convert, who married

his

maternal brother’s wife

who had also converted,

and the incident came before the Sages, and they said: “A convert has no marital bond.”

And we raised a difficulty:

But if a convert betroths a woman, is that likewise the case

that

the betrothal does not take effect with her

? Is it possible that if a convert betroths a woman, the betrothal does not take effect with her? He is a complete Jew with regard to all his laws!

Rather, say

that this is what the Sages said:

“A convert is not subject to the prohibition of a brother’s wife,”

as will be explained.

Is that not

referring to the woman

who married a brother when he was a convert [who married another brother after his conversion], so that she is fully his wife, and nevertheless she is permitted to his brother because converts have no brotherhood, as a convert who converted is like a newborn child; and there is no concern that this will lead to confusion with Jews?

Since the beraita states the matter without qualification, it follows that it is also discussing brothers who are only maternal brothers. Nevertheless, the woman is permitted, which presents a difficulty for Rav Sheshet according to the latter formulation, and according to the first formulation it presents a difficulty even for Rav Aḥa

!

And we answer:

No,

it is not as you understood it, that the brother’s wife married another brother after his conversion, and is his wife—

rather,

she married him when he was a gentile [the woman married the brother while he was a gentile],

and when he converted, his betrothal lapsed; he did not have intercourse with her after they converted, and it follows that she never had the status of a Jewish man’s wife, and the law of a brother’s wife does not apply to her.

The Gemara wonders: Would it enter your mind that she married him

when he was a gentile!?

But if so,

what is the point of stating it

[what novelty is there in the matter] that she is permitted!?

And we answer: Indeed, there is a novelty, because

it might have entered your mind to decree

concerning a woman who married a brother

when he was a gentile, lest people confuse it with

a woman who married a brother

when he was a convert,

whose brother is rabbinically forbidden to her.

Therefore,

it teaches us

that we do not issue such a decree.

Come and hear,

a refutation of Rav Sheshet according to the second formulation, which forbids a maternal brother’s wife, and also of Rav Aḥa according to the first formulation, who agrees with Rav Sheshet regarding a maternal brother’s wife alone:

For ben Yassian said: When I went to the cities by the sea, I found a convert who had married his brother’s wife

the convert

on his mother’s side.

I said to him: My son, who permitted you

to marry your maternal brother’s wife?!

He said to me,

that convert: Behold before you

a woman

a female convert

and her seven sons,

whom Rabbi Akiva permitted to marry one another’s brother’s wives, and from them I learned—

“On this bench”—

the one before you—

Rabbi Akiva sat and said two things,

one a halakhic ruling and the other an aggadic teaching:

a.

A convert may marry

his

maternal brother’s wife,

and the woman’s seven sons acted according to his ruling.

b.

And

he further

said

Rabbi Akiva: It is written: “And the word of the Lord came to Jonah son of Amittai, saying: Arise, go to Nineveh, the great city, and proclaim against it, for their wickedness has risen before Me,” etc.

“And the word of the Lord

came to Jonah a second time, saying: Arise, go to Nineveh, the great city, and proclaim to it the proclamation.”

The verse therefore said “a second time” to teach that

once

a second time

alone

the Divine Presence spoke with him,

but

the Divine Presence did not speak with him a third time,

because he demanded the honor of the son [meaning: his own honor] but did not demand the honor of the Father [meaning the honor of the Holy One].

At any rate, it teaches

in the beraita:

“A convert may marry

his

maternal brother’s wife.”

Is it not that she married his brother when he was a convert [she married another brother after his conversion], and nevertheless Rabbi Akiva permitted him to marry his brother’s wife even if she was only his maternal brother’s wife? This is in accordance with Rav Aḥa according to the second formulation, and it is difficult for Rav Sheshet according to both formulations and for Rav Aḥa according to the first formulation!

And we answer:

No,

Rabbi Akiva is not discussing the wife of a brother whom she married after his conversion, but rather the wife of a brother

who married her when he was a gentile,

as above.

And we wonder:

When he was a gentile!?

But if so,

what is the point of stating it!?

what is the point of saying this!?

And we answer:

It might have entered your mind to decree, when he was a gentile, lest people confuse it with when he was a convert.

It teaches us.

And since the Gemara cited the beraita, it explains it, and afterward the Gemara returns to the subject of the dispute between Rav Aḥa and Rav Sheshet:

The Gemara challenges the acceptance of the words of that convert, who said that they came from Rabbi Akiva:

But is he trustworthy

? Is that convert trustworthy regarding his statement?

But Rabbi Abba said that Rav Huna said that Rav said: Any Torah scholar who comes and rules a halakha, if before

the incident

came

before him, he

had stated it [he was accustomed to teaching it to students],

then

we heed him.

But if not,

rather, he stated it only after the incident had come before him,

we do not heed him,

because since it is a novel ruling, perhaps he stated it only because of the incident that came before him.

And we answer:

If you wish, say

by way of resolution: Indeed, that convert

had already been issuing rulings

even before he married his maternal brother’s wife, and therefore they trusted him.

And if you wish, say: Because he said

that convert:

“Behold, a woman and her seven sons.”

And if you wish, say: Here it is different, because he related another incident together with it,

and here they trusted him because he related another incident in the name of Rabbi Akiva [the explanation of the verse in the Book of Jonah]. Since he was trustworthy regarding the second matter, he was likewise trustworthy regarding the halakhic ruling he attributed to Rabbi Akiva, for it was evident that he had received both statements together as truthful words.

The Master said

in the beraita in the name of Rabbi Akiva:

It is written:

“And the word of the Lord

came to Jonah a second time, saying,”

“The Divine Presence spoke with him a second time; it did not speak with him a third time

the Divine Presence.”

And we challenge this:

But it is written: [In the fifteenth year of Amaziah son of Joash, king of Judah, Jeroboam son of Joash became king. He did evil in the eyes of the Lord; he did not depart from all the sins of Jeroboam son of Nebat, by which he caused Israel to sin.]

“He restored

[immediately recovered from the kings of Aram]

the border of Israel from Lebo-Hamath

[from the place from which one comes to Hamath]

to the Sea of the Arabah

[toward the Sea of the Arabah, which is the Dead Sea],

according to the word of the Lord

which He had spoken through His servant Jonah son of Amittai the prophet.”

Thus, there was an additional prophecy to Jonah!

Ravina said

that this can be resolved:

Ravina

said:

The statement that He did not speak with him a third time refers specifically

to matters concerning Nineveh; that is what he

said,

but Jonah did indeed receive other prophecies from the Lord concerning other matters.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: This is what the verse is saying

:

“According to the word of the Lord

which He had spoken through His servant the prophet: Just as Nineveh was transformed from

a

harsh decree for the better, so in the days of Jeroboam son of Joash, Israel was transformed for the better from a harsh condition.”

bad decree into a good one, so in the days of Jeroboam son of Joash, Israel was transformed for them from bad to good.

Here the Gemara returns to the dispute between Rav Aḥa and Rav Sheshet, and again challenges Rav Sheshet according to the latter formulation, and Rav Aḥa according to the first formulation:

Come and hear:

It was already explained above that although a convert who converted is like a newborn child, nevertheless, when a convert’s conception was not in sanctity and his birth was in sanctity, any maternal kinship that his mother has with him afterward—where she conceived and gave birth to another child in sanctity—constitutes full maternal kinship.

But maternal kinship through his mother, where his conception and birth were both not in sanctity, is not forbidden by Torah law, because a convert who converted is like a newborn child.

A convert whose conception was not in sanctity but whose birth was in sanctity—

has

by rabbinic law

maternal kinship

with a sibling whose conception and birth were not in sanctity [whereas maternal kinship with one whose conception and birth were in sanctity is forbidden by Torah law].

But he has no paternal kinship

even by rabbinic law.

How so:

If he married

his

maternal sister,

even though her conception and birth were not in sanctity, and this convert who converted is like a newborn child, nevertheless

he must divorce her,

as a decree lest he marry his maternal sister whose conception and birth were in sanctity, who is forbidden by Torah law.

And if he married his sister

on his father’s side,

then

he may remain married to her,

because a gentile has no paternal lineage, and everyone knows this halakha; there is no concern that people will confuse the cases.

And if he married his

paternal aunt on his mother’s side,

then

he must divorce her,

although this is merely paternal kinship, because of a decree on account of his maternal sister.