Yevamot 97b — the Talmud in English

The Meiri wrote: We have already explained in its place, concerning the prohibition of evil speech, that it is permitted in its general prohibition whenever a person speaks of the disgrace of one who is a transgressor or one who possesses repulsive traits, with the intention that the listeners distance themselves from him so that they will not learn from his deeds. In this manner, among our Sages there were parables and riddles stated concerning forbidden intercourse, in order to exaggerate in relating their disgrace, so that the listeners would be cautious about this; but because of the elegance of the parables, some of them were also mentioned concerning permitted intercourse, and in these ways many parables are stated in this passage that require explanation.

First riddle:

How is it possible for a woman to say about a certain man that he is:

“A brother by father but not by mother, and he is the husband of my mother, and I am the daughter of his wife

[my brother is from my father and not from my mother, and he is the husband of my mother, and I am the daughter of his wife]”?

He said.

He solved it,

Rami bar Hama:

You will find that a woman says this only

not according to Rabbi Yehuda of the Mishna

[of our Mishna], who forbids his father’s raped woman; only according to the Rabbis will you find this.

And this is the case, for example, where Jacob, Rachel’s husband, had intercourse with Leah without betrothal and fathered Dinah from her, and Joseph, who was Jacob’s son from Rachel, married Leah, his father’s raped woman [who is permitted to him according to the Rabbis].

And Dinah, Jacob’s daughter, says about Joseph:

He is my brother from my father Jacob, but he is not my brother from my mother, since I am from Leah and he is from Rachel; and he is Joseph, the husband of Leah, my mother, and I am the daughter of Leah, who is his wife.

Second riddle:

Who is the one who says about a child whom she is carrying on her shoulders:

“He is a brother, and he is my son, I am the sister of this one whom I carry on my shoulders

[he is my brother and my son, and I am the older sister of this one whom I carry on my shoulders]”?

The Gemara solves it:

You find it

[you find this case]

with a gentile who has intercourse with his daughter,

for example, where Ishmael had intercourse with his daughter Mahalat and fathered Nebaioth from her.

And the daughter of Ishmael, Mahalat, says of her son Nebaioth, that he is her brother from Ishmael:

He is my brother from my father Ishmael, and he is my son, and I am his older sister from Ishmael.

The third riddle:

Who is the one who says:

“Peace to you, my son! I am your sister’s daughter” [

Peace to you, my brother; I am your sister’s daughter].

And its solution:

It can be found with a gentile who has intercourse with his daughter’s daughter.

For example, Ishmael had intercourse with Asenath, his granddaughter, the daughter of Mahalat his daughter, and fathered Nebaioth from her.

And Asenath says of her son Nebaioth:

Peace to you, my son; I am the daughter of Mahalat, who is your sister from Ishmael.

The fourth riddle:

“Water-drawers who draw water! The riddle falls before you; its solution is concealed,” [

You sons of the laborers who draw and water the fields, please hear my riddle, which falls before you sealed, and its solution is concealed]!

Who is the one who says about a baby whom she is carrying on her shoulders:

“This one whom I carry is my son, and I am the daughter of his brother,”

This baby whom I carry is my son, and I am the daughter of his brother.”

And its solution:

It can be found with a gentile who has intercourse with his son’s daughter.

For example, Ishmael had intercourse with Asenath, who was the daughter of his son Kedar, and fathered Nebaioth from her.

And Asenath says of Nebaioth, her young son:

This baby whom I carry on my shoulders is my son. And I am the daughter of Kedar, who is Nebaioth’s brother from Ishmael.

The fifth riddle:

A woman complains:

“Woe” [

like “Woe is me”]

“from a brother, and he is a father, and he is a husband, and he is the son of a husband, and he is the husband of a mother, and I am the daughter of his wife, and he does not give bread to his orphan brothers, the sons of his daughter” [

I complain about my brother, who is my father, and he is my husband, and he is the son of my husband, and he is the husband of my mother, and I am the daughter of his wife—that he does not provide sustenance for his orphan brothers, who are also the sons of his daughter]”

And its solution ...

It can be found with a gentile who has intercourse with his mother, and fathered a daughter from her, and afterward had intercourse with that daughter, and afterward the old man

[the father of that gentile]

had intercourse with her, and fathered sons from her

and the old man died, and his sons remained orphans.

For example, Ishmael, the son of Abraham, had intercourse with Hagar his mother, and fathered Mahalat from her. Mahalat was therefore Ishmael’s daughter and his maternal sister. Ishmael afterward had intercourse with Mahalat, and Mahalat thereby also became Ishmael’s wife. Then Abraham, Ishmael’s father, afterward had intercourse with Mahalat as well, and fathered several sons from her. Abraham died and left his sons from Mahalat as orphans.

And Mahalat complains about Ishmael, who is her father and also her maternal brother from Hagar:

Behold, you are my brother from our mother Hagar. And you are also my father, for you fathered me. And you are also my husband, for you returned and had intercourse with me. And you are the son of my husband Abraham, for he too had intercourse with me. And you are also the husband of my mother Hagar, for you had intercourse with her. And I am the daughter of your wife Hagar.

And if so, how can it be that, despite all this, you do not provide sustenance for the orphaned children, the sons of your father Abraham, who are your brothers, and they are my sons, for I am your daughter?

The sixth riddle:

Who is the one who says to whom:

“You and I are brothers; I and your father are brothers; I and your mother are sisters”

[I and you are brothers; I and your father are brothers; I and your mother are sisters].

It can be found with a gentile who had intercourse with his mother and fathered two daughters from her, and afterward had intercourse

the gentile

with one of them and fathered a son from her, and he calls her the sister of the son’s mother, and she says this to him

[she, the sister of the mother of the son who was born, calls him and says the aforementioned words]—

For example, Ishmael had intercourse with Hagar and fathered Asenath and Mahalat from her, and again Ishmael had intercourse with Mahalat and fathered Nebaioth from her.

And Asenath, Nebaioth’s maternal sister, says to Nebaioth: You and I are brothers from Ishmael. And I and your father Ishmael are brothers from Hagar. And I and your mother Mahalat are sisters from Ishmael.

The seventh riddle:

Who is the one who says to whom:

“You and I are the sons of two sisters; I and your father are the sons of two brothers; I and your mother are cousins”

[I and you are the sons of two sisters; I and your father are the sons of two brothers; I and your mother are cousins].

And its solution:

It can also be found through permission!

The solution of this riddle is possible even by a permitted relationship!

For example, Reuben had two daughters

Hoglah and Noah,

and Simeon came and married one of them

[and Simeon his brother came and married Hoglah, who was one of Reuben’s daughters] and fathered Saul,

and the son of Levi came and married one of them

[and Kohath, the son of Levi, who was the brother of Reuben and Simeon, came and married Noah, the daughter of his cousin Reuben], and fathered Amram.

And he said to him

Saul,

the son of Simeon, to

Amram,

the son of the son of Levi—

thus

[and Saul, the son of Simeon, is the one who says this to Amram, the son of the son of Levi].

For I, who was born to Hoglah, and you, who were born to Noah—we are the sons of sisters:

I, who am the son of Simeon, and your father, who is the son of Levi—we are the sons of brothers.

I, who am the son of Simeon, and your mother, who is the daughter of Reuben—we are the sons of brothers.

Mishna:

a. The Sages said: “There is no paternal relationship for an Egyptian,” meaning that a gentile has no paternal kinship; and this is not because they are steeped in licentiousness, so that you cannot know who his father is, but it is learned from the verse in Ezekiel, as will be explained in the Gemara below, 98a. b. Paternal forbidden relationships are not prohibited to descendants of Noah at all. The reason for this is that “there is no paternal relationship for an Egyptian,” and paternal relatives are not considered his relatives, [Ramban below, 98a].

However, maternal forbidden relationships are prohibited even to descendants of Noah. Nevertheless, prohibitions that arise through marriage, such as a brother’s wife, are not prohibited to descendants of Noah, for marriage creates a prohibition for a descendant of Noah only in the case of a married woman whose husband is alive, [the early authorities in our discussion].

c. “A convert who converted is considered like a newborn,” and every kinship to which he was related while he was a gentile has ceased for him.

d. By Torah law, a convert who converted is permitted to all the relatives to whom he was related while he was a gentile. It is not necessary to say that he is permitted to paternal relatives, since he was never related to them, because “there is no paternal relationship for an Egyptian”; rather, even to his maternal relatives, who were his relatives while he was a gentile, nevertheless once he converted he is permitted to them, since “a convert who converted is considered like a newborn.”

e. Nevertheless, the Sages said that those forbidden relationships that were prohibited to him while he was a gentile, the convert should not be permitted to them, even though “a convert who converted is considered like a newborn.” This is a decree that the Sages enacted so that people would not say, “They are coming from a more stringent sanctity to a less stringent sanctity,” as explained above, 22a. It will be explained further in our discussion that sometimes the Sages prohibited relatives to converts so that people should not come to confuse them with Israelites.

f. When the slave is freed, he immerses a second time, and in every respect his law is that of a convert, and he is considered like a newborn.

g. A slave has no lineage of kinship and family relationship at all, and the Torah equated him with a donkey, as the verse says, “Remain here for yourselves with the donkey”—a people resembling a donkey—as explained in the Gemara above, 62a.

h. A pregnant woman who converted, and the conversion of the fetus was included in the conversion of its mother: when the child is born, the Sages called it, “its conception was not in sanctity, and its birth was in sanctity.” It will be explained in our discussion that the conversion of the fetus is not considered an independent conversion to which the rule “a convert who converted is considered like a newborn” applies.

i. The law of yibbum applies only to brothers from the father, or to brothers from both the father and the mother. But with brothers from the mother alone, there is no yibbum, and they are subject to the prohibition of karet for a brother’s wife.

The female convert whose sons converted

with her ,

those brothers who converted

do not perform halitza

one to the wife of the other

and do not perform yibbum

one with the wife of the other; [and the Gemara will explain whether there is a rabbinic prohibition in their performing yibbum, or whether the intention of the Mishna is only to say that they are not within the institution of yibbum, but if they wished to marry one the wife of his deceased brother, they are not prevented from doing so].

The reason for this is that there is no paternal relationship for an Egyptian, and it follows that they are not brothers from the father, while yibbum applies only to brothers from the father; however, although the institution of yibbum does not apply to them, there is no Torah prohibition on them as maternal brothers, since “a convert who converted is considered like a newborn,” and he has no kinship at all, whether from the father or from the mother.

And

even

if there was only

the conception of the first not in sanctity, and

if

its birth

had already been

in sanctity,

for example, his mother converted while she was pregnant, so that the first’s conception took place while he was a gentile, and his birth was as a Jew—

and

if

the second

had

his conception and birth in sanctity,

for his mother conceived him after she converted, they do not perform halitza and do not perform yibbum. The Gemara will explain why there was room to say that their law differs from that of two brothers whose conception and birth were both not in sanctity, such that the tanna needed to say that “even” in this case the law stated in the first clause applies.

And not only is the institution of yibbum absent from them, since they are not considered brothers from the father, but she is prohibited to the brother by the karet prohibition of a maternal brother’s wife, since both of them were born in sanctity.

And likewise

the same law applies to

a slave-woman whose sons were freed with her,

for the brothers have no paternal family relationship and are not called brothers from the father; therefore they do not perform halitza and do not perform yibbum, and likewise with regard to the law explained in the later clause.

Gemara:

The Gemara brings an incident relevant to the law of our Mishna:

The sons of Yudan the maidservant were freed

[Yudan’s sons—she was a Canaanite maidservant together with her sons—were freed from their servitude]

Rav Aha bar Yaakov permitted them to marry each other’s wives

[Rav Aha bar Yaakov permitted them to marry, one the wife of the other].

The reason that the wives of the brothers are not prohibited to the other brothers as a brother’s wife, even though they were maternal brothers, and a maternal brother’s wife alone is also prohibited, is that a convert who converted, or a slave who was freed, is considered automatically like a newborn, and they have no maternal kinship.

He said

Rava raised an objection

to him, to Rav Aha bar Yaakov

:

But

[behold]

Rav Sheshet prohibited

in a similar case by rabbinic decree, because people might say that even in Israel, in such a case, they are permitted?!

He said to him

Rav Aha bar Yaakov said to Rava:

He—

Rav Sheshet indeed

prohibited, but

if

I permit

[and I permit], meaning: I disagree with him and permit it even rabbinically.

And just as they disagreed concerning the sons of the maidservant, so did they disagree concerning converts whose conception and birth were not in sanctity.

The Gemara explains two formulations in explaining their dispute:

The first formulation:

a. If the brothers were

from the father and not from the mother, everyone

—Rav Aha bar Yaakov and even Rav Sheshet—

agrees that it is permitted;

for there is no concern that people might say that even in Israel they are permitted when it is not a case of yibbum, since this law—that there is no paternal relationship for an Egyptian—is known to everyone, and they will not come to do this in Israel.

b. If the brothers were

from the mother and not from the father, everyone —

Rav Sheshet and even Rav Aha bar Yaakov —

does not disagree that it is forbidden

by rabbinic ordinance.

The reason for their prohibition by rabbinic ordinance is that not everyone knows that “a convert who converted is considered like a newborn child” and has no kinship even through the mother, and people will say that she is also permitted among Israelites; therefore they forbade her.

c.

When did they disagree —

Rav Aha bar Yaakov and Rav Sheshet — when the brothers were

through both the father and the mother

at the same time.

And the basis of their disagreement is:

The one who permits [

Rav Aha bar Yaakov, who permitted them] holds this because he reasoned:

We attribute them to the father [

we cast them after their father],

for they call them the sons of so-and-so [

since they are called by their father’s name]; and since this is so, people will not know that they are also brothers through the mother. With regard to brothers through the father, the Sages did not worry lest people come to permit such a case among Israelites.

And

the reason of

Rav Sheshet,

who forbids, is because

they also call them the sons of so-and-so [

they are also called by their mother’s name], and they will know that they are also brothers through the mother, and will come to exchange one case for another and say that women in such a case are also permitted among Israelites.

A second version:

And some say: Rav Aha bar Yaakov disagreed

and permitted

even brothers through the mother,

and he did not worry lest people come to permit such a case among Israelites.

And what is the reason?

Because everyone knows the law:

“A convert who converted is considered like a newborn child

by itself

is considered”,

so that he has no relatives; and there is no concern lest people come to permit such a case among Israelites.

The Gemara raises an objection to Rav Aha, who permits according to both versions when they were brothers through both the father and the mother:

We learned

in our Mishna:

A female convert whose sons converted with her

— these brothers

neither perform halitza nor perform yibbum.

What is the reason?

And is it

not because they are forbidden!?

That is to say: Is it not the intention of the Mishna to say that they are forbidden to perform yibbum, one with the wife of the other? If so, we have learned from the Mishna that when there is brotherhood between them through both the father and the mother, their wives are forbidden, because people might come to exchange one case for another among Israelites; and this is a difficulty against Rav Aha bar Yaakov, who permits according to both versions when the brothers are through both the father and the mother.

And we answer:

No,

not as you explained what we learned, “nor perform yibbum,” namely, that they are forbidden to perform yibbum.

Rather, the intention of the Mishna is to say:

that she is not subject to the law of halitza and yibbum.

And

since she is not in need of yibbum —

she is permitted

—

to the outside world [

she is permitted to marry in the general community].

And

however,

they too are permitted [

the brothers themselves are also permitted to marry their brothers’ wives], for there is no prohibition upon them at all, not even by rabbinic ordinance, and this follows the view of Rav Aha bar Yaakov.

And we challenge this from the latter clause of the Mishna:

But it teaches

in the latter clause:

“Even

if the first one’s conception was not in sanctity but his birth was in sanctity, and the second one’s conception and birth were in sanctity,” they neither perform halitza nor perform yibbum, and they are forbidden with the prohibition of excision for a maternal brother’s wife.

And it is evident from the word “even” that there would have been room to say that in this case the law would not be as it is in the first clause. And this is difficult:

If you say that “nor perform yibbum,” which we learned in the first clause, came to teach that

the tanna teaches that they are

forbidden

to perform yibbum, because people might come to exchange one case for another among Israelites,

well,

this is why it teaches

in our Mishna that the law of “they do not perform yibbum,” stated in the first clause—namely, the prohibition of yibbum—also applies

“even”

in the case of the latter clause —

And the tanna came to teach us:

that although the first one’s conception was not in sanctity but his birth was in sanctity, and

if

the second one’s conception and birth were in sanctity, and they resemble two mothers

who gave birth

in their appearance

to the children—the mothers being different, since the first one was conceived when she was a gentile and the second was conceived when she was an Israelite—and I might have thought that these are not maternal brothers, to be forbidden by Torah law, and they also do not appear to be maternal brothers, such that the Sages would forbid them from performing yibbum because people might come to exchange one case for another.

Even so,

this is not so, and they do not resemble two mothers; rather, on the contrary, they are completely maternal brothers and

are forbidden

to perform yibbum even by Torah law, and there is an excision penalty.

Rather, if you say

that in the first clause they

are permitted

to perform yibbum, and the fundamental subject of our Mishna is their obligation of yibbum and the permission for the women to marry in the general community because they are not brothers through the father, then

what is “even

”? For it implies that the tanna came to renew that even in the case of the latter clause the law of the first clause applies, which according to your words means that the law of halitza and yibbum does not apply to them, and the women are permitted to marry in the general community —

But there is no novelty in the matter, for even when they appear like two mothers, the law of yibbum does not apply to them, since the matter of yibbum is not dependent at all upon their maternal brotherhood, but upon their paternal brotherhood; and with regard to this brotherhood, there is no greater novelty in the latter clause than in the first clause.

And we answer: the novelty in the latter clause—that the law of yibbum does not apply to them—is not because I might have said, “they resemble two mothers”; rather, the tanna came to teach:

that although both of them [

the two brothers]

were born in sanctity,

and in such a case there is greater concern that they might

come to exchange one case for another

with two brothers through the father

among Israelites,

and permit a yevama to marry in the general community, and therefore I might have said that she should require halitza.

The tanna informs us that

even so she is permitted,

the women are permitted to marry in the general community without halitza [but they are forbidden to the brothers because of the Torah prohibition of a maternal brother’s wife].

Some say: It is also reasonable in this way, that they are permitted

to perform yibbum, when the conception and birth of both husbands were not in sanctity.

For

after all,

it teaches

in the latter clause

“even.”

If you say

that in the first clause they

are permitted

to perform yibbum, and the fundamental novelty taught by the tanna is that they do not require yibbum, well,

this is why it teaches “even,”

to teach you

that although

in the latter clause

both were born in sanctity, and might be confused with

two brothers through the father among

Israelites, even so they are permitted

to marry in the general community without halitza.

But if you say they are forbidden

the women to perform yibbum even when the conception and birth of their husbands were not in sanctity —

What is “even”?

What novelty is there in the matter, that even in the case of the latter clause they are forbidden to perform yibbum? On the contrary, there is greater reason to forbid them to perform yibbum in the case of the latter clause, because they are completely maternal brothers!?

And we answer: Indeed, there is a novelty in the fact that they are forbidden —

that although the first one’s conception was not in sanctity but his birth was in sanctity, and the second one’s conception and birth were in sanctity, so that they resemble two mothers,

and I might have thought that they are permitted both by Torah law and by rabbinic ordinance, since the case does not at all resemble other maternal brothers,

even so they are forbidden

the women to perform yibbum by Torah law.

Come and hear

a proof not according to Rav Aha, who permits convert brothers whose conception and birth were not in sanctity to marry each other’s wives when they were brothers through both the father and the mother:

Two twin brothers [

who necessarily have one father and one mother]

who were converts,

whose conception and birth were not in sanctity,

and likewise

twin brothers who were slaves,

who were emancipated, neither perform halitza nor perform yibbum,

as we learned in our Mishna.

And they are not liable

one for the other’s wife

because of a brother’s wife [

even if she became betrothed to him after he converted], since a convert who converted is considered like a newborn child and has no brotherhood even through the mother; all the more so he has no brotherhood through the father, since an Egyptian has no father.

If their conception was

of the twins

not in sanctity but their birth was in sanctity,

as, for example, their mother converted while she was pregnant with them, these

neither perform halitza nor perform yibbum, since they have no paternal brotherhood and therefore the law of yibbum does not apply to them; and since this is so, they are forbidden to perform yibbum because people might come to exchange one case for another, since they are maternal brothers.

because, since they have no paternal brotherhood, the laws of levirate marriage do not apply to them. Since this is so, they are forbidden to perform levirate marriage because people might confuse this case with one involving Jews, since they are maternal brothers.

But they are liable because of a brother’s wife

through the mother, since the conversion of the brothers took place while she was pregnant.

If their conception and birth were in sanctity,

their mother having conceived them after she converted,

they are like Israelites in every respect.

At any rate, it teaches

in the first clause: two twin brothers —

they are not liable because of a brother’s wife.

—

And it implies:

Liability

is what

there is not,

because a convert who converted is considered like a newborn child.