Yevamot 82a (פב.) — the Talmud in English

And we explain:

Rabbi Yehuda follows his own reasoning, for he says

throughout the entire Torah:

a species mingled with its own species is not nullified.

We ask further:

But if it was not dissolved, what is the law?

And is it the case that

it does not rise—that is, is it not nullified?

If so,

rather than teach [that is, before the tanna taught] in the continuation of the beraita:

—until the tan\-nai taught—at the end of the

But a piece of pure ḥatat that became mixed with one hundred pieces of pure non-sacred food is not nullified,

which is because, in the case of pure ḥatat, there is a remedy: to sell it to a kohen at a minor loss—

let him distinguish and teach the matter in that case itself [why did the tanna not distinguish within the case of a piece of impure ḥatat itself?]

since there is no remedy of selling it to a kohen, and let him say:

When is this statement applicable—

that an impure piece or slice is nullified?—

When it was dissolved,

and is no longer significant.

But if it was not dissolved,

and it is something that is customarily counted—

it does not rise—that is, is it not nullified?

And we answer:

It was preferable for him to teach the case of pure food mingled with pure food,

to inform us that it is not nullified, rather than the case of impure teruma mingled with pure food.

And because the case of pure food mingled with pure food is more appropriately one of nullification—for the tanna’im did not dispute whether it is nullified [when it is not an item that is counted]. Whereas regarding impure food mingled with pure food, the tanna’im disputed whether it is nullified, as explained in Tractate Terumot, chapter 5, mishna 3.

Furthermore, it was preferable for him to teach us the case of a dissolved item, since in any event there are times when it is not nullified.

And

we challenge

Reish Lakish,

who interprets the beraita as referring to a dissolved item: If so,

what is different in the first clause,

where impure pieces and slices are nullified,

and what is different in the latter clause,

where pure pieces and slices are not nullified?

Since, after they have dissolved and the prohibited substance is no longer present at all, even though they can be sold to a kohen at a minor loss, they should have been nullified!

Rav Shisha, son of Rav Idi, said,

to explain the distinction between the first and latter clauses according to Reish Lakish:

The beraita is indeed speaking of a dissolved item. The reason of the first tanna is that, with regard to a prohibition by Torah law, even according to his view, “a species mingled with its own species is not nullified.” However, with regard to a prohibition by rabbinic law, we do not issue a decree because of a prohibition by Torah law.

And this is how the beraita is explained:

The first clause,

which speaks of impure ḥatat and leḥem ha-panim, refers to a case in which they became impure

through impurity imparted by liquids,

which imparts impurity only by

rabbinic law, [that is, the impurity of the piece and slice resulted from impure liquids that touched a vessel—for the impurity of the vessel is only rabbinic, since by Torah law liquids do not impart impurity to a vessel—and the ḥatat or leḥem ha-panim touched that vessel].

Since their prohibition is only rabbinic, they are therefore nullified when they dissolve, even though they are a species mingled with its own species.

But

the latter clause,

which speaks of ḥatat and leḥem ha-panim with regard to a non-kohen, whose prohibition is

by Torah law,

they are therefore not nullified, even though they dissolve, since they are a species mingled with its own species.

And we challenge this:

But

impure ḥatat and leḥem ha-panim that became impure through

impurity imparted by a creeping creature,

which is by Torah law, and then dissolved—

what is the law?

And is it the case that

it does not rise, that is, is it not nullified because it is a species mingled with its own species?

If so,

rather than teach in the latter clause: But a piece of pure ḥatat that became mixed with one hundred pieces of pure non-sacred food—

it does not rise,

let the difficulty be:

Let him distinguish and teach the matter in that case itself:

let us challenge:

When is this statement applicable? With regard to impurity imparted by liquids.

But with regard to impurity imparted by a creeping creature, it does not

rise—that is, it is not nullified?

And we answer:

It was preferable for him to teach the case of pure food mingled with pure food,

as explained above.

Rabba said:

This is how the distinction between the first and latter clauses should be explained according to Reish Lakish, following the resolution of Rav Shisha, son of Rav Idi: This tanna holds that, by rabbinic law, a species mingled with its own species is not nullified. However, they issued this decree only with regard to a prohibition punishable by lashes, and not with regard to a prohibition punishable by karet. And this is how the beraita is explained:

The first clause speaks of impure consecrated food, whose

prohibition against eating it is only a

prohibition punishable by lashes: “And the flesh that touches any impure thing shall not be eaten.” Therefore, the Sages did not decree, in the case of a species mingled with its own species, that it should not be nullified [since the items dissolved].

But

the latter clause speaks of consecrated food that became mixed with non-sacred food. If we permit it, one may come to eat it while impure in body, which is

a prohibition punishable by karet. In such a case, the Sages decreed that a species mingled with its own species should not be nullified.

a prohibition punishable by lashes: “And the flesh that touches any impure thing may not be eaten.” Therefore, the Sages did not decree that, when it is mixed with the same type of substance, it should not become nullified

And

we challenge this: But

Rabba is the one who said: With regard to everything prohibited by Torah law,

it makes no difference whether it is a prohibition punishable by lashes or a prohibition punishable by karet!

If the Sages were concerned about a prohibition punishable by karet, they were also concerned about a prohibition punishable by lashes, and they enacted a safeguard?!

The difficulty remains unresolved!

Rav Ashi said: The latter clause— where pure consecrated food became mixed with non-sacred food, and is permitted to kohanim, and therefore is not nullified— is because it is an item that has a permitted way of being eaten, that is, it is permitted to a kohen.

And any item that has a permitted way—

even in a thousand, it is not nullified.

,

there is no difference whether it is a prohibition punishable by lashes or a prohibition punishable by karet!

The Gemara says:

But this statement of Rav Ashi—

which maintains that something forbidden to one person but permitted to another is deemed “an item that has a permitted way” and is not nullified—

is nonsense

it is!

meaning that it is permitted to a koen.

That is, Rav Ashi never said this [Ritva]. An “item that has a permitted way” is only, for example, an egg laid on a Festival: today it is forbidden, and tomorrow it will be permitted to the person for whom it was forbidden.

For

even in a mixture of one in a thousand, it does not become nullified.

whom, that is, for whom, is this considered an item that has a permitted way?

If for a kohen—

it is permitted [the piece or slice]

already now.

And

if for an Israelite— it is

forever forbidden,

and this is not an item that has a permitted way.

for which person, is this considered an item that has a way to become permitted?

Rather,

certainly,

this statement of Rav Ashi is nonsense.

The Gemara now returns to what was explained above, that Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yoḥanan disputed whether teruma nowadays is by Torah law or rabbinic law, and asks:

We inquire:

And

does

Rabbi Yoḥanan hold

that

teruma nowadays is

by Torah law? But it was taught in a beraita: If there were

two containers

of grain,

one containing non-sacred produce and one containing teruma.

And before them

were

two se’a

of grain,

one containing non-sacred produce and one containing teruma.

And these fell into those,

the se’a into the containers—

these are permitted,

even the container of non-sacred produce, and we do not fear that the container of non-sacred produce became mixed with teruma through the se’a of teruma that fell into it—

because

I say [that is, I can resolve the doubt leniently and say]:

The

teruma se’a

fell into

the container of

teruma, and the se’a of

non-sacred produce

fell into

the container of

non-sacred produce.

And Reish Lakish said: This is so when the non-sacred produce exceeds

the teruma in the container of non-sacred produce, so that even if the teruma fell into the container of non-sacred produce, it would be nullified by the majority. Therefore, we “attribute” the fall and say that the non-sacred produce fell into the non-sacred produce, and the teruma fell into the teruma.

because

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Even though the non-sacred produce does not exceed

the teruma,

the two containers are nevertheless permitted [and below, the Gemara explains Rabbi Yoḥanan’s reasoning in greater detail].

of teruma

The Gemara now raises a difficulty:

Granted, according to Reish Lakish,

who holds that teruma nowadays is rabbinic, there is no difficulty for you as to why the non-sacred produce must exceed the teruma, and attribution alone is insufficient, since

he holds that

even with regard to rabbinic law,

an excess is required.

Without a majority, one may not attribute the matter leniently.

But according to Rabbi Yoḥanan,

who holds that teruma nowadays is by Torah law,

it is difficult: How can we rely on “I say” to permit the containers when the non-sacred produce does not exceed the teruma [Tosafot], in a case of teruma by Torah law?!

by

And we answer: Rabbi Yoḥanan could say to you:

This

beraita—

whose view is it? It is the view of the Rabbis,

who hold that teruma nowadays is rabbinic.

the two storage bins are permitted [and later the Gemara explains Rabbi Yohanan’s reasoning in greater detail].

And now this is difficult:

Granted, according to Rish Lakish,

who holds that teruma nowadays is rabbinic, there is no difficulty as to why it is necessary for the non-sacred produce to exceed the teruma, and why attribution alone is not enough, since

he holds that

Rish Lakish

also in a matter governed by rabbinic law—

we require an excess.

Without an excess, we do not attribute the matter leniently.

But according to Rabbi Yohanan,

who holds that teruma nowadays is from the Torah, it is

difficult:

how can we rely on the statement “I say” to permit the storage bins when the non-sacred produce did not exceed the teruma [Tosafot], in a matter of teruma governed by Torah law?!

And we answer: Rabbi Yohanan could say:

This

baraita

is according to whom?

Who stated it?

It is according to the Rabbis,

who hold that teruma nowadays is rabbinic.