Yevamot 82a — the Talmud in English

And we explain:

Rabbi Yehuda follows his own reasoning, for he says

throughout the entire Torah:

a species mixed with its own species is not nullified.

We ask further:

But if it was not dissolved, what [is the law]?

And is it that

it does not rise?!

If so,

—until the tan\-nai taught—at the end of the

but a piece of pure hatat that became mixed with one hundred pieces of pure non-sacred produce does not rise,

and that is because, in the case of pure [hatat], it has a remedy: to sell it to a kohen at a small loss—

let him distinguish and teach it with regard to that same matter [ [למה לא חילק התנא בחתיכה של חטאת טמאה עצמה] שאין בה תקנה למוכרה לכהן, ויאמר ] [why did the tanna not distinguish with regard to the piece of impure hatat itself,] which has no remedy of selling it to a kohen, and say:

—why did the tan\-nai not distinguish within the case of a piece of impure sin-offering itself, which has no remedy of selling it to a koen, and say:

In what case are these words stated—

that an impure piece or slice is nullified—

when it was dissolved

and is not significant.

But if it was not dissolved,

and it is something “whose manner is to be counted”—then this is

not to rise?!

And we answer:

[the case of] pure [produce] among pure [produce] is preferable to him

to inform us that it is not nullified, rather than [the case of] impure teruma among pure [produce].

And because [the case of] pure [produce] among pure [produce] is more appropriate for nullification, since in this matter the tannaim did not disagree whether it is nullified [when it is not a thing counted]. Whereas with impure [produce] among pure [produce], the tannaim disagreed whether it is nullified, as explained in Terumot, chapter 5, Mishna 3.

And furthermore, it is preferable for him to inform us [of the law] in the case of [a piece that] was dissolved, for in any event there are times when it is not nullified.

And

And we raise an objection

against Reish Lakish,

who explains the beraita as referring to [a piece that] was dissolved: if so,

what is different in the first clause,

a piece and a slice that are impure, which are nullified,

and what is different in the last clause,

a piece and a slice that are pure, which are not nullified—

But since it was dissolved and the prohibited matter is not present as such at all, even though it is possible to sell them to a kohen at a small loss, they should have been nullified?!

Rav Shisha, son of Rav Idi, said,

to explain the distinction between the first clause and the last clause according to Reish Lakish:

The matter always concerns [a piece that] was dissolved. And the reason of the first tanna is that, with a prohibition from the Torah, even according to him, “a species mixed with its own species is not nullified.” However, with a rabbinic prohibition, we do not decree on account of a prohibition from the Torah.

And this is how the beraita is explained:

The first clause,

which speaks of impure hatat and the showbread, concerns a case in which they became impure

through the impurity of liquids,

which renders things impure only

which renders impure only

, [ [כלומר: טומאת החתיכה והפרוסה היא על ידי משקין טמאים שנגעו בכלי - שאין טומאת הכלי אלא מדרבנן, כי מן התורה אין משקין מטמאין כלי - ונגעו החטאת או לחם הפנים באותו כלי] [that is: the impurity of the piece and the slice is through impure liquids that touched a vessel—for the impurity of the vessel is only rabbinic, since according to the Torah liquids do not render a vessel impure—and the hatat or the showbread touched that vessel].

And since their prohibition is only rabbinic, therefore they are nullified when they are dissolved, even though they are a species mixed with its own species.

But

the last clause,

which speaks of a sin-offering and showbread that are pure with regard to a non-koen, whose prohibition is

which speaks of hatat and the showbread with regard to a non-kohen, whose prohibition is

, therefore they are not nullified, even though they are dissolved, since they are a species mixed with its own species.

And we object:

but

in the case of an impure sin-offering and impure showbread that became impure through

hatat and the showbread that became impure through

, which is from the Torah, and they were dissolved—

what [is the law]?

And is it that

it does not rise,

that it is not nullified because it is a species mixed with its own species?

If so,

rather than teaching in the last clause: but a piece of pure hatat that became mixed with one hundred pieces of pure non-sacred produce—

it does not rise.

let him object:

Let him distinguish and teach it with regard to that same matter:

But with regard to impurity imparted by a creeping creature, it does not

In what case are these words stated? With the impurity of liquids.

But with the impurity of a creeping creature, not

does it rise?!

And we answer:

[the case of] pure [produce] among pure [produce] is preferable to him,

as was explained above.

Rabba said:

this is how the distinction between the first clause and the last clause is to be explained according to the view of Reish Lakish, following the answer of Rav Shisha, son of Rav Idi: this tanna holds that, rabbinically, a species mixed with its own species is not nullified. However, they decreed only with regard to a prohibition of lav, and not with regard to a prohibition of karet. And this is how the beraita is explained:

The first clause,

which speaks of impure sacred food, is referring to a case in which the

which speaks of impure sacred [items], the

against eating it is only

against eating them is only a

, “and the flesh that touches anything impure shall not be eaten,” and therefore the Sages did not decree, with regard to a species mixed with its own species, that it should not be nullified [since they were dissolved].

But

the last clause,

which speaks of sacred food mixed with non-sacred food, is referring to a case in which, if we permit it, one might come to eat it while impure in body, which is

which speaks of sacred [items] that became mixed with non-sacred produce, such that if we permit them, he may come to eat them with bodily impurity, which is a

The difficulty remains unresolved!

And

we raise a question against this:

But was it not Rabba who said: In every matter governed by Torah law,

,

and in such a case the Sages decreed that a species mixed with its own species should not be nullified.

If the Sages were concerned about a prohibition punishable by karet, they were also concerned about a prohibition punishable by lashes, and they enacted a remedy?!

This is difficult!

Rav Ashi said: The latter clause

which speaks of pure sacred food mixed with non-sacred food; since it is permitted to koanim, it does not become nullified—

is because it is an item that has a way to become permitted,

meaning that it is permitted to a koen.

And any item that has a way to become permitted—

For

even in a mixture of one in a thousand, it does not become nullified.

And the Gemara says:

But this statement of Rav Ashi

—that an item forbidden to one person but permitted to another is considered “an item that has a way to become permitted” and does not become nullified—

is nonsense

itself!

That is, Rav Ashi never said this [Ritva]. The term “an item that has a way to become permitted” applies only to a case such as an egg laid on a Festival: today it is forbidden, and tomorrow it will be permitted to the person for whom it was forbidden.

For

whom,

for which person, is this considered an item that has a way to become permitted?

If for a koen—

it is already permitted

now

and

if for an Israelite—

it is

forever

Rabbi Yoḥanan hold

forbidden,

and this is not an item that has a way to become permitted.

Rather,

certainly,

that statement of Rav Ashi is nonsense.

And now the Gemara returns to what was explained above, that Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yohanan disagreed whether teruma nowadays is from the Torah or rabbinic, and we ask:

And we consider this:

And

and whether

Rabbi Yohanan held

that

that

is

is

But it was taught in a beraita:

If there were

two baskets

of grain,

one of non-sacred produce and one of teruma.

And before them

there were

two seahs

of grain,

one of non-sacred produce and one of teruma.

And these fell into those,

the seahs into the baskets—

these are permitted,

and even the basket of non-sacred produce, and we are not concerned that perhaps the basket of non-sacred produce became mixed with teruma through the seah of teruma that fell into it—

because

I say [ [כלומר: יכול אני "לתלות" להקל, ולומר] [that is: I can “attribute” the matter leniently and say]:

that is, I can take the matter leniently and say:

The seah of

teruma—

into

the basket of

teruma it fell, and

the seah of

non-sacred produce—

into

the basket of

non-sacred produce they fell.

And Reish Lakish said: and this is when the non-sacred produce became more numerous

that was in the basket of non-sacred produce

than

the seah of

teruma,

so that it follows that even if the teruma fell into the basket of non-sacred produce, it is nullified by the majority. Therefore, we “attribute” the matter and say that the non-sacred produce fell into the non-sacred produce, and the teruma fell into the teruma.

And Rabbi Yohanan said: even though the non-sacred produce did not become more numerous than

the teruma,

the two baskets are permitted [and below in the Gemara Rabbi Yohanan’s reasoning is explained in greater detail].

And now it is difficult:

granted, according to Reish Lakish,

who holds that teruma nowadays is rabbinic, it is not difficult for you why it is necessary that the non-sacred produce became more numerous than the teruma, and attribution is not sufficient, since

he holds

Reish Lakish

even with regard to rabbinic [law]—

it is a majority that we require.

But without a majority, we do not attribute the matter leniently.

But according to Rabbi Yohanan,

who holds that teruma nowadays is from the Torah—

it is difficult

how do we rely on permitting the baskets because of “I say” when the non-sacred produce did not become more numerous than the teruma [Tosafot], in a matter of teruma from the Torah?!

And we answer: Rabbi Yohanan could say to you:

this

this beraita

whose [opinion is this]

Who stated it?

it is the Rabbis’,

who hold that teruma nowadays is rabbinic.