Yevamot 81a (פא.) — the Talmud in English

Shall we say that it is

our Mishna

a refutation of Rav Hamnuna?

For he said: If a yevama awaiting levirate marriage committed adultery—

she is disqualified from marrying the yavam

as the wife of a married man who committed adultery while married, who is forbidden to her husband. And according to his view, she is a zona and is forbidden to marry a kohen. But this poses a difficulty from our Mishna, which says that the woman who is a yevama awaiting levirate marriage to healthy brothers is not disqualified from marrying a kohen unless she committed adultery with her husband’s castrated brother?!

That is: This works out well if we do not accept the view of Rav Huna, for she does not become a zona, since the other man was not originally a stranger to her: Before she married this man, she had been permitted to him, and therefore he did not render her a zona.

But according to Rav Hamnuna, who equates a yevama awaiting levirate marriage who committed adultery with the wife of a married man who committed adultery, she is a zona and is disqualified from marrying a kohen.

And we answer:

No

the inference is not as you understood it: It does not follow from the fact that the Mishna mentioned only her castrated husband, and not another man, that if she committed adultery with another man she is not disqualified from marrying a kohen.

Rather,

the same law applies even

if she had intercourse

with another man—

also

she is disqualified from marrying a kohen.

And

the reason that we stated that intercourse with her castrated husband disqualifies her is that

since

when

the first clause was taught

that a castrated man who performed halitza with his yevama does not disqualify her,

in his case,

[the castrated man], since this law applies only to a castrated man,

the latter clause was likewise taught

that intercourse with her husband disqualifies her,

in his case,

and not with another man.

We learned in the Mishna:

And likewise, with regard to an aylonit with whom the brothers performed halitza

they did not disqualify her; if they had intercourse with her, they disqualified her, because her intercourse is licentious intercourse:

And we infer:

The reason is that they had intercourse with her

the brothers; only then did they disqualify her from marrying a kohen.

Had they not had intercourse with her,

the brothers—

no,

she would not be disqualified from marrying a kohen merely by virtue of being an aylonit—

In accordance with whose view

is our Mishna?—

Not in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda’s view.

For if it were in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, he says: An aylonit is a zona,

and she is forbidden to marry a kohen, because the very nature of intercourse with her is licentious intercourse: Since she is incapable of bearing children and of reproduction, as it is written: “They acted licentiously and did not reproduce,” you have learned that any intercourse that does not lead to reproduction is nothing other than licentious intercourse.

Mishna:

A sun-eunuch who is a kohen—

who is permitted to marry a Jewish woman—

who married a Jewish woman,

this man

feeds her teruma

like other kohanim.

But a man-made eunuch is one with crushed genitals, and he does not feed his wife teruma.

Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon say: An androgynos who is a kohen and married a Jewish woman,

this man

feeds her teruma.

And the Gemara will explain their view: Whether their reason is that, in their opinion, an androgynos is certainly male, or whether he is of uncertain male and female status, but with regard to rabbinic teruma he feeds her even in a case of uncertainty.

Rabbi Yehuda says: A tumtum whose covering was torn and who was found to be male,

and who has another brother—

he should not perform halitza,

he

because he is like a eunuch,

that is, he cannot father children.

Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon further said:

An androgynos may marry

a woman,

but may not be married

to a man, since an androgynos is male, and one who has intercourse with him is like one who has intercourse with a male.

Rabbi Eliezer says: An androgynos

with whom a male had intercourse,

they are liable to stoning,

as though he had intercourse with a

male.

The Gemara will explain the point of disagreement between Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Eliezer.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: A sun-eunuch who is a kohen and married a Jewish woman feeds her teruma:

And we raise a difficulty concerning this: Is it not

obvious

that he feeds her teruma? Why did the tanna need to teach us this?!

And we explain: There is a novel element in this ruling, for

lest you say

that since the Torah states: “And those born in his house, they shall eat of his bread,” and we read it as: “They shall feed others of his bread,” we might derive from the wording “those born” that only a kohen who

can father children

is the one who

feeds

teruma.

But a kohen

who cannot father children does not feed—

it teaches us

that he too feeds her.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon say: An androgynos

who is a kohen and married a Jewish woman feeds her teruma:

Reish Lakish said:

An androgynos, according to Rabbi Yosei, is of uncertain male and female status.

Therefore, he does not

feed her

except

teruma,

since teruma is rabbinic, as the Gemara proceeds to explain,

but he does not feed her from the breast and thigh,

which are given to kohanim and are forbidden to non-kohanim.

Since they are forbidden to non-kohanim by Torah law, he does not feed them to his wife, for it is uncertain whether the betrothal to his wife took effect: Perhaps he is female, and a female cannot betroth another female.

Rabbi Yohanan says: He even feeds her from the breast and thigh,

for according to Rabbi Yosei an androgynos is certainly male; therefore, he feeds her even from the breast and thigh, which are governed by Torah law.

And according to Reish Lakish,

who distinguishes between teruma, from which an androgynos feeds his wife, and the breast and thigh, from which he does not feed her, there is a difficulty:

What is different about the breast and thigh

that an androgynos does not feed them to his wife, because the prohibition against a non-kohen eating the breast and thigh is

by Torah law,

whereas the prohibition against a non-kohen eating

teruma is also

a prohibition

by Torah law

?!

And we answer:

Here,

in our Mishna,

we are dealing with teruma in the present era,

whose entire status at present is only

rabbinic.

It is forbidden to non-kohanim only by rabbinic law. Since it is possible that the androgynos is male, his wife eats teruma as a matter of uncertainty, for in a case of rabbinic uncertainty, the ruling is lenient.

The Gemara raises a difficulty concerning this interpretation of Reish Lakish’s words:

But when the Temple is standing—

what

will be the status of the androgynos’s wife with regard to teruma, according to Reish Lakish? Will she

not

eat teruma then, since at that time teruma is governed by Torah law?!

But if so,

rather than teaching

Reish Lakish

“he does not feed her from the breast and thigh”

which are governed by Torah law and apply when the Temple is standing, since according to you, in explaining Reish Lakish’s words, he permitted her only teruma in the present era, which is rabbinic—

let Reish Lakish distinguish

Reish Lakish

and teach it with regard to teruma itself [

teruma itself], and let Reish Lakish say as follows:

When does this matter

that she eats

teruma?

In the present era, when it is only

rabbinic.

But teruma

when the Temple is standing, when it is governed by

Torah law—

no,

the androgynos does not feed it to his wife.

Why, then, did Reish Lakish need to distinguish and say that when the Temple is standing she does not eat the breast and thigh, when at that time she does not even eat teruma?! And we answer:

This is also what he is saying

Reish Lakish:

When he feeds her—

he feeds her teruma in the present era,

since teruma is only

rabbinic.

But

nevertheless,

he does not feed her

teruma

when

they eat

the breast and thigh,

when the Temple is standing,

and even

not

rabbinic teruma

does he feed her then—for example, the teruma of tree fruit, which is rabbinic in all eras.

And this is because of a decree,

lest she come

[lest the woman come]

to eat it

[to eat] also

teruma governed by Torah law.

And

if

Rabbi Yohanan said: He even feeds her

when the Temple is standing

from the breast and thigh,

since an androgynos is entirely male.

Rabbi Yohanan said to Reish Lakish: Do you think that teruma in the present era is rabbinic

because the sanctity departed from the Land when Israel was exiled from it?!

He said to him,

Reish Lakish said to Rabbi Yohanan:

No,

indeed, teruma in the present era is rabbinic!

a. Teruma—both teruma governed by Torah law and rabbinic teruma—is not nullified by a majority like other prohibitions; it is nullified only by a ratio of one to one hundred. That is: If there were one measure of teruma against one hundred measures of non-sacred produce, the teruma would be nullified.

b. Significant teruma [or another Torah prohibition involving a significant item], which is sold by number rather than by estimation, is not nullified at all. This law applies to teruma governed by Torah law; but teruma in the present era, according to the view that it is rabbinic, is nullified.

c. The teruma of fruit is only rabbinic even when the Temple is standing, since teruma governed by Torah law applies only to grain, wine, and oil [Rashi’s view].

d. Significant teruma of fruit when the Temple is standing [or in the present era, according to the view that teruma in the present era is governed by Torah law] is not nullified. This is because we impose a decree on rabbinic teruma of fruit on account of teruma of grain, wine, and oil, which is governed by Torah law. Its status is not like that of teruma in the present era, with regard to which we do not impose a decree on account of Torah law, since in the present era teruma governed by Torah law does not apply at all.

Since

I teach

a beraita in which it is stated:

A fig cake is nullified among fig cakes.

That is: If a fig cake of teruma fell among one hundred non-sacred fig cakes, the fig cake is nullified.

This proves that teruma in the present era is rabbinic, for if teruma in the present era applied by Torah law, the fig cake—which is a significant item and is sold by number—would not be nullified.

And although in either event the teruma of the fig cake is not teruma governed by Torah law, since it is the teruma of fruit, nevertheless, if teruma in the present era were governed by Torah law, we would have to impose a decree concerning rabbinic teruma on account of teruma governed by Torah law.

Rather, it is certainly the case that teruma in the present era is only rabbinic, and since at present there is no teruma governed by Torah law at all, they did not decree that it should not be nullified on account of teruma governed by Torah law.

Rabbi Yohanan said to him,

Rabbi Yohanan said to Reish Lakish: Is it indeed the case that the fig cake of dried figs is nullified, as you taught, because its prohibition is only rabbinic, as you explained?!

But I teach

another beraita, which states: Even

a piece

of meat from a ritually impure sin-offering—which too is sold by number, like the fig cake, and is equally significant—that became mixed

with

one hundred

pieces

of ritually pure meat

is nullified,

being nullified by the majority despite the fact that its prohibition is governed by Torah law?!

If so, it is proven that the fig cake and the piece of meat are nullified not because their prohibitions are rabbinic, but because these items are not considered significant. For:

Do you think that “anything ordinarily sold by number”

[something that is generally not sold by estimation but by number]

is what we taught

is not nullified because of its significance?!

That is not so. Rather,

“anything that is sold by number”

[something that is always sold by number because of its significance, and is never sold by estimation because of its significance] is what

we taught

is not nullified because of its significance.

The piece of meat and the fig cake are not sufficiently significant to prevent their nullification, since these items are sometimes sold by estimation rather than by number.

And since the fig cake is not significant, we therefore learned: A fig cake is nullified among fig cakes. You cannot prove from here that teruma in the present era is rabbinic.

And the Gemara explains:

What is it?

Where did we learn that an item sold by number is not nullified, which is the subject of the dispute between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yohanan concerning what was taught?

For we learned:

[Clover is a type of legume, used to season a pot] A person who had bundles of clover

from forbidden mixtures in a vineyard—

they are forbidden for benefit, and

they must be burned, since forbidden mixtures in a vineyard are subject to burning, as the verse states: “You shall not sow your vineyard with diverse kinds, lest the fullness of the seed that you have sown and the produce of the vineyard become consecrated.”

And the Sages expounded: “Become consecrated” is as though the verse had said, “be consumed by fire,” teaching that forbidden mixtures in a vineyard are burned.

And the Sages expounded: “Be consecrated” means as though the verse had said, “be burned by fire,” teaching that forbidden mixtures in a vineyard must be burned.

And if

they became mixed

those forbidden bundles

with

bundles

other

that are permitted -