Yevamot 7a — the Talmud in English

And what

mitzva of

the Temple service

of an offering in the Temple,

which is

a mitzva

of greater stringency,

and

because of its stringency it

overrides Shabbat—

and nevertheless

“murder”,

that is, the mitzva to put the murderer to death,

overrides it,

the mitzva of the Temple service.

As it is stated

concerning the mitzva to put the murderer to death:

“From My altar—

you shall take him to die.”

For even if the murderer were in the Temple and wished to perform the service, the court would send [people], and they would take him from there, in order to punish him with the death penalty that he deserved [except if the murderer were upon the altar, with the service in his hand].

And it is demonstrated from here that the stringency of the mitzva to punish one liable for death is preferable to the mitzva of the Temple service. And all the more so is it preferable to the mitzva of Shabbat, which is overridden on account of the service.

And if so,

Shabbat, which is overridden on account of the service

in the Temple—

is it not logical that “murder”

that is, the mitzva to punish the sinner,

should override it!

And the Gemara continues to explain the words of the tanna of the school of Rabbi Ishmael:

And

since he has a kal va-chomer that the mitzva to punish the sinner should override Shabbat—

what is the meaning of “or is it not,” as he says

the tanna of the school of Rabbi Ishmael, that the court’s execution should not override Shabbat!?

This is what he says: The burial of a met mitzva proves it! For

although its stringency is such that it

overrides

even

the

mitzva of

the service

in the Temple,

and

nevertheless

it does not override Shabbat.

And from here we learn that also “murder,” the execution of the sinner, although it overrides the service, will not override Shabbat.

For the mitzva of executing the sinner is not as stringent as the mitzva of burying a met mitzva, and if the burial of a met mitzva does not override Shabbat, all the more so the mitzva of executing the sinner does not override Shabbat.

And therefore he said: “Or is it not, rather even the court’s execution does not override Shabbat.”

And that which he again said, “Or is it not, rather even on Shabbat,” is explained as follows:

He then said: The burial of a met mitzva

itself, we learn that it

should override Shabbat, by a kal va-chomer:

And what of the service, which overrides Shabbat—

nevertheless

the burial of a met mitzva overrides it,

as we learned [in tractate Megilla 3b]

from “and for his sister—

he shall become impure.”

Shabbat, which is overridden on account of the service—

is it not logical that the burial of a met mitzva should override it!

The verse says:

[Exodus 35]

“You shall not kindle

fire in all your settlements on the day of Shabbat.”

And if so, we cannot learn from here that a positive commandment overrides Shabbat, and the question again returns: why is “upon her” necessary?

But before the Gemara continues, it explains what its course was in understanding the words of the tanna of the school of Rabbi Ishmael, according to the premise that it initially assumed: that one should learn from his words that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition for which there is karet, and therefore the verse had to say that the court’s execution does not override Shabbat.

According to what initially arose in mind,

according to what we initially established in our understanding of the words of the tanna of the school of Rabbi Ishmael,

that a positive commandment comes and overrides a prohibition—

what is the meaning of “or is it not

even the court’s execution does not override Shabbat,”

as he says

the tanna of the school of Rabbi Ishmael?

For according to this initial assumption, since in his view a positive commandment overrides a prohibition for which there is karet, why did he retract? And why should the mitzva of executing the sinner not override Shabbat?

And we answer:

this is what he says,

the tanna of the school of Rabbi Ishmael, according to our initial understanding:

How do I apply

[Exodus 31]

“He who profanes it shall surely be put to death”—

to the other labors, except for the court’s execution.

But the court’s execution

does

override Shabbat,

since

a positive commandment comes and overrides a prohibition.

He then said,

but he again said, “Or is it not, rather even in the case of the court’s execution”:

For from where do we have grounds to assume that a positive commandment overrides even a prohibition for which there is karet?

Say that we say: A positive commandment comes and overrides a prohibition—

an ordinary prohibition.

But

a prohibition for which there is karet—

have you heard that it overrides?

He then

retracted and

said, “Or is it not, rather even on Shabbat,” since it can be demonstrated that the initial assumption was correct, and indeed a positive commandment overrides even a prohibition for which there is karet.

For

is it so,

how does

a positive commandment override a prohibition?

No,

is it not that

the prohibition is more stringent than it

is than a positive commandment, for violating a prohibition one receives lashes, whereas for nullifying a positive commandment, or violating a “positive-commandment prohibition,” one does not receive lashes.

And

if nevertheless we find that

a positive commandment comes

the lenient one

and overrides it,

the stringent prohibition, there is again no limit to distinguishing between a prohibition for which there is karet and a prohibition for which there is no karet. For logically even a prohibition in itself is more stringent than a positive commandment, and nevertheless it is overridden on account of it.

And if so,

what difference is there to me

the overriding of

a minor stringency

[of an ordinary prohibition],

and what difference is there to me

the overriding of

a major stringency

[of a prohibition for which there is karet]!

The verse says, “You shall not kindle

fire in all your settlements on the day of Shabbat.”

And now, after the Gemara has explained the understanding of the words of the tanna of the school of Rabbi Ishmael according to the initial assumption, it returns to the conclusion: the tanna of the school of Rabbi Ishmael does not hold that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition for which there is karet; rather, he relied on the kal va-chomer that the mitzva of executing the sinner should override Shabbat, and therefore he needed to expound from “You shall not kindle fire in all your settlements” that it does not override.

And the question again returns to its place: for what purpose is the teaching of “upon her” needed!?

And the Gemara brings a new course in explaining the teaching of “upon her”:

Rather,

therefore

it is necessary: “upon her,” since

it might enter your mind to say, this wife of a brother is

“a matter that was included in the general rule and emerged from the general rule—

to teach.”

For the wife of a brother was included among all the forbidden sexual relations that are liable for karet, for at the end of the section of forbidden sexual relations, which includes the wife of a brother, it is stated: “For anyone who performs any of all these abominations—and they shall be cut off!”

And it emerged from the general rule, for if the brother died without children, she enters yibbum.

And one of the thirteen principles by which the Torah is expounded [the eighth principle in the beraita of the thirteen principles, which Rabbi Ishmael would say] is the principle:

“A matter that was included in the general rule and emerged from the general rule, to teach”—

it did not emerge to teach about itself

alone,

but it emerged to teach about the entire general rule!

And as

it was taught

in tractate Keritot [2b]:

A matter that was included in the general rule and emerged from the general rule

to teach: it did not emerge to teach about itself [alone], but it emerged to teach about the entire general rule.

How so?

It is stated concerning a person who eats sacrificial meat while impure [Leviticus 7]:

“And the person who eats the flesh of the sacrifice of the peace-offerings

that belongs to him,

with his impurity upon him—

that person shall be cut off from his people.”

Now were not the peace-offerings included

among all the

sacrificial

offerings concerning which karet was stated for eating them in impurity,

and why did they emerge

from the general rule of the sacrificial offerings, to be written separately?

Rather, the peace-offerings emerged from the general rule of the sacrificial offerings in order

to compare to them

the other sacrificial offerings,

and to tell you

that only for eating offerings while he is impure is one liable for karet, and not for eating other sacred things that are not offerings:

Just as the peace-offerings are distinctive

in that they are

sacrificial offerings of the altar

and one who eats them while impure is liable for karet,

so too all sacrificial offerings of the altar,

only for them is one who eats them while impure liable for karet.

Sacred things for the repair of the Temple were excluded,

for one who eats them while impure is not liable for karet!

And

here too,

with regard to the mitzva of yibbum,

this

forbidden sexual relation of

the wife of a brother was included in all the forbidden sexual relations.

And why did it emerge,

the forbidden sexual relation of the wife of a brother, to become permitted in the place of yibbum, as it is stated: “Her brother-in-law shall come upon her”?

Rather, for this reason the wife of a brother emerged from all the forbidden sexual relations in the place of yibbum,

to compare to it

the other forbidden sexual relations in the place of yibbum,

and to tell you: just as

the forbidden sexual relation of

the wife of a brother is permitted,

it is permitted in the place of yibbum,

so too all forbidden sexual relations are likewise permitted,

they are permitted in the place of yibbum.

And therefore “upon her” is necessary to reject this teaching concerning yibbum.

And we reject this:

are they comparable

the emergence of the peace-offerings from the general rule of all sacrificial offerings, and the emergence of the wife of a brother from the general rule of all forbidden sexual relations!?

For

there,

there, in the law of one who eats sacrificial offerings in impurity, the

general rule

is the eating of offerings

in the prohibition

of eating sacred things while impure in body,

and

the

specific case,

the peace-offering that emerged from the general rule, is also

within

the general rule of the

prohibition

of eating sacred things while impure in body.

And in the teaching from this principle of the Torah, the specific case did not emerge to teach a new matter concerning the general rule; rather, it comes only to limit the general rule, so that it will be only like the specific case.

And as it teaches there, that only offerings will be forbidden for impure people to eat, and not sacred things for the repair of the Temple.

But

here,

with regard to the mitzva of yibbum, the

general rule

of all the forbidden sexual relations is

in prohibition, and

whereas the

specific case

of the forbidden sexual relation of the wife of a brother, which emerged from the general rule in order to teach, is

in permission!

It teaches that the wife of a brother is permitted.

And this is not the principle in the Torah mentioned concerning the eating of sacrificial offerings!

Rather,

this

wife of a brother in the place of yibbum, which is a matter that emerged from the general rule of prohibition in order to teach a matter of permission,

is not comparable

to this principle in the Torah,

but to

another principle. And thus we learned, in the eleventh principle, in the beraita of the thirteen principles that Rabbi Ishmael would say:

“A matter that was included in the general rule and emerged

from it as a specific case,

to be judged by a new matter—

you cannot return it

to equate the specific case

with its general rule,

and you cannot equate the general rule with its specific case,

until the verse returns it to you explicitly,

to equate them.”

And likewise with yibbum: since the specific case of the wife of a brother emerged from the general rule of the other forbidden sexual relations in order to be judged by the new matter of permission for yibbum, you cannot equate the general rule of the forbidden sexual relations with it, and permit the other forbidden sexual relations for yibbum as well, for the verse did not return to equate them.

And if so, even without the teaching of “upon her,” there would be no basis for saying that the other forbidden sexual relations would be permitted for yibbum.

For it was taught: A matter that was included in the general rule and emerged

from it as a specific case

to be judged by a new matter—you are not permitted to return it

to equate the specific case

with its general rule,

and the general rule with its specific case,

until the verse returns it to you explicitly.

How so?

It is stated concerning the guilt-offering that a leper brings for his purification together with a sin-offering and a burnt-offering [Leviticus 14]:

“And he shall slaughter the lamb

of the guilt-offering

in the place where he shall slaughter the sin-offering and the burnt-offering, in the holy place.

For as is the law of the

law

of the sin-offering,

so is the law of

the guilt-offering, for the priest.”

For it is not necessary for Scripture to state

the end of the verse,

“as the sin-offering, so the guilt-offering.”

For with regard to the place of slaughter in the north, it was already stated at the beginning of the verse that the guilt-offering of the leper is to be slaughtered in the place of the sin-offering, which is in the north.

And with regard to the manner of placing its blood on the altar and with regard to eating its flesh, it is included among all guilt-offerings, in “This is the law of the leper”:

And

if so,

what does “as the sin-offering, so the guilt-offering” teach?

For what matter did Scripture need to equate them?

Since the guilt-offering of the leper emerged

from the general rule of guilt-offerings

to be judged by a new matter,

in the placing of blood on

the right thumb

of the leper,

and

on

the right great toe

of the leper

the right.

And since it emerged from the general rule of guilt-offerings,

it could be that the guilt-offering of the leper would not require

a guilt-offering

the placing of blood

and the burning of

the fats upon the altar

like the other guilt-offerings?