Yevamot 7a (ז.) — the Talmud in English

And what of the

mitzva of

Temple service

of an offering in the Temple,

which is a

mitzva

of great severity,

and

because of its severity it

overrides Shabbat—

and nevertheless,

“execution”

that is, the mitzva to execute the murderer,

overrides it,

the mitzva of Temple service.

As it is stated concerning the mitzva to execute the murderer [Exodus 21]:

“From My altar

you shall take him to die.”

Even if the murderer was in the Temple and wished to perform the Temple service, the court sends agents to take him from there, in order to punish him with the death penalty he deserves [except when the murderer is upon the altar, with his service in his hand].

It is evident from here that the severity of the mitzva to punish one who is liable for execution takes precedence over the mitzva of Temple service. All the more so, it takes precedence over the mitzva of Shabbat, which is overridden for the sake of the service.

And if so,

Shabbat, which is overridden for the sake of Temple service

in the Temple—

is it not logical that “execution”,

that is, the mitzva to punish the sinner,

should override it!

The Gemara continues to explain the words of the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael:

And

since he has a kal va-homer that the mitzva to punish the sinner should override Shabbat—

what is the meaning of “or perhaps,” which

the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael says, that execution by the court does not override Shabbat!?

This is what he is saying: The burial of a met mitzva proves otherwise! For

although its severity is such that it

overrides

even

the

mitzva of

Temple service

in the Temple,

and

nevertheless

it does not override Shabbat.

From here we learn that even “execution,” the execution of the sinner, although it overrides Temple service, does not override Shabbat.

For the mitzva of executing the sinner is not as severe as the mitzva of burying a met mitzva. And if burial of a met mitzva does not override Shabbat, all the more so the mitzva of executing the sinner does not override Shabbat.

And therefore he said: “Or perhaps, even execution by the court does not override Shabbat.”

And this is the explanation of his repeated statement, “Or perhaps, even on Shabbat”:

He then said: The burial of a met mitzva

itself should be learned to

override Shabbat, by means of a kal va-homer:

And just as Temple service, which overrides Shabbat—

nevertheless

the burial of a met mitzva overrides it,

as we learned [in tractate Megilla 3b]

from “and for his sister

he shall render himself impure.”

Shabbat, which is overridden for the sake of Temple service—

is it not logical that the burial of a met mitzva should override it!

The verse states: [Exodus 35]

[Exodus 35]

“You shall not kindle

a fire throughout your settlements on the day of Shabbat.”

And if so, we cannot learn from here that a positive mitzva overrides Shabbat, and the question returns: Why is the word “upon her” necessary?

Before continuing, the Gemara explains its line of reasoning in understanding the words of the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael, based on its initial assumption that one should learn from his words that a positive mitzva overrides a prohibition punishable by karet, and therefore the verse had to state that execution by the court does not override Shabbat.

According to what initially entered our minds,

according to our initial understanding of the words of the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael,

that a positive mitzva comes and overrides a prohibition—

what is the meaning of “or perhaps

even execution by the court does not override Shabbat,”

which

the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael says?

Yet according to this initial supposition, since in his view a positive mitzva overrides a prohibition punishable by karet, why did he retract this position? And why should the mitzva of executing the sinner not override Shabbat?

And we answer:

This is what

the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael was saying, according to our initial understanding:

How do I understand [Exodus 31]

[Exodus 31]

“Whoever profanes it shall surely be put to death”—

as referring to other forms of labor, excluding execution by the court.

But execution by the court

indeed

does override Shabbat,

since

a positive mitzva comes and overrides a prohibition.

He then said,

but he returned and said, “Or perhaps, even execution by the court”:

For where do we know that a positive mitzva overrides even a prohibition punishable by karet?

Granted, we say that a positive mitzva comes and overrides a prohibition—

an ordinary prohibition.

But

a prohibition punishable by karet—

have you heard that it overrides it?

He then

returned and

said, “Or perhaps, even on Shabbat,” since there is proof that the initial assumption was correct, and indeed a positive mitzva overrides even a prohibition punishable by karet.

For

is it so

how can

a positive mitzva override a prohibition?

No,

for

a prohibition is more severe than it,

than a positive mitzva, for violation of a prohibition is punishable by lashes, whereas one is not lashed for neglecting a positive mitzva or violating a “positive prohibition.”

And

if nevertheless we find that

a positive mitzva comes,

the lenient one,

and overrides it,

the more severe prohibition, then there is no basis for distinguishing between a prohibition punishable by karet and one not punishable by karet. For logically, even an ordinary prohibition is more severe than a positive mitzva, and nevertheless it is overridden by it.

And if so,

what difference is there

between overriding

a minor severity [of

an ordinary prohibition],

and what difference is there

between overriding

a major severity [of

a prohibition punishable by karet]!

The verse states: “You shall not kindle

a fire throughout your settlements on the day of Shabbat.”

Now, after the Gemara has explained the understanding of the words of the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael according to the initial supposition, it returns to the conclusion that the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael does not hold that a positive mitzva overrides a prohibition punishable by karet. Rather, he relied on the kal va-homer that the mitzva of executing the sinner should override Shabbat, and therefore he had to expound from “You shall not kindle a fire throughout your settlements” that it does not override it.

And the question has returned to its place: For what purpose is the derivation from “upon her” necessary?

The Gemara presents a new approach to explaining the derivation from “upon her”:

Rather,

therefore

it is necessary

for “upon her,” since

it might enter your mind to say that this wife of a brother is “a matter that was included in the general rule and then departed from the general rule—

to teach.”

For the wife of a brother was included among all the forbidden relations liable to karet, as it is stated at the end of the passage of forbidden relations, which includes the wife of a brother: “For whoever shall commit any of these abominations shall be cut off”!

And it departed from the general rule, in that if the brother dies without children, she enters into yibbum.

And one of the thirteen hermeneutical principles by which the Torah is interpreted [the eighth principle in the beraita of the thirteen principles, which Rabbi Yishmael would state] is the following principle:

“A matter that was included in the general rule and then departed from the general rule to teach”—

it did not depart merely to teach about itself

alone,

but departed to teach about the entire general rule!

And

as it was taught in tractate Keritot [2b]:

A matter that was included in the general rule and then departed from the general rule

to teach: it did not depart [merely] to teach about itself, but departed to teach about the entire general rule.

How so?

It is stated concerning one who eats sacrificial meat while impure [Leviticus 7]:

“And the person who eats the flesh of the sacrifice of peace-offerings

that belongs to him’,

while his impurity is upon him—

that person shall be cut off from his people.”

But were peace-offerings not included

among all the

sacrificial offerings

for which karet is stated for eating them in a state of impurity,

and why were they singled out

peace-offerings from all sacrificial offerings, to be written separately?

Rather, peace-offerings departed from the general category of sacrificial offerings in order

to compare to them

the other sacrificial offerings,

and to tell you

that one is liable to karet only for eating offerings while impure, and not for eating other sacred items that are not offerings:

Just as peace-offerings are distinguished

by the fact that they are

sacrifices consecrated for the altar

and one who eats them while impure is liable to karet,

so too, all sacrifices consecrated for the altar

are such that one who eats them while impure is liable to karet only for them.

Sacred property designated for Temple maintenance is excluded,

for one who eats it while impure is not liable to karet!

And

here too,

with regard to the mitzva of yibbum,

this

forbidden relationship of

the wife of a brother was included among all forbidden relations.

And why did

the forbidden relationship of a brother’s wife depart, to become permitted in the context of yibbum, as it is stated: “Her yavam shall come upon her”?

Rather, for this reason the wife of a brother departed from all the forbidden relations in the context of yibbum,

to compare to her

the other forbidden relations in the context of yibbum,

and to tell you: Just as

the forbidden relationship of

the wife of a brother is permitted,

she is permitted in the context of yibbum,

so too, all forbidden relations are permitted,

they are permitted in the context of yibbum.

And therefore “upon her” is necessary to reject this derivation concerning yibbum.

And we reject this:

Are these cases comparable—

the departure of peace-offerings from the general category of sacrificial offerings and the departure of a brother’s wife from the general category of forbidden relations!?

For

there,

there, in the law concerning one who eats sacred food in a state of impurity, the

general rule

concerning the eating of offerings is

a prohibition

against eating sacred food in a state of bodily impurity,

and

the

specific case,

the peace-offering that departed from the general rule is also

within the

general

prohibition

against eating sacred food in a state of bodily impurity.

And in the derivation based on this principle of the Torah, the specific case did not depart to teach a novel law about the general rule; rather, it comes only to limit the general rule, so that it applies only to cases resembling the specific case.

As it teaches there, that only offerings are forbidden for impure persons to eat, and not sacred property designated for Temple maintenance.

But

here,

with regard to the mitzva of yibbum, the

general rule

concerning all forbidden relations is

a prohibition, and

whereas the

specific case

of the forbidden relationship of a brother’s wife, which departed from the general rule to teach, is

a permission!

to teach that a brother’s wife is permitted.

And this is not the principle of the Torah mentioned with regard to eating sacred food!

Rather,

this—

the wife of a brother in the context of yibbum, which is a matter that departed from a general prohibition to teach a matter of permission,

is not comparable

to this principle of the Torah,

but rather to

another principle. And so we learned, as the eleventh principle in the beraita of the thirteen principles that Rabbi Yishmael would state:

“A matter that was included in the general rule and then departed

from it as a specific case,

to be judged through a novel matter—

which you cannot return

to equate the specific case

with its general rule,

nor equate the general rule with its specific case,

until the verse explicitly returns it to you

to equate them.”

So too with yibbum: Since the specific case of a brother’s wife departed from the general rule of the other forbidden relations to be judged through the novel matter of permission for yibbum, you cannot equate the general rule of all forbidden relations with it and permit the other forbidden relations for yibbum as well, since the verse did not return to equate them.

And if so, even without the derivation from “upon her,” there would be no basis for saying that the other forbidden relations would also be permitted for yibbum.

As it was taught: A matter that was included in the general rule and then departed

from it as a specific case

to be judged through a novel matter—you may not return it

to equate the specific case

with its general rule,

or the general rule with its specific case,

until the verse explicitly returns it to you.

How so?

It is stated concerning the guilt-offering brought by a leper for his purification, together with a sin-offering and a burnt-offering [Leviticus 14]:

“And he shall slaughter the sheep

of the guilt-offering

in the place where he shall slaughter the sin-offering and the burnt-offering, in the sacred place.

For just as the

law of

the sin-offering

is the law of

the guilt-offering, for the priest.”

It is not necessary for the verse to state

the end of the verse,

“Like the sin-offering, so is the guilt-offering”.

For with regard to the place of slaughter in the north, it was already stated at the beginning of the verse that the guilt-offering of the leper is to be slaughtered in the place of the sin-offering, which is in the north.

And with regard to the manner of presenting its blood on the altar and eating its flesh, it is included among all guilt-offerings, in “This is the law of the leper”:

And

if so,

what is the purpose of stating, “Like the sin-offering, so is the guilt-offering”?

For what matter did the verse need to equate them?

Since the guilt-offering of the leper departed

from the general category of guilt-offerings,

to be judged through a novel matter,

in the placement of blood upon

the thumb

of the leper’s right hand,

and

upon

the big toe

of the leper

of the right foot.

And since it departed from the general category of guilt-offerings,

one might think that the guilt-offering of the leper would not require

the guilt-offering of the leper

the presentation of blood

and the burning of

the sacrificial portions upon the altar

as do the other guilt-offerings?