Yevamot 6b — the Talmud in English

What [is meant by] the “observance” stated concerning Shabbat— ![](pamud.bmp "

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you are not in fear of Shabbat,

for behold, “fear” was not stated concerning it,

but

of the Holy One,

of the One who commanded concerning Shabbat.

So too, the fear stated concerning the Temple—

you are not in fear of the Temple, but of the One who commanded

concerning the Temple.

And what is this fear of the Temple?

A person may not enter the Temple Mount with his staff, with his shoe, with his money-belt

[a hollow belt around his loins that serves as a purse for money],

or with dust upon his feet, nor may he make it a shortcut,

so that he should not shorten his way from one place to another by passing through the Temple Mount.

And he may not do all these things because of fear of the Temple.

And spitting

is forbidden there,

by a kal va-chomer

[from his shoe, Berakhot 54a, and see Rashi]. Since it is repulsive, and it is a disgraceful matter, and this is not [merely] fear of the Temple.

And I know

that one must conduct himself with fear on the Temple Mount

only when the Temple is standing.

When the Temple is not standing—

from where

do we know that even then one must conduct himself with fear there?

The verse teaches:

[Leviticus 19]

“You shall observe My Shabbatot, and you shall fear My Sanctuary.”

The verse compared fear of the Temple to Shabbat, to teach:

Just as the observance stated concerning Shabbat

is

forever—

so too the fear stated concerning the Temple

is observance

forever.

And if so, one cannot prove from the fact that it again wrote, “You shall observe My Shabbatot and fear My Sanctuary, I am the Lord,” that a positive commandment overrides a negative commandment involving karet even when not in a place of the fulfillment of a mitzva.

And the question returns: For what purpose is “upon it” needed? Behold, levirate marriage is not the fulfillment of a mitzva, and it is obvious that it does not override the prohibition of a forbidden relation!?

And the Gemara brings another way to resolve this:

Rather, it might enter your mind to say, let the mitzva of levirate marriage come

to override the prohibition of forbidden relations,

from

the labor of

kindling

on Shabbat.

And therefore the exposition of “upon it” is needed, in order to reject this.

For a tanna of the school of

the study house of

Rabbi Ishmael

said: Behold, the Torah said concerning Shabbat, “You shall not perform any labor,” and all the labors are included in this.

And if so, regarding what the verse said [Exodus 35]

“You shall not kindle fire in all your settlements”—

what does it teach?

What does it come to teach?

And before the Gemara brings the continuation of the words of the tanna of the school of Rabbi Ishmael, it is astonished at his question and clarifies his words: And we are astonished: Is one to ask concerning the verse, “You shall not kindle fire”—

what does it teach?

But tannaim disputed the meaning of the matter, as will be explained in the beraita below, so how does the tanna of the school of Rabbi Ishmael ask, “What does it teach?”!?

If according to Rabbi Yose,

the verse comes to say that the labor of kindling—for its prohibition

“a negative commandment”

—went out from the category of the [other] labors, as will be explained below in the beraita.

If according to Rabbi Natan,

the verse comes to say that kindling

to distinguish

went out!

To teach that one is liable for each labor individually, and that one is not liable only when performing all the labors on Shabbat.

And as their dispute is explained in the beraita:

For it was taught:

The labor of

kindling

on Shabbat, which was written separately in the Torah—

went out for a negative commandment; these are the words of Rabbi Yose.

To teach that one is not liable for it by karet, like the other labors, but it is only under a negative commandment, to be flogged for it, and no more.

Rabbi Natan says:

Kindling—

to distinguish

went out!

For kindling went out from the general statement “You shall not perform any labor” to be written separately, in order to teach: Just as it is considered that one becomes liable for it by karet independently, so too for each and every labor one becomes liable independently, and the liability is not stated only for performing “all the labors.”

And

he answered

Rava,

to resolve the astonishment: What was the question of the tanna of the school of Rabbi Ishmael, “What does it teach?”

The tanna

of the school of Rabbi Ishmael—

“settlements”

[“in all your settlements”], which is stated at the end of the verse,

is what is difficult for him!

And this is what he said:

The expression

“settlements”

[“in all your settlements”], which the verse used, and which comes to teach that this prohibition applies in every place in which you dwell, both in the Land and outside the Land—

what does it teach?

Now,

behold,

Shabbat—

is an obligation of the body,

and it is not a mitzva that applies in the Land of Israel because of the sanctity of the Land.

And

every mitzva that is

an obligation of the body—

it is obvious that it

applies both in the Land and outside the Land.

And if so,

“settlements”

[“in all your settlements”]

that the Merciful One wrote concerning Shabbat,

concerning the labor of kindling—

why do I need it?

And now the Gemara brings the continuation of the words of the tanna of the school of Rabbi Ishmael, to answer the question, “What does it teach?”

In the name of Rabbi Ishmael, one student said:

Since it is stated

concerning one sentenced to death [Deuteronomy 21]

“And if there be in a man a sin deserving the judgment of death—

“If there shall be in a man a sin deserving the judgment of death—

and he is put to death.”

I would understand

that the court should put him to death

both on a weekday and on Shabbat.

That is, the mitzva of putting him to death should override Shabbat.

And what do I uphold

[Exodus 31]

“He who profanes it shall surely be put to death”?—

For the other labors, excluding execution by the court,

which is permitted on Shabbat.

Or is it only that even execution by the court

is forbidden on Shabbat?

And what do I uphold by “and he is put to death”?—

?—

On a weekday and not on Shabbat.

And the tanna of the school of Rabbi Ishmael returns and says:

Or is it only even on Shabbat?

[This will be explained below]

The verse teaches: “You shall not kindle fire—

in all your settlements!””

And

also

below,

in the passage concerning the punishment by which the court punishes the murderer who acted deliberately or inadvertently,

it

[the verse]

says

[Numbers 35]:

“And these shall be for you a statute of judgment throughout your generations—

in all your settlements!”

Just as

like

“settlements” stated below,

in the passage concerning a murderer, they refer

to

the punishment administered by

the court,

so too, “settlements” stated here,

concerning kindling on Shabbat, they refer

to

the punishment administered by

the court.

That is, the punishment for one who became liable to execution by the court, by burning.

And

concerning this

the Merciful One said, “You shall not kindle”!

And its meaning is: Even for the purpose of fulfilling the mitzva of punishing the sinner by execution through burning in the court—you shall not kindle fire on Shabbat!

The prohibition of kindling applies only to kindling the fire beneath the “lead wick,” and not to burning the sinful person.

That is, for the purpose of heating a piece of lead until it melts because of the heat; and when the lead becomes a boiling liquid, they pour it into the mouth of the one sentenced to execution by “burning.” But the one sentenced to death himself is not burned by fire, and his execution through pouring the boiling lead into his mouth is not considered the labor of “kindling.”

And now the Gemara explains the proof from the tanna of the school of Rabbi Ishmael, that a positive commandment overrides Shabbat:

Is it not

that which the tanna of the school of Rabbi Ishmael said—the position of

Rabbi Natan?

For

Rabbi Natan said: “Kindling—

to distinguish it went out,”

to teach that one is liable for kindling independently by karet, and from here we learn concerning the other labors that each labor independently entails liability by karet.

And the reason

that they do not execute on Shabbat those liable to execution by “burning” is

because the Merciful One wrote, “You shall not kindle

fire in all your settlements.”

Were it not so,

if the verse had not excluded this,

it would override

the prohibition of karet of kindling on Shabbat!

And therefore “upon it” is needed, to say that levirate marriage does not override the prohibition of a forbidden relation!

And the Gemara rejects: This teaching that the tanna of the school of Rabbi Ishmael taught—

not

is according to the position of Rabbi Natan.

Rather, it is according to the position of

Rabbi Yose,

according to whom kindling on Shabbat is merely a negative commandment; therefore, without the exclusion, it would have been overridden by the positive commandment, “and he is put to death.”

And we ask:

And let this teaching also be

according to the position of

Rabbi Yose,

yet one can still bring proof that a positive commandment overrides Shabbat [without the exclusion]!

I can say that Rabbi Yose said

that

“kindling went out for a negative commandment”—

mere kindling,

when the labor is kindling alone.

But in punishing a person liable to burning, the labor is not limited to kindling the fire beneath the lead.

For behold,

the kindling of the court—

is for the purpose of

cooking the wick

[for through the fire they heat a “wick,” a piece of lead, until it cooks and becomes liquid, and then they pour it into the mouth of the one sentenced to death by “burning”].

And Rav Sheshet said: What difference is there to me between cooking the wick and cooking the dyes!

That is, cooking the lead wick is an act of labor on Shabbat, just like cooking the dyes used for color in the construction of the Tabernacle, from which all the labors forbidden on Shabbat are learned. It is not only cooking food that is forbidden on Shabbat.

And since, according to Rabbi Yose as well, the execution of the sinner contains the labor of cooking, for which there is karet, one can prove according to him as well that a positive commandment overrides Shabbat; for without the exclusion of the verse, “in all your settlements,” they would cook the wick on Shabbat for the purpose of fulfilling the mitzva, “and he is put to death.”

Rav Shimi bar Ashi said: This tanna

of the school of Rabbi Ishmael, who expounded the verse “in all your settlements” to prohibit kindling and cooking for the purpose of executing the sinner—

not because

were it not for the exclusion

a positive commandment would come and override a negative commandment.

For a positive commandment does not override a negative commandment that involves karet.

Rather, because it brings,

because there was a basis from which to bring proof, to learn

by a kal va-chomer

that for the purpose of executing the sinner Shabbat should be overridden.

And in order to reject this derivation, the verse had to say “in all your settlements,” to reveal that nevertheless the mitzva of executing the sinner does not override Shabbat.

And this is what he said: What do I uphold by “He who profanes it shall surely be put to death”—

?—

for the other labors, excluding execution by the court.

But execution by the court overrides Shabbat by a kal va-chomer: