Yevamot 6b (ו:) — the Talmud in English

What is the meaning of the “observance” stated with regard to Shabbat?

You do not fear Shabbat itself—

for “fear” was not stated with regard to it

, but

the Holy One, blessed be He,

the One who commanded concerning Shabbat.

So too, the fear stated with regard to the Temple—

You do not fear the Temple itself, but the One who commanded

concerning the Temple.

And what is the fear of the Temple?

A person may not enter the Temple Mount with his staff, with his shoes, or with his money belt

(a hollow belt worn around the waist that serves as a purse for coins),

or with the dust on his feet, and he may not make it a shortcut

, by shortening his route from one place to another by passing through the Temple Mount.

And he may not do any of these things because of the fear of the Temple.

And spitting

is forbidden there,

by a kal va-chomer

(from the prohibition against wearing shoes, Berakhot 54a; see Rashi). Since spitting is repulsive and disgraceful, it is certainly not an expression of fear of the Temple.

And I know

that one must conduct oneself with fear on the Temple Mount

only while the Temple is standing.

When the Temple is not standing—

from where

do we know that one must conduct oneself with fear there even then?

The verse states:

(Leviticus 19)

“You shall observe My Shabbatot, and fear My Sanctuary.”

The verse juxtaposes the fear of the Temple with Shabbat, to teach:

Just as the observance stated with regard to Shabbat

is

forever—

so too the fear stated with regard to the Temple

is an observance

forever.

If so, one cannot prove from the fact that the verse repeats, “You shall observe My Shabbatot and fear My Sanctuary, I am the Lord,” that a positive mitzva overrides a prohibition carrying karet even when it is not in the context of the proper fulfillment of a mitzva.

The question returns: Why, then, is the phrase “upon her” necessary? Yibbum is not the proper fulfillment of a mitzva, and it is obvious that it does not override the prohibition of a forbidden relationship!?

The Gemara offers another way to resolve this:

Rather, it might have entered your mind to say, let the mitzva of yibbum come

and override the prohibition of forbidden relationships,

from

the labor of

kindling

on Shabbat.

Therefore, the teaching of “upon her” is necessary to exclude this possibility.

For a tanna of the school of

the school of

Rabbi Yishmael

taught: The Torah stated with regard to Shabbat, “You shall not perform any labor,” and all the labors are included in this statement.

If so, the statement of the verse

“You shall not kindle fire in any of your settlements”

—what does it come to teach?

What is it intended to teach?

Before the Gemara cites the continuation of the statement of the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael, it questions his question and clarifies his words: We wonder: Is it appropriate to ask concerning the verse, “You shall not kindle fire”

—

what does it come to teach? After all, the tannaim disagree about the meaning of this verse, as will be explained in the beraita below; how, then, does the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael ask, “What does it come to teach” ?

If it is according to Rabbi Yosei,

the verse comes to say that the labor of kindling was singled out as a

“prohibition”,

as will be explained below in the beraita.

If it is according to Rabbi Natan,

the verse comes to say that kindling was singled out

to distinguish

it.

That is, to teach that one is liable for each labor individually, rather than being liable only when one performs all the labors on Shabbat.

As their dispute is explained in the following beraita:

As it was taught:

The labor of

kindling

on Shabbat, which was written separately in the Torah—

was singled out as a prohibition; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei.

This teaches that one is not liable to karet for it, as for the other labors, but that it entails only a prohibition, for which one is flogged, and no more.

Rabbi Natan says:

Kindling

was singled out to distinguish

it.

Kindling was removed from the general statement, “You shall not perform any labor,” and written separately in order to teach that just as one is considered liable to karet for it individually, so too one is liable for each and every labor individually; the liability is not stated only with regard to performing “all the labors.”

And

Rava

said

to resolve the difficulty: What was the question of the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael, “What does it come to teach” ?

The tanna

of the school of Rabbi Yishmael—

“settlements”

[“in all your settlements,”] stated at the end of the verse—

is what was difficult for him!

And this is what he said:

The expression

“settlements”

[“in all your settlements”] used by the verse, which comes to teach that this prohibition applies everywhere you reside, both in Eretz Yisrael and outside Eretz Yisrael—

what does it come to teach?

Since

it is clear that

Shabbat

is an obligation of the person,

and is not a mitzva that applies in Eretz Yisrael on account of the sanctity of the Land.

And

every mitzva that is

an obligation of the person—

it is obvious that it

applies both in Eretz Yisrael and outside Eretz Yisrael.

If so,

“settlements”

[“in all your settlements”]

that the Merciful One wrote with regard to Shabbat

, in the context of the labor of kindling—

why do I need it?

The Gemara now cites the continuation of the statement of the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael, answering the question, “What does it come to teach?”

In the name of Rabbi Yishmael, one student said:

As it is stated

with regard to one sentenced to death

(Deuteronomy 21):

“If there shall be in a man a sin deserving the judgment of death—

and he is put to death.”

I might understand

that the court executes him

both on a weekday and on Shabbat.

That is, the mitzva of executing him overrides Shabbat.

And how do I understand

(Exodus 31)

“Those who profane it shall surely be put to death”?

With regard to the other labors, apart from execution by the court,

which is permitted on Shabbat.

Or perhaps it means that even execution by the court

is forbidden on Shabbat.

And how do I understand “and he is put to death”

?—

On a weekday, but not on Shabbat.

The tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael returns and says:

Or perhaps it means even on Shabbat?

[This will be explained below.]

The verse states, “You shall not kindle fire

—in all your settlements!”

And

also

below,

in the passage concerning the punishment administered by the court to one who murdered intentionally or unintentionally,

it

the verse

says

(Numbers 35):

“These shall be for you a statute of judgment throughout your generations—

in all your settlements!”

Just as

“settlements”

mentioned below,

in the passage concerning a murderer, refer

to

the punishment administered by

the court,

so too, “settlements” mentioned here,

with regard to kindling on Shabbat, refer

to

the punishment administered by

the court.

That is, the punishment for one who has been sentenced to execution by the court through burning.

And

concerning this

the Merciful One said, “You shall not kindle”!

Its meaning is: Even for the purpose of fulfilling the mitzva of punishing the sinner by execution through burning in court, you shall not kindle fire on Shabbat!

The prohibition against kindling applies only to kindling the fire beneath the “lead wick,” and not to burning the sinful person.

That is, it applies to heating a piece of lead until it melts from the heat, and, once the lead has become a boiling liquid, pouring it into the mouth of the person sentenced to execution by “burning.” The condemned person himself is not burned by fire; his execution through pouring boiling lead into his mouth is not considered the labor of “kindling.”]

The Gemara now explains the proof from the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael that a positive mitzva overrides Shabbat:

Is it not

that what the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael said reflects the view of

Rabbi Natan?

For

Rabbi Natan said, “Kindling

was singled out to distinguish,”

teaching that one is liable to karet for kindling independently, and from here it is learned with regard to the other labors that each labor independently entails liability to karet.

And the reason

that those liable to execution by “burning” are not executed on Shabbat is

because the Merciful One wrote, “You shall not kindle

fire in all your settlements.”

If not for this,

if the verse had not excluded this case,

it would override

the prohibition carrying karet against kindling on Shabbat!

Therefore, “upon her” is necessary to say that yibbum does not override the prohibition of a forbidden relationship!

The Gemara rejects this: This teaching taught by the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael—

not

is according to Rabbi Natan.

Rather, it is according to

Rabbi Yosei,

according to whom kindling on Shabbat entails only a prohibition, and therefore, without the exclusion, it would have been overridden by the positive commandment, “and he is put to death.”

And we ask:

And let this teaching also be

according to

Rabbi Yosei,

but it would still be possible to bring proof that a positive mitzva overrides Shabbat [without the exclusion]!

I can say that Rabbi Yosei said

that

“kindling was singled out as a prohibition”—

kindling alone,

when the labor consists solely of kindling.

But when executing a person liable to burning, the labor is not limited to kindling the fire beneath the lead.

For

the kindling performed by the court

is for the purpose of

preparing the wick

[for through the fire they heat a “wick,” a piece of lead, until it is cooked and becomes liquid, and then pour it into the mouth of the person sentenced to death by “burning”].

And Rav Sheshet said: What difference is there to me between cooking the wick and cooking the dyes!

That is, cooking the lead wick is a labor forbidden on Shabbat, just as cooking the dyes used in the construction of the Tabernacle was a labor, from which all the labors forbidden on Shabbat are derived. It is not only cooking food that is forbidden on Shabbat.

Since even according to Rabbi Yosei, executing the sinner involves the labor of cooking, which carries karet, it can be proved according to his view as well that a positive mitzva overrides Shabbat: Were it not for the exclusion in the verse, “in all your settlements,” they would cook the wick on Shabbat for the purpose of fulfilling the mitzva, “and he is put to death.”

Rav Shimi bar Ashi said: This tanna

of the school of Rabbi Yishmael, who expounded the verse “in all your settlements” as prohibiting kindling and cooking for the purpose of executing the sinner—

not because,

if not for the exclusion,

a positive commandment would come and override a prohibition.

For a positive commandment does not override a prohibition that carries karet.

Rather, because he brings

a possible basis from which to learn

by means of a kal va-chomer

that Shabbat should be overridden for the purpose of executing the sinner.

And in order to reject this teaching, the verse had to say “in all your settlements,” revealing that even so, the mitzva of executing the sinner does not override Shabbat.

And this is what he said: How do I understand “Those who profane it shall surely be put to death”

?—

With regard to the other labors, apart from execution by the court.

But execution by the court overrides Shabbat by means of a kal va-chomer: