Yevamot 58b (נח:) — the Talmud in English

After the yavam has had intercourse with her, even if that intercourse was merely promiscuous,

and

do you call her a “yevama awaiting levirate marriage”

at the time of her seclusion afterward?

But

she is his full-fledged wife

[she is completely his wife], despite the fact that the yavam had intercourse with her only for the sake of promiscuity!

For Rav said

[above, on page 56a, in explaining what we learned: One who has intercourse with his yevama “intentionally” acquires her, meaning that he had intercourse with her merely for the sake of promiscuity. Nevertheless,]

he acquires

her to be like his wife

for all

purposes, even though he had intercourse with her intentionally for the sake of promiscuity?!

And since the Mishna is necessarily corrupt and must be emended, no proof may be brought from it!

The Gemara answers that the Mishna can be reconciled

with the opinion of Shmuel.

For

Shmuel said:

the yavam does not acquire

her through intercourse performed merely for the sake of promiscuity [“intentionally,”

but

only

for the matters stated in

that

passage.

That is, to inherit from his brother; to release her, and her rival wife, from levirate marriage; and to stand in his brother’s place with regard to every matter in which the husband already had authority over her when he died.

But with regard to inheriting her, becoming impure for her, annulling her vows, and enabling her to eat teruma, he does not acquire her if she fell before him from betrothal, since the husband did not have authority over his wife with regard to any of these matters [according to the first formulation].

And since he acquired her only for these matters, she is still called a “yevama awaiting levirate marriage,” and not his wife for every purpose. According to his view, the Mishna is therefore reconciled.

The Gemara challenges this:

The matter is relevant only according to Rav—that is, Rav Sheshet came to prove from this Mishna that the view of Rav is correct, namely, that chuppa is effective for disqualified women.

And

But

Rav himself said

that she

he acquires her for every purpose

even through intentional intercourse?!

It follows that according to Rav himself, this Mishna must necessarily be corrupt; so how can we prove his position from it? The Gemara answers that the matter of a yevama awaiting levirate marriage can be explained in a way that avoids the difficulty: How could he have her drink when he has not yet had intercourse with her and acquired her, since a yevama awaiting levirate marriage does not drink? It is possible for the yevama to become his full-fledged wife through chuppa, without intercourse at all:

Here,

with regard to a yevama awaiting levirate marriage,

what are we dealing with? For example, the yavam performed a

the levir

maamar

[with money or a document],

and this is the opinion of Beit Shammai, who say: Maamar effects a complete acquisition,

and she becomes betrothed through the maamar.

And once she has become betrothed, the chuppa that follows is effective in making her his wife for every purpose. Thus it is possible for him to have her drink even though he has not had intercourse with her.

The Gemara raises an objection to this:

If so—

she is a betrothed woman!

Why, then, is she called a “yevama awaiting levirate marriage”?

The Gemara rejects the objection:

But according to your reasoning,

is

“married” and “taken into his household” not one and the same expression

[are they not one matter]? Yet there is no distinction between them after the yavam has taken her into his household, and a woman taken into the yavam’s household through levirate marriage is like all other married women?!

Rather,

the distinction between them necessarily concerns only their names:

“Married”

is a woman

of his own,

who does not come to him by virtue of another person,

whereas “taken into his household”

is a wife who comes to him by virtue

of another,

since the levirate marriage takes effect only by virtue of her having been his brother’s wife.

Here too,

the distinction concerns only their names:

“Betrothed woman”

means a woman

of his own, whereas “yevama awaiting levirate marriage”

means a woman

of another.

The statements of Rav Pappa below are explained according to Rashi’s second interpretation and according to Tosafot’s understanding of his words.

Rav Pappa said,

that the proof from the Mishna that chuppa is effective for disqualified women must be rejected.

The difficulty concerning the fact that the husband’s intercourse preceded that of the adulterer can be resolved, and likewise the difficulty concerning a yevama awaiting levirate marriage—how can he have her drink before he has had intercourse with her and she has become his wife taken into his household—can be resolved as follows:

Our Mishna is actually dealing with a case in which she secluded herself while betrothed, then married, and he had intercourse with her, after which he had her drink. In such a case, everyone agrees that chuppa is effective for disqualified women.

And with regard to the yevama awaiting levirate marriage, the case is one in which she secluded herself while she was still a yevama awaiting levirate marriage, he had intercourse with her, and afterward he had her drink.

One cannot raise the difficulty: How can the water examine her, when the husband is not free of iniquity, since he had intercourse with her after she secluded herself? Our Mishna follows the opinion of

this tanna,

who does not require the husband to be free of iniquity.

As it was taught in a beraita: One may not impose a warning upon a betrothed woman in order to have her drink while she is betrothed.

But one may impose a warning upon her in order to have her drink while she is married,

even after she has entered beneath the chuppa and had intercourse; he may have her drink with regard to the period when she was betrothed.

Thus, this tanna is not concerned that the husband be “free of iniquity.”

Likewise, regarding the difficulty that the adulterer’s intercourse preceded that of the husband, one can say that this tanna does not hold that the husband’s intercourse must precede that of the adulterer. Therefore, he can have her drink even when the adulterer’s intercourse during the betrothal period preceded the husband’s intercourse during the marriage period.

Whereas

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said

that the proof from our Mishna that chuppa is effective for disqualified women must be rejected, and that the difficulties raised by the Gemara can be resolved as follows:

Our Mishna is not dealing with a woman who secluded herself while betrothed or while a yevama awaiting levirate marriage. Rather, it is dealing with a woman who secluded herself only after her husband married her or after the yavam took her into his household.

And the fact that he administers an oath to her and has her drink even concerning the possibility of promiscuity while she was betrothed or a yevama awaiting levirate marriage refers to a case in which he did not warn her at that time and she did not seclude herself at that time.

The Mishna is saying that he administers an oath to her concerning the period when she was betrothed or a yevama awaiting levirate marriage,

by means of “rolling”

the oath—that is, he adds another oath concerning her following the oath he administers to her concerning promiscuity after the marriage. Our Mishna is dealing with a case in which he had intercourse with her after taking her into his household, and afterward he had her drink.

Therefore, no proof can be brought from our Mishna that chuppa is effective for disqualified women, since he had intercourse with her after the chuppa.

Likewise, the earlier difficulty raised by the Gemara does not apply: The water examines her only when the husband is free of iniquity concerning that promiscuity, yet if she had been promiscuous while betrothed, he subsequently had intercourse with her in transgression, since she was forbidden to him. What benefit, then, is there in rolling into the oath the promiscuity during the betrothal period?

The answer is that since he did not know that she had become forbidden to him, he transgressed unintentionally, and he is considered “free of iniquity.”

This likewise resolves the Gemara’s difficulty concerning a yevama awaiting levirate marriage: How can he have her drink after he had intercourse with her and she became his wife taken into his household, when he is not free of iniquity? The answer is that “free of iniquity” means that he had intercourse with her unintentionally.

This also resolves the Gemara’s difficulty concerning a betrothed woman: The adulterer’s intercourse preceded that of the husband—so how can he have her drink concerning the intercourse during the betrothal period?!

Just as warning and seclusion are not required with regard to that intercourse during the betrothal period, since the principal purpose of having her drink concerns promiscuity during the marriage period, so too, it does not matter that that intercourse preceded the husband’s intercourse. There is no need to explain that he had intercourse with her promiscuously in her father’s house. A. Just as a woman who becomes betrothed or married to a man whose intercourse disqualifies her is considered “reserved for disqualified intercourse,” a matter disputed by Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon, So too, a yevama who is bound to a yavam whose intercourse disqualifies her is considered to be in the category of “reserved for disqualified intercourse,” and her status depends on the dispute among the tannaim.

And even if there are two yevamim, one whose intercourse disqualifies her and another whose intercourse does not disqualify her, since she is bound also to the yavam whose intercourse disqualifies her, she is considered

“reserved for disqualified intercourse.”

B. The maamar [which consists of betrothal through money or a document] effects an acquisition in the case of a yevama.

Nevertheless, it is an established principle that “intercourse can follow maamar.” That is, if another brother has intercourse with her after the first brother performed maamar with her, the second brother acquires her.

But she then becomes forbidden to both of them: to the first because of the intercourse of the second, and to the second because of the maamar of the first.

It follows that immediately after the first brother’s maamar, the yevama is considered “reserved for disqualified intercourse” with the second brother.

For the first brother’s maamar does not prevent the acquisition effected by the second brother’s intercourse. Therefore, she is considered reserved also for intercourse with the second brother, and thereby she is reserved for disqualified intercourse, since the second brother is forbidden to her because of the maamar of the first.

For one who performs maamar with his yevama renders her forbidden by intercourse to all the brothers by rabbinic law, since the prohibition of a brother’s wife applies here by rabbinic law.

Rabbi Ḥanina sent a teaching in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan:

One who performs maamar with his yevama,

thereby rendering the woman forbidden to all the brothers by rabbinic law, under the prohibition of a brother’s wife,

and he has a brother,

to whose intercourse she remains reserved by Torah law [since the first brother performed only maamar with her]—

then

even if

he

himself,

the one who performed the maamar,

is a kohen, and she is the daughter of a kohen

[a kohen’s daughter]—

he disqualifies her

through his maamar

from teruma. For the intercourse of his second brother disqualifies her from the priesthood under the rabbinic prohibition of “a brother’s wife,” and because of his maamar she becomes “reserved for disqualified intercourse.”

The intercourse of his second brother disqualifies her from the priestly status of a kohen under the rabbinic prohibition of “a brother’s wife,” and because of his levirate betrothal she is considered “being reserved for prohibited intercourse.”

The Gemara raises an objection to this statement, since:

According to whom,

according to whose opinion [Rabbi Meir, or Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon, who disagree concerning the law of one reserved for disqualified intercourse], did Rabbi Yoḥanan state his ruling?

If we say it is according to Rabbi Meir,

who holds in our Mishna that one reserved for disqualified intercourse may not eat teruma—

the following difficulty arises:

Granted that Rabbi Meir said, “One reserved for disqualified intercourse may not eat teruma,”

when she is reserved for intercourse that is disqualified

by Torah law,

for example, a widow reserved for intercourse with a High Priest, or a divorcee reserved for intercourse with an ordinary kohen.

But this woman is reserved for intercourse that is disqualified

by rabbinic law,

since the yevama is forbidden to the second brother only because of the first brother’s maamar, which renders her forbidden under the rabbinic prohibition of a brother’s wife—

who said

that Rabbi Meir disqualifies her under the category of one reserved for disqualified intercourse?

Rather,

perhaps you will say that

according to

the opinion of

Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon

Rabbi Yoḥanan stated this ruling—

That cannot be said, because an even stronger difficulty arises:

Now,

if a woman who is

reserved for intercourse

that is

disqualified

by

Torah law

may eat teruma

according to them,

then one who is reserved for intercourse that is disqualified only

by rabbinic law—

is it necessary

to say that she may eat teruma?!

A “chalal” is one disqualified from kehuna, namely, one born from a kohen’s intercourse with a woman disqualified from kehuna.

Although the chalal is the son of a kohen, he is a complete non-kohen, and he has no status of kehuna whatsoever.

A chalal who has intercourse with a woman disqualifies her through that intercourse, making her a chalala like himself, even though there is no prohibition against this intercourse.

A woman who is deemed preserved for a chalal is deemed preserved for a union that is invalid by Torah law.

A kohen’s daughter who became betrothed to an Israelite is thereby disqualified from eating her father’s teruma.

And if he dies or her Israelite husband divorces her, she returns to eating her father’s teruma.

Rather, when Ravin came, he said:

if

this yavam performed

a

maamar with his yevama —

according to everyone,

both according to Rabbi Yohanan and according to Reish Lakish—

she eats

the yevama, who is a kohen’s daughter, eats her father’s teruma, even though the yavam has brothers, since she is deemed preserved for a union that is disqualified only by rabbinic law, as explained.

But if

he has

the yavam

a chalal brother, according to everyone, she does not eat.

Although she is a kohenet and he is a kohen, she is deemed preserved—even after the maamar—for the disqualifying intercourse of the chalal brother.

And in this case even Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon agree.

For they disagreed only to this extent: They said that she is not disqualified when the one who can disqualify her, for whom she is deemed preserved, has the possibility of enabling her to eat teruma elsewhere [as in the case of a widow who marries a High Priest, who would have enabled her to eat teruma had she not been a widow].

But a chalal, who is entirely a non-kohen and never enables anyone to eat teruma, disqualifies a woman when she is deemed preserved for intercourse with him—according to everyone!

They disagreed—

only

in a case such as this,

where he gave her

a kohen yavam gave his kohenet yevama

a bill of divorce [and he has no chalal brother], and she is consequently deemed preserved for his disqualified intercourse [by rabbinic law], since he gave her a bill of divorce.

Rabbi Yohanan said: She eats

her father’s teruma, and he proceeds to explain his reasoning.

Reish Lakish said: She does not eat

her father’s teruma, and he proceeds to explain his reasoning.

Rabbi Yohanan said: She eats—

Even according to Rabbi Meir, who says

that one who is deemed preserved for disqualified intercourse

does not eat—

this applies only to one deemed preserved for intercourse

that is

disqualified

by

Torah law.

But

one who is deemed preserved for intercourse that is disqualified by

rabbinic law—

she eats.

And this woman is deemed preserved for intercourse that is disqualified only by rabbinic law.

And Reish Lakish said: She does not eat—

Even according to Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon, who say

that one deemed preserved for disqualified intercourse

eats—

this applies only

when it is through betrothal, as in the case of a widow betrothed to a High Priest, since

he can enable her to eat

through betrothal

elsewhere.

But through divorce, since he cannot enable her to eat elsewhere

through divorce, she

does not

eat.

And if you would say: Here, too, he can enable her to eat

through divorce,

by her “returning”, since if he were to divorce her completely,

she would return to her father’s household and eat teruma. She would return to her father’s household and eat teruma.

Do not say this, for

the “returning”

to whom he gave a bill of divorce—she has

been severed from him and is close to her father’s household [the bond between them has been completely severed and she has returned to her father’s household].

But this woman—

however—she

is

bound to him

[she remains tied to him], for she is subject to levirate obligation to him and he has not yet taken her in levirate marriage; therefore, he disqualifies her.

We learned in the Mishna: A widow to a High Priest, and a divorcee or a halutza to an ordinary kohen—

If they were widowed or divorced

after marriage, they are disqualified; after betrothal, they are fit:

It is written at the beginning of Parashat Emor: “And the High Priest from among his brothers, upon whose head the anointing oil was poured. And he shall take a woman in her virginity. A widow, a divorcee, a chalala, or a prostitute—these he shall not take, but only a virgin from his people shall he take as a wife.”

The tannaim disagreed in the Mishna below, on 59a, whether a High Priest may marry a mature woman whose virginity has been lost; our sugya follows the view that a High Priest may not marry such a woman.

Rabbi Hiyya bar Yosef asked Shmuel: A High Priest who betrothed a minor

[or a young woman],

and

before he married her,

his betrothed matured

while she was

married to him—