Yevamot 58b — the Talmud in English

After he had had intercourse with her, even if that intercourse was an act of fornication -

and is it that

you call her a shomeret yavam

at the time of her seclusion afterward?

But

she is a full-fledged wife

[she is his complete wife], despite the fact that the yavam had intercourse with her only for the purpose of fornication!

For Rav said

[above, on page 56a, explaining what we learned: one who has intercourse with his yevama “intentionally” acquires her, that he had intercourse with her merely for the purpose of fornication. And nevertheless]

he acquires

her to be like his wife

for every

matter, even though he had intercourse with her intentionally for the purpose of fornication?!

And since the Mishna must necessarily be corrupt and requires emendation, no proof may be brought from it!

And the Gemara answers that the Mishna can be reconciled

with the view of Shmuel.

For Shmuel said:

Shmuel:

he does not acquire

the yevama through intercourse merely for the purpose of fornication [“intentionally”],

but

only

for the matters stated in

her

section.

To inherit his brother, to release her—and her rival—from levirate marriage, and to stand in his brother’s place for every matter in which the husband already had power over her when he died.

But with regard to inheriting her, becoming impure for her, annulling her vows, and feeding her teruma—he did not acquire her if she had fallen to him from betrothal, since the husband did not have power over his wife with regard to all these matters [according to the first formulation].

And since he acquired her only for these matters, she is still called a “shomeret yavam,” and not his wife for every matter; and according to his view, the Mishna is reconciled.

And we raise an objection:

Is this matter relevant except according to Rav—that is, yet from this Mishna Rav Sheshet came to prove according to Rav’s view that a wedding canopy takes effect for disqualified women.

And

But

Rav himself said

himself:

he acquires her for every matter

even through intentional intercourse?!

It follows that according to Rav himself, this Mishna must necessarily be corrupt; so how can we prove from it in accordance with his words?! And the Gemara answers that the matter of the shomeret yavam should be explained in such a way that the question of how he gives her the bitter waters, when he has not yet had intercourse with her to acquire her, and a shomeret yavam does not drink, will not be difficult—namely, it is possible for the yevama to become his complete wife through a wedding canopy, without intercourse at all:

Here,

with regard to a shomeret yavam,

with what are we dealing? For example, he performed upon her

the yavam

a maamar

[money or a document],

and it is the view of Beit Shammai, who say: A maamar effects a complete acquisition,

and she becomes betrothed through the maamar.

And once she has become betrothed, the wedding canopy that follows is effective in making her like a wife for every matter, and thus it is possible to give her the waters without his having had intercourse with her.

And we raise an objection to this:

If so—

she is a betrothed woman!

And why is she called a “shomeret yavam”?

The Gemara rejects the difficulty:

But according to your reasoning,

does

“married” and “brought in” not constitute one matter

[are they not one thing]? Yet there is no difference between them after the yavam brings her in, and the woman brought in through levirate marriage is like other married women?!

Rather,

necessarily, the distinction between them is only in their names, in that

“married”

is a woman

of his,

who does not come to him through the power of another person,

whereas “brought in”

is called his wife who comes to him through the power

of his fellow,

for levirate marriage takes effect only by virtue of her being his brother’s wife.

Here too,

the distinction is only in their names:

“betrothed woman”

means a woman

of his, whereas “shomeret yavam”

means a woman

of his fellow.

The words of Rav Pappa below are explained according to Rashi’s second explanation and according to Tosafot’s understanding of his words.

Rav Pappa said,

that the proof from the Mishna that a wedding canopy takes effect for disqualified women should be rejected.

And the question of “the husband’s intercourse preceded the adulterer’s intercourse” should be resolved, and the question concerning a shomeret yavam—how he gives her the waters before he has had intercourse with her and she becomes the woman brought in by him—should be resolved as follows:

Our Mishna is indeed dealing with a case in which she secluded herself while she was betrothed, and then married, and he had intercourse with her, and afterward gave her the waters. And in such a case everyone agrees that a wedding canopy takes effect for disqualified women.

And with regard to a shomeret yavam, it is dealing with a case in which she secluded herself while she was still a shomeret yavam, and he had intercourse with her, and afterward gave her the waters.

And one should not ask how the waters examine her, since the husband is not free of iniquity, having had intercourse with her after she secluded herself; for our Mishna follows the view of

this tanna,

who does not require that the husband be free of iniquity.

For it was taught in a beraita: They do not cause her, a betrothed woman, to be warned, in order to give her the waters while she is betrothed.

But they do cause her to be warned, in order to give her the waters while she is married,

and this means even after she has entered the wedding canopy and had intercourse, he gives her the waters concerning the time when she was betrothed.

Thus we have that this tanna does not concern himself with the requirement that the husband be “free of iniquity.”

And also regarding the question that the adulterer’s intercourse preceded the husband’s intercourse, it can be said that this tanna does not hold that the husband’s intercourse must precede the adulterer’s intercourse; therefore he can give her the waters even when the adulterer’s intercourse during the period of betrothal preceded the husband’s intercourse during the period of marriage.

But

Rav Nahman bar Yitzhak said

that the proof from our Mishna that a wedding canopy takes effect for disqualified women should be rejected, and this is how the questions raised by the Gemara should be resolved:

Our Mishna is not dealing with a woman who secluded herself while she was betrothed or a shomeret yavam, but with a woman who secluded herself only after her husband married her or after the yavam brought her in.

And the fact that he makes her swear and gives her the waters even concerning the possibility of her fornication while she was betrothed or a shomeret yavam applies even when he did not warn her then and she did not seclude herself then.

And the Mishna speaks of making her swear concerning the time when she was betrothed or a shomeret yavam,

by means of “rolling”

an oath—he rolls an additional oath onto her following the oath that he makes her swear concerning fornication after marriage. And our Mishna is dealing with a case in which he had intercourse with her after bringing her in, and afterward gives her the waters.

Therefore, no proof can be brought from our Mishna that a wedding canopy takes effect for disqualified women, since he had intercourse with her after the wedding canopy.

And likewise the Gemara’s question above is not difficult—that the waters examine her only when the husband is free of iniquity concerning that fornication, yet if she committed fornication while she was betrothed, it follows that he had intercourse with her in iniquity, since she had become forbidden to him; so what benefit is there for him in rolling upon her an oath concerning fornication during betrothal—

because, since he did not know that she had become forbidden to him, he transgressed against her inadvertently, and he is considered “free of iniquity.”

And the question concerning a shomeret yavam is likewise resolved: how can he give her the waters after having intercourse with her and her becoming the woman brought in by him, when he is not free of iniquity? Since “free of iniquity” means that he had intercourse with her inadvertently.

And likewise the Gemara’s question concerning a betrothed woman is resolved: “But the husband’s intercourse preceded the adulterer’s intercourse”—how can he give her the waters concerning intercourse during betrothal?!

For just as warning and seclusion are not required for that intercourse during betrothal, since the principal giving of the waters is concerning fornication during marriage, so we are not concerned that that intercourse preceded the husband’s intercourse. And it is unnecessary to explain that he had intercourse with her licentiously in her father’s house. A. Just as a woman who becomes betrothed or married to a man whose intercourse disqualifies her is considered “awaiting a disqualifying intercourse,” a dispute exists concerning her between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon—

So too, a yevama who is bound to a yavam whose intercourse disqualifies her is in the category of “awaiting a disqualifying intercourse,” and her law depends on the dispute between the tannaim.

And even if there were two yevamim, one whose intercourse disqualifies her and the other whose intercourse does not disqualify her, since she is bound also to the yavam who disqualifies her, she is considered “awaiting a disqualifying intercourse.”

B. The maamar [which is an acquisition by money or a document] effects an acquisition in a yevama.

Nevertheless, it is an established principle that “there is intercourse after a maamar.” That is, if another brother has intercourse with her after the first brother performed a maamar upon her, he acquires her.

But then the yevama will be forbidden to both of them: to the first because of the second’s intercourse, and to the second because of the first’s maamar.

It follows that immediately after the first brother’s maamar, the yevama is considered “awaiting a disqualifying intercourse” from the second brother.

For the first brother’s maamar does not prevent the acquisition effected by the second brother’s intercourse; if so, she is considered to be awaiting the second brother’s intercourse as well, and thereby she is awaiting a disqualifying intercourse, since the second is forbidden to her because of the first’s maamar.

For one who performs a maamar with his yevama makes her forbidden by intercourse to all the brothers by rabbinic law, since the prohibition of a brother’s wife here is rabbinic.

Rabbi Hanina sent in the name of Rabbi Yohanan:

One who performs a maamar with his yevama,

thereby making the woman forbidden to all the brothers by rabbinic law, under the prohibition of a brother’s wife,

and he has a brother,

to whose intercourse she is still awaiting according to Torah law [since the first brother performed only a maamar upon her]—

then

even

if

he

the one performing the maamar

is a kohen, and she is the daughter of a kohen

[a kohen’s daughter]—

he disqualifies her

through his maamar

from teruma.

For his second brother’s intercourse disqualifies her from the priesthood under the rabbinic law of “a brother’s wife,” and because of his maamar she becomes “awaiting a disqualifying intercourse.”

The Gemara raises a difficulty concerning this statement, for:

For whom,

according to whose view [Rabbi Meir, or Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon, who disputed the law of one awaiting a disqualifying intercourse] did Rabbi Yohanan state his law?

If we say, according to Rabbi Meir,

who holds in our Mishna that one awaiting a disqualifying intercourse may not eat—

it is difficult:

I can say that Rabbi Meir said, “one awaiting a disqualifying intercourse may not eat,”

when she is awaiting an intercourse that is disqualified

by Torah law,

such as a widow to a High Priest or a divorcee to an ordinary kohen.

But this woman is awaiting a disqualifying intercourse

by rabbinic law,

since the yevama is forbidden to the second brother only because of the first brother’s maamar, which makes her forbidden under the rabbinic prohibition of a brother’s wife—

who said

that Rabbi Meir would disqualify her under the law of one awaiting a disqualifying intercourse?

Rather,

perhaps you will say that

in

the view

of Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon

Rabbi Yohanan stated this.

This cannot be said, for the difficulty is even greater:

Now,

one who is

awaiting an intercourse

that is

disqualified

by

Torah law—

may eat,

according to them.

One who is awaiting an intercourse that is disqualified only

by rabbinic law—

is it necessary

to say that she may eat?!

A. A challal is disqualified from the priesthood, and he is one who was born from intercourse of a kohen with women disqualified from the priesthood.

The challal, despite being the son of a kohen, is a complete non-kohen, and there is no law of priesthood in him at all.

B. A challal who has intercourse with a woman disqualifies her through his intercourse, making her a challala like him, despite there being no prohibition whatsoever in this intercourse.

C. A woman who is reserved for a challal is reserved for intercourse that is biblically disqualified.

D. A daughter of a kohen who became betrothed to an Israelite is disqualified by him from the teruma of her father's household.

And if he dies or her Israelite husband divorces her, she returns to the teruma of her father's household.

Rather, when Ravin came, he said:

if

this yavam made

the

maamar with his yevama —

according to everyone,

between according to Rabbi Yohanan and according to Resh Lakish,

she eats

the yevama, who is a daughter of a kohen, from the teruma of her father's household, even though the yavam has brothers, since she is reserved for intercourse that is disqualified only rabbinically, as was explained.

And if

he has

the yavam

a brother who is a challal, according to everyone, she does not eat.

Although she is a daughter of a kohen and he is a kohen, for she is reserved—even after the maamar—for the disqualifying intercourse of the brother who is a challal.

And Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon agree in this as well.

For they disagreed only up to this point, saying that she is not disqualified when the one who disqualifies her, for whom she is reserved, has the possibility of feeding teruma elsewhere [such as a widow who marries a High Kohen, for if she had not been his wife as a widow, he would have fed her].

But a challal, who is entirely a non-kohen and does not feed teruma anywhere, disqualifies a woman when she is reserved for his intercourse—according to everyone!

They disagreed—

only

in a case such as

that he gave her

a kohen yavam gave his daughter-of-a-kohen yevama

a get [

and he has no brother who is a challal], and it turns out that she is reserved for his intercourse, which is disqualified [rabbinically], since he gave her a get.

Rabbi Yohanan said: She eats

from the teruma of her father's household, and he proceeds to explain his reasoning.

Resh Lakish said: She does not eat

from the teruma of her father's household, and he proceeds to explain his reasoning.

Rabbi Yohanan said: She eats—

Even according to Rabbi Meir, who says

that one reserved for disqualified intercourse

does not eat—

this applies to one reserved for intercourse

that is

disqualified

from

the Torah.

But

one reserved for intercourse that is disqualified

rabbinically—

she eats.

And this woman is reserved for intercourse that is disqualified only rabbinically.

And Resh Lakish said: She does not eat—

Even according to Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon, who say

that one reserved for disqualified intercourse is

eats—

this applies

through betrothal, such as a widow to a High Kohen, since

he has a way to feed

through betrothal

elsewhere.

But through divorce, since he has no way to feed elsewhere

through divorce, she

does not

eat.

And if you say: Here too, he has a way to feed her

through divorce

by “returning”,

for if he had divorced her completely, she would have returned to her father's household and eaten teruma.

Do not say so, for:

“returning”

to whom he gave a get—behold,

he has severed her from himself, and she is close to her father's household [

the connection between them has been completely severed and she has returned to her father's household].

But here—

behold,

she is bound to him [

she is bound to him], for she is obligated to him and he has not yet taken her in marriage, and therefore he disqualifies her.

We learned in the Mishna: A widow to a High Kohen, a divorcee and a chalutza to an ordinary kohen.

If they became widowed or were divorced

after marriage, they are disqualified; after betrothal, they are fit:

It is written at the beginning of the portion of Emor: “And the High Kohen from among his brothers, upon whose head the anointing oil has been poured. And he shall take a woman in her virginity. A widow, a divorcee, a challala, a prostitute—these he shall not take, for only a virgin from his people shall he take as a woman.”

And the tannaim disagreed in the Mishna below, 59a, whether it is permitted for a High Kohen to take a woman who has reached maturity, whose virginity has ended; and our sugya follows the view that a High Kohen may not marry a woman who has reached maturity.

Rabbi Hiyya bar Yosef asked Shmuel: A High Kohen who betrothed a minor [

or a young woman],

and

before he married her,

his betrothed came of age

his betrothed

under him—