Yevamot 58a (נח.) — the Talmud in English

According to Rabbi Meir, who says that betrothal disqualifies her

since she is being guarded for a forbidden intercourse, so too

the canopy

without betrothal

disqualifies her.

For this woman too is being guarded for a forbidden intercourse, even though the canopy did not take effect to acquire her.

But

according to Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon, who say that betrothal does not disqualify her—

the canopy likewise does not disqualify her.

And from where

do you know that they also disagreed concerning a canopy without betrothal?

But

perhaps Rabbi Meir said this only there

that a woman guarded for forbidden intercourse is disqualified

with regard to betrothal, since it acquires her

the betrothal takes effect and acquires her.

But with regard to a canopy, which does not acquire her—

no,

she is not disqualified.

Alternatively: Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon said this only there

that a woman guarded for forbidden intercourse is not disqualified from teruma

with regard to betrothal, which is not close

close

to intercourse.

But with regard to a canopy, which is close to intercourse—

it indeed disqualifies her

even according to their view.

Rather, if it can be said

that it is tannaim who disagreed about this matter—

it is subject to the dispute between these tannaim

as follows:

The following teaching is explained by Tosafot according to Rashi’s method.

As it was taught:

It was already explained above that Rav and Shmuel also disagree with regard to a canopy after betrothal: whether it takes effect, and whether it disqualifies her from teruma according to the one who holds that a woman guarded for forbidden intercourse through betrothal is not disqualified from teruma.

And concerning this matter, the Gemara cites a dispute between tannaim, who disagreed about it.

As it was taught: If

Israelite women married

kohanim through betrothal and the canopy that followed it—

both the one and the other,

the

fit

for the priesthood,

and

the

disqualified

for the priesthood—

or if they entered

the fit and the disqualified

under the canopy, and

still

had not engaged in intercourse—

they are:

eating

support

from his

that of the husband.

And eating teruma,

by virtue of their husbands, who are kohanim.

But before the Gemara finishes citing the words of the dissenting authority in that same beraita, it explains the words of the beraita and proves from the words of the first tanna that “there is no canopy for disqualified women”:

For the beraita mentioned two matters: At first it said, “they married,” and afterward, “or they entered under the canopy and had not engaged in intercourse.”

Since the beraita continued and added, “or they

entered

under the canopy and had not engaged in intercourse,” after it had already said, “they married,”

by inference

you learn

that “they married”

which was mentioned first in the beraita means

they actually married,

that the disqualified women entered under the canopy and also engaged in intercourse, and nevertheless they eat teruma!

But surely this cannot be said!

For is there anyone who would say that women disqualified from the priesthood who engaged in intercourse with a priest may eat teruma? They were rendered profaned through his intercourse with them!

Rather, is it not

necessarily the case that the beraita is not discussing two forms of marriage, but that it is all one matter: First the beraita says, “both married,” the fit and the disqualified, and then explains how it is that the disqualified women married and eat teruma:

for example, they entered under the canopy and

still

had not engaged in intercourse.

And it teaches

in the beraita that the fit and the disqualified

eat support from his, and eat teruma!

You learn from the words of the first tanna that she is not disqualified from eating teruma, even though she entered under the canopy, in accordance with Shmuel’s view that there is no canopy for disqualified women; therefore, she is not disqualified when she entered under the canopy and did not engage in intercourse.

The Gemara now continues and cites the words of the dissenting authority in that same beraita, in order to learn from his words that there is a canopy for disqualified women:

Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, says: Any woman whose intercourse enables her to eat—

her canopy

also

enables her to eat

teruma.

And any woman whose intercourse does not enable her to eat

that is, if she would not eat after engaging in intercourse,

her canopy likewise does not enable her to eat

the teruma of her husband.

We learn from Rabbi Yishmael’s words, as he compares the canopy to intercourse, that just as intercourse disqualifies her, even from the teruma of her father’s household, so too the canopy disqualifies her, even from the teruma of her father’s household.

From here you learn that there is a canopy for disqualified women. The Gemara rejects the necessity of this inference from Rabbi Yishmael’s words:

From where,

do you know that according to Rabbi Yishmael it is the canopy that disqualifies her, so that you can learn from his words that there is a canopy for disqualified women?

Perhaps Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka

holds in accordance with Rabbi Meir, who says: From the time of

betrothal she

does not eat.

The reason she does not eat is the betrothal, since she is being guarded for forbidden intercourse; and according to Rabbi Meir she does not eat teruma.

The Gemara challenges this rejection and upholds the inference from Rabbi Yishmael’s words.

For if Rabbi Yishmael indeed means to state the view of Rabbi Meir, that she was disqualified because of the betrothal, by the law concerning a woman guarded for forbidden intercourse—

this,

why did he say

“Any woman whose intercourse does not enable her to eat—

her canopy does not enable her to eat”?

If it is as you say, that Rabbi Yishmael disqualified her because of the betrothal, how could he phrase his statement, “her canopy does not enable her to eat”?

But

“Any woman whose intercourse does not enable her to eat—

her money”

the money of her betrothal

“should have enabled her to eat,” he should have said

according to Rabbi Yishmael!

Nevertheless, the Gemara rejects the necessity of inferring from Rabbi Yishmael’s words that he holds that there is a canopy for disqualified women, because

since the first tanna said

in his statement

“canopy,” he too said “canopy.”

But in fact his reason is not the canopy, but the betrothal.

Rav Amram said: This matter,

this statement,

Rav Sheshet told us. And he enlightened our eyes from the Mishna ...

He brought a proof for his words from a Mishna, and Rav Sheshet, who was blind, enlightened our eyes in understanding the Mishna.

Rav Sheshet said as follows:

There is a canopy for disqualified women.

It was already explained above that Rav and Shmuel disagree concerning the canopy of disqualified women—both women disqualified from the priesthood and women disqualified from marrying an Israelite—after betrothal, as to whether it is effective in making her a married woman. The Gemara brings support from the Mishna that the canopy takes effect even when she is disqualified for the husband.

They disagree only with regard to a canopy that is not accompanied by intercourse. But a canopy that is accompanied by intercourse makes her married in every respect.

And the tanna taught likewise,

and the tanna likewise taught in a Mishna, in tractate Sotah:

It is written in the passage concerning a sota [Numbers 5]:

“If any man’s wife goes astray and betrays him, and a man lies with her carnally, and it is hidden from the eyes of her husband, and she is secluded and becomes impure; and a spirit of jealousy passes over him [and had already passed over him before she was secluded], and he warned his wife” [warning her: Do not seclude yourself with so-and-so!], “the priest shall bring her and stand her before the Lord. The priest shall take holy water in an earthen vessel. The priest shall administer an oath to her and say to the woman: If no man has lain with you, and if you have not gone astray into impurity under your husband, be immune from these bitter waters. But if you have gone astray under your husband, and if you have become impure, and a man has lain with you apart from your husband.”

“The priest shall administer to the woman the oath of the curse, and the priest shall say to the woman: May the Lord make you a curse and an oath among your people, when the Lord causes your thigh to fall. And the woman shall say: Amen, amen. And he shall make the woman drink the water.”

“And if she has become impure and betrayed her husband, the water that brings the curse shall enter her and become bitter, and her belly shall swell and her thigh shall fall.”

“And the man shall be clear of iniquity, and that woman shall bear her iniquity.”

The Mishna explains the repetition of the biblical expression “amen, amen”:

“Amen,” that I did not go astray

when I was

betrothed, and

not when I was

married. “

Amen,” that I did not go astray when I was

a woman awaiting levirate marriage,

and

not when I was

brought into the levir’s household

to the yavam.

And the Mishna proceeds to explain it. The Gemara brings proof from this Mishna that a canopy is effective for a disqualified woman, making her a married woman—

This “that I did not go astray when I was

betrothed”—

what are the circumstances?

what are the circumstances?

If you say

that it is referring to a case

in which he warned her,

that her husband warned her not to seclude herself with a stranger

when she was betrothed, and she secluded herself

and was secluded, according to the version of the Bach,

and he makes her drink when she is betrothed—

then the explanation of the Mishna is that the husband can administer an oath to her and make her drink when she is betrothed or a woman awaiting levirate marriage, concerning her seclusion. Likewise, he can administer an oath to her and make her drink concerning seclusion after her marriage or after she entered the authority of her yavam [Rashi, Kiddushin 27b].

This cannot be explained in that manner.

For is

a betrothed woman capable of drinking?

Does she drink the waters of a sota before she has married, concerning her seclusion during her betrothal?

But we learned: A betrothed woman and a woman awaiting levirate marriage,

whom their husbands warned, and who secluded themselves—

do not drink

before they marry.

For the Torah says, “But if you have gone astray into impurity under your husband”; the verse teaches that a man makes only a woman who is, at the time of the drinking, “under her husband” drink.

And

although a betrothed woman and a woman awaiting levirate marriage were excluded from drinking, they were nevertheless not excluded from being warned and from being forbidden to the husband.

Therefore,

they do not receive a marriage settlement

when their husbands divorce them, since they caused themselves to become forbidden to them.

Rather,

necessarily, the Mishna must be explained as referring to a woman who had already married and engaged in intercourse, and when, through her oath, she is made to drink concerning warning and seclusion that occurred after her marriage, she says “amen, amen,” including in her oath also an earlier act of adultery.

For example,

he warned her

also

when she was betrothed, and she secluded herself

was secluded and alone with that so-and-so while she was still betrothed,

and he makes her drink when she is married,

after she entered under the canopy and engaged in intercourse, concerning both acts of seclusion.

This is the explanation of the Mishna: If she is married and secluded herself after her marriage, and also earlier, while she was betrothed, then when he makes her drink, he administers an oath to her also concerning the fact that she did not commit adultery during the seclusion that occurred while she was betrothed. The waters examine both cases.

And if she is a yevama who was brought into the levir’s household, and she secluded herself after she underwent levirate marriage and also earlier, while she was a woman awaiting levirate marriage, then when he makes her drink after performing levirate marriage with her, he administers an oath to her also concerning the fact that she did not commit adultery during the seclusion that occurred while she was awaiting levirate marriage.

This too is impossible.

For:

Do the waters examine her?

Can the waters examine a woman who engaged in intercourse with her husband after she secluded herself and became forbidden to him?

But it was taught:

It is written at the end of the passage concerning a sota:

“And the man shall be clear of iniquity.”

The verse teaches that only

when the man is clear of iniquity,

that he did not engage in intercourse with her after she secluded herself and became forbidden to him, then

the waters examine his wife.

But if

the man is not clear of iniquity,

because he engaged in intercourse with her after she secluded herself—

the waters do not examine his wife.

And in this case, since her husband engaged in intercourse with her after she secluded herself, the waters would not examine her concerning that act of seclusion.

Rather,

necessarily,

he warned her when she was betrothed, and she secluded herself

when she was betrothed,

and she entered under the canopy,

and her husband is fit to make her drink, since

and

she still

had not engaged in intercourse

with her husband through him. Thus he is clear of iniquity. At that point he warned her again, and she secluded herself. When he makes her drink, he administers an oath to her concerning both acts of seclusion together.

And learn from it

in accordance with Rav’s view, who holds:

There is a canopy for disqualified women,

and it makes them married women.

For if not, how could her husband make her drink? If the canopy is not effective for disqualified women, she is still betrothed, and a betrothed man does not make his betrothed woman drink!

Rava said,

rejecting the proof from our Mishna for Rav’s view that there is a canopy for disqualified women:

Do you really think,

do you think

that this

Mishna

is properly arranged

it is sound and not corrupt,

it is,

so that you can bring proof from it?

For when Rabbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina came from the south

when Rabbi Ḥanina came from the south,

he came and brought a beraita with him

he came and brought a beraita with him:

It is written: “And a man has lain with you

apart from your husband”—

The verse teaches:

One for whom the husband’s intercourse preceded that of the adulterer

the seclusion that raises the suspicion that the adulterer had intercourse with her—the waters examine his wife.

But not

one for whom

the adulterer’s intercourse preceded that of the husband.

Therefore, it is entirely impossible for the waters to examine her concerning seclusion that occurred while she was betrothed, since at that time the phrase “apart from your husband” does not apply to her.

Since we learned in that Mishna that he makes her take an oath concerning the period of betrothal, it must be that the Mishna is corrupted and requires emendation and correction, and it is impossible to derive from it anything concerning ḥuppa for disqualified women.

Rami bar Ḥama

explained:

He said:

Indeed, this Mishna can be properly explained.

For

it is possible to find a case

in which the husband's intercourse preceded the seclusion—

for example, when her betrothed had intercourse with her in her father's house

in an illicit relationship. Therefore, after the marriage he can make her take an oath even concerning the period of betrothal.

The passage is explained according to Rashi's second formulation.

But the Gemara raises an objection to his words, for nevertheless the Mishna is not properly explained with regard to a shomeret yavam:

For with regard to what we also learned in it—that he makes her take an oath “that I did not act unfaithfully while a shomeret yavam or after being taken in”—the same difficulty that applies to a betrothed woman applies here as well: How is this possible? For if he warned her at that time and she secluded herself, and he now comes to have her drink the sotah waters before performing yibbum with her, we learned: A betrothed woman and a shomeret yavam neither drink nor collect their ketuba.

It must necessarily be said that at the time of the drinking she had already been taken in by him.

And a difficulty still arises: If so, the husband is not free of transgression!

For it must necessarily be referring to a case in which he makes her take the oath only after having intercourse with her, since it is impossible to say that she entered ḥuppa without having intercourse, as there is no ḥuppa for a yevama.

[But this is not difficult: The intercourse of the paramour preceded that of the husband, and in the case of a yevama it is sufficient for us that the intercourse of the deceased husband—which gives the yavam the power to perform yibbum—preceded the intercourse of the paramour.]

And even if we wish to resolve the difficulty and establish

a case analogous to it,

as we established in the case of the betrothed woman, that it refers to a case in which the betrothed man had intercourse with her in her father's house.

And similarly,

with regard to a shomeret yavam,

the case can be established as one in which

he had intercourse with her,

the

yavam in her father-in-law's house,

for the purpose of an illicit relationship, before she secluded herself with another man. Thus there is no transgression on the part of the yavam. She subsequently secluded herself while she still retained the status of a shomeret yavam, since the yavam's illicit intercourse does not effect a complete acquisition of her.

Nevertheless, the intercourse that he had with her merely for the purpose of an illicit relationship was effective for the yavam insofar as he can now bring her in to become his fully wedded wife through ḥuppa, without having intercourse with her in a transgressive manner.

And once he brings her into ḥuppa, I apply to her the phrase “under your husband,” and he can have her drink even concerning that seclusion which occurred while she was a shomeret yavam.

A difficulty still remains:

It is impossible to say this. For: