Yevamot 55b (נה:) — the Talmud in English

It is derived:

the law that mere initial penetration in cases involving those subject to a positive command is derived from cases involving those subject to a prohibition, where mere initial penetration was included by means of the verbal analogy

“coming, coming.” [

It is written concerning those subject to a positive command: “Children who will be born to them, the third generation

will come

to them into the congregation of the Lord.”

And it is written concerning those subject to prohibitions: “A mamzer shall not

come

into the congregation of the Lord.” ]

The Gemara continues explaining:

a yevama permitted to the public [

a yevama who is bound to a yavam and is forbidden to have relations with a stranger ] —

from where do we know

that she is forbidden even through mere initial penetration?

The Gemara is astonished at the question: Why must we seek a source in Scripture from which to learn that a yevama permitted to the public is forbidden even through mere initial penetration? After all:

If according to the one who says

that a yevama permitted to the public is forbidden to have relations with a stranger by a

prohibition,

as it is written: “The wife of the deceased shall not be outside, to a strange man”—then

it is a prohibition,

and we have already learned that mere initial penetration applies in cases involving those subject to prohibitions.

If according to the one who says

that she is forbidden to a stranger by a

positive command,

as it is written: “The yevama shall come to him”—the yevama, but not a stranger—and a prohibition inferred from a positive command is a positive command— then the prohibition

is a positive command,

and we have already learned that mere initial penetration applies in cases involving those subject to positive commands.

Rather,

this is what we are saying:

A yevama

who is acquired

by the yavam

through intercourse—

from where do we know

that she is acquired even through mere initial penetration?

It is derived:

the acquisition of a yevama by her yavam through mere initial penetration is derived by means of the verbal analogy

“coming, coming”

from cases involving those subject to prohibitions, where mere initial penetration was included. [

As it is written: “The yevama

shall come

to him,” and it is written: “A

mamzer shall not come

into the congregation.” ]

The Gemara continues explaining the laws of mere initial penetration:

A woman

who is acquired

by her husband

through betrothal by intercourse—

from where

do we know that she is acquired by her husband through mere initial penetration when he betroths her through intercourse?

It is derived:

the acquisition of a woman by her husband through mere initial penetration is derived by means of the verbal analogy

“take, take.” [

It is written: “When a man

takes

a woman and cohabits with her,” from which we learn betrothal by intercourse. And it is written: “A man who

takes his sister,” who is among those liable for karet, in whose case mere initial penetration was included. ] Rava said:

It is written concerning a betrothed maidservant: “And if a man lies with a woman, the ‘lying of seed,’ and she is a maidservant betrothed to a man.”

And it is written concerning a married woman: “And to your fellow’s wife you shall not give your lying for seed, to become defiled through her.”

And it is written concerning a sota: “If any man’s wife goes astray and commits treachery against him, and a man lies with her with the ‘lying of seed’” [that is, it is uncertain whether a man lay with her with the lying of seed], “and it was concealed from her husband’s eyes, and she was secluded” [she was alone with another man, and therefore it is uncertain whether] “she was defiled” [she may have been defiled; and the Sages expounded: she is deemed impure to her husband from the time of seclusion, and he is forbidden to her].

“And a spirit of jealousy passed over him, and he was jealous of his wife” [a spirit of jealousy had already passed over him, for he suspected his wife concerning that man and warned her before she secluded herself: “Do not seclude yourself with him”]. “And the man shall bring his wife to the priest. And the priest shall have the woman drink the bitter waters that cause the curse.”

And Rava explains:

Why do I need

what

the Merciful One wrote: “And if a man lies with a woman, the

“lying of seed”

in the case of a betrothed maidservant,”

and why do I need what He wrote:

“lying of seed” [“You shall not give your lying for seed”]

“lying of seed” [“You shall not give your lying for seed”]

concerning a married woman,

and why do I need what He wrote: “And a man shall lie with her,

‘lying of seed’ concerning a sota?”

Rashi wrote concerning a married woman: One cannot say that the verse came to exclude mere initial penetration, since all the forbidden relations stated in the section of forbidden relations were included to make one liable for mere initial penetration by the juxtaposition taught by Rabbi Yona above, on page 54b. And concerning a sota as well, the reason we do not say that the verse came to exclude a case in which he warned her concerning mere initial penetration is that mere initial penetration was included as a prohibition to her husband, like the other prohibitions of intercourse; see below in the sugya, on the next side, and the note there.

“Lying of seed”

in the case of a betrothed maidservant

the Merciful One wrote in order to teach us

as we said—

namely, that one is liable for her only upon completion of intercourse.

And “lying of seed”

in the case of a married woman

the Merciful One wrote in order to teach:

excluding one who has intercourse

with a married woman using an

inert organ [

without an erection ], who is not liable for her, since he does not ejaculate.

And we challenge this:

This works according to the one who says that one who has intercourse with an inert organ in cases of forbidden relations is exempt,

for it can properly be said that the verse came to exclude one who has intercourse with an inert organ in the case of a married woman.

But according to the one who says

that even one who has intercourse with an inert organ in cases of forbidden relations is

liable—

what can be said?

What does “lying of seed,” stated concerning a married woman, come to exclude?

Rather, “lying of seed,” stated concerning a married woman, was written to teach us:

Rather, “lying of seed,” stated concerning a married woman, was written to teach us:

excluding one who has intercourse

with a married woman when she is

dead,

who is not liable for her, since she does not ejaculate.

And the Torah had to exclude a dead married woman from the prohibition of a married woman. Since

it might enter your mind: since even after [according to Rashi’s version]

(this is Rashi’s version)

death she is also called “his close relation,”

as it is written concerning the mitzva prohibiting a priest from becoming impure for the dead: “He shall not become impure for a person among his people, except for ‘his close relation,’ who is near to him.” And we say: “His close relation”—this is his wife.

And therefore it might enter your mind that

one should be liable for her

also if someone has intercourse with her after death

with

the liability incurred by one who has intercourse with

a married woman.

It teaches us

that one is not liable for a dead woman on account of the prohibition of a married woman.

We further explain: “Lying of seed,”

which is

written concerning

a sota—

why do I need it?

Rashi wrote: “Lying of seed” concerning a secluded sota, who becomes forbidden [to her husband] by uncertainty. Rashi does not mean that the exclusion “lying of seed” comes to exclude only from the prohibition to her husband in the case of intercourse that is not lying of seed, while she nevertheless drinks;

As it was taught in a beraita: “Lying of seed”—excluding another matter.

And we explain:

What is “another matter?”

Rav Sheshet said: Excluding one who warned her

not to have intercourse

unnaturally,

for this is not a valid warning that renders her forbidden to him and requires her to drink, even if she subsequently secluded herself.

He said

in astonishment

to him, Rava,

to Rav Sheshet: But

“the relations of a woman” [

two forms of relations are implied: naturally and unnaturally ]

is written. The verse equates them with one another for every law; how, then, can you say that the verse comes to exclude unnatural intercourse in the case of a sota?!

is written. The verse equates them with one another for every law; how, then, can you say that the verse comes to exclude unnatural intercourse in the case of a sota?!

Rather, Rava said: Excluding one who warned her concerning contact by other limbs [

pressing the breasts and rubbing externally with other limbs, Rashi ].

He said

in astonishment

to him, Abaye:

Would we really have said that even if the woman behaved with

promiscuity [

mere promiscuity ],

the Merciful One forbade

her to him, so that the Torah had to exclude this explicitly?!

Rather, Abaye said: Excluding one who warned her concerning “kissing,”

as will be explained, for she does not become forbidden to him through this, and she does not drink.

And we challenge this:

This works according to the one who says that mere initial penetration

—which was included everywhere, and likewise in the case of a sota, to render her forbidden to him—

is the insertion of the corona,

the thickened part of the organ, then it works: the verse comes to exclude “kissing,” which is only contact of the organ with that place.

But according to the one who says

that mere initial penetration, which was included everywhere,

is kissing—

what can be said?

The explanation is: Since mere initial penetration was included both in cases involving those subject to prohibitions and in cases involving those subject to positive commands, it was consequently included as rendering her forbidden to him even in the case of a secluded sota. But if you say that the verse comes to exclude kissing, which is mere initial penetration, it follows that she would not become forbidden to him; and this is impossible, since mere initial penetration was included as a prohibition.

And we explain:

Rather, actually, this is why the Torah stated “lying of seed” concerning a sota: to exclude

Rather, actually, this is why the Torah stated “lying of seed” concerning a sota: to exclude

one who warned her concerning contact by other limbs,

for she does not become forbidden to him.

And

as for what you challenged—would the Merciful One forbid his wife to him because of promiscuity?!—do not raise this objection, for indeed

it was necessary

for the verse to exclude a warning concerning contact by other limbs, through which she does not become forbidden to him, because:

It might enter your mind that the woman’s prohibition

was

made dependent by the Merciful One on the husband’s insistence,

and he does insist

even concerning contact by other limbs.

Therefore

it teaches us

that if he warned her concerning contact by other limbs, she does not become forbidden to him.

Shmuel said: Mere initial penetration

mentioned everywhere

is kissing

of the organ at that place. And it is considered intercourse, because

it is analogous to a person placing his finger on his mouth—

it is impossible that he not press the flesh,

and some of the flesh of the finger enters the mouth.

So too here, when the organ kisses that place, the organ presses the flesh, and this constitutes intercourse.

When Rabba bar bar Ḥana came, he said

in the name of

Rabbi Yoḥanan:

He is not coming to disagree with Shmuel. Later in the sugya, the Gemara considers whether, according to Shmuel, only kissing is mere initial penetration, while insertion of the corona is considered completion of intercourse, as in the statement of Rabba bar bar Ḥana in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan; or whether Shmuel holds that everything from kissing until insertion of the corona is considered mere initial penetration.

Completion of intercourse in the case of a betrothed maidservant [

for one is liable for her only upon completion of intercourse, as explained above ]—

this is the insertion of the corona!

The corona is the head of the organ; it is not part of the shaft, but flesh.

Rav Sheshet raised an objection

from a beraita against what Rabba bar bar Ḥana said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan, that insertion of the corona is the completion of intercourse stated concerning a betrothed maidservant—

As it was taught:

“Lying of seed”

stated concerning a betrothed maidservant comes to teach that

one is liable only for intercourse involving full rubbing [

“Rubbing” denotes completion, that is, complete intercourse, with the entire organ inserted ], through which he ejaculates.

And Rav Sheshet infers:

Is it not

the intention of the beraita that one is liable only for intercourse involving “full rubbing,” meaning that

full rubbing of the organ

is required—that is, its complete insertion?

This proves that insertion of the corona alone is insufficient in the case of a betrothed maidservant; rather, the entire organ must be inserted. This is a difficulty against Rabba bar bar Ḥana in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan!?

And we answer:

No,

the beraita was not referring to full rubbing of the organ, but to the

full rubbing of the

the

corona,

for insertion of the corona alone is considered completion of intercourse.

When Rav Dimi came, he said

in the name of

Rabbi Yoḥanan: Mere initial penetration—

this is the insertion of the corona!

And since insertion of the corona is considered only the beginning of intercourse [“mere initial penetration”], it follows that completion of intercourse in the case of a betrothed maidservant is full rubbing of the organ.

They said to him: But Rabba bar bar Ḥana,

in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan,

did not say so,

for he said that insertion of the corona is considered completion of intercourse, and it consequently follows that mere initial penetration is kissing!?

He said to them

Rav Dimi:

Either he is a liar, or I am a liar [

either I am lying or he is lying ].

When Ravin came, he said

also in the name of

Rabbi Yoḥanan

in accordance with the words of Rav Dimi, who said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan:

Mere initial penetration—

this is the insertion of the corona.

And the Gemara explains: Ravin [in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan]

certainly disagrees with Rabba bar bar Ḥana [

in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan ]—

he certainly disagrees!

For Ravin holds that mere initial penetration is insertion of the corona, and it necessarily follows that completion of intercourse is more than insertion of the corona. Whereas Rabba bar bar Ḥana said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan that completion of intercourse is insertion of the corona.

However, concerning

Shmuel—

who said that mere initial penetration is kissing—

can one say that Ravin disagrees

with him? Is it necessary to say that Ravin, who said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan that mere initial penetration is insertion of the corona, disagrees with Shmuel, who said that mere initial penetration is kissing? One can say: One master stated one matter and the other master stated another matter, and they do not disagree, as the Gemara proceeds to explain.

And we explain:

No,

it is not necessary that they disagree. One can say:

From kissing until insertion of the corona—

he calls it “mere initial penetration.”

That is, Shmuel, who said “mere initial penetration is kissing,” cited the minimal degree of insertion, teaching that even this is called “mere initial penetration.”

Whereas Ravin, who said “mere initial penetration is insertion of the corona,” cited the greatest degree of insertion that is still called mere initial penetration and not completion of intercourse.

When Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda came, he said

in the name of

Rabbi Yoḥanan:

Mere initial penetration—

this is the insertion of the corona.

Completion of intercourse—

actual completion of intercourse.