Yevamot 55a (נה.) — the Talmud in English

Evidently:

you have therefore learned from this Mishna that

a wife’s sister, whether

she is her sister

on the father’s side, or whether

she is her sister

on the mother’s side,

they are

forbidden.

For it is explained in the latter clause that if he has intercourse with the second woman after the death of the first, he is forbidden to the third woman, who is only his second wife’s maternal sister. And he is forbidden to the fifth woman, who is only his fourth wife’s maternal sister.

From where

do we know that his wife’s maternal sister is indeed forbidden to him?

It is derived from his sister: Just as his sister, whether related through the father or through the mother,

is forbidden,

so too here,

with regard to his wife’s sister,

whether

she was her sister

through the father or

she was her sister

through the mother,

she is forbidden.

And we raise an objection:

Let it instead be derived from his aunt!

And let us say:

Just as his aunt

is forbidden specifically when she is his paternal aunt

through the father and not through the mother [as we derived above,

—as we derived earlier—

so too here,

with regard to a wife’s sister, she should be forbidden specifically when she is his wife’s sister

through the father, and not

his wife’s sister

through the mother?

The Gemara explains:

It is more logical to derive it from his sister

and not from his aunt.

It would be

for us

to derive

the law of a wife’s sister.

For

a wife’s sister is

one’s own relative,

and therefore her law should be derived

from

his sister, who is also

one’s own relative.

And do not refute this from one’s aunt, since she is among the relatives of one’s father.

And we object:

On the contrary, it should be derived from his aunt,

and not from his sister,

since the matter

that is

through betrothal

[a wife’s sister] should be derived

from a matter that is through betrothal

[his paternal uncle’s wife], and not from the prohibition of his sister, which is not a matter brought about through betrothal.

As a result of this objection, the Gemara retracts its previous derivation and brings another source:

Rather, it is derived from a brother’s wife

for a wife’s sister, because

we

say:

since

these two forbidden relations are both

a matter brought about through betrothal and one’s own relative. Therefore, one’s aunt cannot refute this derivation, for although she is brought about through betrothal, she is not one’s own relative.”

Therefore, do not refute this from his aunt, for although she comes about through betrothal, she is not “a relative of his own.”

The Gemara asks:

And with regard to a brother’s wife herself,

from where

do we know that she is forbidden whether the brother is related through the father or only through the mother?

And we answer: From

that which was taught:

It is written in the portion of Aharei Mot:

“You shall not uncover the nakedness of your brother’s wife;

it is the nakedness of your brother.”

And we learn from here that one’s brother’s wife is forbidden. Her prohibition applies

whether

the brother was

paternally related

or

whether

the brother was

maternally related.

And from where

do you say

that her prohibition applies

whether through the father

or

whether through the mother?

Or perhaps it is only through the father and not through the mother?

This cannot be said. For

it follows logically!

We can derive by means of a bama matzinu analogy that she is forbidden whether through the father or through the mother:

The Torah made one liable

for

here,

with regard to a brother’s wife,

and made one liable for his sister.

Just as with his sister,

the Torah made one liable

whether

for his sister

through the father or

for his sister

through the mother—

so too here,

with regard to a brother’s wife, the Torah made one liable

whether

the brother was

paternally related or

the brother was

maternally related.

Or

perhaps you will say:

Turn to this alternative path,

and prohibit a brother’s wife only when the brother is related through the father:

Because

the Torah made one liable

in the case stated

here,

with regard to a brother’s wife,

and made one liable

the Torah also

for his aunt.

Just as his aunt is through the father and not through the mother, so too here,

with regard to a brother’s wife, the Torah made one liable only for a brother’s wife

through the father and not

for a brother’s wife

through the mother.

Let us see which one it resembles:

We derive one’s own relatives [a brother’s wife]

—a brother’s wife—

from one’s own relative [his sister].

—one’s sister.

And his aunt cannot refute this, for

she is one of

his father’s relatives.

Or turn to this alternative path: We derive a matter brought about through betrothal [a brother’s wife]

—a brother’s wife—

from a matter brought about through betrothal [his paternal uncle’s wife],

—the wife of one’s father’s brother—

and his sister cannot refute this, as her prohibition arises automatically.

Since it is indeed impossible to derive it through logical inference, therefore:

The verse states: “

You shall not uncover the nakedness of your brother’s wife;

it is the nakedness of your brother.”

The end of the verse is superfluous, and Scripture repeats it in order to teach us that a brother’s wife is forbidden

whether

the brother was

paternally related,

or

whether

the brother was

maternally related.

And perhaps: Both verses,

both “You shall not uncover the nakedness of your brother’s wife” and “It is the nakedness of your brother,”

with regard to a brother’s wife

speak only of a brother related through the father, and both are needed:

And one verse

speaks

of a case in which

she has

a brother’s wife

children during her husband’s lifetime,

and Scripture comes to prohibit her to him if his brother dies or divorces her.

And

one verse

speaks

of a case in which

she does not have children during her husband’s lifetime, to say that she is forbidden during the lifetime of his brother, after his brother divorced her, because at that point there is no mitzva of levirate marriage. Scripture had to state this, so that you would not err and say: Since if she had remained married to his brother and he had not divorced her, and he had died, she would have been subject to levirate marriage, the prohibition of a brother’s wife did not apply to her from the outset.

to say that she is forbidden during the lifetime of his brother, after his brother has divorced her, because there is then no mitzva of levirate marriage. The verse had to state this, so that you would not mistakenly say: Since if she had remained with his brother and he had not divorced her, and then he had died, she would have required levirate marriage, the prohibition of a brother’s wife did not originally take effect upon her.

And we answer:

She does not have children during her husband’s lifetime

does not need to be derived from this verse, because it

follows from Rav Huna [

above, 54b]

as a consequence. For he said that the verse states: “A brother’s wife—she is impure.” Rav Huna learned from this that she is forbidden during her husband’s lifetime even though she becomes permitted after her husband’s death [as explained above]. Therefore, the verse is superfluous for teaching that a maternal brother’s wife is forbidden.

it from the verse: “A brother’s wife—she is like a menstruating woman.” Rav Huna learned from this that she is forbidden during her husband’s lifetime even though she becomes permitted after her husband’s death [as explained above]. Therefore, the verse is superfluous for teaching the law of a maternal brother’s wife.

And

we still object:

And perhaps: Both verses [

“You shall not uncover the nakedness of your brother’s wife; it is the nakedness of your brother”]

refer to a brother’s wife through the father,

and two verses are needed to teach us:

One verse

speaks of a case in which she is forbidden

where

she has children during her husband’s lifetime, after he divorced her.

after he divorced her.

And

one verse

speaks of a case in which she is forbidden

where

she has children,

and she is also forbidden

after her husband’s death!

This is necessary so that you would not say: Since her husband died, the designation “brother’s wife” has been removed from her, and she is permitted to him even if she has children by him, just as her prohibition is removed when she has no children. Rather, when she has no children there is a mitzva to perform levirate marriage with her, and when she has children there is no mitzva to perform levirate marriage with her; but in either case, the prohibition of a brother’s wife is removed after the husband’s death. Therefore, a special verse was needed to prohibit her, but from where do you know that a maternal aunt is also forbidden?

Rather, when she has no children there is a mitzva to perform levirate marriage with her, and when she has children there is no mitzva to perform levirate marriage with her. Nevertheless, in either case the prohibition of a brother’s wife is removed after death, and therefore a special verse is needed to forbid her. But from where do you know that a maternal sister of the father is also forbidden?

And we answer:

A case in which she has children after her husband’s death—

no verse is necessary!

For

since the Merciful One said that a brother’s wife

who

does not have children

is

permitted

through levirate marriage,

you may infer:

this—a brother’s wife who

has children

has children—

is

forbidden.

Therefore, the verse is superfluous for teaching us that a maternal brother’s wife is also forbidden.

And we still object:

Perhaps,

nevertheless, we need a special verse to teach the prohibition of a brother’s wife who has children after her husband’s death, and it cannot be derived from the fact that the Torah permitted her only when he has no children, because I might say:

1.

When she has no children, she is forbidden to everyone else,

as it is stated: “The wife of the deceased shall not be married outside to a stranger,”

but she is permitted to the levir.

But when she

has children, she is

permitted—

she is permitted to marry

anyone else, and she is permitted

also

to the levir.

2.

Alternatively,

I might say:

When she has no children, it is a mitzva

for her to enter levirate marriage with her husband’s brother;

when she has children, it is optional

for him to take her in marriage.

Alternatively,

one can say: It can indeed be derived that the Torah did not permit a brother’s wife who has children after her husband’s death, from the fact that the Torah permitted her only when he has no children. However, from this derivation I would not know that she is subject to karet; I would know only that there is a prohibition of a positive commandment. For I might say:

When she has no children—

yes,

she is indeed permitted to his brother; but

when she has children, no,

she is not permitted to his brother.

A prohibition inferred from a positive commandment

is a prohibition of

a positive commandment,

but we have not heard from here that the punishment is karet. Therefore, the Torah had to write another verse to teach us that he is liable to karet for her.

And since the verse was needed to teach us the prohibition of a brother’s wife who has children after her husband’s death, it is no longer possible to derive from it that a maternal brother’s wife is forbidden.

And we answer:

The Merciful One wrote

a different

verse [a third verse], in the portion of Kedoshim: “And a man who takes his brother’s wife, she is impure;

—the third verse—in the portion of Kedoshim: “And a man who takes his brother’s wife, she is a menstruating woman;

he has uncovered his brother’s nakedness,

they shall be childless.”

You can learn from this verse that a brother’s wife who has children after her husband’s death is liable to karet. Therefore, the phrase “It is the nakedness of your brother” is superfluous, to teach that a brother’s wife is forbidden whether the brother was related through the father or through the mother.

And we object:

And perhaps

the law of

a maternal brother’s wife should be like

the law of

a paternal brother’s wife: Just as a paternal brother’s wife is permitted after her husband’s death,

so too a maternal brother’s wife after her husband’s death

is permitted.

And we answer:

The verse states: “The nakedness of your brother”;

the word “nakedness of your brother”

it is.

And the implication of “it is” is:

It shall remain as it is!

That is, it is always forbidden, even after death. And it is from this verse that we learned the source of the prohibition of a maternal brother’s wife, and the Torah says concerning it that it shall always remain in its state of prohibition, even after her husband’s death.

The Gemara now adds and explains further verses concerning the forbidden relations mentioned in the portion of Kedoshim —

Since the Torah already stated at the end of the passage of forbidden relations [in Aharei Mot]: “For anyone who performs any of all these abominations—the souls that perform them shall be cut off from among their people”—

if so,

his sister, concerning whom

the verse again

wrote karet [in Kedoshim]: “And a man who takes his sister, and they shall be cut off in the sight of the members of their people”—

in the portion of Kedoshim: “And a man who takes his sister, and they shall be cut off before the eyes of their people”—

why is it necessary,

when she is already included among all the forbidden relations?

And we answer: This verse of karet concerning “his sister” was necessary

for the teaching of Rabbi Yohanan.

For Rabbi Yohanan said:

This verse teaches

that if he performed all of them [

that he had intercourse with all the forbidden relations]

during one period of unawareness, [

that he was unaware of the prohibition of all of them, and did not become aware of his sin between one act of intercourse and the next]

he is

liable

to bring a sin-offering

for each and every one

of the forbidden relations.

Since Scripture specified karet for his sister as a separate liability, we learn from here that if he has intercourse with all the forbidden relations—and his sister among them—during one period of unawareness, he becomes liable to bring a separate sin-offering for intercourse with his sister, in addition to the offering for the other forbidden relations.

And from here you learn concerning all the forbidden relations that he is liable to bring a separate sin-offering for each one, as the law of his sister can be applied to all the forbidden relations through Rabbi Yona’s hekesh [above, 54b; Keritot 2b].

And we object:

And according to Rabbi Yitzhak, who says: All those liable to karet were included

in the verse, “For anyone who performs any of all these abominations, the souls that perform them shall be cut off from among their people,”

why were they

And why was karet concerning his sister singled out

to be written separately? To tell you:

It was given for karet, and not for lashes!

For even if they warned him that he would receive lashes, he does not receive lashes.

And since Rabbi Yitzḥak interprets the word “excision” stated with regard to one’s sister as teaching that one is not flogged for violating that prohibition, then, according to his opinion,

to distinguish—

to impose a separate sin-offering for each of the forbidden relations with whom he had intercourse during one lapse of awareness—

from where do we derive this?

And we answer:

he derives it—

for Rabbi Yitzḥak, the division of all the forbidden relations into a separate liability for an offering for each one—

from

what the Torah said:

“And to a woman in the impurity of her menstruation

you shall not come near, to uncover her nakedness.”

But it could have written: “And to a menstruant you shall not come near.”

Rather, the verse teaches that each and every woman mentioned in that passage is distinct from the others; and from here you learn

to impose

upon one who, during one lapse of awareness, has intercourse with all the women mentioned in the passage, a separate offering

for

his intercourse with

each and every woman.

And the Gemara continues to explain another matter in the passage of the forbidden relations:

Everywhere that the Torah states karet, the meaning is that he and his offspring are cut off.

If so, with regard to the forbidden relation with

one’s aunt, concerning which the Merciful One wrote, “They shall die childless

[without children]

”—

why do I need this?

For “childless” means “karet,” that he and his offspring are cut off. And one’s aunt is included among the forbidden relations, and it is stated with regard to them, “They shall be cut off,” whose meaning is that they and their children will die. Why, then, did the verse need to state with regard to one’s aunt, “They shall die childless”?

And we answer: There is a need to state with regard to one’s aunt, “They shall die childless,”

to teach that which

Rabba

said!

For Rabba raises a contradiction between the verses, as it would appear:

[a difficulty, pointing out an apparent contradiction between the verses]:

On the one hand,

it is written

in the passage of the forbidden relations, concerning the punishment for the forbidden relation with one’s aunt:

“They shall be childless,”

which means that they will be childless in the future: they are destined to lose the children they presently have, at the time of the sin. Ultimately, they will become childless with regard to the children they now have, because those children will be buried during their parents’ lifetimes. Thus, when the sinners die, they will be childless of the children who existed at the time of the sin.

And

on the other hand,

it is written

in another verse in the passage of the forbidden relations:

“They shall die childless,”

which means that if they are childless now, at the time of the sin, without children, they will likewise remain as they are now, childless, even at the time of their death. Even if children are born to them after the sin, they will die—

but this does not include the principle that if today, at the time of the sin, they have children and are not presently childless, their children will die during their parents’ lifetimes.

How, then,

can the two verses be reconciled?

Rather, this is the explanation of the two verses:

If he has children

at the time of the sin, he will

bury them.

And if

he has no children

at the time of the sin, he will

go childless.

And it was necessary for the Torah to write

also

“They shall be childless,” and

it was necessary for it to write

also, “They shall bear their sin,

they shall die childless”!

For had the Merciful One written

only

“They shall be childless,” I would have said

that only the children born to him

before his sin [before he sinned] would die.

[before he sinned] would die.

But

the children born to him

from the time of his sin onward,

I would have said that they would

not

die.

Therefore,

the Merciful One wrote, “They shall die childless,”

that all the children will die.

And had the Merciful One written

only, “They shall bear their sin,

they shall die childless,” I would have said

that only the children he would have

from the time of his sin onward

would die, and that he would be childless of them, since this is the meaning of the verse: “They shall bear their sin—they shall die childless.”

But

the children he had

from the outset,

before he sinned, I would have said that they would

not

die.

Therefore,

it is necessary

to state also, “They shall be childless”!

And here the Gemara returns to explain the source of the law prohibiting ha’araha, initial penetration, in all the forbidden forms of intercourse stated in the Torah:

The prohibition of

initial penetration with those liable for violation of a prohibition—

from where do we derive it?

And the Gemara explains that this can be derived from the case of a “designated maidservant,” a Canaanite maidservant betrothed to a Hebrew slave [who is permitted to a maidservant ], and she is forbidden to everyone else under the category of those liable for violation of a prohibition, by the prohibition “There shall not be a sacred prostitute” [which is a prohibition applying to all maidservants].

And the Torah states, “She shall be subject to an examination,” teaching you that she is flogged [but he is not], “and he shall bring his guilt-offering to the Lord, to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, a guilt-offering ram.”

And we derive the prohibition of initial penetration in cases involving those liable for violation of a prohibition

from the fact that the Merciful One singled out

in the verse, “And if a man lies with a woman

with an emission of semen,”

which is stated

with regard to a designated maidservant,

implying that he is liable for her only for intercourse capable of producing an emission, which is completed intercourse.

By inference,

you learn

that

the other

people liable for violation of a prohibition,

who resemble the designated maidservant in that she is among those liable for violation of a prohibition, are subject to their prohibition even

from initial penetration.

And we challenge this:

On the contrary,

let us say that

from the fact that the Merciful One singled out

the prohibition of

initial penetration in cases involving those liable for karet,

as we learned in the earlier sugya—

by inference,

you learn

that those liable for violation of a prohibition

are liable

only upon completed intercourse,

and not for initial penetration.

Rav Ashi said: If you

say

so,

that with regard to all those liable for violation of a prohibition the Torah made one liable only upon completed intercourse,

let the verse remain silent concerning the designated maidservant,

which the Torah singled out by stating “with an emission of semen,” since we already know with regard to all those liable for violation of a prohibition [and the designated maidservant is included among them] that one is liable for them only upon completed intercourse.

We further explain:

Initial penetration with those liable for a prohibition due to priestly status—

whose prohibition does not apply universally, and which therefore cannot be derived from the designated maidservant, who is forbidden to all Israelites—

from where do we derive it?

It is derived

by means of a gzera shava concerning initial penetration in cases involving those liable for a prohibition due to priestly status:

“Take” [“They shall not take” a prostitute or a profaned woman]

[“They shall not take” a prostitute or a profaned woman]

“take” [“And a man who takes his sister”] from those liable for karet, with regard to whom initial penetration in all such cases was included above through Rabbi Yonah’s hekesh.

[“A man who takes” his sister], from cases involving prohibitions punishable by karet. It was previously established that the initial stage of intercourse applies in all of them, by Rabbi Yonah’s verbal analogy.

We further explain: Initial penetration

with those liable for a positive commandment [such as an Egyptian or an Edomite, concerning whom it is stated, “The children born to them—in the third generation they may enter the assembly of the Lord”; the third generation may enter, but the second generation may not, and a prohibition derived from a positive commandment is a positive commandment]—

[such as an Egyptian or an Edomite, regarding whom it is stated: “Children who are born to them—in the third generation they may enter the assembly of the Lord”; the third generation may enter, but the second generation may not, and a prohibition derived from a positive commandment has the status of a positive commandment]—

from where do we derive it?