Yevamot 55a — the Talmud in English

Evidently,

you have learned from this Mishna that

the sister of his wife, whether

she is her sister

from the father, or whether

she is her sister

from the mother,

they are

forbidden.

For it is explained in the seifa that if he had intercourse with the second after the death of the first, he is forbidden to the third, who is only the maternal sister of his second wife, and forbidden to the fifth, who is only the maternal sister of his fourth wife.

From where do we know

that the maternal sister of his wife is indeed forbidden to him?

We derive it from his sister: Just as his sister, whether from the father or from the mother,

is forbidden,

so here too,

the sister of his wife,

whether

she was her sister

from the father or

she was her sister

from the mother,

she is forbidden.

And we challenge this:

But let us derive it from his aunt!

And let us say:

Just as his aunt

is forbidden specifically when she is his father’s sister

from the father and not from the mother

[as we derived above].

So here too,

with regard to the sister of a wife, the sister of his wife should be forbidden specifically

from the father, and not

the sister of his wife

from the mother?

And we explain:

It is reasonable that we should derive it from his sister

and not from his aunt.

For it would be

[for us]

to derive

the sister of his wife from

the fact that

the sister of his wife is

a relative of his own,

and therefore we should learn it

from

his sister, for she too is

a relative of his own.

And do not refute this from his aunt—for she is among his father’s relatives.

And we challenge this:

On the contrary, it would have been proper to derive it from his aunt,

and not from his sister,

for it is a matter

that

comes about through betrothal

[the sister of his wife],

from a matter that comes about through betrothal

[his father’s brother’s wife]. You should derive one from the other, and not from the prohibition of his sister, which is not a matter that comes about through betrothal.

Because of this challenge, the Gemara retracts and brings another source:

Rather, we derive it from a brother’s wife

for the sister of a wife, because

we

say:

for

these two forbidden relations are

a matter that comes about through betrothal and a relative of his own.

Therefore, do not refute this from his aunt, for although she comes about through betrothal, she is not “a relative of his own.”

We inquire concerning this:

And the case of a brother’s wife itself—

from where do we know

that she is forbidden whether the brother was from the father or whether the brother was from the mother alone?

And we answer: From that

which was taught:

It is written in the section of the forbidden relations:

“The nakedness of your brother’s wife you shall not uncover,

it is the nakedness of your brother.”

And we learn from here that his brother’s wife is forbidden. Her prohibition is

whether

the brother was

from the father

or

whether

the brother was

from the mother.

And from where

do you say

that her prohibition is

whether from the father

or

whether from the mother?

Or perhaps it is only from the father and not from the mother?

This cannot be said. For:

And it is a logical inference!

We can learn by the principle of “what do we find” that she is forbidden whether from the father or from the mother:

The verse made liable

in one case,

here,

with regard to a brother’s wife,

and made liable with regard to his sister.

Just as with his sister,

the verse made him liable

whether

with his sister

from the father or

with his sister

from the mother—

so here too,

with regard to a brother’s wife, the verse made him liable

whether

the brother was

from the father or

the brother was

from the mother.

Or

perhaps you will say:

Turn to this path,

and forbid a brother’s wife only from the father:

Because

the verse made liable

here,

with regard to

a brother’s wife,

and made liable

the verse also

with regard to his aunt.

Just as his aunt is from the father and not from the mother, so here

with regard to a brother’s wife, the verse made liable only for a brother’s wife

from the father and not

for a brother’s wife

from the mother.

Let us see to whom it resembles:

We derive a relative of his own

[a brother’s wife]

from a relative of his own

[his sister].

And do not refute this from his aunt, which

is among

his father’s relatives.

Or turn to this path: We derive a matter that comes about through betrothal

[a brother’s wife]

from a matter that comes about through betrothal

[his father’s brother’s wife],

and do not refute this from his sister, whose prohibition comes by itself.

And since, indeed, it is impossible to learn it by the logical inference, therefore:

The verse says: “

The nakedness of your brother’s wife you shall not uncover,

it is the nakedness of your brother.”

The end of the verse is superfluous, and the verse repeated it in order to teach us that a brother’s wife is forbidden

whether

the brother was

from the father,

or

whether

the brother was

from the mother.

And say: Both this and that,

both “The nakedness of your brother’s wife you shall not uncover” and “It is the nakedness of your brother,”

speak of a brother’s wife

from the father alone, and both are needed:

And one verse

speaks

in the case

where she has,

his brother’s wife,

children during her husband’s lifetime,

and the verse came to forbid her to him if his brother died or divorced her.

And

one verse

speaks

in the case

where she has no children during her husband’s lifetime,

to say that she is forbidden during the lifetime of his brother, after his brother divorced her, because at that time there is no mitzva of levirate marriage. And the verse needed to say this so that you would not err and say: Since, had she remained with his brother and he had not divorced her, and he had died, she would have required levirate marriage, the prohibition of a brother’s wife did not initially apply to her.

And we answer:

[The case of] one who has no children during her husband’s lifetime

does not need to be learned from this verse, because

from Rav Huna

[above, 54b]

it emerges!

For he said that the verse states: “His brother’s wife—she is impure.” And Rav Huna learned from this that she is forbidden during her husband’s lifetime, even though she becomes permitted after her husband’s death [as explained above]. Therefore, the verse is superfluous for learning from it the case of a maternal brother’s wife.

And

we still challenge this:

Say: Both this and that

[“The nakedness of your brother’s wife you shall not uncover; it is the nakedness of your brother”]

speak of a brother’s wife from the father,

and two verses were needed to inform us:

One verse

speaks

of a case in which she is forbidden

where she has children during her husband’s lifetime,

after he divorced her.

And

one verse

speaks

of a case in which she is forbidden

where she has children,

for she is also forbidden

after her husband’s death!

So that you should not say: Since her husband died, the designation “brother’s wife” has departed from her, and she is permitted to him even if she has children from him, just as her prohibition departs when she has no children.

Rather, when she has no children there is a mitzva to perform levirate marriage with her, and when she has children there is no mitzva to perform levirate marriage with her; but in every case the prohibition of a brother’s wife is removed after death, and therefore a special verse was needed to forbid her—and still, from where do you know that a maternal paternal-aunt is also forbidden?

And we answer:

[The case of] one who has children after her husband’s death—

a verse is not needed!

For

since the Merciful One said

that a brother’s wife

who has no children

is

permitted

through levirate marriage,

you infer from this:

that

a brother’s wife who

has children

is

forbidden.

Therefore, the verse is superfluous for teaching us that a maternal brother’s wife is forbidden as well.

And we still challenge this:

Perhaps,

in any event we need a special verse to teach the prohibition of a brother’s wife who has children after her husband’s death, and it cannot be learned from the fact that the Torah permitted her only when he has no children, because I would say:

a.

When she has no children, she is forbidden to everyone,

as it is stated: “The wife of the dead shall not be outside to a strange man,”

but she is permitted to the brother.

But when

she has children—

she is permitted,

she is permitted to marry

to everyone, and she is permitted

also

to the brother.

b.

Alternatively,

I would say:

When she has no children, there is a mitzva

that she be taken in levirate marriage by her husband’s brother;

when she has children, it is permissible

for him to take her.

Alternatively,

it may be said: Indeed, one can learn that the Torah did not permit a brother’s wife who has children after her husband’s death from the fact that the Torah permitted her only when he has no children. But from this teaching I would not know that she carries karet, only a prohibition of a positive commandment. For I would say:

When she has no children—

yes,

she is indeed permitted to his brother, but

when she has children, no,

she is not permitted to his brother.

And a prohibition inferred from a positive commandment

is a prohibition of

a positive commandment,

but we have not heard karet as a punishment from here. Therefore, the Torah needed to write another verse to teach us that she carries karet.

And since the verse was needed to teach us the prohibition of a brother’s wife who has children after her husband’s death, it is no longer possible to learn from it that a maternal brother’s wife is forbidden.

And we answer:

The Merciful One wrote

another

verse

[a third verse], in the section of Kedoshim: “And a man who takes his brother’s wife—it is impurity.

He has uncovered his brother’s nakedness; they shall be childless.”

And from this verse you can learn that a brother’s wife who has children after her husband’s death carries karet.

Therefore, “It is the nakedness of your brother” is superfluous, in order to teach that a brother’s wife is forbidden whether the brother was from the father or whether the brother was from the mother.

And we challenge this:

And say

that the law of

a maternal brother’s wife should be like

the law of

a paternal brother’s wife: Just as a paternal brother’s wife after her husband’s death is permitted—

so too a maternal brother’s wife after her husband’s death

is permitted.

And we answer:

The verse says

“the nakedness of your brother”—

it.

And the implication of “it” is:

It shall remain in its state!

That it is always, and even after death, forbidden. For from this verse we learned the source of the prohibition of a maternal brother’s wife, and the Torah said concerning it that it shall remain in its state of prohibition always, even after her husband’s death.

And now the Gemara adds and explains further verses concerning the forbidden relations mentioned in the section of Kedoshim —

Since the Torah already said at the end of the section of the forbidden relations [in the section of Aharei Mot]: “For everyone who commits any of these abominations—the persons who commit them shall be cut off from the midst of their people”—

if so,

his sister, concerning whom

the verse returned and

wrote karet concerning her

[in the section of Kedoshim]: “And a man who takes his sister, and they shall be cut off before the eyes of the members of their people”—

why is it needed,

when she is included among all the forbidden relations?

And we answer: This verse of karet concerning “his sister” was needed

for the teaching of Rabbi Yohanan.

For Rabbi Yohanan said:

This verse teaches

that if he performed all of them

[if he had intercourse with all the forbidden relations]

in one state of unawareness,

[that he was unknowing concerning all of them and did not become aware of his sin between one act of intercourse and the next]—

he is

liable

to bring a sin-offering

for each and every one

of the forbidden relations.

For since the verse specified his sister, with karet separately, we learn from here that if he has intercourse with all the forbidden relations—and his sister among them—in one state of unawareness, he becomes liable for the intercourse with his sister to a separate sin-offering, in addition to the offering for the other forbidden relations.

And from here you learn concerning all the forbidden relations that he is liable for a separate sin-offering for each one, for it can be learned from the law of his sister concerning all the forbidden relations by the analogy of Rabbi Yona [above, 54b; Keritot 2b].

And we challenge this:

But according to Rabbi Yitzhak, who says: All those liable to karet were included

in the verse “For everyone who commits any of these abominations, the persons who commit them shall be cut off from the midst of their people”—

they were.

And why did karet concerning his sister go out

to be written separately? To tell you:

It was given for karet and not for lashes!

For even if they warned him concerning lashes, he does not receive lashes.

And since Rabbi Isaac explains that the hakaret mentioned concerning his sister comes to say that one is not flogged for her, then, according to his view—

to distinguish—

to obligate a separate sin-offering for each of the forbidden relations with whom he had intercourse in one unwitting lapse—

from where do we know it?

And we answer:

he derives it—

for Rabbi Isaac, to distinguish all the forbidden relations, so that there is an obligation of a sacrifice for each one separately—

from

what the Torah said:

“And to a woman in the impurity of her menstruation

you shall not approach to uncover her nakedness.”

And it should have written: “And to a menstruating woman you shall not approach.”

Rather, the verse teaches that each and every woman mentioned in that passage is distinguished from her fellow, and from here you learn

to obligate

one who, in one unwitting lapse, had intercourse with all the women mentioned in the passage, that he is liable to a separate sacrifice

for

his intercourse with

each and every woman.

And the Gemara continues to explain another matter in the passage of forbidden relations:

Every place where the Torah said karet, the meaning is that he and his offspring are cut off.

And if so, concerning the nakedness of

his paternal aunt, about which the Merciful One wrote, “Childless

without sons

shall they die”—

why do I need this?

For the meaning of “childless” is karet, that he and his offspring are cut off. Now, his paternal aunt is included among the forbidden relations, and it is said concerning them, “and they shall be cut off,” whose meaning is that they and their sons shall die; so why did the verse need to say concerning his paternal aunt, “childless shall they die”?

And we answer: There is a need to say concerning his paternal aunt, “childless shall they die”—

for what

Rabbah

said!

For Rabbah raises [

he objected that there is, apparently, a contradiction between the verses]:

On the one hand,

it is written

in the passage of forbidden relations, concerning the punishment for the nakedness of his paternal aunt:

“They shall be childless”

, whose meaning is “they will be childless in the future”: they are destined to lose the sons they presently have, at the time of the sin. For in the end they will come to be childless of the sons they now have, because they will bury them during their own lifetimes, so that at the time of the sinners’ death they will die childless of the sons existing at the time of the sin.

And

on the other hand,

it is written

in another verse in the passage of forbidden relations:

“Childless shall they die”

, whose meaning is that if at present, at the time of the sin, they are childless, without sons, so too they will remain as they are, childless now, also at the time of their death: even if sons are born to them after the sin, they will die

.

How

can the two verses be possible?

Rather, this is their explanation, of the two verses:

If he has sons

at the time of the sin—this one

buries them.

And if

he has no sons

at the time of the sin—this one

goes childless.

And it was necessary to write

also

“They shall be childless”, and

it was necessary to write

also “They shall bear their sin,

childless shall they die”!

For had the Merciful One written

only

“They shall be childless,” I would have said

that only the sons born to him

until his sin [

until he sinned] would die.

But

the sons born to him

from his sin onward, I would say that they

would

not

die.

Therefore

the Merciful One wrote, “Childless shall they die”

, that all the sons will die.

And had the Merciful One written

only “They shall bear their sin,

childless shall they die,” I would have said

that only the sons he will have

from his sin onward

will die, and he will be childless of them, for this is the meaning of the verse: “They shall bear their sin—childless shall they die.”

But

the sons he had

from the outset,

before he sinned, I would say that they

would not

die.

Therefore:

it is necessary

to say also, “They shall be childless”!

And here the Gemara returns to explain the source of the law of the prohibition of haara'a in all the forbidden unions stated in the Torah:

The prohibition of

haara'a for those liable for negative commandments—

from where do we know it?

And the Gemara explains that this is to be learned from “a designated maidservant,” who is a Canaanite maidservant betrothed to a Hebrew slave [permitted to a maidservant ], and she is forbidden to everyone else under the category of those liable for negative commandments, by the negative commandment “There shall not be a consecrated one” [which is a negative commandment concerning all maidservants].

And the Torah said: “She shall be examined,” to teach you that she is flogged [but he is not], “and he shall bring his guilt-offering to the Lord, to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, a ram of guilt-offering.”

And they learn the prohibition of haara'a for those liable for negative commandments

from the fact that the Merciful One specified

in the verse, “And a man, if he lies with a woman,

the lying of seed,”

which is stated

concerning a designated maidservant,

from which it is implied that he is liable for her only for intercourse fit to produce seed, and that is completed intercourse.

It follows

that you learn from this

that

the other

ones liable for negative commandments,

who resemble a designated maidservant in that she is among those liable for negative commandments, their prohibition applies even

with haara'a.

And we challenge:

On the contrary,

let it be said:

from the fact that the Merciful One specified

the prohibition of

haara'a for those liable for karet

, as we learned in the earlier passage—

it follows

that you learn from this

that those liable for negative commandments

are liable only

with completed intercourse

!

Rav Ashi said: If

you

say

that this is so, that with all those liable for negative commandments the Torah made one liable only for completed intercourse,

let the verse be silent concerning the designated maidservant

which the Torah specified concerning her “the lying of seed,” for we already know concerning all those liable for negative commandments [and the designated maidservant among them] that one is not liable for them except for completed intercourse.

We further explain:

haara'a for those liable for negative commandments of priesthood

—whose negative commandment is not equal for all, and you cannot learn it from a designated maidservant, which is forbidden to all Israelites—

from where do we know it?

It is derived

that haara'a for those liable for negative commandments of priesthood is derived by a gzera shava:

“taking” [“A woman who is a prostitute or profaned they shall not “take”]

[“They shall not take” a prostitute or a profaned woman]

“taking” [“And a man who “takes” his sister], from those liable for karet, concerning all of whom haara'a was included above, through Rabbi Yona’s juxtaposition.

We further explain: haara'a

for

those liable for positive commandments [

such as an Egyptian and an Edomite, concerning whom it is said, “The sons who are born to them—the third generation may enter the assembly of the Lord”: the third may enter, but the second may not enter; and a negative commandment derived from a positive commandment is a positive commandment]—

from where do we know it?