Yevamot 53a — the Talmud in English

There is zika.

That is, the force of the zika is strong, as though she were acquired by him; therefore, the ma’amar of the yevamin can be attributed to the zika, and he can betroth her through the zikat yevamin.

And since the only reason this wording is effective is that there is zika, if he has already performed halitza with her, since

the halitza has come—

it has nullified the zika!

He can no longer betroth her through the zikat yevamin.

And the Rabbis hold: There is no zika.

This is because the zika is not sufficiently strong to consider her as though she were acquired by him.

And yet,

initially, if he had said to her, “You are betrothed to me through the zikat yevamin”—

would it not have been effective? Now too, it should be effective!

That is, necessarily, the reason the wording “You are betrothed to me through the zikat yevamin” is effective initially, before she underwent halitza, is that in every respect the Sages endowed the kiddushei ma’amar of a yevama with significance, without relying on the zika. If so, even after halitza, when no connection remains between them, this wording should likewise be effective for betrothing her!

Rav Sherevya said: With regard to a valid halitza, if he said to her

after it,

— -

everyone agrees that it is ineffective,

since initially there is zika, whereas after halitza the zika no longer exists.

And here they disagree with regard to an invalid halitza,

Rabbi and the Rabbis,

for example, where the halitza follows a bill of divorce, as the Rabbis hold that the invalid halitza did not nullify the entire zika. Therefore, it is still possible to betroth her through the ma’amar of the yevamin.

One master,

Rabbi,

holds: An invalid halitza effects release,

and nothing of the zika remains; therefore, he cannot betroth her with such wording.

And the other master,

the Rabbis,

holds: An invalid halitza does not effect release

completely. Rather, some zika remains, so he can betroth her with this wording.

Rav Ashi said: Everyone

holds that

an invalid halitza does not effect release.

And here they disagree about whether a condition is effective in halitza.

The question is whether it is possible to make the halitza conditional upon payment, so that if he performs halitza and they do not pay him, the halitza is ineffective.

For example, he performed a conditional halitza here, and afterward betrothed her with money, saying to her this wording.

One master,

the Rabbis,

holds,

that

a condition is effective in halitza,

and if she does not pay him, the halitza does not take effect and the zika remains as it was; therefore, he can betroth her through the zikat yevamin.

And the other master,

Rabbi,

holds: A condition is not effective in halitza,

and the halitza takes effect and nullifies the zika, so he cannot betroth her through the zikat yevamin [and see Tosafot, who raised the difficulty that, if so, they should disagree with regard to an ordinary yevama, with whom he did not perform halitza and did not stipulate a condition in her halitza; see their explanation].

Ravina said: Everyone agrees that a condition is effective in halitza,

and here they disagree about a doubled condition,

whether it is necessary in order to make the halitza conditional upon payment.

One master holds: We require a doubled condition

in order to annul the halitza if the woman does not fulfill the condition. Here, since he did not make a doubled condition, the halitza takes effect even if she did not pay him, the zika is nullified, and he cannot betroth her through the zikat yevamin.

And the other master holds: We do not require a doubled condition.

Since she did not pay him, the halitza does not take effect, and he can betroth her through the zikat yevamin.

We learned in the Mishna:

If he performed halitza and performed ma’amar, gave a bill of divorce, and engaged in intercourse—

nothing follows the halitza.

We raised a difficulty:

And let it also teach: Nothing follows intercourse!

Abaye and Rava both say:

Indeed,

it should be taught;

they themselves would teach it as follows:

Nothing follows intercourse.

But our tanna,

why did he say, “Nothing follows halitza,” and not, “Nothing follows intercourse”?

Because

the release of a yevama to marry anyone

through halitza

was preferable for him

to state, and from it you derive that nothing follows intercourse as well; it would have been burdensome for him to repeat the matter.

We learned in the Mishna, after it stated that one ma’amar follows another ma’amar:

Whether there is one yevama or whether there are two yevamot.

The Mishna,

which states that with two yevamot one ma’amar follows another ma’amar, is

not in accordance with ben Azzai—

as it is taught in a beraita: ben Azzai says: One ma’amar follows another ma’amar when there are two yevamin and one yevama.

But one ma’amar does not follow another ma’amar when there are two yevamot and one yevama.

We learned further in the Mishna:

How

is there halitza after a ma’amar?

He performed ma’amar with this one and performed halitza with that one—

the first one [the recipient of the ma’amar] requires a bill of divorce from him.

It follows that only in this manner does the halitza of the second release the first from the requirement of halitza.

But if he were to perform halitza with the recipient of the ma’amar, the second would not be released without also undergoing halitza, since the halitza of the recipient of the ma’amar is invalid halitza: it does not release her to marry anyone without his also having to release her through a bill of divorce for his ma’amar.

Shall we say that this supports

the wording of the Mishna, which did not mention halitza with the recipient of the ma’amar,

in accordance with Shmuel,

who said: If he performed halitza with the recipient of the ma’amar, her rival is not released through her halitza?!

And

likewise, since he performs halitza with the second, who is not disqualified from marrying a kohen, and does not perform halitza with the recipient of the ma’amar, who becomes disqualified from marrying a kohen through the bill of divorce—

let this be a refutation of Rav Yosef,

who prohibits causing disqualification from marrying a kohen when there is no necessity, as he cited in the name of Rabbi: A person should not pour out the water of his pit when others need it!

And we answer:

Does it teach “he performs halitza

with the second,” so that you could infer from here that this is what must be done?

It teaches “he performed halitza,

which is an expression of

post facto.

No proof can be brought from it.

We learned further in the Mishna: He gave

a bill of divorce to this one and a bill of divorce to that one—

they require halitza from him.

The Gemara infers from the wording “they require,” which is plural, that both require halitza, and neither is released through the other’s halitza, since the halitza of both is “defective”; neither one is released through the other’s halitza:

And according to the continuation of the Mishna, which states that this is the procedure when there are two yevamin and one yevama, both of them must perform halitza with her.

Shall we say that our Mishna supports

our Mishna

in accordance with Rabba bar Rav Huna.

As Rabba bar Rav Huna said: An invalid halitza—

requires her to seek out all the brothers!

And we reject this:

What is the meaning of “they require”—

they require it in general.

We learned further in the Mishna:

He gave a bill of divorce to this one and performed halitza with that one—

nothing follows the halitza.

We raised a difficulty:

Shall we say that this supports

our Mishna, from which it appears that specifically because he performed halitza with the second and not with the recipient of the bill of divorce, nothing follows the bill of divorce; but if he performs halitza with the recipient of the bill of divorce, whose halitza is invalid, she requires a bill of divorce in addition to the halitza—this supports

As Shmuel said: If he performed halitza with the recipient of the bill of divorce—

her rival is not released.

Because the halitza of the recipient of the bill of divorce is invalid halitza.

And

or alternatively, you could say [according to Tosafot] that our Mishna is

a refutation of Rav Yosef!

For it appears from it that he performs halitza initially with the second, thereby disqualifying her from marrying a kohen, and does not perform halitza with the recipient of the bill of divorce. Yet according to Rav Yosef, Rabbi taught us that a person should not pour out the water of his pit when others need it; he should not have caused her disqualification from marrying a kohen when her fellow was already disqualified, and he could have performed halitza with her.

And we reject both inferences:

Does it teach “he performs halitza

initially,” so that the tanna teaches us that this is what should be done?

It teaches “he performed halitza,

which is an expression of

post facto!

We learned in the Mishna:

He performed halitza and he performed halitza, or he performed halitza—

nothing follows the halitza!

We raised a difficulty:

And let it also teach

at the end of the matter, with regard to one who engaged in intercourse and performed additional acts:

Nothing follows intercourse!

Abaye and Rava both say: It should teach: Nothing follows intercourse.

But our tanna,

who did not teach this, but rather stated it with regard to halitza, because

the release of a yevama to marry anyone was preferable for him.

As was explained above.

We learned in the Mishna:

Whether there is one yevama and two yevamot, etc.

Granted, according to Rabbi Yohanan, who says that the entire household,

of the brothers and the yevamot after one of the brothers performs halitza,

is subject to a prohibition

of “He shall not build”

—

it is understandable that

the tanna needed

—

to teach us

that when he performs halitza with this one and performs ma’amar with that one,

kiddushin does not take effect with those subject to prohibitions,

in accordance with Rabbi Akiva.

But according to Reish Lakish, who says that the entire household is subject to karet

of the prohibition of a brother’s wife

—stands,

and only with regard to the one who performs halitza is the karet transformed into a prohibition, the difficulty arises:

And is it the case that

the tanna needed

—

to teach us that kiddushin does not take effect with those subject to prohibitions punishable by karet?

Reish Lakish could have said to you: And according to your reasoning,

there is likewise a difficulty:

The latter clause, which teaches: “He engaged in intercourse and performed ma’amar,”

“nothing follows the intercourse”—and is it the case that

it needed to teach us that kiddushin does not take effect with a married woman?

Rather, since it taught the release of one yevama and one yevama,

where there is a novel point even according to Reish Lakish: that kiddushin does not take effect for the one who performed halitza with the woman who underwent halitza, since for him she is subject only to a prohibition,

it also taught the case of two yevamot and one yevama.

And since it taught the case of two yevamot and one yevama, it also taught the case of two yevamin and one yevama.