Yevamot 52b (נב:) — the Talmud in English

And

if he told him to write a bill of divorce

for an ordinary woman,

so that he would divorce her after marrying her,

it is not a bill of divorce, because he does not have the ability

at present

to divorce her.

Rabbi Ḥama raised a question: If he wrote such a bill of divorce

for his yevama

before he consummated the levirate marriage, and after he had intercourse with her, he gave it to her,

what is the halakha

—

can she be divorced with it once he marries her?

The sides of the dilemma are:

Should we say:

Since she is bound to him

she is considered like his betrothed,

and he is therefore like a betrothed man who tells a scribe to write a bill of divorce for him so that he may give it to his wife when he marries her: He may write it now and give it to her when he marries her.

Or perhaps, since he did not perform maamar with her, no?

Since she is not yet considered his betrothed but only a woman who is bound to him, he cannot write it now and divorce her with it after he marries her.

The question remains unresolved.

[See Tosafot, who explain that the question is whether this bill of divorce disqualifies her from marrying a kohen by virtue of the “trace of a bill of divorce,” since by Torah law she is certainly not divorced, as he cannot divorce her at present by Torah law even if he performs maamar with her.]

Rav Ḥananya raised a question: A levir who performed maamar with his yevama and thereafter

wrote a bill of divorce

only for her bond,

but not for her maamar.

Or he wrote a bill of divorce

only for her

maamar

alone,

but not for her bond—

what is the halakha

if she is divorced by such a bill of divorce?

The sides of the dilemma are:

Should we say that, since he performed the betrothal of maamar with her,

the maamar is placed upon the bond in order to elevate it,

so that the maamar takes effect upon the bond, and this is one marital relationship, half of which cannot be severed independently?

Therefore, if he gives a bill of divorce only for the maamar or only for the bond,

it is like divorcing half a woman,

and she is not divorced at all. For

one who divorces half a woman

has accomplished nothing!

Or perhaps, this

maamar

stands independently, and this

bond

stands independently.

They do not constitute one marital relationship, and therefore it is possible to give a bill of divorce separately for the maamar and separately for the bond?

And we raise an objection:

Resolve it from the statement of Rava!

As Rava said: A yevama with whom the levir performed maamar, and thereafter the levir died, may no longer undergo levirate marriage with another brother, because she has the bond of two levirs: that of the first, and that of the second, who performed maamar with her. Her rival wife is likewise prohibited from levirate marriage, because she is the rival wife of a woman who has the bond of two levirs.

But if the levir who performed maamar with her

gave

the levir

a bill of divorce for his maamar

but not for her bond,

her rival wife is permitted

to undergo levirate marriage, since she is no longer the rival wife of a woman who has the bond of two levirs.

[As for why the woman who received the maamar herself may not undergo levirate marriage, it was already explained above that this is due to a rabbinic decree, lest she be confused with a woman who received a complete bill of divorce for the bond that preceded the maamar, in which case she would be prohibited to all the brothers.]

And we answer:

For Rava it is obvious; Rav Ḥananya raises the question!

What became of this question?

The question remains unresolved.

We learned in the Mishna:

If he performed ḥalitza

and afterward

performed maamar,

nothing after ḥalitza has any effect!

Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: This is the statement of Rabbi Akiva, who says that betrothal does not take effect with those liable for

negative commandments,

and a woman who underwent ḥalitza is prohibited to the man who performed ḥalitza with her by the negative commandment: “Since he did not build, he shall not build again.”

But the Sages say: Something after ḥalitza does have an effect.

The betrothal of the man who performed ḥalitza therefore takes effect with the woman who underwent ḥalitza, despite the negative-commandment prohibition that applies to her.

And we challenge this:

Can you really establish it as the opinion of Rabbi Akiva?

But did we not learn in the first clause: If he gave a bill of divorce

and afterward

performed

with her

maamar, she requires a bill of divorce and ḥalitza.

And if it is Rabbi Akiva,

then

once he gave her a bill of divorce, can maamar have any effect with her!?

And it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Akiva says: From where is it derived that one who gives a bill of divorce to his yevama renders her permanently prohibited to him?

She is even more severely restricted than a married woman who returns to her husband after being divorced!

As it is stated: “Her first husband, who sent her away, may not take her again”

The words “who sent her away” are superfluous, and they come to teach that there is a man who is prohibited from taking back his divorced wife even when she has not married another man. And who is this? It is a yevama who was divorced: The man who performed levirate marriage with her is prohibited from taking her back forever

after [an unclear, corrupted phrase].

Since she is prohibited to him by a negative commandment, betrothal no longer takes effect with her according to Rabbi Akiva. If so, it is impossible to establish the first clause that we learned—he gave a bill of divorce and performed maamar with her, and she requires a bill of divorce and ḥalitza—as the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. And consequently, it is likewise impossible to establish the latter clause of the Mishna according to Rabbi Akiva!

And we answer:

Rav Ashi said: A bill of divorce of a levir

is,

even according to Rabbi Akiva,

a rabbinic enactment

and not a Torah prohibition.

The verse is merely a supporting allusion,

and therefore betrothal takes effect with her even according to Rabbi Akiva.

It was taught likewise: The statement that we learned, “Nothing after ḥalitza has any effect,” is according to Rabbi Akiva.

For it was taught:

Rabbi says: These words

that nothing after ḥalitza has any effect

are stated only according to Rabbi Akiva, who treated a woman who underwent ḥalitza as an erva,

so that betrothal does not take effect with her.

But the Sages say: Something after ḥalitza does have an effect.

And I,

Rabbi,

say: When

betrothal takes effect after ḥalitza,

is that when he betrothed her for the sake of marriage.

But

if he

betrothed her for the sake of levirate marriage

[and below it will be explained how he betrothed her],

nothing after ḥalitza has any effect!

Since there is no aspect of levirate marriage at all after ḥalitza, she does not require a bill of divorce from him.

It was taught in another beraita: One who performed ḥalitza with his yevama and then betrothed her.

Rabbi says: If he betrothed her for the sake of marriage

—

she requires a bill of divorce from him.

For the sake of levirate marriage

—

she does not require a bill of divorce from him.

And the Sages say: Whether he betrothed her for the sake of marriage or whether he betrothed her for the sake of levirate marriage

—

she requires a bill of divorce from him.

Rav Yosef said: What is the reason for Rabbi’s opinion,

who holds that the levir’s betrothal of his yevama after she underwent ḥalitza is ineffective if he betrothed her for the sake of levirate marriage? He performs an act of betrothal with her; why should we care about his intention when he says “for the sake of levirate marriage”?

They made her like one who digs in the property of a convert

who died, whose property is ownerless, except that he does not know that these are the convert’s lands, but

believes that they are his,

and therefore does not intend to acquire them through the act of taking possession.

He does not acquire them,

despite the fact that he dug in them and actually performed an act of acquisition through possession.

The same applies to a levir who intended to acquire his yevama [after she underwent ḥalitza] through the betrothal of a yevama: Since he intended to acquire her by virtue of his brother’s levirate bond, even though he performed an act of betrothal, he does not acquire her [because the levirate bond has already been dissolved by ḥalitza].

Abaye said

to Rav Yosef:

Are these cases comparable?

Is the levir’s acquisition after ḥalitza comparable to one who digs in the property of a convert and believes that it is his? For

there, he does not intend to acquire it;

he is merely digging in his own land.

But

here,

when he betroths the woman who underwent ḥalitza for the sake of levirate marriage,

he does intend to acquire her.

In such a case, since he performed an act of betrothal and intends to acquire her, why should we care whether his intention is for the sake of marriage or for the sake of levirate marriage?

Rather, it is comparable only to one who digs in the property of this convert

and intends to acquire it, but is merely mistaken,

believing that it belongs to another convert; in that case, he acquires it.

Since he performs an act of acquisition and intends to acquire it, it does not matter that he is mistaken regarding the acquisition itself.

Rather, Abaye said: Here we are dealing with a case where he said to her: “You are betrothed to me through the maamar of levirate marriage”

[and he did not betroth her through ordinary betrothal, but believed that he could betroth her by virtue of his brother’s levirate marriage].

Rabbi holds

that when the Sages instituted the betrothal of maamar, they instituted it only where a levirate bond exists. The nature of the enactment was:

“The maamar is placed upon the bond in order to elevate it!”

—

so that the maamar should take effect upon the bond and strengthen it.

Therefore, when

the ḥalitza came

—

it dissolved the bond.

He can no longer perform maamar after ḥalitza, since the entire essence of maamar is to strengthen the bond while it still exists.

And the Rabbis hold: This

bond

stands independently, and this

maamar

stands independently.

Therefore,

from the outset,

before ḥalitza,

if he had said to her, “You are betrothed to me through the maamar of levirate marriage,” would it not have been effective

to betroth her without strengthening the bond?

Now also,

after ḥalitza, when there is no longer a bond,

it is likewise effective

—the maamar.

The fact that he said that he was betrothing her on account of “the maamar of levirate marriage” is irrelevant, since he intended to betroth her and performed an act of betrothal.

Rava said: If he said to her

“You are betrothed to me”

“through the maamar of levirate marriage,” everyone agrees that it is effective.

And here, with what case are we dealing? With a case where he said to her: “You are betrothed to me through the bond of the levirs!”

That is, he betroths her now, after ḥalitza, by virtue of the levirate bond that applies to her, but such a bond no longer exists after ḥalitza.

Rabbi holds

that the reason maamar is effective when he says to her before ḥalitza, “You are betrothed to me through the bond of the levirs,” is that Rabbi holds: