Yevamot 52b — the Talmud in English

And

if he said to him to write a get

for an ordinary woman,

that he should divorce her after he marries her,

it is not a get, because he does not have the ability

now

to divorce her.

Rami bar Hama raised a question:

if he wrote such a get

for his yevama

before he married her, and after he had intercourse with her, he gave it to her,

what

is the law regarding her being divorced by it when he marries her?

And the sides of the question are:

Shall we say:

since she is bound to him—

she is considered like his betrothed,

and he is therefore like a betrothed man who says to a scribe to write him a get so that he will be able to give it to his wife when he marries her, who may write it now and give it to her when he marries her?

Or perhaps, since he did not perform maamar with her, no!

Since she is still not considered his betrothed, but only one who is bound to him, and therefore he cannot write it now and divorce her with it after he marries her.

Teyku!

See the Tosafot, who explained that the question is whether this get disqualifies her from marrying a koen by virtue of the mere scent of a get, because by Torah law she is certainly not divorced, since he cannot divorce her now by Torah law even if he performs maamar with her.

Rav Hananya raised a question:

a yavam who performed maamar with his yevama, and afterward

wrote a get only for her bond,

alone,

and not for her maamar.

Or he wrote a get

for her maamar

alone,

and not for her bond—

what

is the law regarding her being divorced by such a get?

And the sides of the question are:

Shall we say that, since he performed maamar—the betrothal of maamar—with her,

the maamar is placed as an elevation of the bond,

so that the maamar takes effect upon the bond, and this is one marriage, from which it is impossible to uproot half of it.

And therefore, if he gives a get for the maamar alone or for the bond alone,

it is like divorcing half a woman,

so that she is not divorced at all. For

one who divorces half a woman—

has done nothing at all!

Or perhaps, this

maamar

stands by itself. And this

bond

stands by itself.

For they do not constitute one marriage. And therefore it is possible to give a get for the maamar separately and for the bond separately?

And we raise an objection:

And resolve it for him from Rava!

For Rava said:

a yevama with whom the yavam performed maamar, and afterward the yavam died, can no longer undergo yibbum with another brother, because she has the bond of two yevamin: that of the first, and that of the second, who performed maamar with her. And her rival-wife is also forbidden for yibbum, because she is the rival-wife of a woman who has the bond of two yevamin.

But if

he gave

the yavam who performed maamar with her

a get for her maamar,

and not for her bond,

her rival-wife is permitted

for yibbum. For she is no longer the rival-wife of a woman who has the bond of two yevamin.

And as for the woman of the maamar herself not undergoing yibbum, it was already explained above that this is because of a decree lest she be confused with a woman who received a complete get for the bond that preceded the maamar, in which case she is forbidden to all the brothers.

And we answer:

For Rava it is obvious. For Rav Hananya it is a question!

What

became of this question?—

Teyku!

We learned in the Mishna:

he performed chalitza

and afterward

performed maamar, there is nothing after chalitza!

nothing that follows the ritual of release has any effect!

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: This is the statement of Rabbi Akiva, who says that betrothal does not take effect with those forbidden by

negative commandments,

and a woman who underwent chalitza is forbidden to the man who performed chalitza by the negative commandment of “Since he did not build, he shall no longer build.”

But the Sages say: There is something after chalitza.

And the betrothal of the man who performed chalitza takes effect with the woman who underwent chalitza, despite the prohibition by a negative commandment that applies to her.

And we challenge this:

Can you establish it as the opinion of Rabbi Akiva?

But did he not teach at the beginning: He gave a get

and afterward

performed

with her

a maamar; she requires a get and chalitza.

And if it is Rabbi Akiva,

then

once he gave her a get, can maamar have any effect with her!?

And it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Akiva says: From where is it derived that one who gives a get to his yevama renders her forbidden to him forever?

For she is worse than a married woman who returns to her husband after she was divorced!

As it is stated: “Her first husband, who sent her away,

may not return to take her.”

The words “who sent her away” are superfluous, and they came to teach that there is one who sends away a woman and is forbidden to restore his divorced wife even when she did not marry another man. And who is this?—A yevama who was divorced, whom the man who performed yibbum with her is forbidden to restore forever

after chalitza.

And since she is forbidden to him by a negative commandment, betrothal no longer takes effect with her according to Rabbi Akiva. And if so, it is impossible to establish what we learned at the beginning—that he gave a get and performed maamar with her, and she requires a get and chalitza—as the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. And if so, it is likewise impossible to establish the latter part of the Mishna according to Rabbi Akiva!

And we answer:

Rav Ashi said: The get of yevamin

even according to Rabbi Akiva

is by rabbinic law

alone.

And the verse is merely a support,

and therefore betrothal takes effect with her even according to Rabbi Akiva.

It was also taught so,

that this statement we learned—“There is nothing after chalitza”—is according to Rabbi Akiva.

For it was taught:

Rabbi says: These statements

that there is nothing after chalitza

are said only according to Rabbi Akiva, who made a woman who underwent chalitza like a forbidden relation,

with whom betrothal does not take effect.

But the Sages say: There is something after chalitza.

And I,

Rabbi,

say: When

betrothal takes effect after chalitza is

when he betrothed her for the sake of marriage.

But

if

he betrothed her for the sake of yevamin

[and below it will be explained how he betrothed her],

there is nothing after chalitza!

For there is no aspect of yibbum at all after chalitza, and therefore she does not require a get from him.

It was taught in another beraita: One who performed chalitza with his yevama and then returned and betrothed her.

Rabbi says: If he betrothed her for the sake of marriage—

she requires a get from him.

For the sake of yevamin—

she does not require a get from him.

And the Sages say: Whether he betrothed her for the sake of marriage or whether he betrothed her for the sake of yevamin—

she requires a get from him.

Rav Yosef said: What is Rabbi’s reason,

who holds that the betrothal of the yavam with his yevama after she underwent chalitza is ineffective if he betrothed her for the sake of yevamin? For he is, after all, performing an act of betrothal with her, and what concern of ours is his intention when he says “for the sake of yevamin”?

They made her like one who tills the property of a convert

who died, and whose property is ownerless, except that he does not know that they are the convert’s lands, but

thinking that they are his,

and therefore he does not intend to acquire them through the act of possession.

He does not acquire them,

despite the fact that he tilled them and actually performed the act of acquisition through possession.

And the same is true of a yavam who intended to acquire his yevama [after she underwent chalitza] through the betrothal of a yevama: since he intended to acquire her by virtue of his brother’s yibbum, although he performed an act of betrothal, he does not acquire her [for the bond of yibbum had already ceased through chalitza].

Abaye said to him,

to Rav Yosef:

Are they comparable,

the acquisition by the yavam after chalitza to one who tills the property of a convert while thinking that it is his? For

there, he does not intend to acquire it,

but is merely tilling his own land.

But

here,

when he betroths the woman who underwent chalitza for the sake of yevamin,

he intends to acquire her.

And in such a case, since he performed an act of betrothal and intends to acquire her, what concern of ours is it whether his intention is for the sake of marriage or for the sake of yevamin?

Rather, it is comparable only to this one who tills the property of a convert,

and intends to acquire it, but is merely mistaken in this,

thinking that it belongs to another convert; he acquires it.

Because he performs an act of acquisition and intends to acquire it, even though he is mistaken regarding the acquisition itself.

Rather, Abaye said: Here, with what are we dealing? With a case where he said to her: “You are betrothed to me through the maamar of yevamin

[and he did not betroth her with ordinary betrothal, but rather thought that he could betroth her by virtue of his brother’s yibbum].

Rabbi is of the opinion

that when the Sages instituted the betrothal of maamar, they instituted it only where a bond exists. Since the framework of the enactment was:

“The maamar is placed as an elevation of the bond”

!

So that the maamar should take effect upon the bond and strengthen it.

And therefore, when

the chalitza came, it

uprooted the bond.

And he can no longer perform maamar after chalitza, for the entire essence of maamar is the strengthening of the bond, as long as it still exists.

And the Rabbis are of the opinion: This

bond

stands by itself. And this

maamar

stands by itself.

And therefore,

originally,

before chalitza,

if he said to her, “You are betrothed to me through the maamar of yevamin,” would it not take effect

to betroth her without strengthening the bond?

Now also,

after chalitza, when there is no longer a bond,

it likewise takes effect

the maamar.

And the fact that he said to her that he was betrothing her because of “the maamar of yevamin” does not concern us, since he intends to betroth her and performs an act of betrothal.

Rava said: If he said to her

“You are betrothed to me”

through the maamar of yevamin—

everyone agrees that it is effective.

And here, with what are we dealing? With a case where he said to her: “You are betrothed to me through the bond of yevamin!”

That is, he is betrothing her now, after chalitza, by virtue of the bond of the yevamin that applies to her, but such a bond no longer exists after chalitza.

Rabbi is of the opinion

that the reason maamar is effective when he says to her before chalitza, “You are betrothed to me through the bond of yevamin,” is only because Rabbi holds: