Yevamot 3a (ג.) — the Talmud in English

The Gemara raises an objection concerning the precedence of the prohibition of one's daughter, and concerning what we said: Since it is derived through a homiletic interpretation, the tanna favors mentioning it first:

But

all of them

the forbidden relations whose co-wives are exempt from yibbum

also

are derived from a homiletic interpretation! Since the exemption from yibbum was stated only with regard to one's wife's sister, and all the other forbidden relations are derived through a homiletic interpretation from her, what precedence does one's daughter have over the other forbidden relations?

For the exemption from levirate marriage is stated only with regard to one’s brother’s wife, and all the other forbidden relatives are derived through an exposition from the case of one’s brother’s wife. What precedence, then, does one’s daughter have over the other forbidden relatives?

And we answer:

Granted—

even though

with regard to

the exemption from

yibbum, they are derived

all the forbidden relations

through a homiletic interpretation

from one's wife's sister,

nevertheless,

the primary basis of their prohibitions

explicitly

in an explicit statement

is written concerning them

concerning those relations.

But

one's daughter—

the primary basis of her prohibition

is derived

through a homiletic interpretation,

as the prohibition of one's daughter is not written anywhere in the Torah at all. Therefore, she is more favored by the tanna.

As Rava said: Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi said to me: It is derived

the prohibition of sexual relations with one's daughter is derived through a gezera shava

“henna, henna”

[Leviticus 18].

The prohibition of one's daughter born to him by his wife whom he married [but not his daughter born of a woman whom he raped] is derived from the prohibition of his wife's daughter, which applies even to his wife's daughter from her previous husband.

For it is no less the case that she is his daughter by his wife than that she is his wife's daughter by another man, who is prohibited to him because she is his wife's daughter.

This derivation also applies to his son's daughter and his daughter's daughter, for they are no less than his wife's son's daughter and his wife's daughter's daughter from another man.

However, this is not a derivation prohibiting his daughter born of a woman whom he raped, since the verse prohibiting “his wife's daughter” speaks of a marital relationship, and not of the rape of an unmarried woman.

Therefore, the prohibition of his daughter born of a woman whom he raped must be derived through a gezera shava. For we find another verse in which the Torah prohibits his son's daughter and his daughter's daughter born of a woman whom he raped, as it is stated: “You shall not uncover the nakedness of your son's daughter or your daughter's daughter.” There the verse does not use language referring to marriage, and therefore it applies even to his son's daughter and his daughter's daughter born of a woman whom he raped.

However, that verse does not state a prohibition concerning his daughter born of a woman whom he raped.

Rather, we derive it through a gezera shava: Since the word “henna” is stated in this verse, and “henna” is also stated in the verse concerning his wife's daughter—

just as his daughter is prohibited together with his wife's son's daughter and daughter's daughter in the case of his wife's daughter,

so too, his daughter born of a woman whom he raped is prohibited, just like his son's daughter and his daughter's daughter born of a woman whom he raped, which are stated explicitly in the other verse.

And likewise,

it is derived

through a gezera shava that the punishment for one's daughter is burning:

The term

“zima”

is stated concerning one's wife's daughter [Leviticus 18],

and the term

“zima”

is stated [Leviticus 20] with regard to the punishment of burning, concerning one's mother-in-law.

There is still room to raise an objection concerning the order adopted by the tanna in enumerating the forbidden relations:

Now—

now

that you say

that

anything derived through a homiletic interpretation is favored by him

the tanna, and therefore he mentions it first, the following difficulty arises:

Let him teach

the prohibition of

one's wife's sister

from which the exemption from yibbum for all the forbidden relations is derived,

last,

since the exemption from yibbum was stated explicitly only with regard to one's wife's sister, whereas all the other forbidden relations are derived from her.

The tanna should place the exemption of the other forbidden relations, which is derived through a homiletic interpretation, before one's wife's sister, whose exemption is written explicitly.

And we answer:

Since he was discussing

since the tanna had already been discussing

the prohibition of a sister,

one's maternal aunt,

he taught

immediately afterward also the prohibition of

one's wife's sister,

which is also a prohibition involving a sister, and therefore he did not defer one's wife's sister until the end of the list.

And we refute this:

Then let him teach

all

this section

the entire passage concerning one's maternal aunt and one's wife's sister—

last!?

Rather,

there is another way to explain why the tanna mentioned the prohibition of one's daughter first, and consequently the question of why he did not mention one's wife's sister last does not arise.

The tanna—

listed them in order of their closeness.

The one who is closer to him, the tanna mentioned first.

Therefore, he mentioned his daughter first, because she is closer to him than all the other forbidden relations—not because she is favored on account of being derived through a homiletic interpretation.

And therefore

the tanna

first

mentioned his daughter, his daughter's daughter, and his son's daughter—

for they are his own close relatives

.

And since he taught three generations

that are

below him,

those who are close to him,

he also taught three generations below her,

those of his wife, even though they are not prohibited because of their relationship to him, but because they are his wife's close relatives.

That is: his wife's daughter, his wife's son's daughter, and his wife's daughter's daughter.

And since he taught three generations below her—

he taught three generations above her:

his mother-in-law, his mother-in-law's mother, and his father-in-law's mother.

And

again

he taught his sister and his maternal aunt—

for they are his own close relatives,

and therefore he mentioned them before his daughter-in-law, who is not his own relative but is prohibited to him because of his son's marriage.

And since he was discussing the prohibition involving a sister—

he taught

also

one's wife's sister.

There now remained three other forbidden relations whose prohibition is not due to their relationship to him: his maternal half-brother's wife, the wife of a brother who was not alive in the world, and his daughter-in-law.

And it would be appropriate to place his daughter-in-law before the wife of a brother who was not alive in the world,

and before his maternal half-brother's wife, since

it is not because of a relationship

to him

that she is prohibited

from yibbum. The prohibition of his daughter-in-law is more severe than theirs, as she is subject to stoning, whereas they are subject to karet.

Rather, since he was discussing

since the tanna was engaged

with the prohibition involving a brother—

he preceded and

taught the wife of a brother who was not alive in the world,

and likewise he preceded her with the wife of his maternal half-brother.

And afterward,

later, at the end,

he taught his daughter-in-law.

The Gemara now explains the wording of the Mishna, “exempt their co-wives”:

And why specifically did he teach,

why did the tanna state the formulation “fifteen women

exempt

their co-wives from ḥalitza and from yibbum,” which might lead one to understand that they are merely exempt from the obligation of yibbum, but if they wish, they may enter into yibbum?

But he should have

taught,

stated:

“prohibit”

their co-wives from yibbum!

That is, since there is no mitzva of yibbum in their case, the prohibition of a brother's wife remains upon them [when it is not in the context of the mitzva of yibbum]!

And we answer:

If he had taught, “prohibit

their co-wives,”

I would have said that it is prohibited to perform yibbum.

But with regard to removing the shoe—

she performs ḥalitza!

For they would still require ḥalitza in order to marry someone outside the levirate bond.

He teaches us

the tanna, by using the expression “exempt their co-wives,” that they are entirely exempt, both from yibbum and from ḥalitza!

But the difficulty nevertheless remains: Why does the tanna use the expression “exempt their co-wives”?

For this expression could mislead one into thinking that it is permitted to perform yibbum with them:

Let him teach “

the co-wife of a forbidden relation

is prohibited from performing ḥalitza!”

And we answer: It is impossible to say “the forbidden relation prohibits her co-wife from performing ḥalitza,” because

what

prohibition

does he cause

by performing ḥalitza with the co-wife of a forbidden relation?

And we ask:

Why not?

Is there no reason to prohibit ḥalitza for the co-wife of a forbidden relation?

For

if you say that she performs ḥalitza,

the co-wife of a forbidden relation, people will also come to say that she

enters into yibbum!

If so, there is reason to prohibit ḥalitza in the case of the co-wife of a forbidden relation, even though the ḥalitza accomplishes nothing.

The question therefore returns: Why did the tanna teach “exempt,” rather than “prohibit”?

And we answer:

Since

only

in the context of the mitzva

of yibbum

is the co-wife prohibited.

But when it is not in the context of the mitzva,

if a forbidden relation and her co-wife were married to an unrelated man—

the co-wife is permitted

the co-wife of the forbidden relation [as will be explained below, the prohibition of “the co-wife of a forbidden relation” applies only where she falls to yibbum, in which case she is prohibited there as a brother's wife whose husband has children; but she does not have an intrinsic prohibition as “the co-wife of a forbidden relation”].

For this reason he taught “exempt.”

For had the tanna said “prohibit their co-wives,” one might err and say that he meant the prohibition of “the co-wife of a forbidden relation”—that every co-wife of a forbidden relation is prohibited, even if she was married to an unrelated man and even when it is not in the context of yibbum.

But now that the tanna used the expression “exempt,” it indicates that the co-wife of a forbidden relation is merely “exempt” from yibbum, and that her prohibition is only because she is a brother's wife who has no permission for yibbum; she is therefore like a brother's wife whose husband has children.

Nevertheless, there is still room to wonder:

And why specifically did he teach,

why did the tanna state “fifteen women exempt their co-wives

from ḥalitza and from yibbum”?

Let him teach: “

They exempt their co-wives

from yibbum alone,”

only! And we would know on our own that since she is not subject to yibbum, she is exempt from ḥalitza as well, for yibbum is the primary mitzva; if she is exempt from it, why should she perform ḥalitza?

And we answer:

If he had taught

only “they exempt their co-wives

from yibbum,” I would have said

that nevertheless

she performs ḥalitza,

even though

he does not perform yibbum with her.

For we would have said that there is a scriptural decree, derived from “to vex,” prohibiting the co-wife of a forbidden relation from yibbum. But there is nevertheless a mitzva to perform ḥalitza for her, so that at least the mitzva of ḥalitza will be fulfilled.

Therefore,

he teaches us

the tanna, by saying “they exempt their co-wives from ḥalitza and from yibbum,” the following principle:

Anyone who is subject to

the bond of

yibbum

is subject to

the bond of

ḥalitza.

And anyone who is not subject to

the bond of

yibbum

is not subject to

the bond of

ḥalitza.

to the bond of levirate marriage is subject to the bond of the ritual of the levir’s-lifted shoe, and anyone who is not subject to the bond of levirate marriage is exempt from the ritual of the levir’s-lifted shoe. Whenever we say that she performs the ritual of the levir’s-lifted shoe but does not enter into levirate marriage, it is because of uncertainty. Rabbi Akiva Eiger raised a difficulty from page 21a, where it is evident that women subject to prohibitions derived from negative commandments and positive commandments perform the ritual of the levir’s-lifted shoe but do not enter into levirate marriage, and this is not a law of uncertainty. Later authorities explained that there are two principles included in “anyone who is not subject to levirate marriage.” The first applies to a woman who is not subject at all to the bond of levirate marriage, as Rashi phrases it. This is a forbidden relative subject to a prohibition carrying excision, who has no bond of levirate marriage at all and therefore has no bond of the ritual of the levir’s-lifted shoe either. The second applies to women subject to prohibitions derived from negative commandments and positive commandments. Even if one says that when the levir has relations with her he does not acquire her, and even if one says that because she is prohibited by a negative commandment and a positive commandment she has the status of a brother’s wife subject to excision [this is the view of Tosafot HaRosh], she nevertheless has a “bond of levirate marriage” for the ritual of the levir’s-lifted shoe. Therefore, even though she is not actually subject to levirate marriage, she is subject to the ritual of the levir’s-lifted shoe. The reason is that only a forbidden relative who exempts from levirate marriage, such as one’s brother’s wife, can exempt her entirely; women subject to prohibitions derived from negative commandments and positive commandments cannot do so. Even the excision applicable to them as a brother’s wife cannot exempt them from the ritual of the levir’s-lifted shoe, since that excision does not prevent levirate marriage: because she is a brother’s wife, she would indeed be subject to levirate marriage, and only the negative and positive commandments prevent the levirate marriage. Therefore, although she is not subject to levirate marriage, she is subject to the ritual of the levir’s-lifted shoe—even though she has the status of a brother’s wife subject to excision. The later authorities explained that Rashi’s intention is the principle that anyone who is not subject to the bond of levirate marriage is not subject to the bond of the ritual of the levir’s-lifted shoe; the only exception we find to it is a case of uncertainty, in which she performs the ritual of the levir’s-lifted shoe but does not enter into levirate marriage. Rashi did not explain here the principle that women subject to prohibitions derived from negative commandments and positive commandments are subject to the ritual of the levir’s-lifted shoe even though they do not enter into levirate marriage, because that principle does not deal with the bond of levirate marriage and the ritual of the levir’s-lifted shoe.

For just as the forbidden relation exempts her from the bond of yibbum, she exempts her entirely, so that she does not require ḥalitza.

But the question still remains: Why did the tanna place the exemption from ḥalitza before the exemption from yibbum, rather than teach the exemption from yibbum first? For the mitzva of yibbum is primary, and the tanna should have taught its exemption before the exemption from ḥalitza:

Let him teach “

they exempt their co-wives

from yibbum and from ḥalitza”!?

Alternatively,

let him teach

“from ḥalitza alone”,

and this exemption would also include exemption from yibbum, since it is impossible to exempt her from ḥalitza while the bond of yibbum exists!? And we answer: Our Mishna follows the view of

Abba Shaul.

For he says: The mitzva of ḥalitza—

takes precedence over the mitzva of yibbum.

In his view, since if the yavam intends to take his yevama in marriage for the sake of beauty or for the sake of marriage, and does not intend to do so for the sake of the mitzva of yibbum, he is thereby engaging in intercourse with the forbidden relation of a brother's wife, it is preferable for him to perform ḥalitza.

Therefore, the tanna placed the mitzva of ḥalitza before the mitzva of yibbum.

The Gemara now explains what the tanna intended to teach by stating the number of fifteen women at the beginning of the Mishna, and what he intended to teach by saying “these are they” at the end of the list—thereby seeming to repeat the enumeration and emphasize that this is the number, with nothing to be added:

The enumeration at the beginning, “

fifteen women”—

what does it come to exclude

?

And

likewise,

the enumeration at the end, “

these are they”—

what does it come to exclude

?