Yevamot 3a — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara raises an objection concerning the precedence of the nakedness of his daughter, and concerning what we said: that since it is learned by a derasha, it is dear to the tanna to mention it first:

But

all of them

the forbidden relations, whose exemption from yibum

also

comes from a derasha!

For the exemption from yibum was stated only with regard to a wife’s sister, and all the forbidden relations are learned by a derasha from her; so what precedence does his daughter have over the other forbidden relations?

And we answer:

Granted,

even though

with regard to

the exemption from

yibum, they come,

all the forbidden relations are learned

by a derasha

from a wife’s sister.

Nevertheless,

the primary prohibition

explicitly

is stated

in them,

in them.

But

his daughter—

the primary prohibition

is learned

by a derasha,

for the prohibition of his daughter is not written in the Torah at all. Therefore she is dearer to the tanna.

For Rava said, Rav Yitzhak bar Avdimi said to me: It comes

the prohibition of the nakedness of his daughter is learned by a gezerah shavah

“henah, henah”

Leviticus 18.

The prohibition of his daughter who was born to him from his wife who is married to him [but not his daughter from a woman whom he raped] is to be learned from the prohibition of his wife’s daughter, which applies even to his wife’s daughter from her previous husband.

For this—that she is his daughter from his wife—is certainly no less [included] than his wife’s daughter from another man, who is forbidden to him because she is his wife’s daughter.

And this teaching also applies to his son’s daughter and his daughter’s daughter, for they are no less [included] than his wife’s son’s daughter and her daughter’s daughter from another man.

But this is not a teaching to prohibit his daughter from a woman whom he raped, for this verse, which prohibits “his wife’s daughter,” speaks of marriage and not of the rape of an unmarried woman.

Therefore it is necessary to learn the prohibition of his daughter from a woman whom he raped by a gezerah shavah: for we find another verse in which Scripture prohibited his son’s daughter and his daughter’s daughter from a woman whom he raped, as it says: “The nakedness of your son’s daughter or your daughter’s daughter you shall not uncover.” There Scripture did not use language of marriage, and therefore it applies even to his son’s daughter and his daughter’s daughter from a woman whom he raped.

However, in this verse no prohibition of his daughter from a woman whom he raped is stated.

And we have to learn by a gezerah shavah: since “henah” is stated in this verse, and “henah” is also stated in the verse concerning his wife’s daughter—

just as, with regard to his wife’s daughter, his daughter was prohibited like his son’s daughter and his daughter’s daughter,

so too, with regard to his daughter from a woman whom he raped, she shall be prohibited like his son’s daughter and his daughter’s daughter from a woman whom he raped, which are stated explicitly in the other verse.

And likewise

it comes

by a gezerah shavah with regard to the punishment of burning for his daughter:

“

Zimmah”

is stated concerning his wife’s daughter [Leviticus 18].

And “

zimmah”

is stated [Leviticus 20] with regard to the punishment of burning, concerning his mother-in-law.

There is still room to raise an objection concerning the order adopted by the tanna in counting the forbidden relations:

Now,

now

that you say,

that

every matter that comes from a derasha is dear to him,

to the tanna, and therefore he places it first, the following difficulty arises:

Let him teach the

nakedness of

a wife’s sister

from whom the exemption from yibum for all the forbidden relations is learned,

last,

since only concerning the nakedness of a wife’s sister was the exemption from yibum stated explicitly, whereas all the other forbidden relations are learned from her.

And the tanna should place the exemption of the other forbidden relations, which is learned by a derasha, before a wife’s sister, whose exemption is written explicitly.

And we answer:

Since he was occupied

since the tanna had already dealt

with the prohibition of sisterhood,

with his mother’s sister,

he taught

next to it also the prohibition of

his wife’s sister,

which is also a prohibition involving a sister; therefore he did not defer his wife’s sister to the end of the list.

And we object:

Then let him teach

all

this section,

the entire section concerning his mother’s sister and his wife’s sister,

last!?

Rather,

there is another way to explain why the tanna placed the nakedness of his daughter first, and consequently there will be no difficulty concerning why the tanna did not place a wife’s sister last.

The tanna—

he placed them according to their closeness.

He placed first the one who is closer to him.

Therefore he placed his daughter first, because she is closer to him than all the forbidden relations, and not because she is dear since she is learned by a derasha.

Therefore

the tanna

first

his daughter, his daughter’s daughter, and his son’s daughter—

for they are his own close relations

they.

And since he taught three generations

which are

below him,

which are close to him,

he also taught three generations below her,

of his wife, although they are not forbidden because of his relationship to them, but because they are his wife’s close relations.

That is: his wife’s daughter, her son’s daughter, and her daughter’s daughter.

And since he taught three generations below her—

he taught three generations above her:

his mother-in-law, his mother-in-law’s mother, and his father-in-law’s mother.

And

again

he taught his sister and his mother’s sister—

for they are his own close relations,

and therefore he placed them before his daughter-in-law, who is not “his close relation,” but is prohibited because of his son’s marriage.

And since he was occupied with the prohibition of sisterhood—

the tanna

also

his wife’s sister.

Now three forbidden relations remain whose prohibition is not because of their relationship to him: his maternal half-brother’s wife, the wife of a brother who was not alive in his lifetime, and his daughter-in-law.

And in principle, he should have placed his daughter-in-law before the wife of a brother who was not alive in his lifetime,

and before his maternal half-brother’s wife, since

it is not because of relationship

to him

that she is prohibited

from yibum. And the prohibition of his daughter-in-law is more severe than theirs, for she is subject to stoning, whereas they are subject to karet.

Rather, since he was occupied,

since the tanna was engaged

with the prohibition of sisterhood—

he preceded and

taught the wife of a brother who was not alive in his lifetime

and likewise he preceded her with the wife of his maternal half-brother.

And afterward

and afterward, at the end,

he taught his daughter-in-law.

And now the Gemara explains the wording of the Mishna, “exempt their co-wives”:

And what is the reason that the tanna taught,

why did the tanna use the wording “fifteen women

exempt

their co-wives from halitza and from yibum,” which might lead one to understand that they are exempt only from the obligation of yibum, but if they wish, they may perform yibum?

But he should have

taught,

stated:

forbid

their co-wives for yibum!

To say that since there is no mitzva of yibum concerning them, the prohibition of a brother’s wife remains upon them [when it is not the place of the mitzva of yibum]!

And we answer:

Had he taught “they forbid

their co-wives,”

I would have said that it is forbidden to perform yibum.

But halitza—

let her perform halitza!

For they would still require halitza in order to marry outside the levirate bond.

It teaches us

the tanna, by using the wording “exempt their co-wives,” that they are completely exempt, both from yibum and from halitza!

But there is still a difficulty: why does the tanna use the wording “exempt their co-wives”?

For this wording can mislead one into thinking that it is permitted to perform yibum with them:

And let him teach “

a co-wife of a forbidden relation—

is forbidden to perform halitza!?”

And we answer: It is impossible to say, “A forbidden relation prohibits her co-wife from halitza,” because

what

prohibition

does he perform

by performing halitza with a co-wife of a forbidden relation?

And we ask:

Why not?

Is there no reason to prohibit halitza for a co-wife of a forbidden relation?

For

if you say that a co-wife of a forbidden relation performs halitza

a co-wife of a forbidden relation, people will also come to say that she

performs yibum!

And if so, there is room to prohibit halitza with a co-wife of a forbidden relation, even though halitza accomplishes nothing.

And the question returns: why did the tanna teach “exempt,” and not teach “forbid”?

And we answer:

Since

only

in the place of the mitzva

of yibum

is the co-wife prohibited.

And when it is not the place of the mitzva,

if a forbidden relation and her co-wife were married to an unrelated man—

the co-wife is permitted

of the forbidden relation [as will be explained below, that the prohibition of “a co-wife of a forbidden relation” applies only where there is a falling into yibum, where the co-wife of the forbidden relation is prohibited there like a brother’s wife who has children, but she does not have an independent prohibition of “a co-wife of a forbidden relation.”]

For this reason he taught “exempt.”

For if the tanna had said “they forbid their co-wives,” there would be room for error and one might say that his intention is to prohibit “a co-wife of a forbidden relation.” That is, every “co-wife of a forbidden relation” is prohibited, even if she was married to an unrelated man, even when it is not the place of yibum.

But now that the tanna used the wording “exempt,” it implies that a co-wife of a forbidden relation has only an “exemption” from yibum, and her prohibition is only because she is a brother’s wife who has no permission for yibum, and she is like a brother’s wife who has children.

However, there is still cause to inquire:

And what is the reason that the tanna taught,

why did the tanna state “fifteen women exempt their co-wives

from halitza and from yibum”?

Let him teach: “

exempt their co-wives

from yibum alone,”

only! And we would know on our own that since she is not fit for yibum, she is exempt from halitza; for yibum is the primary mitzva, and if she is exempt from it, why should she perform halitza?

And we answer:

Had he taught

only “exempt their co-wives

from yibum,” I would have said

that nevertheless

she performs halitza, even though

she does not

perform yibum.

For we would have said that there is a decree of Scripture, from “to vex,” to prohibit a co-wife of a forbidden relation for yibum. But there is a mitzva to perform halitza for her, so that at least the mitzva of halitza will be fulfilled.

Therefore

it teaches us

the tanna, by saying “exempt their co-wives from halitza and from yibum,” the principle:

Everyone who is subject to

the bond of

yibum—

is subject to

the bond of

halitza.

And anyone who is not subject to

the bond of

yibum—

is not subject to

the bond of

halitza.

to the bond of levirate marriage is subject to the bond of the ritual of the levir’s-lifted shoe, and anyone who is not subject to the bond of levirate marriage is exempt from the ritual of the levir’s-lifted shoe. Whenever we say that she performs the ritual of the levir’s-lifted shoe but does not enter into levirate marriage, it is because of uncertainty. Rabbi Akiva Eiger raised a difficulty from page 21a, where it is evident that women subject to prohibitions derived from negative commandments and positive commandments perform the ritual of the levir’s-lifted shoe but do not enter into levirate marriage, and this is not a law of uncertainty. Later authorities explained that there are two principles included in “anyone who is not subject to levirate marriage.” The first applies to a woman who is not subject at all to the bond of levirate marriage, as Rashi phrases it. This is a forbidden relative subject to a prohibition carrying excision, who has no bond of levirate marriage at all and therefore has no bond of the ritual of the levir’s-lifted shoe either. The second applies to women subject to prohibitions derived from negative commandments and positive commandments. Even if one says that when the levir has relations with her he does not acquire her, and even if one says that because she is prohibited by a negative commandment and a positive commandment she has the status of a brother’s wife subject to excision [this is the view of Tosafot HaRosh], she nevertheless has a “bond of levirate marriage” for the ritual of the levir’s-lifted shoe. Therefore, even though she is not actually subject to levirate marriage, she is subject to the ritual of the levir’s-lifted shoe. The reason is that only a forbidden relative who exempts from levirate marriage, such as one’s brother’s wife, can exempt her entirely; women subject to prohibitions derived from negative commandments and positive commandments cannot do so. Even the excision applicable to them as a brother’s wife cannot exempt them from the ritual of the levir’s-lifted shoe, since that excision does not prevent levirate marriage: because she is a brother’s wife, she would indeed be subject to levirate marriage, and only the negative and positive commandments prevent the levirate marriage. Therefore, although she is not subject to levirate marriage, she is subject to the ritual of the levir’s-lifted shoe—even though she has the status of a brother’s wife subject to excision. The later authorities explained that Rashi’s intention is the principle that anyone who is not subject to the bond of levirate marriage is not subject to the bond of the ritual of the levir’s-lifted shoe; the only exception we find to it is a case of uncertainty, in which she performs the ritual of the levir’s-lifted shoe but does not enter into levirate marriage. Rashi did not explain here the principle that women subject to prohibitions derived from negative commandments and positive commandments are subject to the ritual of the levir’s-lifted shoe even though they do not enter into levirate marriage, because that principle does not deal with the bond of levirate marriage and the ritual of the levir’s-lifted shoe.

For just as the forbidden relation exempts from the bond of yibum, so she exempts her completely, and she does not require halitza.

But it is still necessary to ask: why did the tanna place the exemption from halitza before the exemption from yibum, rather than teach the exemption from yibum first? For the mitzva of yibum is primary, and the tanna should have taught its exemption before the exemption from halitza:

And let him teach “

exempt their co-wives

from yibum and from halitza”!?

Alternatively,

let him teach

“from halitza alone”,

and this exemption would also include exemption from yibum, for it is impossible to exempt her from halitza where there is a bond of yibum!? And we answer: Our Mishna is according to the view of

Abba Shaul.

For he says: The mitzva of halitza—

takes precedence over the mitzva of yibum.

For according to his view, since if the levir intends to take his levirate wife in marriage for the sake of beauty or for the sake of marriage, and does not intend for the sake of the mitzva of yibum, he is thereby violating the nakedness of a brother’s wife, it is preferable for him to perform halitza.

Therefore the tanna placed the mitzva of halitza before the mitzva of yibum.

And now the Gemara explains what the tanna came to teach by counting the number of fifteen women at the beginning of the Mishna, and what he came to teach by saying at the end of the list “these are they,” whereby it is as though he counts them again and emphasizes that this is the number, with no addition to it:

The number at the beginning, “

fifteen women”—

to exclude what

does it come?

And

likewise

the number at the end, “

these are they”—

to exclude what

does it come?