Yevamot 114b — the Talmud in English

If it had taught us

the prohibition of feeding a minor by hand only with regard to the prohibition of

reptiles

, I would have said that it is only those that one is forbidden to feed to minors,

because their prohibition

is more severe than forbidden foods, such as eating blood, for the Torah was stringent regarding the measure for eating creeping creatures, even

in any amount

, for even a creeping creature the size of a lentil is forbidden to eat, just as it imparts impurity at the measure of a lentil.

But

the eating of

blood, until there is

blood in the measure of

“a quarter”

, one is not liable for eating it,

I would say

, I would say that

the adults are not

warned not to feed it to minors.

And if it had taught us

only the prohibition of feeding

blood

to minors, I would have said that the Torah was stringent only regarding feeding blood,

because there is

in it the prohibition of

karet

for an adult who eats it intentionally.

But

the eating of

creeping creatures

, for an adult who eats them is liable only for lashes,

I would say

I would say that

the Torah did not

forbid feeding it to minors.

And if it had taught us

only

these two

, feeding blood and feeding creeping creatures, I would have said that the Torah forbade feeding only those to minors

because their prohibition

is a prohibition

common to everyone

.

But impurity

from a corpse, concerning which only priests were warned,

I would say

I would say that

the adults were not

warned concerning it not to render minor priests impure.

And if it had taught us

this only concerning

impurity

, that the adults should not render minor priests impure, I would have said that

the impurity of priests is different

, that the impurity of priests is different from feeding blood and creeping creatures, because the Torah was stringent in safeguarding the purity of priests,

because Scripture increased for them

the

additional mitzvot

.

But these

, blood and creeping creatures,

I would say not

the Torah forbade feeding them to minors.

Therefore

it is necessary

, Scripture had to write the prohibition against feeding minors by hand something prohibited in all three prohibitions.

Come and hear

, the Gemara brings a proof from our Mishna [112b], that when a minor eats carcasses on his own, the court is commanded to separate him from it.

For we learned:

Two brothers, one competent and one deaf-mute

, who were

married to two competent sisters

, and

the deaf-mute husband of the competent woman died

, whose marriage was rabbinic.

What shall the competent husband of the competent woman do

with his wife’s sister who falls before him from his deaf-mute brother, from whose rabbinic betrothal she falls, and what shall he do with his wife, who is the sister of the yevama who falls before him?

He shall do nothing. Rather,

she shall leave

—his wife’s sister, by Torah law, without halitza,

because of

the nakedness of

a wife’s sister

, and his wife is permitted to him, for she is not the sister of his bond, since there is no levirate bond with regard to a forbidden relation.

But if

the competent husband of

the

competent woman died —

what shall the deaf-mute husband of a competent woman do

with his yevama, his wife’s sister, who falls before him for levirate marriage by Torah law, and what shall he do with his wife, who is the sister of his bound woman?

He divorces his wife with a bill of divorce

, because she is forbidden to him as the sister of his bound woman, for her sister falls before him by Torah law.

And his brother’s wife is forbidden

to him

forever

, for he cannot perform levirate marriage with her, since she is his wife’s sister by rabbinic law. And he also cannot perform halitza with her, since the deaf-mute lacks the capacity to perform halitza. And the Gemara proves:

Why does he divorce

the deaf-mute, whose status regarding mitzvot is that of a minor,

his wife with a bill of divorce!?

Let her sit with him

, let her remain under him, and we have no reason to require him to divorce her, for

“he is a minor eating carcasses”

, and you said that the court is not commanded to separate him from it!

The Gemara rejects the proof: The fact that the court separates him is not because of him, but

because of her prohibition

, that of his wife, who is competent.

Come and hear

, the Gemara brings a proof from another ruling in our Mishna, that a minor must be separated from eating something prohibited.

For we learned:

Two competent brothers

who were

married to two sisters, one competent

, whose betrothal is by Torah law,

and one deaf-mute

, whose betrothal is rabbinic,

the competent husband of the deaf-mute woman died —

what shall the competent husband of the competent woman do

with his brother’s wife, who is his wife’s sister, who falls before him, and what shall he do with his wife, who is the sister of the yevama who falls before him?

He shall do nothing. Rather,

she shall leave

his brother’s wife without halitza,

because of

the nakedness of

a wife’s sister

, by Torah law. And his wife is not the sister of his bound woman, since there is no bond with regard to a forbidden relation.

And if

the competent husband of the competent woman died —

what shall the competent husband of the deaf-mute woman do

with his brother’s wife, who is his wife’s sister by rabbinic law, and what shall he do with his wife, who is the sister of his bound woman by Torah law? He has no remedy to leave his wife with him, but

he divorces his wife with a bill of divorce

because she is forbidden to him with the prohibition of the sister of his bound woman,

and his brother’s wife

he sends away

through halitza

by Torah law; he does not perform levirate marriage with her, since she is his wife’s sister by rabbinic law.

And the Gemara proves:

And why does the competent man divorce

the

woman

who is deaf-mute

with a bill of divorce; let her sit with him

, let his deaf-mute wife continue to remain under him, for, according to your words, we are not commanded to separate her, since the deaf-mute woman is in the category of

“a minor eating carcasses”!?

And we answer: They remove her from him not because of her, but

because of his prohibition

, for he is competent.

Rava said: Come and hear

a proof from that which we learned in our Mishna:

Two brothers —

one deaf-mute and one competent

, who were

married to two sisters —

one competent and one deaf-mute,

the deaf-mute husband of the deaf-mute woman died

, and the deaf-mute woman fell for levirate marriage before the competent man married to the competent woman.

What shall the competent husband of the competent woman do

with his yevama and with his wife?

He does nothing. Rather,

she shall leave

the deaf-mute woman without halitza,

because of a wife’s sister

, as the law of a forbidden relation who falls for levirate marriage, and his wife is permitted to him, since she is not the sister of his bound woman.

But if

the competent husband of the competent woman died

, and the competent woman fell before the deaf-mute, who does not have the capacity for halitza because he cannot recite —

what shall the deaf-mute husband of the deaf-mute woman do?

He divorces

the deaf-mute

his wife

the deaf-mute woman

with a bill of divorce

, because she becomes forbidden to him as the sister of his bound woman.

And

if

his brother’s wife

, the competent woman, who falls before him for levirate marriage,

were forbidden

to him

forever!

For he cannot perform halitza with her, since he is deaf-mute and lacks the capacity for recitation.

And he cannot take her in levirate marriage and afterward divorce her with a bill of divorce, since he has partial rabbinic betrothal with his deaf-mute wife, and by virtue of this her sister is forbidden to him as his wife’s sister. And even after he divorces his wife, she continues to be forbidden to him, like the sister of his divorced wife.

And Rava proves:

But here

in the case of a deaf-mute man and a deaf-mute woman,

there is neither her prohibition

for she is deaf-mute,

nor is there his prohibition

for he is deaf-mute,

and

nevertheless

it teaches: “He divorces his wife with a bill of divorce”

, implying that when a minor eats carcasses, the court is commanded to separate him from it!?

Rav Shemaya said

: You cannot prove from here. Rather, in truth, when a minor eats carcasses, the court is not commanded to separate him, and here they required him to divorce his wife because the Sages enacted

a decree

specifically that he should divorce her and she should not remain under him,

because of “the permitting of a yevama to the marketplace”

.

For if people see that she remains under him, they will not attribute this to the fact that he is a minor eating carcasses; rather, they will err and think that the betrothal of the deaf-mute woman overrides the bond of her competent sister, and therefore his deaf-mute wife is not forbidden to him with the prohibition of the sister of his bound woman.

And they will come to permit the competent yevama who falls before him from his competent brother to the marketplace without halitza, as though she were his wife’s sister by Torah law.

Whereas in truth she is a yevama by Torah law, who requires halitza by Torah law in order that she be able to marry, for she is not his wife’s sister by Torah law.

Mishna:

1.

A woman who went, together with her husband, to an overseas country,

and they went when

there was peace between him and her and

also

peace in the world,

for it was not known of any war in the place to which they went, and she returned

and came

here without her husband

and said

in the court

“My husband has died,” she is trusted and

she is deemed credible and

may marry

on the basis of her testimony; and if she has no children and her husband has a brother, and she said

“My husband has died, she must perform yibbum

on the basis of her testimony.

The reason that she is trusted is that it is not a time of emergency, and consequently there is no concern that she is speaking from an estimate of her heart, saying: Since he did not come for a month or two, certainly bandits killed him. Rather, we say that she saw him actually dead, for otherwise she would not have said that he died, since she is concerned lest he come after she has married and she become disqualified, so that she would be forbidden both to her first husband and to her second husband.

2.

If there was

peace between him and her, but war in the world,

and we are concerned that she is speaking from an estimate of her heart,

or there was

a quarrel between him and her

when they went, and then, even if there is

peace in the world,

nevertheless we are concerned that, since she hates him, she wants to forbid herself to him,

and she came and said, “My husband has died,” she is not trusted.

Rabbi Yehuda says: She is never trusted,

even if there was peace between him and her and peace in the world,

unless she came crying, and her garments were torn

in mourning for her husband.

The Sages said to him

to Rabbi Yehuda: If so, a clever woman who knows that she must come to court and cry may marry, whereas a foolish woman, who does not have the understanding to authenticate her words through crying in court, may not marry?

Rather,

this one

who came crying and her garments were torn

and this one

who came when she was not crying and her garments were not torn,

may marry.

Gemara:

The tanna

taught first that she is trusted when it is known that

there is peace between him and her, because he needed to teach

at the end that when it is known that

there is a quarrel between him and her

she is not trusted.

The tanna

taught first that when it is known that

there is peace in the world

she is trusted,

because he needed to teach

at the end that when it is known that

there is war in the world

she is not trusted.

Rava said: What is the reason that

she is not trusted when there is

war?

Because she says it according to what appears to her

from an estimate of her heart,

for she reasons:

She considers: Is it possible that

among all these who were killed he

her husband

escaped?

And also,

if you should say that, since there is peace between him and her,

she consequently fears even a remote possibility that he will return and she will become disqualified, and for this reason

she guards herself,

she protects herself from saying in court that he died

until she sees,

that she sees him killed.

Nevertheless, she is not trusted.

Since

sometimes they strike him with an arrow,

they hit him with an arrow

or with a spear, and she reasons

in her mind that

he certainly died, but

in truth he did not die, for

there is one who applies samterei

a dressing

and he lives.

And now the Gemara discusses several cases: whether in them we are concerned that she says it according to what appears to her, as in war, or not.

Initially,

Rava thought to say that famine,

if she says that he died from famine,

is not like war.

And she is trusted, since

she does not say it according to what appears to her

from an estimate of her heart that he died from famine.

Rava then said:

He retracted and said:

Famine is like war,

and she is not trusted, because she fears dying and flees from there before he dies, and says it according to what appears to her.

And as in the incident that occurred,

that a certain woman came before Rava and said to him: “My husband died of famine,”

and Rava wanted to test her, that she was not speaking from an estimate of her heart; therefore

he said to her: “You did well that you saved yourself,”

You did well that you left him, even while he was alive, and fled for yourself. For is it possible

to imagine

—could it enter your mind

that with that small amount of sifted flour

flour sifted in a sieve

that you left him, which you left for him, he could live?

She said to him: “Master,

Rava, do you also

know that in such a manner he cannot live?”

And it is demonstrated that she said from an estimate of her heart that he had died, and because of this incident Rava retracted.

Rava then said: Famine is worse than war. For in the case of war, when she says, “My husband died in the war,” it is that she is not believed,

and we are concerned that she is speaking from an estimate of her heart.

But

if she said

“He died on his bed,” she is believed,

since she is not suspected of lying and saying that he died on his bed, because she thinks that perhaps he fled from the war and was saved;

whereas concerning famine,

even if she said that he died on his bed, we are concerned that she is lying, since she thinks: How could he live? And she is not trusted

until she says, “He died and I buried him.”

A collapse,

where the house fell upon him, or a storm wind came and caused all the houses of the city to fall,

is like war,

and she is not trusted, for we are concerned

that she says it according to what appears to her.

The sending of snakes and scorpions is like war,

and we are concerned

that she says it according to what appears to her.

Concerning pestilence, some say it is like war, and some say it is not like war.

Some say it is like war,

for we are concerned

that they say it according to what appears to them.

And some say it is not like war, for they rely on what people say,

that she relies in her mind on the statement of

“For seven years there was pestilence, and a person does not depart without his time.”

A person does not die before his time, even during seven years of pestilence!

And therefore she does not estimate in her mind that he died until she sees him dead.

We learned in the Mishna: When it has become established for us that there is war in the world, she is not trusted.

And the Gemara is uncertain:

It was asked of them:

What is the law when

she established that there is war in the world,

when we did not know that there were wars in those countries except from her mouth?

What is it?