Yevamot 114b (קיד:) — the Talmud in English

If it had taught us

the prohibition against feeding a minor something forbidden by hand only with regard to the prohibition against eating

creeping creatures,

I would say that only those may not be fed to minors

because their prohibition

is more severe than that of forbidden foods, such as eating blood, for the Torah was stringent regarding the measure for eating creeping creatures, even

the slightest amount,

as even a creeping creature the size of a lentil is forbidden to eat, just as it imparts ritual impurity at the measure of a lentil.

But

eating

blood, since until there is

blood in the measure of

“a quarter-log,”

one is not liable for eating it,

I would say,

I would say that

no

adults are cautioned not to feed it to minors.

And if it had taught us

only the prohibition against feeding

blood

to minors, I would say that the Torah was stringent only with regard to feeding blood

because there is

the prohibition of

karet

for an adult who eats it intentionally.

But

eating

creeping creatures,

for which an adult who eats them is liable only for lashes,

I would say

I would say that

no

the Torah prohibited feeding them to minors.

And if it had taught us

only

these two,

feeding blood and feeding creeping creatures, I would say that the Torah prohibited feeding only those to minors

because their prohibition

is a prohibition

applying equally to all

people.

But impurity

contracted from a corpse, concerning which only priests were cautioned,

I would say

I would say that

no

adults were cautioned not to render minor priests impure.

And if it had taught us

this only with regard to

impurity,

that adults may not render minor priests impure, I would say that

the impurity of priests is different,

that the impurity of priests differs from feeding blood and creeping creatures, because the Torah was stringent concerning the preservation of the priests’ ritual purity

because Scripture increased for them

the number of

additional mitzvot.

Therefore, the Torah prohibited adults from rendering even minor priests impure.

But these,

blood and creeping creatures,

I would say, no

the Torah did not prohibit feeding them to minors.

Therefore

it is necessary:

the verse had to write the prohibition against feeding minors by hand something forbidden with regard to all three prohibitions.

Ta shma,

the Gemara brings a proof from our Mishna [112b], that when a minor eats neveila of his own accord, the court is commanded to separate him from it.

As we learned:

Two brothers, one competent and one deaf-mute,

who were

married to two competent sisters,

and

the deaf-mute husband of the competent woman died,

whose marriage had been only by rabbinic law.

What shall the competent husband of the competent woman do

with his wife’s sister who falls before him for levirate marriage from his deaf-mute brother, whose betrothal was rabbinic, and what shall he do with his wife, who is the sister of the yevama who falls before him? —

He shall do nothing. Rather,

she shall leave

his wife’s sister, by Torah law, without halitza,

because of

the nakedness of

a wife’s sister,

and his wife is permitted to him, as she is not the sister of a woman subject to levirate bond, since there is no levirate bond with regard to a forbidden relationship.

But if

the competent husband of

the

competent woman died —

what shall the deaf-mute husband of the competent woman do,

whose marriage to her had been rabbinic, with his yevama, his wife’s sister, who falls before him for levirate marriage by Torah law, and what shall he do with his wife, who is the sister of the woman subject to his levirate bond? —

He divorces his wife with a bill of divorce,

because she is forbidden to him as the sister of a woman subject to his levirate bond, since her sister falls before him by Torah law.

And his brother’s wife is forbidden

to him

forever,

as he cannot perform levirate marriage with her, since she is his wife’s sister by rabbinic law. And he likewise cannot perform halitza with her, since the deaf-mute is incapable of performing halitza. And the Gemara proves:

Why does he divorce

the deaf-mute, whose status with regard to mitzvot is that of a minor,

his wife with a bill of divorce!?

Let her remain with him,

let her live with him, and we should not require him to divorce her, since

“he is a minor eating neveilot,”

and you said that the court is not commanded to separate him from it!

The Gemara rejects the proof: The reason the court separates him is not because of him, but

because of the prohibition concerning her,

his wife, who is competent.

Ta shma,

the Gemara brings a proof from another ruling in our Mishna that a minor must be separated from eating something forbidden.

As we learned:

Two competent brothers

who were

married to two sisters, one competent

whose betrothal is by Torah law,

and one a deaf-mute

whose betrothal is rabbinic,

the competent husband of the deaf-mute died —

what shall the competent husband of the competent woman do

with his brother’s wife, who is his wife’s sister and falls before him, and what shall he do with his wife, who is the sister of the yevama who falls before him?

He shall do nothing. Rather,

she shall leave

his brother’s wife without halitza,

because of

the nakedness of

a wife’s sister,

by Torah law. And his wife is not the sister of a woman subject to his levirate bond, since there is no levirate bond with regard to a forbidden relationship.

And if

the competent husband of the competent woman died —

what shall the competent husband of the deaf-mute do

with his brother’s wife, who is his wife’s sister by rabbinic law, and what shall he do with his wife, who is the sister of the woman subject to his levirate bond by Torah law? He has no remedy that would allow him to keep his wife with him; rather,

he divorces his wife with a bill of divorce

because she is forbidden to him by the prohibition against the sister of a woman subject to his levirate bond,

and his brother’s wife

he sends away

through halitza

by Torah law; he may not perform levirate marriage with her, since she is his wife’s sister by rabbinic law.

And the Gemara proves:

Why does the competent man divorce

the

wife

of the deaf-mute

with a bill of divorce?

Let his deaf-mute wife continue to live with him, since, according to your statement, we are not commanded to separate her from him, for the deaf-mute woman is in the category of

“a minor eating neveilot”!

And we answer: She is removed from him not because of her, but

because of the prohibition concerning him,

since he is competent.

Rava said: Ta shma

a proof from that which we learned in our Mishna:

Two brothers —

one deaf-mute and one competent,

who were

married to two sisters —

one competent and one a deaf-mute.

The deaf-mute husband of the deaf-mute woman died,

and the deaf-mute woman fell for levirate marriage before the competent man who was married to the competent woman.

What shall the competent husband of the competent woman do

with his yevama and with his wife? —

He shall do nothing. Rather,

she shall leave

the deaf-mute woman without halitza,

because she is a wife’s sister,

as is the law of a forbidden relation who falls for levirate marriage, and his wife is permitted to him, since she is not the sister of a woman subject to his levirate bond.

But if

the competent husband of the competent woman died,

and the competent woman fell before the deaf-mute, who is not eligible for halitza because he cannot recite the required passage —

what shall the deaf-mute husband of the deaf-mute woman do?

The deaf-mute divorces

the

wife

who is a deaf-mute

with a bill of divorce,

because she becomes forbidden to him as the sister of a woman subject to his levirate bond.

And

if

his brother’s wife,

the competent woman who falls before him for levirate marriage,

is forbidden

to him

forever!

For he cannot perform halitza with her, since he is a deaf-mute and is not capable of reciting the required passage.

And he cannot take her in levirate marriage and subsequently divorce her with a bill of divorce, since he has a partial rabbinic betrothal with his deaf-mute wife, and by virtue of this her sister is forbidden to him as his wife’s sister. Even after he divorces his wife, she remains forbidden to him like the sister of a divorced wife.

And Rava proves:

But here,

in the case of a deaf-mute man and a deaf-mute woman,

there is no prohibition concerning her,

since she is a deaf-mute,

and there is no prohibition concerning him

since he is a deaf-mute,

and

nevertheless

it teaches: “He divorces his wife with a bill of divorce,”

indicating that when a minor eats neveilot, the court is commanded to separate him from it!?

Rav Shemaya said:

You cannot prove it from here. Rather, in principle, when a minor eats neveilot, the court is not commanded to separate him from it; here they required him to divorce his wife because the Sages enacted

a decree

specifically that he must remove her from him and she may not live with him

because of “permitting a yevama to marry outside.”

For if people see her remaining with him, they will not attribute this to his being a minor eating neveilot; rather, they will mistakenly think that the deaf-mute woman’s betrothal overrides the levirate bond of her competent sister, and therefore that his deaf-mute wife is not forbidden to him by the prohibition against the sister of a woman subject to his levirate bond.

And they will come to permit the competent yevama who falls before him from his competent brother to marry outside without halitza, as though she were his wife’s sister by Torah law.

Whereas in truth, she is a yevama by Torah law, and requires halitza by Torah law in order to be able to marry, since she is not his wife’s sister by Torah law.

We shall return to you, chapter “A Deaf-Mute Who Married.”

Mishna:

1.

A woman who went with her husband overseas,

and they went when

there was peace between him and her and

also

peace in the world,

meaning that no war was known to be taking place in the place to which they went, and she returned

and came

here without her husband

and said

in court,

“My husband is dead,”

she is deemed credible and

may marry

on the basis of her testimony. And if she has no children and her husband has a brother, and she said,

“My husband is dead,” she must perform yibbum

on the basis of her testimony.

The reason she is deemed credible is that, since it is not a time of crisis, there is consequently no concern that she is speaking based on an estimation in her heart, saying: Since he did not come for a month or two, certainly bandits killed him. Rather, we say that she actually saw him dead, for otherwise she would not have said that he died, since she is concerned that perhaps he will return after she has married and she will thereby be disqualified, as she would become forbidden both to her first husband and to her second husband.

2.

If there was

peace between him and her, but there was war in the world,

we are concerned that she is speaking based on an estimation in her heart.

Or if there was

strife between him and her

when they left, then, even if there is

peace in the world,

nevertheless we are concerned that, since she hates him, she wants to render herself forbidden to him,

and if she came and said, “My husband is dead,” she is not deemed credible.

Rabbi Yehuda says: She is never deemed credible,

even if there was peace between him and her and peace in the world,

unless she came weeping, with her garments torn

in mourning for her husband.

The Sages said to him

that if so, a clever woman who knows that she must come to court and cry will marry, whereas a foolish woman, who does not know how to substantiate her words by crying in court, will not marry?

Rather,

this one,

who came weeping with her garments torn,

and this one,

who came without crying and without her garments torn,

may marry.

Gemara:

The tanna

first taught that she is deemed credible when it is known that

there was peace between him and her, because he wanted to teach

at the end that when it is known that there was

strife between him and her

she is not deemed credible.

The tanna

first taught that when it is known that there is

peace in the world

she is deemed credible

because he wanted to teach

at the end that when it is known that there is

war in the world

she is not deemed credible.

Rava said: What is the reason that

she is not deemed credible when there is

war?

Because she says it based on an assumption,

from an estimation in her heart,

for she reasons,

she considers: Is it possible that

of all those who were killed, he

my husband

survived?

And

even if you say that since there was peace between him and her,

she consequently fears even the remote possibility that he may return and she will become disqualified, and for this reason

she guarded herself,

she was careful not to say in court that he died

until she saw,

that she saw him being killed.

Nevertheless, she is not deemed credible.

Since

sometimes they strike him with an arrow,

they shot him with an arrow

or with a spear, and she reasons

in her mind that

he certainly died, but

in fact he did not die, because

there is one who applied samterei,

a dressing,

and he recovered.

The Gemara now considers several cases, asking whether in them there is concern that she says it based on an assumption, as in the case of war, or not.

Initially,

Rava thought to say that famine

if she says that he died of starvation

is not like war.

She is deemed credible, since

she did not say it based on an assumption

from an estimation in her heart that he died of starvation.

Rava subsequently said:

He retracted and said:

Famine is like war

and she is not deemed credible, because she fears dying and flees from there before he dies, and says it based on an assumption.

And this is like the incident that occurred:

A certain woman came before Rava and said to him: “My husband died of starvation,”

and Rava wanted to test her to see whether she was not speaking based on an estimation in her heart. Therefore,

he said to her: “You did well to save yourself,”

meaning: You did well to leave him even while he was alive and flee. For is it possible

to imagine

that

with that small amount of sifted flour

that you left him,

he could have lived?

She said to him: “Master,

Rava, do

you also know that in such circumstances he could not live?”

This proves that she had said, based on an estimation in her heart, that he was dead; and because of this incident Rava retracted his position.

Rava subsequently said: Famine is worse than war. For in the case of war, when she says, “My husband died in the war,” it is only then that she is not deemed credible,

and we are concerned that she is speaking based on an estimation in her heart.

But

if she said,

“He died in his bed,” she is deemed credible,

since she is not suspected of lying and saying that he died in his bed, because she reasons that perhaps he fled from the war and was saved.

Whereas concerning famine,

even if she said that he died in his bed, we are concerned that she is lying, since she reasons: How could he have lived? And she is not deemed credible

until she says, “He died, and I buried him.”

A collapse,

where the house fell upon him, or a storm wind came and knocked down all the houses of the city,

is like war

and she is not deemed credible, as we are concerned

that she says it based on an assumption.

The sending of snakes and scorpions is like war,

and we are concerned

that she says it based on an assumption.

Concerning plague, some say that it is like war, and some say that it is not like war.

Those who say that it is like war

say that we are concerned

that they say it based on an assumption.

And those who say that it is not like war rely on what people say,

that she relies on the statement that

“For seven years there was plague, and a person does not die before his time.”

A person does not die before his appointed time, even during seven years of plague!

Therefore, she does not estimate in her mind that he died until she sees him dead.

We learned in the Mishna that when it has become established for us that there is war in the world, she is not deemed credible.

The Gemara raises a question:

They raised a dilemma:

What is the halakha when

she herself established that there was war in the world,

meaning that we did not know that there were wars in those countries except from her report?

What is the halakha?