Yevamot 113b (קיג:) — the Talmud in English

If it is not clear-minded:

for he cannot direct his mind as a competent person does, since his mind is perpetually unclear.

Or perhaps forever—

he has one state of mind.

Or perhaps

his mind is not consistently settled.

Rather,

it is obvious to him

to Rabbi Elazar

that his mind

of a deaf-mute

is weak, and

it is also obvious to him that

it is not clear-minded.

And here, this is the reason

that his teruma is uncertain:

since at times he is sound-minded,

sometimes his mind is sound, like that of a competent person,

and at times

he is

insane.

And since it is uncertain when he is sound-minded and when he is insane, one must be concerned that he separated the teruma while he was sound-minded and competent. Similarly, when he betroths a woman, one must be concerned that he betrothed her while he was sound-minded and competent.

What practical difference does this make—

to divorce

his

wife with a get.

If you say

that throughout the deaf-mute’s life

he has one state of mind—

then betrothal is like divorce.

If he possesses a valid mind, his betrothal is a betrothal by Torah law, and so is his divorce. And if he does not possess a valid mind, his betrothal is by rabbinic ordinance, like that of a minor, and so is his divorce.

And if you say that at times he is sound-minded and at times insane,

he is—

As for betrothal—

he can betroth,

with uncertainty under Torah law.

As for divorce—

he cannot divorce,

because perhaps he betrothed her while he was sound-minded and competent, whereas now, when he comes to divorce her, he does not possess a valid mind.

And the question is raised:

What

is Rabbi Elazar’s position concerning the betrothal and divorce of a deaf-mute?

And we conclude:

Teyku!

We learned in the Mishna: A competent man who married a competent woman and

she became insane—

he may not divorce her!

Rabbi Yitzḥak said: By Torah law—

an insane woman can be divorced!

Since her consent is not required for divorce,

is it any different

from

what would be the case with a competent woman,

who can be divorced

against her will,

without her consent?

And for what reason did they say

that the Sages said that an insane woman

is not divorced?

In order

that people not treat her

with

a wanton manner,

since she is insane.

And we discuss this:

What are the circumstances of

this insane woman?

If you say

that it is referring to an insane woman

who knows how to safeguard her get,

who accepts it and safeguards it, and does not take it and throw it away,

and knows how to safeguard herself

as a divorcée—

This cannot be, because with regard to an insane woman of this kind,

would people treat her

with

a wanton manner,

when she knows how to safeguard herself?!

Rather,

perhaps you will say that the Mishna is referring to a type of insane woman

who does not know how to safeguard either her get or herself—

It cannot be said with regard to an insane woman of this kind

“By Torah law, an insane woman can be divorced”!

Because—

But the school of Rabbi Yannai said:

The verse states:

“And he places it in her hand”—

The verse teaches that only

one who has the capacity to divorce herself

can be divorced.

Excluded

is

this insane woman, who does not have the capacity to divorce herself,

as she does not know how to safeguard herself or her get.

And the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught:

It is written in the passage concerning divorce:

“And he sends her from his house.”

The verse teaches that only

one whom he sends

from his house

and who does not return

to him can be divorced.

Excluded

is

this insane woman,

who does not know how to safeguard herself as a divorcée,

whom he sends

from his house

and who returns

to him—and therefore her divorce is not a divorce!

And we answer:

No, it is necessary;

here it is referring to a case

where she knows how to safeguard her get,

when she receives it,

but

nevertheless

she does not know how to safeguard herself

from other people.

And therefore,

by Torah law, an insane woman can be divorced—

for

since she

knows how to safeguard her get,

and understands what divorce is.

But

the Sages

said that he may not send her away,

that he may not remove her from his house—in order

that people not treat her in a wanton manner.

Abaye said: This is also precise:

the reference is to an insane woman who knows how to safeguard her get, and therefore she can be divorced by Torah law—

as it teaches with regard to her,

with regard to an insane woman:

she became insane—

he may not divorce her.

But

if

with regard to him,

with regard to an insane man, it teaches: He became insane—

he may never divorce her.

And Abaye infers:

What is different here,

with regard to a husband who became insane,

that it teaches

that he may not divorce her

ever?

And what is different there,

with regard to a wife who became insane,

that it does not teach

that he may not divorce her

ever?

Rather, infer from this that here,

with regard to a man who became insane, the reference is to one who is completely insane, who cannot divorce her

by Torah law

and may never divorce her.

Here,

with regard to a woman who became insane, the reference is to one who can be divorced only

by rabbinic law,

since she is not completely insane, but understands her divorce; therefore it cannot be said with regard to her that he may never divorce her.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri said:

Why is it that a woman who became deaf-mute may leave through divorce, whereas a man who became deaf-mute cannot divorce?

They raised a dilemma before them:

Did

Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri, with regard to a man

who is a deaf-mute,

find it obvious

that he cannot divorce?

And with regard to a woman

who is a deaf-mute,

was the question raised for him:

Why may she leave?

Or perhaps, with regard to a woman

who is a deaf-mute,

it was obvious to him

that she may leave,

and with regard to a man

who is a deaf-mute,

was the question raised for him:

Why can he not divorce?

And the Gemara resolves the dilemma:

Come and hear

from the response of the Sages in our Mishna:

As, when they said to him

the Sages in response to his question:

A man who divorces is not comparable to a woman who is divorced,

because

a woman leaves both willingly and unwillingly, whereas

if so,

a man can send his wife away only willingly—

Infer from this

that with regard to a

man

who is a deaf-mute,

the question was raised for him: Why

can he not divorce?

Because if he had been asking the reason why a woman may leave, they should have said to him: It is because a woman is not comparable to a man.

And the Gemara challenges this proof:

On the contrary, as, when they said to him

the Sages:

Even this one,

a deaf-mute woman,

is like her,

like a competent woman who is divorced without her consent—

Infer from this—

a woman

who is a deaf-mute

was the question raised for him

why she may leave!

Rather,

the Gemara offers another explanation:

Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri

was speaking according to their own statement,

the statement

of the Sages:

According to my position, just as a man cannot divorce—

a woman likewise cannot be divorced.

But according to your position, what is the difference between a woman and a man?

And they answered him that one must distinguish between a woman and a man, and

they said to him: A man who divorces is not comparable to a woman who is divorced,

and they brought proof from a competent woman who leaves without her consent.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Yoḥanan testified

ben Gudgada concerning a deaf-mute woman whom her father married off, that she may leave through a get.

Rava said: From the testimony of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Gudgada

who says that even in a case of a fully valid betrothal by Torah law, a man can divorce his wife even when she lacks legal understanding, we learn that if

a man said

to witnesses:

“See this get that I am giving

to my wife,” and then turned to the woman

and said to her: “Take this promissory note,”

and gave her the get, while she thought that it was a promissory note and did not know that she was being divorced with it,

she is divorced.

For such a case is no better than that of a deaf-mute woman who is divorced without understanding what divorce is or what the get is. And the proof is—

Who—

did

Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Gudgada not say

that

we do not

require her consent

in the case of a deaf-mute woman?

Here too, we do not require her consent.

And the Gemara raises a difficulty:

It is obvious

that this is the law according to Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Gudgada, as this is the very basis of his ruling: that the woman’s consent is not required at all for her divorce!

And it answers:

Lest you say

that perhaps

because he said to her, “Take this promissory note,”—

he completely nullified it,

thereby nullifying his divorce, as he had changed his mind.

It teaches us

that

if indeed he had nullified it,

the get, then

to the witnesses,

to whom he had previously said that he intended to divorce her with this get,

he would have said

that he had changed his mind.

And since he did not say to the witnesses

that he had changed his mind—

he did not nullify

his divorce,

and it is nothing

[and nothing at all; there is no basis for saying otherwise].

And the fact that he said

to his wife

this

[“Take this promissory note”]—

was due to embarrassment

[the embarrassment he felt before her because he was divorcing her];

that is why he said this

to her.

From this point, the Gemara discusses the matter of a minor eating unslaughtered animal carcasses, which it began explaining on the previous page.

Rav Yitzḥak bar Bisna lost

his

keys to the house of study, in the public domain—

on Shabbat.

He came before Rabbi Pedat

to ask him what to do: