Yevamot 113a — the Talmud in English

people would refrain,

people

and would not marry her,

they would not marry her as a wife, lest after many years of marriage he would be unable to appease her so that she would remain with him, and she would perform mi'un against him and uproot her marriage. But the mi'un of a minor girl is limited to a few years, until she grows up; therefore, the man who marries her as a wife thinks that he has the ability to appease her throughout this period, at every moment.

And what is different about a minor girl

who was married through her mother and brothers,

that she eats teruma, and what is different about a deaf-mute woman, that she does not eat teruma?

And the proof that this is the law is from this,

as we learned

in tractate Eduyot [7:9]:

Rabbi Yohanan ben Gudgada testified:

1.

Concerning a deaf-mute woman whom her father married off, that she leaves through a bill of divorce,

as was explained in our Mishna, that this refers even to a case where her father married her off, so that the marriage took hold in her מן התורה. Since the woman’s understanding is not required for her divorce, therefore even when she grows up, when her father cannot receive her bill of divorce, she herself can receive it.

2.

And concerning a minor Israelite girl who was married to a priest

through a rabbinic marriage —

that she eats teruma

by rabbinic law, as was explained above [90a].

And the Gemara infers:

But

concerning the deaf-mute woman, of whom Rabbi Yohanan ben Gudgada spoke at the beginning of his words, that she leaves through a bill of divorce, he did not testify that she eats teruma. It follows from this that

a deaf-mute woman —

does not eat

even rabbinic teruma.

And let it be difficult: What is different about a deaf-mute woman from a minor girl?

And we answer:

A decree, lest

if a competent priest who married a deaf-mute woman feeds her teruma,

a deaf-mute priest feed

a priest

a deaf-mute woman

an Israelite woman whom he married.

But the Gemara asks: Why should a deaf-mute woman who is the wife of a deaf-mute priest not eat teruma?

Let her eat,

let the deaf-mute woman eat teruma, and we should not interfere and prevent her from eating, since the law of a deaf-mute woman is like that of a minor, and her eating teruma is in the category of

“a minor who eats non-sacred animals”,

and we are not commanded to prevent a minor from eating a forbidden thing!?

And we answer:

A decree lest he feed

a priest

a deaf-mute man with a competent woman.

And concerning the competent woman, the court is commanded to prevent her from eating a forbidden thing.

But the Gemara still asks:

And

even a

deaf-mute man with a competent woman —

he too should eat

rabbinic teruma, since the Sages enacted betrothal for them, so the deaf-mute man properly feeds the competent woman rabbinic teruma!?

And we answer: Indeed, he feeds her rabbinic teruma. And what they decreed concerns

Torah-level teruma.

And we inquire further:

And what is different about a minor girl, who has

that she has

a marriage settlement

— [below it will be explained from where we know that there is a distinction concerning the obligation of a marriage settlement between a minor girl and a deaf-mute woman], whereas a deaf-mute woman does not have a marriage settlement?

For if so,

if there were an obligation of a marriage settlement for a deaf-mute woman —

people would refrain,

people

and would not marry her,

and they would not marry a deaf-mute woman, so that they would not have to pay a marriage settlement if they wished to divorce her, since she has no understanding, and they fear that their marriage would not endure for many days and years.

The Gemara explains:

And a minor girl —

from where do we know that she has a marriage settlement?

As we learned

in tractate Ketubot [100b]:

A minor girl who performs mi'un,

who leaves him against his will,

and “a second wife”

forbidden to him as a forbidden relation by rabbinic decree,

and a woman incapable of conception,

whose betrothal was in error —

they do not have a marriage settlement.

And it is proved that only these do not have a marriage settlement.

But

this woman who

leaves through a bill of divorce, and

she is

a minor girl —

she has a marriage settlement,

because it is he who releases her from him!

And a deaf-mute woman —

from where do we know that she does not have a marriage settlement?

As is proved from this,

for it was taught: A deaf-mute man and a shoteh who married competent women —

behold,

even if the deaf-mute became competent and the shoteh recovered —

they do not have

for their wives

anything owed by them.

Since at the time when they betrothed their wives they were not capable of understanding, they are not obligated to their wives in a marriage settlement. Rather, they can now divorce them from the rabbinic betrothal that the Sages enacted for them when they lacked understanding, without giving them a marriage settlement.

But if, after they became competent,

they wished

to continue and

maintain them —

they have

for their wives

a marriage settlement.

And a competent man who married a deaf-mute woman or a shoteh,

who is not obligated to give her a marriage settlement,

even if he wrote her one hundred maneh

in her marriage settlement —

her marriage settlement stands, because he wished to obligate himself

[to become disadvantaged]

through his property,

when he voluntarily undertook an obligation that he was not obligated in.

And the Gemara proves:

The reason is that he wished

to obligate himself to her and become disadvantaged through his property; therefore the deaf-mute woman has a marriage settlement.

But if he did not wish

the husband to obligate himself to her voluntarily —

she does not have

a marriage settlement. And the reason for this is,

for if so,

if he were obligated to give her a marriage settlement by rabbinic enactment —

people would refrain,

people would refrain,

and would not marry her,

and would not marry a deaf-mute woman.

And we refute this:

If so,

since the reason for exempting him from the obligation of the marriage settlement is so that people will not refrain from marrying a deaf-mute woman, let us say, because of this reason, the opposite side should also apply —

A competent woman

who agrees to marry

a deaf-mute man —

let a marriage settlement be enacted for her,

because of this reason,

for if so,

if she did not have a marriage settlement —

the competent women would refrain

the competent women

and would not marry

deaf-mute men!?

And we answer:

More than a man wishes to marry —

a woman wishes to be married.

Therefore, we need not be concerned with arranging matters for deaf-mute men, so that women will agree to marry them.

The Gemara brings a story about

a certain deaf-mute man who was in the neighborhood of

who lived in his neighborhood,

Rav Malkiyu.

He had a woman married to him,

Rav Malkiyu married off a competent woman to him,

and wrote her

the deaf-mute man, under the influence of Rav Malkiyu,

four hundred zuz from his property

[from his property].

Rava said: Who is as wise

who is the wise man

as Rav Malkiyu, for he is a great man!

He held

that Rav Malkiyu influenced him to write her such a high marriage settlement because the matter was worthwhile for the deaf-mute man’s benefit, and it was appropriate to persuade him to do so.

For

if he wished

this deaf-mute man

for a maidservant to serve him —

would we not purchase her for him!?

Would the court or his guardian not pay her such a sum so that she would serve him all the days of her life?

If so,

all the more so

here,

for there are two things,

that the deaf-mute man has two things for this sum: both a wife and someone who will care for him.

Rav Hiyya bar Ashi said in the name of Shmuel: The wife of a deaf-mute man —

one is not liable for a provisional guilt-offering on account of her.

That is, there is no doubt whether the deaf-mute has understanding, and because of the doubt his wife is betrothed מן התורה, and one who has relations with her is liable for a provisional guilt-offering, which is brought for a doubt.

Rather, certainly the deaf-mute lacks understanding. And his betrothal is not betrothal מן התורה.

Let us say that this supports him

Shmuel from the Mishna in tractate Terumot [5:1]:

For we learned:

Five may not separate teruma.

And if they separated it —

even after the fact

their separation is not teruma.

And these are they: a deaf-mute, a shoteh, and a minor.

And one who separates the teruma of that which is not his,

when the owner of the produce did not appoint him as an agent to separate teruma from his produce.

And a gentile who separated the teruma of an Israelite, even if

he separated it

with authorization,

as the agent of its owner, the

Israelite —

his separation is not teruma,

because a gentile is not subject to the law of agency, and without the law of agency a person cannot separate the teruma of something that is not his.

And it is proved from this Mishna that the separation of the deaf-mute is not considered teruma at all, even if he separated it after the fact.

For if after the fact his separation were teruma, because of the doubt, the tanna of the Mishna should have said: The separation of a deaf-mute is teruma, and the owner of the untithed produce should return and separate again.

The Gemara rejects the support for Shmuel’s words —

For it is possible to say that

he,

Shmuel,

who said,

he holds

like Rabbi Elazar,

according to whom a deaf-mute is “possibly capable of understanding” מן התורה. And according to Rabbi Elazar, if the deaf-mute separated teruma, his separation is teruma as a matter of doubt מן התורה, and Rabbi Elazar disagrees with our Mishna.

And it is possible that Shmuel holds like Rabbi Elazar, that a deaf-mute is possibly capable of understanding מן התורה.

For it was taught: Rabbi Yitzhak said in the name of Rabbi Elazar: The teruma of a deaf-mute —

does not become non-sacred, because he is possibly

capable of understanding.

And the reason Shmuel exempts one who has relations with the wife of a deaf-mute from a provisional guilt-offering is that one is not liable for a provisional guilt-offering in every case of doubt.

The Gemara now explains this matter:

For seemingly it is difficult:

If Shmuel holds

that

like Rabbi Elazar —

he should also be liable for a provisional guilt-offering,

the one who has relations with the wife of a deaf-mute!?

And it can be resolved by saying that

he requires,

according to Shmuel, in order to impose liability for a provisional guilt-offering, that the doubt concern

one piece

of food

out of two pieces,

for example, there were two pieces, one of them forbidden fat and the other permitted fat, and he does not know which piece he ate.

But if there was only one piece, concerning which there was doubt whether it was forbidden fat or permitted fat, and he ate it, and now he is uncertain whether he ate forbidden fat or permitted fat — one is not liable for a provisional guilt-offering for this eating.

And Shmuel holds that since the Torah said concerning the provisional guilt-offering, “and he performed one of all the commandments of the Lord that may not be performed” [Leviticus 5], and “commandments” is plural, it follows from the verse that specifically if he performed one out of two, one permitted and the other forbidden, and he does not know which he ate, then he is liable for a provisional guilt-offering [whose price is fixed, silver shekels].

But not if he ate one piece, which is possibly forbidden and possibly permitted. In that case he does not bring a provisional guilt-offering.

Therefore, one who has relations with the wife of a deaf-mute, where the doubt concerns only her herself — whether the deaf-mute’s betrothal was effective מן התורה or not — and there is no doubt of one out of two, is exempt from a provisional guilt-offering.

The Gemara raises an objection: Since you said that Shmuel holds like Rabbi Elazar, and therefore he says that the deaf-mute’s separation is teruma as a matter of doubt, then in a provisional guilt-offering in such a case Rabbi Elazar himself imposes liability —

For it was taught: Rabbi Elazar says: A kוי

which is possibly a wild animal, whose fat is permitted, and possibly a domesticated animal, whose fat is forbidden —

one is liable for

eating

its fat, a provisional guilt-offering.

But the eating of the fat of a kוי is a doubt concerning one piece, and nevertheless Rabbi Elazar imposes liability upon him for a provisional guilt-offering!

And we answer:

Shmuel —

holds like Rabbi Elazar in one matter,

concerning the separation of teruma by a deaf-mute, that it is teruma as a matter of doubt מן התורה,

and disagrees with him in one matter,

concerning the law of liability for a guilt-offering; according to Shmuel, one is liable for a provisional guilt-offering even for a doubt concerning one piece by itself.

And some say —

Rav Hiyya bar Ashi said in the name of Shmuel: The wife of a deaf-mute —

one is liable for a provisional guilt-offering on account of her! Meitivi

from this that we learned:

Five may not separate teruma!

And among them is a deaf-mute, so that if he separated it, his separation is not [valid], not even teruma as a matter of doubt; and it is proved that the deaf-mute has no understanding at all.

And we answer:

He holds

Shmuel

like Rabbi Elazar,

that even concerning teruma the deaf-mute separates it as a matter of doubt, because it is uncertain whether he has understanding or not.

Rav Ashi asked: What is Rabbi Elazar’s reason,

who holds that a deaf-mute separates teruma as a matter of doubt, since it is possible that he has understanding — how does he hold concerning the following law, concerning one who has relations with the wife of a deaf-mute?

In his view, is he liable for a provisional guilt-offering, or not?

And the sides of the doubt are:

Whether

it is absolutely clear to him

Rabbi Elazar

that a deaf-mute has a weak understanding.

That his understanding is fine and limited, and is not sharp like that of other people, but this understanding is fixed within him all the days of his life and does not change at times.

However, it is uncertain to him -

whether his mind is clear,

whether the deaf-mute's weakened understanding is clear, and regarding a matter to which he directs his attention, does he do it intentionally like a sound-minded person,