Yevamot 113a (קיג.) — the Talmud in English

people would refrain

from

marrying her,

because they would fear that, after many years of marriage, they would be unable to appease her so that she would remain with them, and she would exercise refusal against him, thereby uprooting her marriage. A minor girl’s ability to exercise refusal, however, is limited to a few years, until she grows up. Therefore, a man who marries her believes that he can appease her throughout this period whenever necessary.

And what is different about a minor girl

who was married through her mother or brothers

that she may eat teruma, and what is different about a deaf-mute woman that she may not eat teruma?

The proof that this is the law is

from that which we learned

in tractate Eduyot [7:9]:

Rabbi Yohanan ben Gudgada testified:

a.

Concerning a deaf-mute woman whom her father married off, that she leaves through a bill of divorce,

as was explained in our Mishna: this applies even when her father married her off, so that the marriage has legal force according to Torah law. Since a woman’s understanding is not required for her divorce, even after she matures, when her father can no longer receive her bill of divorce, she herself can receive it.

b.

And concerning a minor Israelite girl who was married to a priest

through a rabbinic marriage—

that she may eat teruma

by rabbinic ordinance, as explained above [90a].

The Gemara infers:

Whereas

regarding the deaf-mute woman, whom Rabbi Yohanan ben Gudgada mentioned at the beginning of his statement as leaving through a bill of divorce, he did not testify that she may eat teruma. This implies that

a deaf-mute woman

may not eat

even rabbinically ordained teruma.

The Gemara asks: What is different about a deaf-mute woman from a minor girl?

It answers:

It is a decree, lest

if a mentally competent priest who married a deaf-mute woman were to feed her teruma, he would

feed

a priest who is

a deaf-mute

to an Israelite woman whom he married.

The Gemara nevertheless asks: Why should a deaf-mute woman who is the wife of a deaf-mute priest not eat teruma?

Let her eat,

let the deaf-mute woman eat teruma. We should not interfere and prevent her from eating it, since a deaf-mute woman has the status of a minor, and her eating teruma is in the category of

“a minor who eats forbidden foods,”

and we are not commanded to prevent a minor from eating something prohibited.

It answers:

It is a decree lest he feed

a priest who is

a deaf-mute to a mentally competent woman.

The court is commanded to prevent the mentally competent woman from eating a prohibited food.

The Gemara still asks:

And even a priest who is

even a

a deaf-mute to a mentally competent woman—

let him also feed her,

teruma by rabbinic ordinance. Since the Sages instituted betrothal for them, the deaf-mute may properly feed the mentally competent woman rabbinically ordained teruma.

It answers: Indeed, he may feed her rabbinically ordained teruma. The decree was issued with regard to

teruma required by Torah law.

The Gemara further considers the matter:

And what is different about a minor girl, who has

a

ketuba

[the source of the distinction between a minor girl and a deaf-mute woman with regard to liability for a ketuba will be explained below], whereas a deaf-mute woman has no ketuba?

For if so,

if a deaf-mute woman were entitled to a ketuba,

people would refrain

from

marrying her,

because they would not marry a deaf-mute woman lest they have to pay her ketuba if they wished to divorce her; since she lacks legal understanding, they fear that their marriage will not endure for many years.

The Gemara explains:

And with regard to a minor girl—

from where do we know that she has a ketuba?

As we learned

in tractate Ketubot [100b]:

A woman who exercises refusal,

who leaves him against his will,

and a “second wife”

who is forbidden to him as a secondary forbidden relationship by rabbinic law,

and a woman incapable of conception,

whose betrothal was in error—

they do not have a ketuba.

This proves that only these women do not have a ketuba.

But a woman

who

leaves through a bill of divorce, and

who is

a minor—

has a ketuba,

because it is he who divorces her.

And with regard to a deaf-mute woman—

from where do we know that she does not have a ketuba?

As is demonstrated by

that which was taught: If a deaf-mute man or a mentally incompetent man married mentally competent women—

then

even if the deaf-mute subsequently became mentally competent, and the mentally incompetent man recovered—

they do not have

for their wives

anything owed to them.

Since at the time they betrothed their wives they lacked legal understanding, they are not liable to their wives for a ketuba. They may now divorce them from the rabbinic marriages instituted for them while they lacked legal understanding, without giving them a ketuba.

But if, after they recovered, they

wished

to continue

maintaining the marriages—

they have

for their wives

a ketuba.

And a mentally competent man who married a deaf-mute woman or a mentally incompetent woman,

who is not obligated to give her a ketuba,

even if he wrote her one hundred maneh

in her ketuba—

her ketuba remains valid, because he wished to expose himself to loss

that is, to be disadvantaged

through his property,

by voluntarily undertaking an obligation that he did not otherwise bear.

The Gemara proves:

The reason is that he wished

to undertake the obligation voluntarily and expose his property to loss; therefore the deaf-mute woman has a ketuba.

Had he not wished

to undertake the obligation voluntarily—

she would not have

a ketuba. The reason is that

if so,

if he were obligated to give her a ketuba by rabbinic ordinance,

people would refrain

from marrying her

and would not marry her,

that is, would not marry a deaf-mute woman.

The Gemara challenges:

If so, if the reason for exempting him from the ketuba is to prevent people from refraining from marrying a deaf-mute woman, let us say the same in the opposite case—

since the reason for exempting him from the obligation of a marriage contract is to prevent men from refraining from marrying a deaf-mute woman, let us apply the same reasoning in the opposite direction—

A mentally competent woman

who agrees to marry

a deaf-mute man—

a ketuba should be instituted for her,

for this reason:

if so,

if she were not entitled to a ketuba,

mentally competent women would refrain

from

marrying

deaf-mute men.

It answers:

More than a man wishes to marry,

a woman wishes to marry.

Therefore, there is no need to safeguard the interests of deaf-mute men by ensuring that women will agree to marry them.

The Gemara relates an incident involving

a certain deaf-mute who was in the neighborhood of

Rav Malkio,

who lived nearby.

He arranged a wife for him,

that is, Rav Malkio married a mentally competent woman to him,

and he wrote her—

the deaf-mute, under Rav Malkio’s influence—

four hundred dinars from his property

[from his property].

Rava said: Who is as wise

as

Rav Malkio, for he is a great man!

He reasoned

that Rav Malkio had influenced him to write her such a large ketuba because it was worthwhile for the deaf-mute, and it was proper to persuade him to do so.

For

if he had wished

this deaf-mute

to have a maidservant to attend him—

would we not have purchased one for him?

Would the court or his guardian not have paid her such a sum so that she would attend to him all his life?

If so,

all the more so

in this case,

where there are two benefits,

since for this sum the deaf-mute obtains both a wife and someone to care for him.

Rav Hiyya bar Ashi said in the name of Shmuel: With regard to the wife of a deaf-mute—

one is not liable to bring an uncertain guilt-offering on her account.

That is, there is no doubt whether the deaf-mute possesses legal understanding and his wife is betrothed according to Torah law, in which case one who has relations with her would be liable to an uncertain guilt-offering, which is brought in a case of doubt.

Rather, the deaf-mute certainly lacks legal understanding, and his betrothal is not betrothal according to Torah law.

Let us say that this supports

Shmuel’s view from the Mishna in tractate Terumot [5:1]:

As

we learned:

Five may not set aside teruma, and

even after the fact, if they did set it aside,

their teruma is not teruma.

And these are they: a deaf-mute, a mentally incompetent person, and a minor.

And one who sets aside teruma from property that is not his,

when the owner of the produce did not appoint him an agent to set aside teruma from his produce.

And a gentile who set aside teruma from produce belonging to an Israelite, even

if he set it aside

with permission,

as the agent of its

Israelite owner—

his teruma is not teruma,

because a gentile is not subject to the laws of agency, and without the law of agency a person cannot set aside teruma from property that is not his.

This Mishna proves that the teruma set aside by a deaf-mute is not considered teruma at all, even after the fact.

For if, after the fact, his teruma were considered teruma because of doubt, the tanna of the Mishna should have said: The teruma of a deaf-mute is teruma, and the owner of the untithed produce must return and set aside teruma again.

The Gemara rejects the support for Shmuel’s opinion—

For it may be said that

he,

Shmuel,

says

that he holds

in accordance with Rabbi Elazar,

according to whom a deaf-mute is, according to Torah law, of uncertain legal understanding. According to Rabbi Elazar, if a deaf-mute set aside teruma, his teruma is a matter of Torah-law doubt, and Rabbi Elazar disagrees with our Mishna.

It is possible that Shmuel holds in accordance with Rabbi Elazar, that a deaf-mute is of uncertain legal understanding according to Torah law.

As it was taught: Rabbi Yitzhak said in the name of Rabbi Elazar: The teruma of a deaf-mute—

does not become non-sacred, because he is of uncertain

legal understanding.

As for Shmuel’s exempting one who has relations with the wife of a deaf-mute from an uncertain guilt-offering, this is because not every case of doubt entails liability for an uncertain guilt-offering.

The Gemara now explains this matter:

For apparently one should wonder:

If Shmuel holds

that

he follows Rabbi Elazar,

he should likewise be liable to an uncertain guilt-offering,

the one who has relations with the wife of a deaf-mute.

It can be resolved by saying that, according to Shmuel, it

requires

that, in order to incur liability for an uncertain guilt-offering, the doubt must concern

one piece

out of

two pieces,

for example, there were two pieces, one of forbidden fat and the other of permitted fat, and he does not know which piece he ate.

But if there was only one piece, and it was uncertain whether it was forbidden fat or permitted fat, and he ate it, and now is uncertain whether he ate forbidden fat or permitted fat, there is no liability for an uncertain guilt-offering for this eating.

Shmuel maintains that since the Torah states with regard to an uncertain guilt-offering, “and he commits one of all the commandments of the Lord that may not be done,” and “commandments” is plural, the verse indicates that he is liable to an uncertain guilt-offering specifically when he committed one of two possibilities, one permitted and the other prohibited, and he does not know which one he ate [the offering has a fixed value, a sum of silver shekels].

But not when he ate one piece that was uncertainly prohibited or permitted. In that case he does not bring an uncertain guilt-offering.

Therefore, one who has relations with the wife of a deaf-mute, where the doubt concerns only her—whether the deaf-mute’s betrothal had legal force according to Torah law or not—and there is no doubt concerning one of two possibilities, is exempt from an uncertain guilt-offering.

The Gemara asks: Since you said that Shmuel holds in accordance with Rabbi Elazar, and therefore says that the teruma of a deaf-mute is teruma because of doubt, in a case of this kind Rabbi Elazar himself would obligate him to bring an uncertain guilt-offering—

But it was taught: Rabbi Elazar says: A koy,

which is of uncertain status, perhaps a wild animal, whose fat is permitted, and perhaps a domesticated animal, whose fat is prohibited—

one is liable for

eating

its fat to bring an uncertain guilt-offering.

But eating the fat of a koy involves doubt concerning a single piece, and nevertheless Rabbi Elazar obligates him to bring an uncertain guilt-offering.

It answers:

Shmuel

agrees with Rabbi Elazar in one matter,

with regard to the separation of teruma by a deaf-mute, which is teruma by Torah-law doubt,

but disagrees with him in one matter,

with regard to the law of liability for an uncertain guilt-offering. According to Shmuel, an uncertain guilt-offering is required even when the doubt concerns one piece by itself.

Some say—

Rav Hiyya bar Ashi said in the name of Shmuel: With regard to the wife of a deaf-mute—

one is liable to bring an uncertain guilt-offering on her account! The objection is raised

from that which we learned:

Five may not set aside teruma!

Among them is a deaf-mute: if he set it aside, his teruma is not teruma, not even teruma of uncertain status. This proves that a deaf-mute has no legal understanding at all.

It answers:

He holds—

Shmuel—

in accordance with Rabbi Elazar,

who maintains that even with regard to teruma, when a deaf-mute separates it, it is a matter of doubt, since it is uncertain whether he possesses legal understanding.

Rav Ashi asked: What is the reason for Rabbi Elazar,

who holds that a deaf-mute can separate teruma as a matter of doubt because he may possess legal understanding? What does he hold regarding one who has relations with the wife of a deaf-mute?

In his view, is one liable to bring an uncertain guilt-offering, or not?

The sides of the doubt are as follows:

Does

Rabbi Elazar take it as obvious

to him

that a deaf-mute possesses a weakened form of legal understanding?

That is, his understanding is slight and limited, and not as sharp as that of other people, but this understanding is permanently present in him throughout his life and does not vary from time to time.

However, it is uncertain to him -

whether his mind is sound,

whether the deaf-mute’s weakened mind is sound, and, in a matter to which he directs his mind, whether he performs it intentionally, like one who is mentally competent,