Yevamot 112a — the Talmud in English

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he is embarrassed by her,

he is ashamed before her, and therefore he delays in having intercourse with her.

And now the Gemara discusses why the coercion is only concerning halitza and not concerning yibbum -

Before we coerce him to perform halitza -

let us coerce him to perform yibbum!?

Rav said:

Our Mishna is speaking

when her bill of divorce emerges from under her hand.

The Gemara assumed that the case is one of a full bill of divorce, which he gives her after having intercourse with her, but she claims that he did not have intercourse with her, and this bill of divorce is not effective for her. Therefore, it is impossible to coerce him to perform yibbum with her, since he claims that he has already had intercourse with her, fulfilled his mitzva, and this bill of divorce is a full bill of divorce. Rather, we coerce him to perform halitza, because according to her words she has still not undergone yibbum, and she requires halitza in order to leave him.

He raised an objection

to Rav from a beraita:

For it was taught:

A yevama who said, within thirty days, “I was not possessed.”

Behold,

whether he says, “I had intercourse,” or whether he says, “I did not have intercourse” -

we coerce him to perform halitza for her.

And if she said this

after thirty days -

only

we request of him that he perform halitza for her.

And if after thirty days -

she says, “I was possessed,” and he says, “I did not have intercourse” ...

but he wishes to send her out and does not wish to keep her under him -

this one shall send her out with a bill of divorce,

and she does not require halitza from him, since after thirty days she is believed to say that she was possessed, because he does not restrain himself for more than thirty days.

And if after thirty days -

he says, “I had intercourse,” and she says -

“I was not possessed” -

behold

even though he went back and said, “I did not have intercourse” -

we accept his first words, in which he said, “I had intercourse,” for it is certain to us that he does not restrain himself for more than thirty days, and he had intercourse with her.

And therefore

it is necessary

to send her out with a

bill of divorce.

And

she also requires

halitza,

since she said, “I was not possessed,” and prohibited herself to the market if he does not perform halitza for her.

And since in the latter clause they obligate him to give a bill of divorce, this is proof that their claims are made without the bill of divorce emerging from under her hand.

And if so, the first clause is difficult for Rav: why, when she says within thirty days, “I was not possessed,” do we coerce him to perform halitza, and do we not coerce him to perform yibbum?

And the Gemara brings two answers to resolve Rav’s words from the difficulty from the beraita:

First answer:

Rabbi Ami said:

Actually, the beraita too is speaking as Rav established the Mishna, that her bill of divorce emerges from under her hand. And this is what the beraita says: A. A yevama whose bill of divorce emerges from under her hand, and who says within thirty days, “I was not possessed” — we coerce him to perform halitza and not yibbum, since her bill of divorce emerges from under her hand.

B. And if she claimed after thirty days, “I was not possessed” \-

we request of him that he perform halitza for her.

C. She says, “I was possessed,” and he says, “I did not have intercourse,” and no bill of divorce emerges from under her hand — he shall send her out with a bill of divorce.

D. If after thirty days he says, “I had intercourse,” and she says, “I was not possessed,” and the bill of divorce emerges from under her hand, we request of him that he perform halitza for her.

And even though he went back and said, “I did not have intercourse,” and there would be room to say that on the basis of his admission that he did not have intercourse we should coerce him to perform yibbum, we rely upon his first statement, in which he said, “I had intercourse,” since there is a presumption that after thirty days he does not restrain himself from having intercourse; and if he wishes, he may perform halitza for her.

And she, who said, “I was not possessed” -

requires a bill of divorce

which had already been given to her by him,

together with the halitza

which we request of him to perform for her.

Second answer:

Rav Ashi said:

Actually, the beraita too is speaking of a case in which a bill of divorce emerges from under her hand, and nevertheless she requires an additional bill of divorce.

For

there,

the first bill of divorce that emerges from under her hand is

a bill of divorce

by rabbinic ordinance, which he gave her

for his bond,

without having intercourse with her; but through this bill of divorce she was disqualified from undergoing yibbum, and therefore we do not coerce him to perform yibbum.

Whereas

here,

the bill of divorce of which the beraita speaks in the latter clause is

a bill of divorce

from the Torah,

for his intercourse.

For since he admits that he had intercourse, and there is intercourse after the bill of divorce, since according to the Torah he acquires his yevama even if he gave her a bill of divorce for his bond, he is obligated to divorce her in order to permit her from the law of a married woman.

And even though he goes back and says, “I did not have intercourse,” and halitza would suffice for her, and she too says, “I was not possessed,” nevertheless he is obligated to give a bill of divorce as well, because we rely upon his first words, that he had intercourse with her, since thirty days have already passed.

An incident involving

those “two who admitted,”

a yavam and a yevama who admitted that he had not had intercourse, but initially the yavam claimed that he had had intercourse,

who came before Rava.

Rava said to them: “Perform halitza for her, and release her belt,”

and he permitted her belt [this is a metaphor for the loosening of her bond to the yavam]. And Rava did not require a bill of divorce as well.

Rav Sherevia said to Rava: “But it was taught: She requires a bill of divorce and halitza!”

He said to him,

Rava:

“If it was taught -

it was taught!”

Hun, son of Rav Naḥman, asked Rav Naḥman:

A yevama whom the yavam brought into his household, and it was assumed that he had intercourse with her, and her rival was exempted. And afterward the yevama who had been brought into the household claimed that he had not had intercourse with her -

what is the status of her rival

that she should become prohibited because of this woman’s statement?

Rav Naḥman said to him,

Rav Naḥman to Hun his son:

“And because we coerce

him to perform halitza within thirty days,

and request

him to perform halitza after thirty days -

should the rival become prohibited!?”

That is, there is a presumption concerning him that he has intercourse immediately upon bringing her into his household, and certainly her rival thereby becomes exempt.

And all that we coerce him, or request of him, to perform halitza is only for the sake of the yevama herself, for she has made herself a piece of prohibition: she admitted concerning herself that she is prohibited to the market, and she is believed to prohibit herself by saying that she was not possessed, and she is prohibited to the market without halitza.

We learned in the Mishna:

A woman who vows to derive benefit from her yavam.

We learned there

in tractate Nedarim [90b]:

“At first, they would say: Three women go out and receive their marriage contract,”

for although their husbands are obligated to send them out against their will, they are entitled to their marriage contract, and these are they -

A. The wife of a

Heaven,

who says, “I was raped while married to you,” and

“I am impure to you.”

B. A woman who claims toward her husband: “You do not attend to me, to have intercourse with me in the manner of all human beings, and there is no man who can testify for me concerning this, but only

the heavens,

it is revealed and known before Him what is done

between me and you.

C. A woman who vows not to derive benefit from intercourse, and says:

“I am withheld from the Jews!”

And since she did not prohibit herself only to her husband, but vowed that she would not be possessed by any man, this is proof that intercourse is difficult for her, and she is coerced concerning it; therefore she is entitled to her marriage contract.

But afterward

the Sages went back

from

saying this, in order

must bring proof of her statement,

that “a woman should not cast her eyes upon another and ruin her husband,”

and leave him with her marriage contract, go to another place where they do not know her or her vow, and marry him.

Rather,

this is the law:

One who says, “I am impure to you” -

shall bring proof for her words,

and she is not believed to prohibit herself to him without proof.

The one who says

“The heavens are between me and you” -

they shall act by way of request,

that they request of her husband to have intercourse and to treat her properly.

And the one who says

“I am withheld from the Jews” -

the husband shall annul

the

portion,

the force of the vow concerning him [but he cannot annul it completely, because the husband has the power to annul only vows that are between him and her].

And he has intercourse with her

after he has annulled for her the prohibition of her vow concerning him.

And she shall be withheld from the Jews,

if she is divorced or her husband dies.

They raised a question:

the one who says

“I am withheld from the Jews” -

as for a yavam, what

is her law?

And the question arises from the fact that her entire intention in saying, “I am withheld from the Jews,” and not saying, “I am withheld from you,” is to calm her husband, that she is not vowing to derive benefit from him because she has cast her eyes upon another, but because intercourse is difficult for her. Therefore, she prohibits herself to every other man who would be permitted to marry her after her husband divorces her.

But her husband’s brother during her husband’s lifetime is prohibited to her, and she does not need to prohibit herself to him as well in order thereby to calm her husband, and she does not need to include him in her vow that she is withheld from the Jews.

And now it is uncertain whether she herself considers prohibiting herself also to the yavam, in the event that her husband dies -

does she consider

whether she considers

with the intention that her husband might die and she might fall before a yavam,

and prohibits herself to him as well.

Or not,

she does not consider this, and the yavam is not included in her intention to prohibit herself to the Jews through a vow.

Rav said: A yavam -

is not like a husband,

so that he would need to annul his portion for her, because she intended only to prohibit herself to her husband and to all the men currently permitted to her if he divorces her, and not to the yavam, who is prohibited to her if her husband divorces her.

And therefore she is permitted to the yavam.

And Shmuel said: A yavam -

is indeed like a husband.

For she intended to prohibit him as well. And he cannot annul the vow that she vowed, because a yavam does not annul a vow that his yevama vowed while she was under her husband.

Abaye said: In accordance with Rav

who said that a yavam is not like a husband, and she does not become prohibited to him, since she does not consider prohibiting herself to him -

it is reasonable.

For we learned

in our Mishna:

“A woman who vows to derive benefit from her yavam during her husband’s lifetime” -

we coerce him to perform halitza for her.

And if it is so,

if we say

that she considers it,

that she considers that her husband might die and intends to prohibit herself to her yavam — then we should say that even if she vowed to derive benefit from her yavam during her husband’s lifetime, she intended thereby to prohibit herself to her yavam, so that he would not be able to perform yibbum with her. And if so -