Yevamot 112a (קיב.) — the Talmud in English

But his brother’s wife -

he is repelled by her,

he is ashamed before her, and therefore he delays having intercourse with her.

The Gemara now discusses why the coercion is only to perform halitza, and not to perform yibbum -

Before we coerce him to perform halitza -

should we not coerce him to perform yibbum!?

Rav said:

Our Mishna is speaking

when her get is in her possession.

The Gemara assumes that this is referring to a full-fledged get, which he gave her after having intercourse with her, except that she claims that he did not have intercourse with her, and this get is therefore of no avail to her. Consequently, it is impossible to coerce him to perform yibbum, since he claims that he already had intercourse with her, fulfilled his mitzva, and that this is a fully valid get. Rather, he is coerced to perform halitza, because according to her claim she has not yet undergone yibbum and requires halitza in order to be released from him.

The Gemara raises an objection

to Rav from a beraita:

As it was taught:

A yevama who says within thirty days: “I have not had intercourse with him.”

Behold,

whether he says, “I had intercourse with her,” or whether he says, “I did not have intercourse with her,” -

he is coerced to perform halitza for her.

And if she says this

after thirty days -

only

he is asked to perform halitza for her.

And if after thirty days -

she says, “I had intercourse with him,” while he says, “I did not have intercourse with her,” ...

but he nevertheless wishes to divorce her and does not wish to keep her as his wife -

he must divorce her with a get,

and she does not require halitza from him. Since she is believed after thirty days to say that he had intercourse with her, as he would certainly not restrain himself for more than thirty days.

And if after thirty days -

he says, “I had intercourse with her,” and she says -

“I did not have intercourse with him,” -

behold,

even if he retracts and says, “I did not have intercourse with her,” -

we accept his initial statement that he had intercourse with her, for it is certain to us that he would not restrain himself for more than thirty days, and that he had intercourse with her.

Therefore,

he must

divorce her with a

get.

And

she also requires

halitza,

since she said that he did not have intercourse with her, thereby rendering herself forbidden to marry anyone else unless he performs halitza for her.

And since in the latter clause he is required to give her a get, this is proof that their claims are being made when the get is not in her possession.

If so, the first clause presents a difficulty for Rav: Why, when she says within thirty days that he did not have intercourse with her, is he coerced to perform halitza, and is he not coerced to perform yibbum?

The Gemara offers two answers to reconcile Rav’s statement with the objection from the beraita:

First answer:

Rabbi Ami said:

Actually, the beraita too is speaking, as Rav interpreted the Mishna, when her get is in her possession. And this is what the beraita says: a. A yevama whose get is in her possession, and who says within thirty days that she did not have intercourse with him - he is coerced to perform halitza, and not yibbum, since her get is in her possession.

b. And if she claims after thirty days that he did not have intercourse with her - \-

he is asked to perform halitza for her.

c. She says that she had intercourse with him, while he says that he did not have intercourse with her, and no get is in her possession - he must divorce her with a get.

d. If after thirty days he says that he had intercourse with her, while she says that she did not have intercourse with him, and the get is in her possession, he is asked to perform halitza for her.

And even though he retracts and says that he did not have intercourse with her, and it might have been reasonable to say that on the basis of his admission that he did not have intercourse with her we should coerce him to perform yibbum, we rely on his first statement, that he had intercourse with her, since there is a presumption that after thirty days he does not restrain himself from having intercourse. And if he wishes, he may perform halitza for her.

And she, who said that he did not have intercourse with her,

requires a get

that he had already given her,

together with halitza

that he is asked to perform for her.

Second answer:

Rav Ashi said:

Actually, the beraita too is speaking when a get is in her possession, and nevertheless she requires an additional get.

Because

there,

the first get in her possession is

a get

of rabbinic origin, which he gave her

because of the bond between them, without having intercourse with her. However, through this get she was disqualified from undergoing yibbum, and therefore he is not coerced to perform yibbum.

But

here,

the get mentioned by the latter clause of the beraita is

a get

of Torah law,

for

his intercourse. Since he admits that he had intercourse with her, and the intercourse occurred after the get, for by Torah law he acquires his yevama even if he gave her a get because of their bond, he is obligated to divorce her in order to permit her to marry others, as the wife of a married man.

And even though he retracts and says that he did not have intercourse with her, and halitza alone should suffice, and she too says that he did not have intercourse with her, nevertheless he is obligated to give her a get as well, because we rely on his initial statement that he had intercourse with her, since thirty days have already passed.

An incident involving

those

“two who admitted”:

a yavam and a yevama who admitted that he had not had intercourse with her, although initially the yavam claimed that he had had intercourse with her,

who came before Rava.

Rava said to them: “Perform halitza for her, and release her bond,”

and he permitted her to undo her belt [this is a metaphor for releasing her bond to the yavam]. Rava did not require her to receive a get as well.

Rav Shefarya said to Rava: “But it was taught: She requires a get and halitza!”

He said to him

Rava:

“If it was taught -

it was taught!”

Huna, son of Rav Naḥman, asked Rav Naḥman:

A yevama whom the yavam took into his home, and it was assumed that he had intercourse with her, and her rival wife was thereby released. Then the yevama whom he had taken into his home claimed that he had not had intercourse with her -

what is the status of her rival wife

who might become forbidden because of this woman’s statement?

He said to him

Rav Naḥman to Huna his son:

“Is it because we coerce

him to perform halitza within thirty days,

and ask

him to perform halitza after thirty days, that

the rival wife should become forbidden?”

That is, there is a presumption concerning him that he has intercourse immediately after taking her into his home, and certainly her rival wife was released through this act.

And all the coercion or requests that he perform halitza are only for the sake of the yevama herself, since she has rendered herself as a forbidden object by her own declaration (shavya anafsha ḥatikkha de-isura): she admitted with regard to herself that she is forbidden to marry anyone else, and she is believed to render herself forbidden by saying that he did not have intercourse with her. She is forbidden to marry anyone else without halitza.

We learned in the Mishna:

A woman who vows not to derive benefit from her yavam.

We learned there

in tractate Nedarim [90b]:

“Initially, they would say that three women leave their husbands and receive their marriage contracts,”

for although their husbands are required to divorce them against their will, they are nevertheless entitled to their marriage contracts. And these are they -

a. A wife of a

kohen

who says, “I was raped while married to you,” and

“I am impure to you.”

b. A woman who claims to her husband: You do not engage in intercourse with me as all people do, and there is no man who can testify on my behalf about this; only the Holy One, blessed be He, from

Heaven,

knows and sees what takes place

between me and you.

c. A woman who vows that she will derive no benefit from intercourse, and says:

“I am forbidden to all Jews!”

And since she did not forbid herself only to her husband, but vowed that she would not have intercourse with anyone, this is evidence that intercourse is difficult for her and that she is compelled in this matter; therefore, she is entitled to her marriage contract.

But afterward,

the Sages retracted

from

saying

this, in order

“that a woman should not set her eyes on another man and ruin her relationship with her husband,”

and leave him with her marriage contract, go elsewhere, where they do not know her or her vow, and marry him.

Rather,

this is the law:

One who says, “I am impure to you,” -

must bring proof for her statement,

and she is not believed to render herself forbidden to him without proof.

One who says,

“Heaven is between me and you,” -

they should proceed by way of entreaty,

meaning that they should ask her husband to have intercourse with her and treat her properly.

And one who says,

“I am forbidden to all Jews,” -

her husband should annul

his

portion

of the vow, its force with regard to him [but he cannot annul it completely, because a husband has the power to annul only vows between him and her].

And he may have intercourse with her

after annulling the prohibition of her vow with regard to him.

And she shall remain forbidden to all Jews

if she is divorced or her husband dies.

They raised a dilemma:

One who says

“I am forbidden to all Jews” -

what is the law with regard to a yavam

in her case?

The dilemma arises because her entire intention in saying, “I am forbidden to all Jews,” rather than, “I am forbidden to you,” is to reassure her husband that she is not vowing to derive benefit from him because she has set her eyes on another man, but because intercourse is difficult for her. Therefore, she forbids herself to every other man whom she would be permitted to marry after her husband divorces her.

But her husband’s brother is forbidden to her during her husband’s lifetime, and she need not also forbid herself to him in order thereby to reassure her husband. Nor does she need to include him in her vow that she is forbidden to all Jews.

The question, then, is whether she herself considers the possibility of forbidding herself to the yavam in the event that her husband dies -

Does she consider

whether she considers

the possibility that her husband will die and she will fall before a yavam,

and thereby forbids herself to him as well?

Or not

does she consider this possibility, and the yavam is not included in her intention when she vows to forbid herself to all Jews?

Rav said: A yavam -

is not like a husband,

who must annul his portion of her vow, because she intended only to forbid herself to her husband and to all men who are currently permitted to her if he divorces her, but not to the yavam, who is forbidden to her if her husband divorces her.

Therefore, she is permitted to the yavam.

And Shmuel said: A yavam -

is indeed like a husband.

For she intended to forbid herself to him as well. And he cannot annul the vow that she made, because a yavam does not annul a vow that his yevama made while she was under her husband’s authority.

Abaye said: The opinion of Rav

that a yavam is not like a husband, and she is not forbidden to him because she does not consider the possibility of forbidding herself to him -

is reasonable.

As we learned

in our Mishna:

A woman who vows not to derive benefit from her yavam during her husband’s lifetime -

he is coerced to perform halitza for her.

And if it is so,

if we say

that she considers the possibility,

that she considers the possibility that her husband will die and intends to forbid herself to her yavam - then we should say that even when she vows not to derive benefit from her yavam during her husband’s lifetime, she intended by this to forbid herself to the yavam, so that he would be unable to perform yibbum with her. If so -