Yevamot 110a — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara posits:

Is it not

speaking of a case such as

that he did not have intercourse with

her after she matured, and nevertheless she is betrothed to him by Torah law according to Rav, since now the betrothal that was performed with her in her minority has taken effect?

And the Gemara rejects this:

No,

it is speaking of a case in which he did not have intercourse with her. Rather, it is a case such as

that he did have intercourse with

her after she matured, and ordinarily his intercourse with her after she matured is for the purpose of betrothal by Torah law, for he knows that a minor’s betrothal is of no consequence.

And the Gemara is astonished:

If

it is speaking of a case in which

he had intercourse with

her after she matured, and she is acquired to him by Torah law, then

what is the reason of Shmuel,

who required her to receive a divorce document from the second man, when betrothal does not take hold with the wife of a married man?

And we answer:

He holds

that Shmuel holds that

everyone who has intercourse —

has intercourse with the intent of the original betrothal.

For when he comes upon her after she has matured, he does not intend to acquire her now by Torah law; rather, he continues the previous marital relationship, which exists only by rabbinic law, and therefore she requires a divorce document from the second man.

And it follows that the dispute of Rav and Shmuel is regarding the question of whether a person has intercourse with the intent of the original betrothal, not thinking that perhaps he needs to renew something through his intercourse, or whether he does not have intercourse with the intent of the original betrothal, but considers what is the nature of the intercourse that he is now performing, whether he needs to renew something through it.

And the Gemara raises an objection to this explanation:

But

already

they disputed this

Rav and Shmuel

one time

regarding the question of whether a person has intercourse with the intent of the original betrothal. If so, it is impossible that this is the explanation of their dispute here.

For it was stated: If he betrothed her

as a woman

on condition

that she would have no blemishes or that there would be no vows upon her—

and

afterward

he brought her in

to the wedding canopy

without qualification,

without mentioning his condition—

and afterward blemishes were found in her, or vows were upon her—

Rav said: She requires a divorce document from him.

And Shmuel said: She does not require a divorce document from him.

And the explanation of their dispute is:

Rav said she requires a divorce document from him, since he married her,

for he married her and had intercourse with her —

he relinquished it,

he forgave her at the time of intercourse

her condition,

which he stipulated with her at the time of her betrothal.

Since at the time of intercourse he knows that the condition that he made in his betrothal can annul the betrothal if indeed she has blemishes or vows are found upon her, and it is possible that he is now having intercourse with a woman who is not betrothed to him, he therefore considers, at the time of intercourse, relinquishing his condition and acquiring her as a wife through this intercourse, and therefore she requires a divorce document from him.

And Shmuel said: She does not require a divorce document from him.

This is despite the fact that at the time of intercourse he knows that there was a condition in his betrothal by virtue of which the betrothal can be annulled, since

everyone who has intercourse —

has intercourse with the intent of the original betrothal!

He does not consider at the time of intercourse what he now needs to do so that his intercourse will be in accordance with halakha; rather, he conducts himself as a husband with a woman on the basis of the betrothal that he performed in the past.

And we answer:

It is necessary

to state the dispute of Rav and Shmuel in both cases! [

According to Rashi’s version ]

For if it were stated

that their dispute was only

in this case,

with regard to a minor who did not perform refusal, matured, and married another man—

I would say that only

in this case Rav said

that since she matured, he brings to mind that she is not his wife at all by Torah law, and therefore he intends through his intercourse to acquire her

because there is no condition

that would annul the betrothal; rather, they certainly do not exist by Torah law.

But in that case,

with regard to one who betrothed her on condition,

that there is a condition

in his betrothal, and only because of it can the betrothal be annulled, but if she has no blemishes or vows are not found upon her, it will not be annulled—

say that he agrees with him,

Rav

with Shmuel,

that he does not consider, through his present intercourse, that perhaps she is not betrothed to him, and does not intend to relinquish the condition and betroth her through this intercourse; rather, he has intercourse with the intent of the original betrothal, while relying in his mind on the condition being fulfilled, and that she has no blemishes and no vows are upon her.

And if it were stated

that the dispute of Rav and Shmuel was

in that case,

with regard to one who betrothed her on condition and brought her in without qualification, I would say that only

in that case Shmuel said

that he has intercourse with the intent of the original betrothal, because he relies in his mind on the condition being fulfilled.

But in this case,

with regard to a minor who matured,

say that he agrees with Rav

that he has intercourse in order to acquire her now.

Therefore

it is necessary

to state their dispute in both cases.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

And did

he ask whether

Rav said that

only if

he had intercourse, yes,

she is betrothed to him through his intercourse, but

if he did not have intercourse,

she is

not

betrothed to him, and we do not say that when she matured, the betrothal that he performed with her in her minority took effect retroactively?

But what of that incident that occurred in

a place called

Neresh, where she was betrothed while she was a minor, and she matured, and

then

they seated her

they sat her

on the bridal chair,

on a platform, as they seat every bride beneath her wedding canopy.

And

a certain man

came, another, and snatched her

the bride

from him,

from her husband, and betrothed her to himself as a wife.

And Rav Bruna and Rav Hananel, the students of Rav, were there,

they were there,

and they did not require her to receive a divorce document from the latter,

from the second man who snatched her and betrothed her!

And the Gemara assumed that they seated her on the platform after she matured, as at an ordinary wedding canopy, when she had still not had intercourse, and nevertheless they did not require her to receive a divorce document from the second man; and it proves that her betrothal in her minority took effect when she matured, even without intercourse, by Torah law!

Rav Pappa said: In Neresh, they would marry through intercourse,

they would betroth her through intercourse, whereby he had intercourse with her after she matured, and through this they married her as a wife,

and

only

afterward,

after she had had intercourse after maturing,

they would seat

they would seat her

on the bridal chair,

on the platform.

Rav Ashi said

another reason, to explain why they did not require her to receive a divorce document from the second man who snatched her and betrothed her to himself—

He,

the one who snatched her and betrothed her to himself,

acted improperly

by his snatching her and betrothing her from beneath her husband [by rabbinic law],

therefore they acted toward him

the Sages

improperly, and the Sages expropriated the betrothal from him.

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: This works if he betrothed her with money,

for the Sages can expropriate his money and say that it is not betrothal money but gift money. But if—

he betrothed her through intercourse,

when the Sages have nothing to expropriate by the force of their power of the court’s ownerless declaration—

what?

And we answer:

The Sages rendered his intercourse

such that it would be

promiscuous intercourse.

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer,

who is in our Mishna and said that we teach the minor to perform refusal with her husband, so that he will be able to perform yibbum with her sister who falls before him for yibbum, by Torah law.

And Rabbi Elazar likewise said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer.

Mishna:

One who was married and died without sons, leaving behind two wives: one of them performs yibbum or chalitza, and the other is permitted to marry an outsider after the first one performs yibbum or chalitza.

This law applies also in a place where yibbum and chalitza are by rabbinic law, such as in the marriages of a minor or a deaf-mute woman.

When are these words said? With regard to two women whose marriages to their husband were equal.

But if their marriages were different, such as the marriage of a minor and the marriage of a deaf-mute woman—

because the marriage of a minor is defined as a “marriage of doubt,” since all her marriage is contingent and pending on whether she will perform refusal in it or not, and therefore it is in the category of doubt, whether it is a complete acquisition or is no acquisition at all.

Whereas the marriage of a deaf-mute woman is defined as a marriage “in part,” which is not complete, and in the language of the Gemara, “acquired, and partially retained” —

And therefore the intercourse of the minor does not exempt her fellow-wife, the deaf-mute woman, because it is possible that the minor is not acquired at all, and her intercourse is not yibbum intercourse, and through it she did not become exempt, nor did her fellow-wife, the deaf-mute woman, become exempt.

And likewise the intercourse of the deaf-mute woman does not exempt her fellow-wife, the minor, because the deaf-mute woman is acquired only in part, while the minor may be completely acquired, and intercourse with one who possesses only partial acquisition does not exempt one who possesses complete acquisition.

a.

One who was married

through a rabbinic marriage

to two minor orphans,

who are not sisters,

and died—

and they fell before his brother for yibbum, by rabbinic law.

Since their marriages and their yibbum are equal, therefore—

the intercourse or the chalitza of one of them —

exempts her fellow-wife. “

Intercourse” of a minor who was married can exempt her fellow-wife even while she is still a minor, and it is like yibbum by Torah law, which exempts the fellow-wife.

Whereas the “chalitza” of a minor who was married can exempt her fellow-wife only after the minor has matured, since a minor does not perform chalitza.

And likewise,

the same law applies to one who was married to

two deaf-mute women,

whose betrothals and yibbum are equal, by rabbinic law, so that the intercourse of one of them exempts her fellow-wife [and the matter of chalitza in the case of a deaf-mute woman will be explained in the Gemara].

b. But one who was married to

a minor and a deaf-mute woman—

the intercourse of neither one exempts her fellow-wife.

Since we do not know with which one he was more pleased, and which one is considered more his wife. c. And if he was married to

a woman of sound mind

to a woman of sound mind [who was an adult]

and a deaf-mute woman—

The intercourse of the woman of sound mind,

which is by Torah law,

exempts the deaf-mute woman.

And the intercourse of the deaf-mute woman,

which is subject to yibbum by rabbinic law,

does not exempt the woman of sound mind,

who requires yibbum or chalitza by Torah law.

d. And likewise, if he was married to

an adult woman and a minor—

the intercourse of the adult woman,

which is by Torah law,

exempts

the

minor.

And the intercourse of the minor,

which is by rabbinic law,

does not exempt the adult woman,

who requires yibbum or chalitza by Torah law.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: And likewise, one who was married to two deaf-mute women—their law is like that of one who was married to two minors; that is, the intercourse or the chalitza of one of them exempts her fellow-wife.

And we raise an inquiry concerning it:

And

when

a deaf-mute woman —

is she capable of chalitza?

But we learned

above, on page 104b:

A deaf-mute man with whom chalitza was performed, and a deaf-mute woman with whom chalitza was performed, and

the woman who

performs chalitza with a minor —

her chalitza is invalid!

And we answer:

Rav Giddel said in the name of Rav: What the Mishna said, that the law of one who was married to two deaf-mute women is like the law of one who was married to two minors, is speaking only

What the Mishna said—that one married to two deaf-mute women has the same law as one married to two minors—refers only

of intercourse, that the intercourse of one of them exempts her fellow-wife, and not of chalitza.

meaning that the intercourse of one of them releases her fellow wife, and not to ḥalitza.

For only in the case of one who was married to two minors is chalitza possible, since the minor who was married performs chalitza once she matures. But not in the case of a deaf-mute woman, with whom chalitza is never possible.

Rabba said: You may even say

that it is possible to say that “and likewise two deaf-mute women” refers also

to chalitza.

And do not find difficulty from the Mishna that says that there is no chalitza with a deaf-mute woman, since it is possible to distinguish—

Here,

in our Mishna, which says that chalitza with a deaf-mute woman is possible, it is speaking

of a deaf-mute woman from the outset,

who had never been a woman of sound mind.

Here,

in the earlier Mishna, which says that there is no chalitza with a deaf-mute woman, it is speaking

of

one who had been

a woman of sound mind, and afterward became deaf-mute.

And the reason for the distinction between them is:

A deaf-mute woman from the outset,

of whom our Mishna speaks,

just as when he entered upon

as the Sages instituted for her, that she could enter into marriage with her husband through gestures—

so she exits,

from the yavam through chalitza by gestures alone, by rabbinic law.

But one who had been

a woman of sound mind

at the time of her marriage to her husband

and afterward became deaf-mute,

and she falls before the yavam by Torah law—she

cannot

perform chalitza through gestures alone, since

recitation is indispensable for her.

For the recitation, “What is the matter with you, my sister-in-law?” which the woman performing chalitza must say at the time of her chalitza, is indispensable by Torah law. But a deaf-mute woman [who also does not speak] cannot recite it, and therefore chalitza by Torah law is not possible with her.

Abaye raised an objection to Rabba

:

And

when

a deaf-mute woman from the outset —

is she capable of chalitza

by rabbinic law!?

But we learned

below [on page 112b]:

Two brothers —

one of sound mind and one deaf-mute,

who were

married to two unrelated women —

one a woman of sound mind,

to the one of sound mind,

and one a deaf-mute woman,

to the deaf-mute man.

The deaf-mute man, the husband of the deaf-mute woman, died,

and she fell before his brother, the one of sound mind, for yibbum by rabbinic law—

what should

the yavam, who is

a man of sound mind and the husband of a woman of sound mind, do?

For he cannot perform chalitza with her, since the woman performing chalitza must recite, and she cannot recite.

Rather, he

brings her in

as his yevama, by rabbinic law.

And if he wishes

afterward

to remove

her by a divorce document through gestures—

he removes her,

without needing to perform chalitza with her.

And if

the man of sound mind, the husband of the woman of sound mind, dies,

and she falls before the deaf-mute brother for yibbum by Torah law!—

what should the deaf-mute man, the husband of the deaf-mute woman, do?

For he cannot perform chalitza with her, since he cannot recite, and the recitation prevents the chalitza from being valid.

Rather, he

brings her in,

her,

and does not remove her

from beneath him

ever!

For the deaf-mute man cannot give her a divorce document and thereby annul the betrothal of his brother, the man of sound mind, by virtue of which she fell before him for yibbum.

And Abaye proves against Rabba:

Is it not,

is this Mishna speaking

of

one who is

a deaf-mute woman from the outset,

who falls before a man of sound mind?

And

nevertheless,

it teaches

in it only that the man of sound mind

brings her in

her.

And it implies that only to bring her in,

no —

he can bring her in.