Temurah 6b — the Talmud in English

However,

“the dust of interest,”

interest that is prohibited only by rabbinic decree —

is not collected through the courts.

And Rabbi Yohanan said: Even stipulated interest is not collected through the courts.

Abaye agrees with Rabbi Yohanan that the transaction is effective, and therefore the lender does not return the interest, even though he violated the statement of the Merciful One. Rava agrees with Rabbi Elazar.

Rav Aḥa said

to Rav Ashi: Is it really the case that

there they disagree on a matter of reasoning!?

Did Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yohanan disagree over this reasoning—whether the transaction is effective or ineffective?! After all,

there they disagree on the biblical verses;

their dispute depends on how the verses are expounded!

The Gemara now cites several expositions from which Rabbi Yohanan derived that the interest is not collected through the courts, as well as Rabbi Elazar’s exposition that it is collected through the courts:

As Rabbi Yitzḥak said: What is Rabbi Yohanan’s reason? The verse states

[Ezekiel 18:]

“He gave with interest and took usury,

he shall not live;

he has committed all these abominations;

he shall surely die; his blood shall be upon him.”

And we expound the verse as follows:

It was given for life,

meaning, his punishment is that he will not live,

and not for repayment;

the punishment was not stated as an obligation to return the money.

Rav Aḥa bar Adda said: From here,

Rabbi Yohanan derived this matter. As it is stated

“Do not take from him interest or usury, and fear your God.”

And we expound the verse:

For instilling fear in those who take it,

meaning, fear God, who will punish you!

But not for repayment.

Rava said: From here,

from this verse

“He has committed all these abominations; he shall surely die; his blood shall be upon him,” and adjacent to it

:

“And he has fathered a violent son who sheds blood.”

And we expound:

Those who lend with interest are juxtaposed with those who shed blood. Just as those who shed blood are not subject to repayment,

meaning, they cannot be returned to life,

so too those who lend with interest,

who shed the poor person’s blood, causing him to die of hunger,

are not subject to repayment.

And Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: What is Rabbi Elazar’s reason,

who holds that the interest is collected through the courts?

As the verse states

[Leviticus, there:] “Do not take from him interest or usury, and fear your God,

and your brother shall live with you.”

And we expound: If you took money from him,

return it to him;

give it back to him,

so that he may live with you,

so that he may live alongside you and not die of hunger.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, therefore asks Rav Ashi: Rava could agree with Rabbi Yohanan on the basis of these expositions, even though with regard to the other prohibitions of the Torah he holds that the transaction is ineffective. Similarly, Abaye could agree with Rabbi Elazar because of that exposition. From where, then, do you know that Abaye and Rava disagree in the dispute between Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yohanan?

And we conclude: Indeed, they do not disagree with regard to stipulated interest.

Rather, with regard to what do Abaye and Rava disagree? With regard to whether a change acquires the object.

That is, when a person changes an object contrary to the Owner’s intention and thereby violates the statement of the Merciful One. Abaye holds that the person “acquires” it, meaning that his act is effective, except in the cases of prohibitions for which the Torah explicitly revealed that the act is ineffective. Rava holds that he “does not acquire” it, meaning that his act is ineffective, except in the cases of prohibitions for which the Torah explicitly revealed that the act is effective.

Alternatively: They disagree with regard to these distinctions that we stated,

meaning, all the explanations that we gave. That is, with regard to all the prohibitions mentioned above, some of which indicate that the act is effective, Rava explains that this is a special decree of the Torah. And some of which indicate that the act is ineffective, Abaye explains that this is a special decree of the Torah.

Alternatively:

The Gemara presents another formulation in its back-and-forth discussion: What is the subject of the dispute between Abaye and Rava?

According to this formulation as well, Rav Ashi initially thought that they disagreed with regard to stipulated interest. Rav Aḥa’s question, however, is that it is impossible to say that Abaye holds that stipulated interest is not collected through the courts, since Abaye himself said in tractate Bava Metzia that stipulated interest is collected through the courts.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: And now that we have explained all these distinctions—

—

He said to him: With regard to stipulated interest. According to Abaye, the interest is not returned,

it is not collected through the courts;

according to Rava, the interest is returned.

The Gemara raises a difficulty:

But Abaye also holds that stipulated interest is taken from the lender through the courts,

does Abaye not also agree with Rava that stipulated interest is collected through the courts?—

As Abaye said

in tractate Bava Metzia [65a]:

If someone is owed four dinars of interest by another person,

meaning, if it happened that one person was owed four dinars of interest by another,

and the borrower gave the lender in their place

instead of the four dinars of interest,

a cloak

a garment

worth five

worth

five

dinars, instead of four,

then even though the borrower gave the lender more than the amount of interest that he had stipulated,

when we take it from him,

when the judges come to take the interest from the lender, in accordance with the law that stipulated interest is collected through the courts,

we take only four from him;

the four dinars are taken from him,

but this dinar,

the fifth dinar, which he was not obligated to give him but nevertheless gave him, is not taken from him, because

he gave it to him as a gift;

he gave it to him as an ordinary gift.

And Rava said: We take five from him.

What is the reason?

He did not give him any gift! Rather,

the entire

garment

came into his possession as interest,

it came into his possession as payment of interest.

Their disagreement, then, concerned only the fifth dinar.

And Abaye agrees with Rava that stipulated interest “is collected through the courts.” This is difficult for Rav Ashi, who said that according to Abaye stipulated interest is not collected through the courts!?

Rather, when Abaye and Rava disagree, it is with regard to whether a change acquires the object.

As explained above, there are two interpretations.

The discussion concerning one who consecrates animals with a defect

We learned above that one who consecrates animals with a defect for the altar violates a prohibition.

The Torah does not explicitly state the prohibition against consecrating them; the Sages derived it through expositions of the verses. The following discussion cites a

baraita that expounds the prohibition against consecrating animals with a defect for the altar. The Torah states [Leviticus chapter 22], in the passage concerning animals with defects: “

Anything that has a defect,

you shall not offer.” For it will not be acceptable for you. “

For it shall not be acceptable for you.

Blind, or broken, or mutilated, or having a wart, or scabbed, or a rash,

you shall not offer

these to the Lord, and you shall not place any of them as a fire-offering on the altar to the Lord.” “

Crushed, or shattered, or torn, or cut,

you shall not offer

to the Lord.”

Three times the Torah states “you shall not offer” with regard to animals with defects—once concerning an Israelite’s offering, and later in the discussion the Gemara will explain another verse stated concerning the offering of a gentile. The baraita expounds all three verses.

The Sages taught: “Anything that has a defect, you shall not offer”—what does this teach?

If

the intention of the verse is to prohibit

“you shall not slaughter,”

to prohibit slaughtering an animal with a defect for the altar,

it has already been stated

this prohibition

below,

in the following verses. The prohibitions against burning and sprinkling its blood have also already been stated.

If so,

what does “you shall not offer” teach?—

“You shall not consecrate,”

meaning that the verse prohibits even consecrating an animal with a defect for the altar.

From here the Sages said:

the Sages said:

One who consecrates animals with defects for the altar,

and slaughters them, sprinkles their blood, and burns them,

violates five prohibitions.

These are:

the prohibition “you shall not consecrate,”

the prohibition

“you shall not slaughter,” “you shall not sprinkle,” “you shall not burn all of it,” and “you shall not burn”

even

part of it.

They said in the name of Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda: He also

violates the prohibition concerning

receiving the blood.

The Gemara explains the baraita:

The Master said,

we learned in the baraita:

If it means “you shall not slaughter,” it has already been stated below.

The Gemara asks:

Where is it stated?

As it was taught

in another baraita: Concerning the verse [verse 22],

“Blind, or broken, or mutilated, or having a wart, you shall not offer these to the Lord”—what does this teach?

If

the intention of the verse is to say

“you shall not consecrate”

these for an offering,

it

this matter

has already been stated above

[in verse 20].

Rather, what does “you shall

not offer” teach?—

“You shall not slaughter”!

It is further stated there:

“And you shall not place any of them as a fire-offering on the altar to the Lord.”

And we expound: “And you shall not place a fire-offering,”

these are the portions burned on the altar,

to prohibit burning the sacrificial portions of these animals with defects on the altar fire.

And still

I know only

that it is prohibited to burn

all of them.

From where do we derive that part of them

is also prohibited from being burned, even an olive-bulk?

The verse states, “of them,”

even a small part of them.

The sprinkling of the blood

of animals with defects—

from where

do we know that it too is prohibited?

The verse states, “on the altar.”

It is further stated there:

“To the Lord,”

and the verse comes

to include the goat sent away

to Azazel, so that one who consecrates it with a defect receives lashes because of the prohibition against consecrating an animal with a defect. This will be explained later. The Gemara now discusses what we learned in the second baraita: that “to the Lord” comes to include the goat sent away. Yet in another exposition, concerning the prohibition of slaughtering an animal outside the Temple courtyard, where “to the Lord” is also stated, we expound it as excluding the goat sent away. How can these teachings be reconciled?

“Slaughtering outside” is the prohibition against offering outside the Temple Courtyard a sacrifice fit for the altar.

And we object:

“And is ‘for the Lord’ needed in order to include [them]?”

Is it derived [for that purpose]?!

And it was taught:

But we learned in a beraita: It is stated in the Torah [Leviticus 17]: “Any man of the House of Israel who slaughters an ox or a sheep or a goat [and the verse is speaking of consecrated animals. Rashi] in the camp [outside the Courtyard], and does not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting to offer a sacrifice to the Lord. That man shall be cut off from among his people.”

And we derive:

Had [the verse stated only] “a sacrifice,” I would understand that even items consecrated for Temple maintenance

are forbidden to offer outside,

for

they too

are called “a sacrifice,” as it is stated

concerning the spoils of the war against Midian [Numbers 31]:

“And we brought the offering of the Lord, each man who found a gold vessel, a bracelet, a ring, an earring, and a כומז,”

and they are certainly items consecrated for Temple maintenance, yet they are called in the Torah by the term “a sacrifice.” And from where [do we know] that it is permitted to slaughter items consecrated for Temple maintenance outside?

The verse states: “And he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting.”

And we derive: “A sacrifice

that is fit for the entrance of the Tent of Meeting—one is liable for it

for excision

because of slaughtering outside.

But items consecrated for Temple maintenance,

which are not fit for the entrance of the Tent of Meeting,

for they are blemished animals, as we learned above that it is forbidden to consecrate unblemished animals for Temple maintenance, and one who consecrates them transgresses a negative commandment, therefore

, one is not liable for it because of slaughtering outside.

And the beraita continues to discuss: From what we derived—that for anything not fit for the entrance of the Tent of Meeting one is not liable because of slaughtering outside—

I will exclude these,

the items consecrated for Temple maintenance that are blemished,

but I will not exclude the sin-offering cow

the red cow

and the scapegoat,

for they are fit for the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, since neither of them is blemished: for concerning the red cow it is stated [Numbers 19], “which has no blemish,” and concerning the scapegoat we derived in the preceding beraita, from what is stated “for the Lord,” that it must not have a blemish. And now we must reason: Since they are unblemished, should one who offers them outside become liable? For example, if he slaughtered the red cow outside contrary to its commandment—that is, not upon its arrangement [the place designated for its slaughter]—or if he slaughtered the scapegoat anywhere outside [for everywhere is outside its designated place, since it is not slaughtered at all, but pushed from the top of the cliff], should he become liable to excision for slaughtering outside?

The verse therefore states: “For the Lord.”

And we derive:

Those that are designated “for the Lord,”

only for sacrifices offered inside is one liable to excision if he slaughtered them outside;

these are excluded,

the sin-offering cow and the scapegoat,

which are not designated “for the Lord.”

And it is difficult: In this beraita we derive “for the Lord” to exclude, whereas concerning blemished animals we derive “for the Lord” to include?

And we answer:

Rava said:

The expositions do not contradict one another, because

here

it is derived

from the subject matter of the verse

from the meaning of the verse,

whereas there, from the subject matter of the verse—

There,

with regard to slaughtering outside, it is stated

“and he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting,”

and it comes

to include

and make liable everything fit for the Tent of Meeting—that is, all unblemished animals consecrated with the sanctity of the altar—to make one liable for them if he slaughtered them outside. Therefore, since the Torah again wrote

“for the Lord,”

and all items consecrated for the altar have already been included, certainly the verse comes

to exclude

the sin-offering cow and the scapegoat.

But

here,

with regard to blemished animals, that which

“And you shall not offer any of them upon the fire,”

wrote

to exclude.

For this verse teaches that only something that is offered upon the altar fires entails liability for one who consecrates it while it is blemished, but one that is not offered upon the altar fires does not entail liability [and included in this exposition is the exclusion of the scapegoat, for one who consecrates it while blemished is not liable]. And why did the Torah again write

“for the Lord”?

Therefore, certainly it comes to expound

to include

the scapegoat, to forbid consecrating it when it is blemished.

The Gemara continues to explain the beraita.

We learned in a beraita: “For the Lord” comes to include the scapegoat, and it is forbidden to consecrate it while blemished.

And the Gemara infers:

The reason is that the verse wrote “for the Lord”; it is thus that one does not bring a blemished scapegoat,

and it is forbidden to consecrate it. —

Had the verse not included it by writing “for the Lord,”

if the Torah had not included it,

I would have said: A blemished scapegoat is perfectly acceptable,

so that it is permitted to consecrate it?!

But this cannot be said, for

the lot establishes only with regard to something fit for the Name!

The lot that is cast over it establishes it as the scapegoat only when it is also fit for the Name. For when they bring it together with the other goat, it is not known upon which of them the lot for the Lord will fall and upon which the lot for Azazel will fall; therefore both must be unblemished. And why is a special scriptural decree needed to forbid consecrating it?

And we answer:

Rav Yosef said: Whose opinion is this? —

It is the opinion of Hanan the Egyptian,

this beraita was taught according to the method of Hanan the Egyptian.

For it was taught:

Hanan the Egyptian says: Even if there is blood in the cup—

he brings its fellow and pairs it with him.

Even if the inner goat, made for the Lord, has already been slaughtered, its blood received and found in the cup, and the scapegoat died, he brings another goat from the market and pairs it with it—that is, he places it beside the blood in the cup, to show that it is its fellow—and sends it to Azazel.

And Rav Yosef holds that according to Hanan the Egyptian it is necessary to bring only one goat, and it will be sent to Azazel without any lottery at all.

And concerning such a goat, I would have said that it is permitted to consecrate it when it is blemished, because it is not included in the lottery and no lot for the Lord will fall upon it [as in the questioner’s difficulty]. Therefore, the beraita comes to teach us by including it in the prohibition of consecration.

And therefore the Gemara asks: From where do we know that Hanan the Egyptian holds that a lottery is not required? Perhaps he holds that the blood is valid and does not need to be spilled, but nevertheless a lottery is required, in such a manner that he brings two goats and casts lots over them as at first. The one upon which the lot for Azazel fell will stand beside the blood and be sent to Azazel, while the one upon which the lot for the Lord fell will graze until it becomes unfit, and the blood of the first will not be spilled, but atonement will be achieved through it, because the lot for the Lord fell upon it in the first lottery. And when he said “even,” he excluded the one who says that it is necessary to bring two others, cast lots, and even slaughter the second as at first, in which case the blood of the second would be spilled.

And we object:

Granted,

indeed,

that you hear from Hanan the Egyptian

that the blood is not spilled, because he holds

that it is not rejected,

but

that a lottery is not required—

do you hear that from him?

From where do you know that he holds that a lottery is not required?

Perhaps,

it is possible that according to Hanan the Egyptian

he brings,

he brings two goats,

and casts lots

over them?

And the difficulty returns: How could it enter your mind that it is forbidden to consecrate a blemished animal as the scapegoat? In every case it needs to be chosen by lot together with another goat that is for the Lord, and certainly that goat may not be blemished; so why is an exposition needed to include that it does not come as a blemished animal?

And we conclude:

Rather, Rav Yosef said: Whose opinion is this? It is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon;

the beraita was taught according to the words of Rabbi Shimon.

For it was taught: If one of them died,

after the lottery and before the slaughter of the goat made inside,

he brings its fellow without a lottery, the words of Rabbi Shimon,

because he holds that “the lottery does not prevent.”

And concerning that goat which he brings without a lottery, the beraita said that one might have thought that it is possible to consecrate it when it is blemished.

Rava said:

With regard to one who consecrates a blemished animal as the scapegoat, indeed

it was not needed,

the beraita did not need to teach us that he receives lashes, as the questioner asked. Rather, what did it need to teach us?

For example, when it became blemished,

a blemish developed in the scapegoat

on that very day,

on Yom Kippur itself, after the lottery,

and he transferred its sanctity onto its fellow,

onto another goat, which was also blemished. And since he transferred its sanctity onto another, it does not require a lottery, for the transfer itself is the consecration; and concerning this the beraita renewed that it is forbidden to consecrate it.