Temurah 6b (ו:) — the Talmud in English

However,

“the dust of interest,”

interest that is prohibited only by rabbinic decree

is not subject to collection through the courts.

The word “dust” means something that is not the principal form of the prohibition, but rather a lesser aspect of it, like dust from an object crushed in a mortar Rashi [Sukkah 40b]. For example, this is interest that results from a sale. That is, a person sells his field and says to the buyer: “If you pay me now, its price is one thousand dinars; but if you pay at harvest time, its price is one thousand two hundred dinars.” Since he takes two hundred dinars for waiting to receive the money, this is interest. However, since it was not structured as a loan but as a sale, it is not interest prohibited by Torah law.

And Rabbi Yohanan said: Even stipulated interest is not subject to collection through the courts.

Abaye follows the opinion of Rabbi Yohanan that the transaction is effective, and therefore the lender need not return the interest, even though he violated the statement of the Merciful One. Rava follows the opinion of Rabbi Elazar.

Rav Aḥa said

to Rav Ashi: Is it really the case that

there they disagree on the basis of reasoning!?

Did Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yohanan disagree about this reasoning—whether the transaction is effective or not effective?! Surely

there they disagree on the basis of verses,

as their dispute depends on their interpretations of the verses!

The Gemara now cites several interpretations from which Rabbi Yohanan derived that the interest is not subject to collection through the courts, as well as Rabbi Elazar’s interpretation that it is subject to collection through the courts:

As Rabbi Yitzḥak said: What is the reason of Rabbi Yohanan? The verse says

[Ezekiel 18]:

“He lent at interest and took increase,

he shall not live;

he has done all these abominations;

he shall surely die; his blood shall be upon him.”

And we interpret it as follows:

It was given for life,

meaning, his punishment is that he shall not live,

but not for repayment,

and his punishment was not given as an obligation to return the money.

Rav Aḥa bar Adda said: From here,

Rabbi Yohanan derived it, as it is stated [Leviticus 25]:

“Do not take from him interest and increase, and you shall fear your God.”

And we interpret it as referring

to fear of Him,

meaning: Fear God, who will exact payment from you!

But not for repayment.

This is the version in Bava Metzia [there].

Rava said: From here,

from this verse [Ezekiel, there]:

“He has done all these abominations; he shall surely die; his blood shall be upon him,” and adjacent to it

the verse immediately continues:

“And he fathers a violent son who sheds blood.”

And we interpret it as follows:

Those who lend at interest are juxtaposed with those who shed blood. Just as those who shed blood are not given over to repayment,

to restore them to life,

so too those who lend at interest,

who shed the blood of the poor man, causing him to die of hunger,

are not given over to repayment.

According to the version of the Tosafot in Sanhedrin [81a]; see there in the Book of Ezekiel and you will understand. Rashi Bava Metzia [there].

And Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: What is the reason of Rabbi Elazar,

who holds that the interest is subject to collection through the courts?

As the verse says

[Leviticus, there]: “Do not take from him interest and increase, and you shall fear your God,”

“and your brother shall live with you.”

And we interpret it: If you took from him,

return it to him;

return it to him,

so that he may live with you,

so that he may live with you and not die of hunger.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, therefore asks Rav Ashi: Rava could follow the opinion of Rabbi Yohanan on the basis of these interpretations, despite the fact that with regard to the other prohibitions of the Torah he holds that a prohibited act is ineffective. And Abaye could likewise follow the opinion of Rabbi Elazar on the basis of that interpretation. From where, then, do you know that Abaye and Rava disagree in the dispute between Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yohanan?

And we conclude: Indeed, they do not disagree with regard to stipulated interest.

Rather, with regard to what do Abaye and Rava disagree? With regard to whether a change effects acquisition.

That is, one who changes an object contrary to the owner’s intention, thereby violating the statement of the Merciful One. Abaye holds that he acquires it, meaning that his actions are effective, except in the case of those prohibitions concerning which the Torah reveals that the act is ineffective. Rava holds that he does not acquire it, meaning that his actions are ineffective, except in the case of those prohibitions concerning which the Torah reveals that the act is effective.

Another version: With regard to these changes that we explained,

in all the answers that we gave. That is, with regard to all the prohibitions mentioned above, some of which indicate that the act is effective, while Rava explained that this is a specific Torah decree; and some of which indicate that the act is ineffective, while Abaye explained that this is a specific Torah decree.

Another version:

The Gemara presents another formulation in the give-and-take discussion—what is the subject of the dispute between Abaye and Rava.

According to this version as well, Rav Ashi initially thought that they disagree with regard to stipulated interest. Rav Aḥa’s question, however, is that it is impossible to say that Abaye holds that stipulated interest is not subject to collection through the courts, since Abaye himself said in tractate Bava Metzia that stipulated interest is subject to collection through the courts.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: And now that we have answered all these answers—

with regard to what do Abaye and Rava disagree?

He said to him: With regard to stipulated interest. According to Abaye, he does not return the interest;

it is not subject to collection through the courts;

according to Rava, he returns the interest.

The Gemara raises an objection:

But Abaye too holds that we extract stipulated interest through the courts,

as Abaye also agrees with Rava that stipulated interest is collected through the courts—

As Abaye said

in tractate Bava Metzia [65a]:

One who is owed four zuz of interest by another,

if it happened that a person was owed four zuz of interest by another,

and the latter gave the lender in their place

the borrower gave the lender in exchange for the four zuz of interest

a cloak

a garment

worth five

worth

five

zuz, instead of four.

Thus, even though the borrower gave the lender more than the amount of interest he had stipulated,

when we extract it from him,

when the judges come to extract the interest from the lender, as is the law with regard to stipulated interest that is subject to collection through the courts, only

four do we extract from him;

they extract four zuz from him.

But this one zuz,

the fifth zuz, which he was not obligated to give him but nevertheless gave him, they do not extract, because

he gave it to him as a gift;

he gave it to him as an ordinary gift.

And Rava said: We extract five from him.

What is the reason?

Because he did not give him any gift at all! Rather,

the entire

cloak

came into his possession by virtue of interest,

it came into his possession as interest.

The dispute between them extends only to the fifth zuz.

Abaye therefore holds, like Rava, that stipulated interest “is subject to collection through the courts.” This is difficult for Rav Ashi, who says that according to Abaye stipulated interest is not subject to collection through the courts!?

Rather, when Abaye and Rava disagree, it is with regard to whether a change effects acquisition.

As explained above, there are two interpretations.

The sugya concerning one who consecrates blemished animals

We learned above that one who consecrates blemished animals for the altar violates a prohibition.

The Torah does not explicitly state a prohibition against consecrating them, and the Sages derived it from their interpretation of the verses. The following sugya cites a beraita that expounds the prohibition against consecrating blemished animals for the altar.

The Torah states [Leviticus, chapter 22], in the section concerning blemished animals: “

Anything that has a blemish,

you shall not offer.

For it shall not be acceptable for you.

Blind, or broken, or mutilated, or having a wart, or scurvy, or a rash,

you shall not offer

these to the Lord, and you shall not place any of them as a fire-offering upon the altar to the Lord.

And one that is bruised, or crushed, or torn, or cut,

you shall not offer

to the Lord.”

Three times the Torah says, “You shall not offer” blemished animals [with regard to an Israelite’s offering; later in the sugya the Gemara will explain an additional verse stated with regard to the offering of a gentile]. The beraita expounds all three occurrences.

The Sages taught: “Anything that has a blemish, you shall not offer”—what does this teach?

If

the intention of the verse is to prohibit

“You shall not slaughter,”

to prohibit slaughtering a blemished animal for the altar,

it is already stated

this

below,

in the following verses; and the prohibitions against burning and sprinkling its blood are also already stated.

If so,

what does “you shall not offer” teach?

“You shall not consecrate,”

for the verse prohibits even consecrating blemished animals for the altar.

From here they said

the Sages:

One who consecrates blemished animals for the altar

and slaughters them, sprinkles their blood, and burns them,

violates five prohibitions.

And these are they:

the prohibition “You shall not consecrate,”

the prohibition

“You shall not slaughter,” “you shall not sprinkle,” “you shall not burn it all,” and “you shall not burn”

even

part of it.

In the name of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, they said: Also

the prohibition of

receiving the blood.

The Gemara explains the beraita:

The Master said,

we learned in the beraita:

“If it is the prohibition ‘You shall not slaughter,’ it is already stated below.”

The Gemara asks:

Where is it stated?

As it was taught

in another beraita: Concerning that which the Torah says [verse 22],

“Blind, or broken, or mutilated, or having a wart, you shall not offer these to the Lord”—what does this teach?

If

the intention of the verse is to say,

“You shall not consecrate”

these as an offering,

this

matter

is already stated above

[in verse 20].

Rather, what does “you shall not

offer” teach?—

The prohibition “You shall not slaughter”!

The version of the Bach. The rabbi Me’ili explains in the Shita Mekubetzet: If Abaye holds that the transaction is effective, why did the Gemara need to cite an interpretation for Rabbi Yohanan that the interest is not subject to collection through the courts? And likewise, if Rava holds that the transaction is not effective, why did it need to cite interpretations for Rabbi Elazar that the interest is subject to collection through the courts? They answered: Abaye will explain that the interpretation comes to reject the interpretations of Rabbi Elazar, and Rava will explain similarly. that the first verse alludes to consecration [he does not explain his intention; perhaps it is because the first verse suggests the beginning of the prohibition, as explained by the explains concerning the Sifra], whereas the second verse says “to the Lord,” indicating that the only missing element is offering it to the Lord, since it has already been consecrated. on the Sifra], whereas the second verse says “to the Lord,” indicating that what is lacking is only offering it to the Lord, since it had already been consecrated.

It is further stated there:

“And you shall not place any of them as a fire-offering upon the altar to the Lord.”

And we interpret, “You shall not place a fire-offering,”

these are the fires,

to prohibit burning the sacrificial portions of these blemished animals on the fire of the altar.

And still,

I have only

that it is prohibited to burn

all of them.

From the plain meaning of the Gemara and from the discussion below [7b], it appears that “all of it” and “part of it” mean “all of it” when all the sacrificial portions are burned, and “part of it” when an olive-bulk of them is burned. This is also implied by Rashi in his commentary on “these are the portions burned on the altar.” It is likewise implied by the Ra’avad, cited in the Knesset HaRishonim. But here, in his commentary on “one who consecrates,” Rashi explained “all of it” with regard to a burnt-offering, which is entirely burned on the altar. Gaon Rabbi Moshe David Ha-Levi discusses this, noting that apparently the words of Rashi contradict one another. He seeks to explain that there is no contradiction in the words of Rashi Indeed, in the case of a burnt-offering, “all of it” means the entire offering, and the separate prohibition of “all of it” applies only when the entire animal is burned; when only the sacrificial portions are burned, one violates “part of it.” But with regard to other offerings, “all of it” means all the sacrificial portions that are fit to be offered on the altar, while “part of it” means an olive-bulk of them. He nevertheless raises the following difficulty: In the case before us, the animal had a defect from the beginning of its consecration, so no sanctity of the altar took effect on it at all. It remained completely unconsecrated property. If so, how can it be said that it is a burnt-offering, so that the prohibition of “all of it” applies specifically when the entire animal is burned, and not when all the sacrificial portions are burned? How could it have become consecrated as a burnt-offering when it remained completely unconsecrated property? What difference does it make that he intended to consecrate it as a burnt-offering? He has no power to consecrate it as a burnt-offering, and it remains entirely unconsecrated property.

From where is it derived that part of them

is also prohibited to burn, even an olive-bulk of them?

The verse states: “Of them,”

even a small part of them.

The sprinkling of the blood

of blemished animals—

from where

is it derived that it too is prohibited?

The verse states: “Upon the altar.”

It is further stated there:

“To the Lord,”

and the verse comes

to include the goat sent away

to Azazel, so that one who consecrates it while blemished receives lashes because of the prohibition against consecrating a blemished animal. It will be explained below. The Gemara now discusses what we learned in the second beraita: that “to the Lord” comes to “include” the goat sent away. Yet in another exposition, concerning the prohibition of “slaughtering outside” the Temple courtyard, where “to the Lord” is also stated, we interpret it as excluding the goat sent away.

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“Outside slaughter” is the prohibition against offering a sacrifice fit for the altar outside the Temple courtyard.

And we raise an objection:

“And is ‘for the Lord’ expounded to include”

what is required?!

And it was taught in a beraita:

But we learned in a beraita: It is stated in the Torah [Leviticus 17]: “Any man of the house of Israel who slaughters an ox, a sheep, or a goat [and the verse is speaking of consecrated animals. Rashi] in the camp [outside the courtyard], and does not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting to offer it as a sacrifice to the Lord. That man shall be cut off from among his people.”

And we expound,

“Had the verse stated only ‘sacrifice,’ I would understand that even consecrated property for Temple maintenance

may not be offered outside,”

as

they too

are called ‘sacrifice,’ as it is stated

concerning the spoils of the war against Midian [Numbers 31]:

“And we have brought the Lord’s offering, each man who found a gold vessel, a bracelet, a ring, an earring, or a kumaz,”

and they were certainly consecrated property for Temple maintenance, yet in the Torah they are called by the term “sacrifice.” And from where do we know that it is permitted to slaughter consecrated property for Temple maintenance outside?

The verse therefore states: “And does not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting.”

And we expound: “A sacrifice

that is fit for the entrance of the Tent of Meeting—one is liable for it

to karet

because of outside slaughter.”

But consecrated property for Temple maintenance,

which is not fit for the entrance of the Tent of Meeting,

since it consists of animals with physical defects, as we learned above that it is prohibited to consecrate unblemished animals for Temple maintenance, and one who consecrates them violates a negative commandment, therefore

one is not liable for it because of outside slaughter.

The beraita continues its discussion: From what we expounded—that for anything not fit for the entrance of the Tent of Meeting one is not liable for outside slaughter—

I would exclude these,

the consecrated property for Temple maintenance that consists of animals with physical defects,

but I would not exclude the red heifer

[the red heifer]

and the scapegoat,

which are fit for the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, since neither has a physical defect: Regarding the red heifer it is stated [Numbers 19], “which has no blemish,” and concerning the scapegoat we expounded in the preceding beraita from the phrase “for the Lord” that it may not have a physical defect. One must now reason as follows: Since they are unblemished, one who offers them outside should be liable. For example, if one slaughtered the red heifer outside contrary to its prescribed procedure—that is, not upon its pyre [the place designated for its slaughter]—or if one slaughtered the scapegoat anywhere outside [since everywhere is outside its designated place, as it is not slaughtered at all but rather pushed from the top of the cliff], he should be liable to karet for outside slaughter.

The verse therefore states: “For the Lord.”

And we expound:

Those designated “for the Lord,”

only for sacrifices offered inside is one liable to karet if one slaughters them outside;

these are excluded,

the red heifer and the scapegoat,

which are not designated “for the Lord.”

This is difficult: In this beraita we expound “for the Lord” as an exclusion, whereas concerning animals with physical defects we expound “for the Lord” as an inclusion?

And we answer:

Rava said:

The expositions do not contradict one another, because

here,

the verse is expounded

based on the subject matter of the verse

from the meaning of the verse,

whereas there, based on the subject matter of the verse—

There,

concerning outside slaughter, it is stated

“and does not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting,”

and this comes

to include

and make liable anyone fit for the Tent of Meeting—that is, all unblemished animals consecrated with the sanctity of the altar—if one slaughters them outside. Therefore, since the Torah repeated and wrote

“for the Lord,”

and all consecrated animals of the altar have already been included, the verse certainly comes

to exclude

the red heifer and the scapegoat.

But

here,

with regard to animals with physical defects, the fact that the Torah wrote

“You shall not offer any of them upon the altar,”

is

to exclude.

For this verse teaches that only something that goes up upon the altar fire renders one who consecrates it while it has a physical defect liable; but for something that does not go up upon the altar fire, he is not liable [and this exposition includes the exclusion of the scapegoat, for one who consecrates it with a physical defect is not liable]. Why, then, did the Torah repeat and write

“for the Lord”?

Therefore, it certainly comes to expound

to include

the scapegoat, prohibiting one from consecrating it when it has a physical defect.

The Gemara continues to explain the beraita.

We learned in the beraita: “For the Lord” comes to include the scapegoat, and it is prohibited to consecrate it with a physical defect.

And the Gemara infers:

The reason is that the verse wrote “for the Lord”; only for that reason does one not bring a scapegoat with a physical defect,

and it is prohibited to consecrate it. —

If the verse had not included it with “for the Lord,”

if the Torah had not included it,

I would have said that a scapegoat with a physical defect is entirely acceptable

and that it is permitted to consecrate it?!

But this cannot be said, since

“The lottery establishes only with regard to something fit for the Name!”

The lottery that is conducted concerning it establishes it as the scapegoat only when it is also fit for the Name. For when it is brought together with the other goat, it is not known upon which of them the lottery will fall: which will be “for the Lord” and which will be for Azazel. Therefore, both must be unblemished. Why, then, is a special scriptural decree needed to prohibit consecrating it?

And we answer,

Rav Yosef said: “Who is the author of this?”

It is the view of Hanan the Egyptian,

as this beraita was taught according to the view of Hanan the Egyptian.

As it was taught:

Hanan the Egyptian says: Even if the blood is already in the bowl—

he brings its counterpart and pairs it with it.

Even if the inner goat designated for the Lord has already been slaughtered, its blood received and found in the bowl, and the scapegoat has died, he brings another goat from the marketplace and pairs it with it—that is, he places it beside the blood in the bowl, to show that it is its counterpart—and sends it to Azazel.

Rav Yosef maintains that according to Hanan the Egyptian, it is necessary to bring only one goat, and it is sent to Azazel without any lottery at all.

Concerning such a goat, one might have thought that it is permitted to consecrate it when it has a physical defect, because it is not included in the lottery, and the lottery will certainly not designate it “for the Lord” [as the questioner asked]. Therefore, the beraita teaches us by including it within the prohibition against consecrating it.

The Gemara therefore asks: From where do we know that Hanan the Egyptian maintains that a lottery is not required? It is possible that he maintains that the blood is valid and need not be spilled, but nevertheless a lottery is required, in the following manner: He brings two goats and conducts a lottery between them as at first. The one upon which the lottery falls for Azazel stands beside the blood and is sent to Azazel, while the one upon which the lottery falls “for the Lord” grazes until it becomes unfit, and the blood of the first goat is not spilled; rather, atonement is achieved through it, because the lottery in the first drawing designated it “for the Lord.” And when he said “even,” he intended to exclude the view that one must bring two other goats, conduct a lottery, and even slaughter the second one as at first, with the blood of the second one being spilled.

And we raise an objection:

Granted

indeed,

you have heard Hanan the Egyptian

say that the blood should not be spilled, because he maintains

that it is not rejected,

but

that a lottery is not required—

have you heard him say that?

From where do you know that he maintains that a lottery is not required?

Perhaps

according to Hanan the Egyptian

he brings

two goats

and conducts a lottery

between them?

The question returns: How could it enter your mind that it is prohibited to consecrate a goat with a physical defect as the scapegoat? In every circumstance, it must undergo a lottery together with another goat designated for the Lord, and that other goat certainly may not have a physical defect. Why, then, is an exposition needed to include the scapegoat within the prohibition against bringing one with a physical defect?

And we conclude:

Rather, Rav Yosef said: “Who is the author of this? It is the view of Rabbi Shimon,”

as the beraita was taught in accordance with the words of Rabbi Shimon.

As it was taught: If one of them died

after the lottery and before the slaughter of the goat offered inside,

he brings its counterpart without a lottery; these are the words of Rabbi Shimon,

because he maintains that “the lottery is not indispensable.”

Concerning that goat, which he brings without a lottery, the beraita stated that one might have thought that it is permitted to consecrate it when it has a physical defect.

Rava said:

In the case of one who consecrates a goat with a physical defect as the scapegoat, indeed

it was not needed

for the beraita to teach us that he receives lashes, as the questioner asked. Rather, what was it needed to teach us?

For example, where it became blemished

and a physical defect developed in the scapegoat

on that very day,

on Yom Kippur itself, after the lottery,

and he transferred its sanctity to its counterpart,

to another goat, which also had a physical defect. Since he transferred its sanctity to another, no lottery is required, because the transfer of sanctity itself constitutes the consecration; and the beraita teaches us that it is prohibited to consecrate it.