Temurah 6a (ו.) — the Talmud in English

“You shall make it a voluntary offering; but for a vow it shall not be accepted.”

And it is obvious that it is forbidden to offer it as a sacrifice, neither as a vow nor as a voluntary offering! Rather, the Sages expounded [below, 7b]:

“You shall make it a voluntary offering”

refers to dedications for the repair of the Temple,

“but for a vow it shall not be accepted” refers to the altar.

They further expounded there from the fact that it says “it”: that one [with a blemish] you may dedicate for the repair of the Temple, but you may not dedicate unblemished animals for the repair of the Temple. And one who dedicates it for the repair of the Temple violates a prohibition, as explained there.

And we learned:

One who dedicates unblemished animals for the repair of the Temple, even though he

violates

a negative commandment,

what he has done is valid,

and the sanctity takes effect upon them. Thus, “it is effective.”

This is a refutation of Rava!

And we answer:

Rava could say to you:

There too, it was included by a scriptural derivation that if one did so, “it is effective.”

And

from the fact that animals with blemishes were included with regard to the altar,

from the same verse that we expounded above—that one who dedicates animals with blemishes for the altar, what he has done is valid and the sanctity takes effect—

unblemished animals were included with regard to the repair of the Temple.

For two laws are stated in this verse. The first is the prohibition against dedicating unblemished animals for the repair of the Temple, derived from the word “it”: we expound, “it” you may dedicate for the repair of the Temple, but you may not dedicate unblemished animals for the repair of the Temple. The second is the prohibition against dedicating animals with blemishes for the altar, derived from the words “but for a vow it shall not be accepted.” Since the Torah juxtaposed them, they are also juxtaposed with regard to the principle that “it is effective” for their dedication. And we likewise expound: In the case of animals with blemishes dedicated for the altar, “they are indeed consecrated,” as learned from the fact that the Torah said, “but for a vow it shall not be accepted”—this implies that it is not accepted, but the sanctity takes effect;

so too, in the case of unblemished animals with regard to the altar, the sanctity takes effect, and “it is effective,” even though he violated the word of the Merciful One.

The Gemara raises a difficulty against Rava from the case of “robbery.”

But what of robbery, regarding which the Merciful One said

“

You shall not rob”—

And we learned

in tractate Bava Kamma [93b]:

One who robs wood and makes it into vessels,

or

wool and makes it into garments—

pays according to the value at the time of the robbery,

and he does not return the vessel or garment, because through the change brought about by his action he has acquired the stolen object.

And since he acquired it, it is not returned intact to its owners; rather, he returns money equal to its value at the time of the robbery, and the robber retains the stolen object.

Apparently, “it is effective”;

this is a refutation of Rava.

And we answer:

Rava could say to you: The case there is different.

Robbery differs from the other prohibitions of the Torah, because

the verse says

in the passage concerning the guilt offering for robbery [Leviticus 5] [one who robs his fellow’s property, swears falsely concerning it, and then admits it must repay the stolen property, add a fifth, and bring a guilt offering]: “And he shall restore the stolen property that he stole.”

And the verse’s wording

“that he stole”

is superfluous, to teach us:

in accordance with

what he stole.

That is, when the stolen object has not changed, he returns the stolen object itself. But if it changed, he does not return it; rather, he pays the amount it was worth at the time of the robbery. From here Rava learned that in the case of robbery, “it is effective.”

Abaye has a difficulty: Why did the Torah need to teach us from “that he stole” that “it is effective,” when with regard to all the prohibitions of the Torah “it is effective”?

And we answer:

But according to Abaye, this “that he stole” is needed

for another derivation: “that he stole” teaches only that

for his own stolen property he adds a fifth,

but

for his father’s stolen property,

which he inherited from him, even if his father swore falsely, he pays only the stolen property, and

he does not add a fifth.

The Gemara raises a difficulty against Rava from the case of “collateral.”

The Torah said [Exodus 22]: “If you take your fellow’s garment as collateral, by sunset you shall return it to him.” That is, throughout the day you shall return it to him until sunset [when the sun sets], and when the sun sets you shall take it again, until the following morning.

The Torah further said [Deuteronomy 24]: “You shall surely return his pledge to him when the sun goes down, and he shall lie in his garment.” This means: If it is a nighttime garment, return it to him toward nightfall. The verse cited earlier refers either to a daytime garment or to a plow, which he needs for the work of the day and which he takes at night and returns during the day.

If he did not return a nighttime garment at night, or the plow during the day, he violated a positive commandment. He also violates a negative commandment, as it is stated [Deuteronomy, ibid.]: “And if he is a poor man, you shall not sleep with his pledge.” This means: You shall not go to sleep while his pledge is in your possession. This positive and negative commandment is called “the returning of the pledge.”

When does this apply? When he took the collateral not at the time of the loan—that is, the time for repayment arrived and he did not repay him, and then he took collateral from him. But if he took the collateral at the time of the loan, he is not obligated to return it at all.

The Torah further said [Deuteronomy, ibid.]: “You shall not take a widow’s garment as collateral.”

The Torah further said [there]: “When you lend your fellow any loan, you shall not enter his house to take his pledge. You shall stand outside, and the man to whom you lend shall bring the pledge outside to you.”

The Gemara here maintains that even if he transgressed and entered the borrower’s house and took collateral—that is, he took it against the borrower’s will and without the authorization of the court—the lender who took the collateral is likewise obligated in “the returning of the pledge,” as will be explained below.

But what of collateral,

which it is forbidden for a lender to enter the borrower’s house to take against his will, because

the Merciful One said

[Deuteronomy 24]

“You shall not enter his house to take his pledge”—

And we learned,

we learned in the Mishna [Bava Metzia 113a]:

He returns the cushion,

a nighttime garment,

every

night.

And the plow,

the implement he needs for the work of the day, he returns it

during the day.

This implies that the lender acquires the daytime implement as collateral at night, and acquires the nighttime implement during the day. It is proven that “it is effective,” even though he violated the word of the Merciful One;

this is a refutation of Rava!

For if “it is not effective,” he would not acquire them at all, and he should return them completely to the borrower.

And we answer:

Rava could say to you: The case there is different,

because

the verse says

[there]

“You shall surely return,”

and from the Torah’s repetition of the wording we expound that he returns it several times. That is, he returns the plow each day and the cushion each night. It is thus proven that his act was effective and he acquired the collateral, and he does not return it completely, even though he violated the word of the Merciful One.

The question returns against Abaye: Why did the Torah need to write a special derivation to teach us that he acquires the collateral, when with regard to all the other prohibitions of the Torah “it is effective”?

And we answer:

According to Abaye,

we shall explain that he does not understand this derivation as “including several returns.” Rather, since he maintains that a prohibited act is effective, it might have entered one’s mind to say that he is not obligated to return it at all—not even the plow during the day and the cushion at night. Therefore, the Torah commanded him to return it. For

if the Merciful One had not said, “You shall surely return,” we would have said

that if the lender entered the borrower’s house without permission,

he committed a prohibition;

the prohibition had already been committed, and now

if he wishes, he may return it,

if he wishes, he returns it,

but if he wishes, he need not return it,

and if he does not wish to, he need not return it. Therefore,

it teaches us

that the verse informs us that he is obligated to return the cushion at night and the plow during the day.

Alternatively:

But what of collateral, regarding which the Merciful One said, “You shall not enter his house to take his pledge”?

And we learned: He returns the cushion at night and the plow during the day. This is a refutation of Rava!

And we answer:

Rava could say to you: Collateral is different,

because

it is written concerning it

[Exodus 22]

“Until the sun sets you shall return it to him”; from this

that the Torah commanded him to return the daytime implement during the day, you infer

that he acquires daytime collateral—

at night. And another verse is written

[Deuteronomy, ibid.]

“You shall surely return his pledge to him when the sun goes down”; from this

that the Torah commanded him to return the nighttime implement at night, you infer

that he acquires nighttime collateral—

during the day.

Therefore, he acquires the collateral and “it is effective.”

And Abaye maintains:

These verses did not come to teach us that “it is effective”; rather,

these verses come only for this purpose:

they come to teach us the following exposition:

one

verse, “Until the sun sets you shall return it to him,” comes to teach us

about a daytime garment. And one

verse, “You shall surely return his pledge to him when the sun goes down,” comes to teach us

about a nighttime garment.

Both are necessary!

The Torah had to teach us both, because one cannot be learned from the other. If the Torah had stated only “plow,” we would have said that specifically the plow must be returned, because he earns his livelihood from it and it is his means of survival, but he is not obligated to return the cushion at night. Therefore, the Torah says that he must also return the cushion. And if the Torah had stated only “cushion,” we would have said that specifically the cushion must be returned, because he suffers without it, but he is not obligated to return the plow during the day. Therefore, the Torah wrote that he must also return the plow.

The Gemara raises a difficulty against Abaye from the case of pe’a.

But what of pe’a, regarding which the Merciful One said

[Leviticus 23]

“You shall not completely reap the corner of your field when you reap it”—

And it was taught in a beraita,

we learned in a beraita:

The mitzva of pe’a

is

to set it aside from standing grain,

when the grain is standing—that is, while it is still attached to the ground. This is also the meaning of the verse: “When you reap,” you shall not completely reap the pe’a.

If he did not set it aside from standing grain, he shall set it aside from the sheaves. If he did not set it aside from the sheaves, he shall set it aside from the heap, until he has leveled it.

That is, he smooths the surface of the heap with a rake [an implement designated for this purpose]. “Leveling” establishes the obligation for tithe and teruma, since it completes the processing of the grain, at which point it becomes obligated in terumot and tithes. But if he has already

leveled it, he first tithes,

the terumot and tithes,

and gives him

the pe’a for the poor. Even though a poor person who himself levels gifts for the poor is exempt from tithes, since gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and pe’a are ownerless and exempt from tithes, nevertheless, now that the owner has leveled the grain, it has become obligated in tithes.

In the name of Rabbi Yishmael they said:

If he did not separate it until he had made dough from it,

he may also separate

pe'a

from the dough.

And the first tanna maintains that once it has become dough, the owner has already acquired it through a change in its form, and he may no longer separate pe'a. But before it became dough, it had not undergone a change. And Rabbi Yishmael maintains: “A change retains its standing.”

In any event, according to the words of the first tanna, and all the more so according to Rabbi Yishmael, he separates even after he has finished harvesting the standing grain, despite the fact that he has transgressed the word of the Merciful One.

A refutation of Abaye !

Since if it is effective, he has already transgressed the prohibition when he took them for himself, and his action was effective. And from the fact that the beraita says that his action was not effective, and that he must still separate from the sheaves and so on, it is evident that his action was not effective and that he did not acquire it?

And we answer:

Abaye could say to you: There it is different, because the verse says an extra “you shall leave it,” “you shall leave it.”

That is, the Torah wrote two verses concerning pe'a. One is in the portion of Kedoshim [Leviticus 19]: “You shall not finish off the corner of your field when you harvest it; for the poor and the stranger you shall leave them.” The second is in the portion of Emor [Leviticus 23]: “You shall not finish off the corner of your field when you harvest; for the poor and the stranger you shall leave them.” The repetition teaches us that if he did not separate from the standing grain, he must separate from the sheaves and from the heap until it has undergone a change, according to the first tanna—and even from the dough, according to Rabbi Yishmael.

And the question returns to Rava: Why did the Torah write the extra “you shall leave it,” when in any event we know that “it is not effective”?

And we answer:

And Rava could say to you: “You shall leave it,” “you shall leave it,” is brought for this purpose,

the Torah wrote it for another exposition, to say:

There is another “leaving”

to leave for the poor

that is like this one

as will be explained below,

and which is it? It is one who declares his vineyard ownerless.

As it was taught in a beraita,

as we learned:

One who declares his vineyard ownerless,

while it is ownerless is exempt from tithing, and is likewise exempt from the gifts to the poor [peret, olelot, shikhḥa, and pe'a]. Similarly, one who acquires it from ownerlessness is exempt from all of these,

but if he rose early

the owner of the vineyard

to be early

in the morning, before someone else acquired it,

and harvested it,

thereby acquiring it himself from ownerlessness,

he is obligated in peret and olelot, in shikhḥa, and in pe'a.

For concerning all of these it says an extra “you shall leave it,” teaching us that ownerless produce acquired by the owner himself is subject to these obligations.

But he is exempt from tithing

[terumot and ma'asrot], because he acquired it from ownerlessness, and the Torah did not write an exposition obligating him.

And this is Rava’s answer: The extra “you shall leave it” does not come to teach us that “it is not effective”; rather, it comes to teach us the law of “you shall leave it” after he had been exempt on account of ownerlessness.

And this is “another leaving”—that is, an additional leaving for the poor—“that is like this one,” like the leaving of a field that was not declared ownerless.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to him [son of Rava]

Rava’s son]

to Rav Ashi: And now that we have answered all these objections,

now that we have given all these answers: For every question against Abaye, based on a Mishna or beraita and on the many prohibitions of the Torah, that “it is not effective,” we have answered that no proof can be brought from them because the Torah contains a particular indication concerning each of them; and the same applies to Rava. And Abaye and Rava do not disagree in any of these matters. If so,

Abaye and Rava —

what do they disagree about!?

What, in fact, is their disagreement? Regarding cases in which Rava says “it is not effective,” Abaye agrees with him; and regarding cases in which Abaye says “it is effective,” Rava agrees with him!?

He said to him

Rav Ashi to Rav Aḥa:

They disagree concerning fixed-interest loan,

they disagree.

“Fixed-interest loan” is interest that the lender stipulates with the borrower at the time of the loan. It is interest prohibited by Torah law, and the lender and borrower have transgressed the word of the Merciful One, violating several prohibitions stated in the Torah. Rav Ashi answers that Abaye and Rava disagree regarding a case in which the borrower paid the interest: According to Rava, “it is not effective,” and the borrower may “bring him before the judges,” demanding that the lender return the interest to him; whereas according to Abaye, “it is effective,” and what he did is done.

And it is in accordance with Rabbi Elazar,

as Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yoḥanan disagreed concerning this halakha:

For Rabbi Elazar said: Fixed interest is recoverable through the courts.