Temurah 6a — the Talmud in English

“You shall make it a freewill-offering. And for a vow it shall not be accepted.”

And it is obvious that it is forbidden to offer it as a sacrifice—not for a vow and not even for a freewill-offering! Rather, the Sages expounded [below, 7b]:

“You shall make it a freewill-offering”—

this refers to consecrated property for the maintenance of the Temple,

“and for a vow it shall not be accepted”—on the altar.

And they further expounded there from what is stated, “it”: that one you consecrate for the maintenance of the Temple, but you do not consecrate unblemished animals for the maintenance of the Temple. And one who consecrates it for the maintenance of the Temple transgresses a negative commandment, as explained there.

And we learned

One who consecrates unblemished animals for the maintenance of the Temple, even though he

transgresses

a negative commandment—

what he did is effective,

and the sanctity takes effect upon them. Thus, it is “effective.”

And this is a refutation of Rava!

And we answer:

Rava could say to you:

There too it was included by a scriptural decree that if he did so, “it is effective.”

And

from the place where blemished animals were included for the altar,

from that same verse that we expounded above—that one who consecrates blemished animals for the altar, what he did is effective and the sanctity takes effect—

unblemished animals were included for the maintenance of the Temple.

For in this verse two laws are stated. The first is the prohibition of consecrating unblemished animals for the maintenance of the Temple, derived from what is stated “it”; and we expound: that one you consecrate for the maintenance of the Temple, but you do not consecrate unblemished animals for the maintenance of the Temple. The second is the prohibition of consecrating blemished animals for the altar, derived from what is stated “and for a vow it shall not be accepted.” And since the Torah compared them, they were also compared with regard to the fact that their consecration is “effective.” And so we expound: Just as with blemished animals for the altar, “sanctity takes effect,” as is learned from the fact that the Torah said “and for a vow it shall not be accepted”—it implies that it does not effect acceptance, but the sanctity takes effect—

so, with unblemished animals concerning the altar, the sanctity takes effect and it is “effective,” even though he transgressed the statement of the Merciful One.

The Gemara raises a difficulty against Rava from “robbery.”

But what about robbery, for the Merciful One said [Leviticus 19]:

Leviticus 19]:

“You shall not rob”—

And we learned

in tractate Bava Kamma [93b]:

One who robs wood and makes vessels from it,

or

wool and makes garments from it—

pays as [the value at] the time of the robbery,

and he does not return the vessel or the garment, because through a change effected by an act he acquired the robbed item.

And since he acquired it, it does not return in its actual form to its owners; rather, he returns money equal to what it was worth at the time of the robbery, and the robber retains the robbed item with him.

Evidently, “it is effective,”

and a refutation of Rava.

And we answer:

Rava could say to you: the case there is different,

because robbery differs from the other prohibitions of the Torah, because

the verse says [Leviticus 5], in the passage concerning the guilt-offering for robberies [one who robs his fellow’s property, swears falsely concerning it, and confesses pays him the robbery, adds a fifth, and brings a guilt-offering]. And there the Torah wrote: “And he shall restore the robbery that he robbed.”

Leviticus 5], in the passage concerning a guilt-offering for theft [one who steals another’s property, swears falsely concerning it, and then confesses must pay the stolen property, add a fifth, and bring a guilt-offering]. There the Torah wrote: “He shall restore the theft that he stole.”

And what the verse said,

“that he robbed,”

is superfluous, to teach us

like

what he robbed.

That is, when the robbed item has not changed, he returns the robbed item itself. But if it changed, he does not return it; rather, he pays as much as it was worth at the time of the robbery. And from here Rava learned that with robbery “it is effective.”

And it is difficult for Abaye: Why did the Torah need to teach us from “that he robbed” that “it is effective”? Is it not the case that with all the prohibitions of the Torah “it is effective”?

And we answer:

But for Abaye, this “that he robbed” is needed for this:

it was needed for another exposition: “that he robbed”—only

for his own robbery he adds a fifth,

but

for his father’s robbery,

which he inherited from him, even if his father swore falsely, he pays only the robbery, and

does not add a fifth.

The Gemara raises a difficulty against Rava from “a collateral.”

The Torah said [Exodus 22]: “If you lend money to My people. If you take your fellow’s garment as collateral, until the sun comes, you shall return it to him.” That is, throughout the entire day you shall return it to him until the sun comes [sunset], and when the sun comes you shall return and take it, until the morning of the next day comes.

The Torah further said [Deuteronomy 24]: “You shall surely return to him the collateral when the sun comes, and he shall lie in his garment.” That is: If it is a night garment, return it to him toward nighttime. And what is stated in the preceding verse refers to a day garment, or to a plow which he needs for the work of the day, which he takes at night and returns during the day.

If he did not return the night garment at night, or the plow during the day, he transgressed a positive commandment. And he further transgresses a negative commandment, as it is stated [there, Deuteronomy]: “And if he is a poor man, you shall not lie down with his collateral.” That is: You shall not lie down while his collateral is with you. This positive commandment and negative commandment are called “the return of the collateral.”

In what circumstance are these words said? When he took collateral not at the time of the loan—that is, the time of repayment arrived and he did not repay him, and then he took collateral from him. But if he took collateral at the time of the loan, he is not obligated to return it at all.

The Torah further said [Deuteronomy, there]: “You shall not take a widow’s garment as collateral.”

The Torah further said [there]: “When you lend your fellow any loan, you shall not enter his house to take his collateral. Outside you shall stand, and the man to whom you lend [the borrower] shall bring the collateral out to you.”

The Gemara here holds that even if he transgressed and entered his house and took collateral from him—that is, he took collateral from him against his will and without the authorization of the court—the lending creditor who took the collateral is also obligated in “the return of the collateral,” as will be explained below.

But what about a collateral,

which it is forbidden for the lending creditor to enter the borrower’s house to take collateral from him against his will, because

the Merciful One said [Deuteronomy 24]:

Deuteronomy 24]:

“You shall not enter his house to take his collateral”—

And we learned,

we learned in the Mishna [Bava Metzia 113a]:

He returns the pillow,

a night garment,

on

every

night. And the plow,

an implement he needs for the work of the day, he returns to him

during the day.

And it implies that the lender acquires the collateral that is a day implement during the night, and acquires the night implement during the day. It is proven that “it is effective,” even though he transgressed the statement of the Merciful One,

and a refutation of Rava!

For since if “it is not effective,” he would not acquire it at all, and he would have to return them entirely to the borrower.

And we answer:

Rava could say to you: the case there is different,

because

the verse says [there]:

there]:

“You shall surely return,”

and from the Torah’s repetition of the expression we expound that he returns it several times. That is, he returns the plow each day, and the pillow each night. And it is proven that his actions were effective and he acquired the collateral, and he does not return it entirely, even though he transgressed the statement of the Merciful One.

And the question returns against Abaye: Why did the Torah need to write a special exposition to teach us that he acquires the collateral? Is it not the case that with all the other prohibitions of the Torah “it is effective”?

And we answer:

But for Abaye,

we shall explain that this exposition does not imply “to include several times.” Rather, because he holds “it is effective,” it might have occurred to us to say that he is not obligated to return it at all—not even the plow during the day and the pillow at night. Therefore the Torah commanded him to return it. For

if the Merciful One had not said “you shall surely return,” we would have said,

we would have said: If the lender entered the borrower’s house without authorization,

he committed the prohibition,

the prohibition has already been committed, and now

if he wishes, let him return it,

if he wishes, he returns it,

and if he wishes, let him not return it,

and if he does not wish, he does not return it. Therefore

it teaches us

that the verse informs us that he is obligated to return the pillow at night and the plow during the day .

Another formulation

But what about a collateral, for the Merciful One said, “You shall not enter his house to take his collateral.”

And we learned: He returns the pillow at night and the plow during the day. A refutation of Rava!

And we answer:

Rava could say to you: the collateral is different,

because

it is written concerning it [Exodus 22]:

Exodus 22]:

“Until the sun comes, you shall return it to him,” as a general implication

of the matter that the Torah commanded to return the day implement during the day—you understand

that he acquires the day collateral

at night. And another verse is written [there, Deuteronomy]:

Deuteronomy, there]:

“You shall surely return to him the collateral when the sun comes,” as a general implication

of the matter that the Torah commanded to return the night implement at night—you understand

that he acquires the night collateral

during the day.

Therefore he acquires the collateral, and “it is effective.”

And Abaye holds:

These verses did not come to teach us that “it is effective,” but rather,

these verses, for this are they coming,

they come to teach us this exposition:

one,

one verse, “until the sun comes, you shall return it to him,” comes to teach us

concerning a day garment. And one,

the verse “you shall surely return to him the collateral when the sun comes,” comes to teach us

concerning a night garment.

And they are necessary!

The Torah needed to teach us both, because one cannot be learned from the other. For if the Torah had stated only “plow,” we would have said that specifically the plow must be returned, because he earns his livelihood through it and it is his life-support, but he is not obligated to return the pillow at night. Therefore the Torah says that he must also return the pillow. And if the Torah had stated only “pillow,” we would have said that specifically the pillow must be returned, because he suffers without it, but he is not obligated to return the plow during the day. Therefore the Torah wrote that he must also return the plow.

The Gemara raises a difficulty against Abaye from “the corner of the field.”

But what about the corner of the field, for the Merciful One said [Leviticus 23]:

Leviticus 23]:

“You shall not finish the corner of your field when you reap”—

And it was taught,

we learned in a beraita:

The commandment of the corner of the field

is

to separate it from the standing crop,

when the grain is standing—that is, when it is still attached to the ground—and this is the meaning of the verse as well: at the time of your reaping, you shall not finish the corner.

If he did not separate it from the standing crop, he shall separate it from the sheaves. If he did not separate it from the sheaves, he shall separate it from the heap until he smooths it,

that is, he smooths the surface of the heap with a shovel [an implement designated for this], and “smoothing” establishes the obligation for tithe and teruma, for it is the completion of the grain’s labor, and then it becomes obligated in terumot and tithes. And if he already

smoothed it, he tithes

first the terumot and tithes,

and gives it

the corner of the field to the poor person. And even though the poor person himself who smooths the gifts of the poor is exempt from tithes—for gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and the corner of the field are ownerless property, exempt from tithes—nevertheless, now that the owner has already smoothed it, it has become obligated in tithes .

They said in the name of Rabbi Yishmael:

If he did not separate it until he made it into dough,

he also separates

pe’a

from the dough.

And the first tanna holds that if it became dough, the owner has already acquired it through a change, and he no longer separates pe’a. But before it became dough, it had not changed. And Rabbi Yishmael holds: “A change remains in its place.”

In any event, both according to the words of the first tanna, and all the more so according to Rabbi Yishmael, he separates even after he has finished harvesting the standing grain, although he transgressed the command of the Merciful One.

A refutation of Abaye !

Since, if “it is effective,” he already transgressed the prohibition when he took them for himself, and his actions were effective. And from the fact that the beraita said that his actions were not effective, and that he still has to separate from the sheaves and so forth, it is proven that his actions were not effective and that he did not acquire it?

And we answer:

Abaye could say to you: There it is different, for Scripture says an extra “you shall leave, you shall leave,”

that is, the Torah wrote two verses concerning pe’a. One is in the passage of Kedoshim [Leviticus 19]: “You shall not finish the corner of your field to reap; for the poor and the stranger you shall leave them.” And the second is in the passage of Emor [Leviticus 23]: “You shall not finish the corner of your field when you reap; for the poor and the stranger you shall leave them.” And the repetition teaches us that if he did not separate from the standing grain, he separates from the sheaves and from the heap [until it changed, according to the first tanna. And even from the dough, according to Rabbi Yishmael].

And we answer:

And Rava could say to you: “You shall leave, you shall leave” comes for this purpose,

the Torah wrote it for another exposition, to say:

You have another “leaving” [

to leave for the poor]

that is like this [

to be explained below],

and what is it? This is one who declares his vineyard ownerless.

As it was taught,

as we learned:

One who declares his vineyard ownerless,

while it is ownerless he is exempt from tithing, and likewise exempt from the gifts to the poor [peret, olelot, forgotten produce, and pe’a]. And likewise, one who takes possession of it from the ownerless property is exempt from all of these,

and he rose early

the owner of the vineyard

to seek it

in the morning, before someone else took possession of it,

and harvested it,

and he himself took possession of it from the ownerless property,

he is obligated in peret and olelot, in forgotten produce and in pe’a.

Since concerning all of these it is stated, “an extra ‘you shall leave’” ,

to teach us that ownerless property of which the owner himself took possession is subject to the obligation. But he is exempt from tithing [

tithes and terumot]

because he took possession of it from ownerless property, and the Torah did not write an exposition to obligate him.

And this is Rava’s answer: The “extra you shall leave” did not come to teach us that “it is not effective,” but to teach us the law of “you shall leave” after he had been exempt on account of ownerless property.

And it is “another leaving,” that is, an additional leaving for the poor, “that is like this,” like the leaving of a field that was not declared ownerless .

Rav Aha son of Rava said [

Rava’s son]

to Rav Ashi: And now, after we have resolved all these resolutions,

now that we have answered all these objections: concerning every objection against Abaye, in which proof is brought from a Mishna or beraita and from the many prohibitions of the Torah that “it is not effective,” he answered that there is no proof from them because they contain a special scriptural indication; and likewise concerning Rava. And in all these Abaye and Rava do not disagree. If so,

Abaye and Rava

in what do they disagree!?

In what did they in fact disagree? After all, regarding that which “is not effective” according to Rava, Abaye agrees with him, and regarding that which “is effective” according to Abaye, Rava agrees with him!?

He said to him

Rav Ashi to Rav Aha:

It is with regard to fixed interest—

that they disagree,

“Fixed interest” is interest that the lender stipulates with the borrower at the time of the loan, and it is interest prohibited by the Torah, and the lender and the borrower transgressed the command of the Merciful One, violating several prohibitions stated in the Torah. And Rav Ashi answers that Abaye and Rava disagree concerning a case in which the borrower repaid the interest: according to Rava, “it is not effective,” and the borrower can “bring it out through the judges,” demanding that the lender return the interest to him; but according to Abaye, “it is effective,” and what he did is done.

And in accordance with Rabbi Elazar,

as Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yohanan disagreed concerning this halakha:

For Rabbi Elazar said: Fixed interest is recoverable through the judges.