Temurah 24a (כד.) — the Talmud in English

But in two arrangements—

in two arrangements, for example, he set aside two groups of coins for purposes of assurance, and gained atonement with one of them, thereby rejecting the remaining coins—

no;

he does not hold that they go to voluntary offerings, but rather that they go to the Dead Sea, just as he holds with regard to one who sets aside two sin-offerings for purposes of assurance, as explained—

This teaches us:

Rabbi Ami teaches us that even with regard to two groups of coins, Rabbi Shimon holds that the surplus goes to voluntary offerings.

Rabbi Oshaya said: One who sets aside two sin-offerings for purposes of assurance—

so that if one of them is lost, he can achieve atonement through the other—

achieves atonement through one of them, and its fellow grazes,

and it does not die.

The Gemara clarifies:

According to whose opinion

did Rabbi Oshaya say this?

If you say—

if you say:

according to the Rabbis,

there is a difficulty:

Now,

if even

one who sets aside an offering for loss,

which is rejected once atonement is achieved through the lost offering,

the Rabbis say: It is not considered like a lost offering,

and it does not die, then with regard to one who sets aside an offering

for purposes of assurance,

which was never rejected—

is it necessary

to say that it does not die?!

Rather,

if you say that he said this

according to Rabbi Shimon,

and Rabbi Oshaya is teaching us anew that Rabbi Shimon concedes that it does not die—

how can this be said,

but

Rabbi Shimon said: Five sin-offerings die,

under all circumstances, and one of them is an offering whose owner achieved atonement, even if it was set aside for purposes of assurance [as explained above]—

The Gemara concludes:

Rather,

he said this

according to Rabbi,

and Rabbi Oshaya teaches us anew

that

[in what case]

Rabbi said that “one who sets aside an offering for loss is considered like one who set aside a lost offering” only

with regard to one who sets aside an offering for

a

purpose of

loss,

and it was set aside because his sin-offering had been lost.

But with regard to

one who first set aside an offering for

purposes of assurance, Rabbi did not

say that it dies, but rather that it grazes.

The Gemara brings our Mishna to challenge Rabbi Oshaya, who says according to Rabbi that an offering set aside for purposes of assurance does not die. We learned:

One who sets aside a sin-offering and it is found to have a blemish,

that is, a blemish occurred in it,

sells it and brings

another in its place,

and the first does not die, because it has already been sold and its sanctity has lapsed. These are the words of the first tanna.

Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: If the second was sacrificed before the first was slaughtered,

and the first is still in existence—

it must die,

because

its owners have already achieved atonement

through the other one. This is so even though the first is not in his possession and is ordinary property; nevertheless, the status of a sin-offering that must die applies to it.

It might have entered your mind,

the challenger thought that the reason of

Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon,

is because

he holds in accordance with Rabbi,

who is stringent and holds that “one who sets aside an offering for loss is considered like one who sets aside a lost offering,” even though the second one was never lost,

and

Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, holds that

even when

it was set aside for

purposes of assurance

for the first one, which developed a blemish,

also

it must die.

And Rabbi holds like him. Does this not demonstrate that Rabbi holds that an offering set aside for purposes of assurance dies, thus presenting a difficulty against Rabbi Oshaya’s statement?

The Gemara rejects this:

No!

One cannot compare Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon’s, statement to Rabbi’s statement. Rabbi concedes that an offering set aside for purposes of assurance does not die, because from the outset it was not set aside for loss.

Perhaps,

it is possible to say:

Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, holds like his father,

his father, Rabbi Shimon—

he holds, as he said: “

Five sin-offerings die

under all circumstances,” even when the other offering was not lost and was not set aside for loss, and even when it was set aside for purposes of assurance. His son, Rabbi Elazar, holds that the same law applies when it was set aside in place of an offering with a blemish, even if the latter had already been sold.

The Gemara challenges Rabbi Oshaya from the Mishna in tractate Yoma concerning the two goats [as explained above, on 22a–23a]:

We learned:

The second goat grazes until it develops a permanent blemish, and it is sold, and its proceeds go to voluntary offerings,

because a communal sin-offering does not die.

And one may infer:

That of an individual—

dies.

And

Rav said:

If he wishes, he may achieve atonement through the second goat of the first pair, and it was not rejected through the death of its partner, since

“living offerings are not rejected.”

And when he achieves atonement

through the second goat of the first pair, he achieves atonement, and the other one,

the second goat of the second pair,

is considered

to have been set aside for

purposes of assurance.

That is, it was not set aside in place of a “lost” offering, since it was not the goat for the Lord from the second pair that died, but rather the goat for Azazel, and not the goat for the Lord.

And it teaches,

and we learned: “because a communal sin-offering does not die”;

that of an individual dies,

which proves that an offering “set aside for purposes of assurance” dies, presenting a difficulty against Rabbi Oshaya’s statement?

The Gemara answers: The second goat is not like an offering “set aside for purposes of assurance,” but rather like one “set aside for loss,” because

Rav held

in accordance with Rabbi Yosei, who said [Yoma 84a] regarding one who set aside a Paschal offering, it was lost, he set aside another in its place, and then the first was found, with both of them before him: Which one should he offer? The Sages hold that he may offer whichever one he wishes, whereas Rabbi Yosei holds: “

The mitzva is with the first.”

Rav Shimi bar Ziri taught before Rav Pappa,

he recited a beraita before him in this wording: If it was lost at the time of designation—

Rav likewise holds with regard to this goat that “the mitzva is with the first.” Consequently, the setting aside of the second goat was initially not for the purpose of offering it, but for “loss”—so that it would go to its death [if it belonged to an individual] when he offered the first goat, the goat designated for the rite performed inside, and at the time he set it aside he knew this. Therefore, the Mishna says that the sole reason it does not die is that it belongs to the community; had it belonged to an individual, it would die—

This is unlike one who sets aside an offering for purposes of assurance. Since he may choose whichever one he wishes and offer it, and he could also achieve atonement through this second one, it cannot be said that it was initially set aside for loss. On the contrary, it was initially set aside in order to achieve atonement through it.

Rav Shimi bar Ziri taught before Rav Pappa, he recited a beraita before him in the following language:

An offering was lost at the time it was set aside—

according to Rabbi, it dies; according to the Rabbis, it grazes.

An offering was lost at the time of atonement—

according to the Rabbis, it dies; according to Rabbi, it grazes.

He said to him,

Rav Pappa said to him: How can it be possible to say that an offering lost at the time of atonement grazes? Is this not a

kal va-chomer?

If an offering lost at the time it was set aside, regarding which the Rabbis say that it grazes,

Rabbi says that it dies, then with regard to

an offering lost at the time of atonement,

which even according to the Rabbis dies,

and

according to Rabbi, is it not all the more so

that it dies?!

?!

Rather,

Rav Pappa concludes,

teach it like this!

This is how it should be taught:

An offering was lost at the time it was set aside—

according to Rabbi, it dies; according to the Rabbis, it grazes.

An offering lost

at the time of atonement—

all agree that it dies.

We learned in our Mishna:

Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: If the second was sacrificed before the first was slaughtered—

it must die, because the owners have already achieved atonement.

The Gemara discusses the law of “margilin,” and in the course of the discussion it will explain the relevance of this law to our Mishna.

“Margilin,” from the word “legs,” is a special method of flaying an animal’s hide: one flays it from the legs, leaving the hide whole, so that it can be made into a bellows for blacksmiths or used by sellers of honey and oil, who place honey and oil in whole, flayed sheep hides. This is unlike ordinary flaying, in which one cuts the hide with a knife along the animal’s belly, from its neck to its tail.

The Sages taught: One may not flay in this manner on a Festival,

even though the slaughter and flaying of the animal are permitted, nevertheless he should flay it in the ordinary manner and not use this method; the reason will be explained below.

Similarly—

one may not flay a firstborn in this manner,

even though it developed a blemish,

nor offerings disqualified after consecration,

which were redeemed and slaughtered.

The Gemara discusses this:

Granted, on a Festival,

one may not flay in this manner because

he is undertaking labor that is not fit for his needs,

as it is not needed for the Festival, and labor was permitted only for the needs of the Festival.

But with regard to a firstborn, which tanna—

that is, why is it prohibited? It has already been redeemed, and no sanctity remains upon it?

Rav Hisda said: It is the opinion of Beit Shammai,

who say

A firstborn remains in its sanctity,

even though it developed a blemish, it nevertheless remains in its sanctity. Therefore, one may not flay it in this manner, because this resembles work involving consecrated animals rather than ordinary animals.

As we learned,

as we learned in tractate Bekhorot [32b]:

Beit Shammai say: An Israelite may not count,

that is, join the meal,

, with the koen regarding the firstborn,

a blemished firstborn slaughtered by a koen, just as an Israelite may not eat an unblemished firstborn. This is because Beit Shammai hold that even a firstborn with a blemish still remains in its sanctity.

With regard to offerings disqualified after consecration—

which tanna

holds that even after they have been redeemed they remain in their sanctity?

Rav Hisda said: It is the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon,

who is stringent with regard to offerings disqualified after consecration and holds that even after they have been redeemed and slaughtered they remain in their sanctity—

The Gemara cites a beraita [and not our Mishna! In our Mishna, he holds that if it was slaughtered when he achieved atonement through another, it does not die], in which Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, holds that offerings disqualified after consecration remain in their sanctity even after they have been redeemed and slaughtered— As it was taught:

If two sin-offerings were before him, one unblemished and one blemished,

and he had set aside the unblemished one after the other had developed a blemish—

the unblemished one shall be offered, and the blemished one shall be redeemed,

before the unblemished one is offered.

If the blemished one was slaughtered,

ordinary slaughter after its redemption,

before the blood of the unblemished one was sprinkled—

it is permitted,

the blemished animal may be eaten. And although when the blood of the unblemished one is sprinkled its flesh still exists, it is not treated like a sin-offering whose owners achieved atonement through another, and it is permitted to be eaten, because it was slaughtered before the sprinkling of the second offering and had already reached the status in which slaughter is permitted; it no longer possesses sanctity. But if it was slaughtered

after

the blood of the unblemished one had been sprinkled—

its blood having been sprinkled—

it is prohibited,

to eat it and even to derive benefit from it, like a sin-offering whose owners achieved atonement through another.

Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: Even the flesh of the blemished animal,

if it is already

lying in a pot and the blood of the unblemished one is sprinkled—

he shall remove

the flesh

to the place of burning.

This is because he holds that even after its redemption and slaughter it remains in its sanctity, and the status of a sin-offering whose owners achieved atonement through another applies to it.

Therefore, says the tanna of the teaching about “flaying in this manner,” who holds like Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, one may not flay offerings disqualified after consecration in this manner, even after they have been redeemed and slaughtered.

The Gemara discusses why Rav Hisda had to establish the law of the firstborn according to Beit Shammai and the law of offerings disqualified after consecration according to Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon. Surely it is logical] that Beit Shammai are also stringent with regard to other offerings disqualified after consecration, and it is likewise logical that Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, is also stringent with regard to a firstborn. The Gemara discusses:

And Rav Hisda—

could he not establish it,

he could have established the beraita,

both this and that,

the firstborn and the other offerings disqualified after consecration,

according to Beit Shammai?

The Gemara answers: There is no necessity to say that Beit Shammai are also stringent with regard to the other offerings disqualified after consecration!

Perhaps,

and it is possible to say:

When Beit Shammai say

that it remains in its sanctity even after it developed a blemish and was slaughtered,

it is

with regard to a firstborn,

because

its sanctity is from the womb,

and its sanctity is more severe.

But

with regard to other

offerings disqualified after consecration—

no!

Beit Shammai concede that they are no longer sacred after their redemption. It is Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who holds this with regard to other offerings disqualified after consecration.

The Gemara further clarifies:

And could he not establish it,

Rav Hisda could have established the beraita,

both this and that,

the firstborn and the other offerings disqualified after consecration,

according to Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon?

The Gemara answers: There is no necessity to say that Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, also holds with regard to a firstborn that its sanctity remains after it develops a blemish and is slaughtered!

Perhaps,

it is possible to say:

When Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, said

that they remain in their sanctity even after redemption and slaughter, it was only

with regard to offerings disqualified after consecration,

because they are powerful in retaining the redemption payment,

as, since they require redemption, their sanctity is strong.

But with regard to a firstborn,

which has no redemption, as it is stated [Numbers 18]: “You shall not redeem it,” and if one redeems it, its redemption payment is not retained within its sanctity—

no!

Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, concedes that its sanctity does not remain after it develops a blemish,

and only Beit Shammai hold this.

Therefore, Rav Hisda established the beraita according to Beit Shammai with regard to the firstborn, and according to Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, with regard to the other offerings disqualified after consecration.

Regarding this conclusion—that the prohibition against flaying offerings disqualified after consecration in this manner follows the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who holds that their sanctity remains even after their redemption and slaughter—the Gemara raises a challenge:

And Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon—

does he not accept that which we learned [Bekhorot 31a]:

All offerings disqualified after consecration

that were redeemed—

are slaughtered in a butcher shop,

a place where ordinary meat is sold,

and are sold in a butcher shop, and are weighed by the litra,

like other ordinary meat, and do not remain in their sanctity.

Apparently,

it is proven that

once you permit it,

if, at the time of redemption, one knows that he will be able to sell it in the same manner as ordinary meat in the butchers’ market,

he pays more [the letter tet with a kamatz]

and redeems,

he pays more money for it, knowing that when it is flayed in this manner its hide will become more valuable, and consequently the Temple treasury profits from it. If so,

here

too,

with regard to flaying it through its legs,

if you permit him to flay it in this manner—

he pays more and redeems,

he will pay more money for it, knowing that when it is flayed in this manner its hide will become more valuable. Why, then, should we not permit him to do so in order to increase the benefit to the Temple treasury?

And we answer:

Rabbi Mari, son of Rav Kahana, said: What improves the hide damages the flesh.

This is because he takes care not to cut the hide and impair its wholeness, so that it will be fit for a bellows, while he damages and cuts the flesh; ultimately, therefore, consecrated property gains nothing from the matter. This is not so with selling it in a butcher shop, from which consecrated property can only gain, without suffering any loss.

The Gemara brings two further answers, according to which there is no need to interpret the baraita that says that one may not flay a firstborn animal or animals disqualified from consecrated offerings as following the view of Beit Shammai and that of Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon. In fact, according to everyone, flaying it in this manner is forbidden, even according to the one who holds that their sanctity no longer remains; and it is forbidden for other reasons.

They said in the West in the name of Rabbi Avin:

Therefore, flaying it in this manner is forbidden,

because

when he sells the hide for use as a bellows while it is still attached to the consecrated animal—

it appears as though he is performing sacrificial service with consecrated offerings.

This is a great act of disrespect, and therefore the Sages prohibited it. [It is not actual sacrificial service, since after its slaughter the concept of sacrificial service does not apply; rather, it merely “appears” as service].

Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Avin said:

Therefore, flaying it in this manner is forbidden, because if we permit him to do so, he will keep it and refrain from slaughtering it until he finds buyers who need it for a bellows; and they decreed

a decree lest he raise entire herds from them,

and thereby come to violate the prohibitions against shearing and working with animals disqualified from consecrated offerings while they are still alive. Shearing and working with them are forbidden even after their redemption [Bekhorot 14a].

We will return to you, chapter “These consecrated offerings”