Temurah 23b (כג:) — the Talmud in English

What, is it not

stated that this Mishna

is according to the Rabbis?

Nevertheless, they maintain that had it been an individual sin-offering, the second animal of the second pair would be left to die, despite the fact that it is merely “designated to be lost.”

This indicates that the Sages maintain that “an animal designated to be lost is considered like one that was lost,” and it is not left to graze, but dies according to the law governing a sin-offering that must die. And this is difficult for the statement of Rabbi Abba

?

No!

That Mishna is not in accordance with the Rabbis, but rather

it is Rabbi’s

view, as he maintains that “an animal designated to be lost is considered like one that was lost,” and therefore it would have died had it belonged to an individual.

The Gemara continues discussing the statements of Rav Huna and Rabbi Abba.

We learned

in our Mishna:

One who designates his sin-offering and it is lost, and he sacrifices another in its place,

and afterward the first one is found,

it must die.

And we infer:

The reason

that it must die is because

he sacrificed

and afterward the first one was found—

But had it been found initially,

before he achieved atonement through the other one,

it would graze,

and certainly this is the view of the Rabbis and not of Rabbi.

And the Mishna does not distinguish in what manner atonement was achieved or through which of the two atonement was achieved; in every case it would graze:

it makes no difference

whether he

achieved atonement

through the lost one or whether he achieved atonement through the one that was not lost; it makes no difference whether he pulled it, and it makes no difference whether he did not pull it;

in every case it would graze.

A refutation of both of them

And the Mishna’s unequivocal wording is difficult both for Rav Huna and for Rabbi Abba

?

It is a definitive matter

for him,

a clear matter without varying circumstances,

that he teaches,

namely, that if it was found after he achieved atonement through the second one, the first one must die; in this matter there are no differing circumstances or laws, and it is clear. But

a matter that is not definitive for him,

a matter involving varying circumstances, such as when it was found before he achieved atonement through the second one—for sometimes it dies and sometimes it grazes—Rav Huna according to his position and Rabbi Abba according to his position,

he does not teach;

the Mishna did not state it and did not wish to state it, since it involves differing laws and circumstances. Therefore, Rav Huna and Rabbi Abba each interpret the words of the Rabbis according to his own position.

Alternatively

We learned: One who designates a sin-offering and it is lost, and he sacrifices another in its place, and afterward the first one is found, it must die. And we infer:

But had it been found initially,

before he achieved atonement through the other one,

it would graze.

And we challenge this:

That works well if he sacrificed the lost one

[for Rav Huna, upon the advice of the court, and for Rabbi Abba, even if he did so on his own initiative],

so that the one that was not lost grazes. But if he sacrificed the one that was not lost

[according to Rabbi Abba, and according to Rav Huna even if he sacrificed the lost one but did so on his own initiative]

and the lost one remained, why should it graze?

And we answer:

He holds that when he teaches,

in what circumstance did the Mishna state that it

grazes

? For example,

where he sacrificed the lost one.

And we challenge this:

If so, why specifically does it teach: “He sacrificed, and afterward it was found; it dies”?

If the tanna wished to teach that the Rabbis agree in a particular circumstance that it dies,

let him teach

that it was

found initially,

before he achieved atonement through the other one [according to Rav Huna, when he pulled it on his own initiative, and according to Rabbi Abba, when he achieved atonement through the one that was not lost], and even then it dies

?

We answer:

That matter, which is not definitive for him, he does not teach;

but

“he sacrificed, and afterward it was found,” which is definitive for him, he teaches.

We learned: One who designates money for his sin-offering and it is lost, and designates other money in its place, and afterward the first money is found —

he shall bring a sin-offering from either this money or that money, and the remainder shall go to the communal gift.

And we infer:

The reason is that he achieves atonement from either this money or that money; but

if he

brought

from one of them, he shall take

the other money

to the Dead Sea.

The one raising the challenge assumes that this latter clause was taught even according to the Rabbis, and that they said that the other money goes to the Dead Sea in every case:

it makes no difference whether he achieves atonement with

the money of the

lost one or whether he achieves atonement with the money of the one that was not lost; and it makes no difference whether he pulled it

on his own initiative

or whether he did not pull it;

in every case the Sages maintain that the other money [or the other sin-offering] goes to the Dead Sea—

A refutation of both of them,

both Rav Huna and Rabbi Abba

? Rashi explains it this way. The Gaon of Vilna apparently found this interpretation difficult: surely this latter clause certainly is not according to the Rabbis, even without reference to the statements of Rav Huna and Rabbi Abba. It seems that Rashi’s intention [and perhaps this is what the Gaon of Vilna meant] is that the one raising the challenge proves only one point: that the Mishna’s precise wording is not in accordance with Rav Huna and Rabbi Abba. More fully: the one raising the challenge thought that the Rabbis maintain that the money goes to the Dead Sea for whatever reason, always to the Dead Sea. This is according to the wording of Rashi that we possess. But the Shitta Mekubbetzet cites a marginal note to Rashi’s commentary from a manuscript [and it is unclear whether these are Rashi’s words or those of one of his students discussing his method], which explains the Gemara’s challenge as follows: the one raising the challenge always knew that this latter clause was not according to the Rabbis, as the preceding sugya stated. Therefore he asks: why did the Gemara conclude above that it was not according to the Rabbis? Could it not be explained even according to the Rabbis—according to Rav Huna, when he pulled it on his own initiative, and according to Rabbi Abba, when he sacrificed the one that was not lost? From the fact that the Gemara simply concluded that this latter clause is not according to the Rabbis, it can be proved that the statements of Rav Huna and Rabbi Abba are not correct. We answer: We should not infer, “But if he sacrificed one of them, the others go to the Dead Sea.” In truth, sometimes they go to the Dead Sea and sometimes they do not, according to Rav Huna’s position and according to Rabbi Abba’s position. And as for the fact that the Mishna said, “He shall bring from either this money or that money,” and did not say—according to Rav Huna, “He should consult the court, and they will advise him to bring the lost one, while the one that was not lost should go to the communal gift,” or, according to Rabbi Abba, “He should bring the lost one, while the one that was not lost should go to the communal gift”—the reason the Mishna did not say this is that

here too, it is a definitive matter for him,

a certain and clear remedy, namely, to bring from either this money or that money,

it teaches, and

whereas

a matter that is not definitive for him,

and involves varying circumstances,

it does not teach.

Thus far the Gemara discussed a sin-offering that was lost, or money that was lost, when a sin-offering or money was designated in its place and the first was found. The Gemara now discusses one who initially designates two piles of money “for responsibility”—that is, if one is lost, he will achieve atonement through the other—and what is the status of the second pile of money. The Gemara will then discuss one who designates two sin-offerings for responsibility.

Rabbi Ami said: One who designates two piles of money for responsibility,

such that if one is lost he will achieve atonement through the other,

achieves atonement through one of them, and

the second

pile shall go to the communal gift,

to the communal gift, as is the law governing the surplus of a sin-offering that is brought as a voluntary offering.

It does not go to the Dead Sea, as does money designated for a sin-offering that was lost, because each of them is fit to provide atonement, neither is lost, and neither was designated to be lost. By sacrificing one of them, he did not actively reject the other, since they were initially designated on the condition that he would choose one of them. This is the halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai.

The Gemara discusses this:

According to whose view

did Rabbi Ami say this—according to which tanna?

If you say,

if you propose,

according to Rabbi,

and he is teaching that Rabbi concedes in this case, this is difficult:

It is obvious

that Rabbi concedes

that they go to the communal gift!

For

Rabbi said only with regard to one who designates an animal to be lost,

and maintains that it goes to the Dead Sea because it is considered lost,

but

when it was designated

for responsibility

and it was not lost—it is obvious that Rabbi

concedes

that it does not go to the Dead Sea.

Rather,

if you say that Rabbi Ami said this

according to the Rabbis,

this is difficult:

It is obvious that they go

to the communal gift!

And this is a

kal va-homer! Now,

if even when

one designates an animal to be lost, the Rabbis said

that

it

is not considered like one that was lost,

then when it was designated

for responsibility, is there a question

for Rabbi Ami to state that it is not considered lost and does not go to the Dead Sea

?! And we conclude:

Rather,

according to Rabbi Shimon,

who maintains [above, 15a] that the five sin-offerings that must die —die in every circumstance in which you find them, and a sin-offering whose owner achieved atonement dies in every situation, whether it was found before atonement or after atonement; and even when two were designated for responsibility, the second one dies. And according to Rabbi Shimon, it

was necessary

for Rabbi Ami to state that, with regard to money, Rabbi Shimon concedes that it goes to the communal gift. For

lest you say,

if he had not informed us of this, one might have said:

Rabbi Shimon does not hold that there is a communal gift

—Rabbi Shimon does not maintain that the money goes to the communal gift. Just as, when one designates two animals as sin-offerings for responsibility, Rabbi Shimon maintains that he achieves atonement through one of them and the second dies and does not graze, so too, with regard to money, he maintains that it goes to the Dead Sea—

Rabbi Ami teaches us

that

he does hold that there is a communal gift:

with regard to money, Rabbi Shimon maintains that if one designates money for responsibility, it does not die—that is, it does not go to the Dead Sea—but goes to the communal gift.

The next questioner understood the Gemara’s conclusion to mean that there had been a “presumption” that Rabbi Shimon does not hold at all of the law that the surplus of a sin-offering goes to the communal gift. Therefore he asks:

Can you really say that Rabbi Shimon does not hold of a communal gift?!

The Gemara cites a Mishna in Tractate Shekalim [chapter 6, Mishna 5] and a beraita to prove that Rabbi Shimon maintains that the surplus of a sin-offering is brought as a communal gift. The Mishna describes the collection boxes, which were shaped like inverted shofarot—wide at the bottom and narrow at the top—that stood in the Temple courtyard. Consecrated money was placed in them, each sum being placed in the box designated for the purpose for which that money had been consecrated. The designation of the money placed in each box was written on it.

And we learned: There were thirteen collection boxes in the Temple, and written

on them:

On one was written

“new shekels”—

new shekels. One who had not brought the half-shekel in the month of Adar, at the time when the half-shekel was collected, would bring it during the year and place it in that box. When the time came for the teruma of the chamber [there was a chamber in the Temple where all the half-shekel money of the entire Jewish people was placed, and since it exceeded what was needed for the daily and additional communal offerings, they would take a teruma from it—that is, they would set aside what was needed for the communal offerings; this was done three times a year], the money in this box was placed in the chamber together with the other money, and it was therefore included in the teruma taken from it.

And

on the second was written

“old shekels,”

old shekels. One who had not brought his shekels during the previous year, or during earlier years, would place them in that box. These shekels were not mixed with the money in the chamber; rather, they were used for the wall of Jerusalem, its towers, and all the city’s needs. For the surplus of the chamber’s money [which was not taken for the daily and additional offerings and remained in the chamber] was likewise used for the wall and the city’s needs. These old shekels had the status of the surplus of the chamber’s money, since even had he given them on time, they would also have remained in the chamber.

On the third was written

“bird-nests,”

for one who was a מחוסר כיפורים, such as a man or woman with a discharge, a woman who had given birth, or a metzora, who brought a bird-nest for purification and to become permitted to eat sacrificial food. He would place money there for his nest. In the evening, he was permitted to eat sacrificial food, on the assumption that his atonement-offering had been sacrificed, because the court of kohanim certainly sacrificed it that day; they knew that the מחוסר כיפורים relied on them and would eat sacrificial food that evening.

And

on the fourth was written

“young birds for a burnt-offering,”

and one who vowed turtledoves or young pigeons for a voluntary bird burnt-offering placed his money there.

On the fifth was written

“wood,”

and one who vowed wood for the arrangement of the altar placed the money of his donation there.

And

on the sixth was written

“frankincense,”

and one who vowed frankincense placed the money of his donation there.

And

on the seventh was written

“gold for the Ark cover,”

and there one who vowed gold for the Ark cover placed it; these were gold sprinkling basins, vessels from which blood was sprinkled or placed on the altar.

And

there were

six

additional collection boxes

for the communal gift,

into which the communal gift brought from surplus funds was placed. The first was for the surplus of a sin-offering: one who designated money for his sin-offering, purchased a sin-offering, and had money remaining placed that money in this collection box. The second was for the surplus of a guilt-offering; the third, for the surplus of the bird-nests of men and women with discharges and of women who had given birth; the fourth, for the surplus of the offerings of a nazirite; the fifth, for the surplus of the guilt-offering of a metzora; and the sixth, for anyone who made an unspecified voluntary donation, who placed it there. From all of them, the kohanim brought burnt-offerings for the “summer of the altar,” as will be explained below. The reason they divided them into six, although all served the same purpose, is explained in Tractate Menachot [107b]

.

And a beraita was taught concerning it:

Six for the communal gift.

What did they do with them?

For a burnt-offering brought from the surplus,

that is, the “summer of the altar” offering: they brought burnt-offerings from the surplus and sacrificed them when the altar was free of offerings,

whose hide does not belong to the kohanim,

as do the hides of all burnt-offerings; rather, they would sell them again, and the money would go to the communal gift. These are

the words of Rabbi Yehuda.

Rabbi Nehemya said to him—and some say

that this tradition was transmitted in the name of

Rabbi Shimon: “If so,

if, as you say, the burnt-offerings are not given to the kohanim,

the teaching of Yehoyada the kohen is nullified!”

As we learned there [Mishna 6]:

we learned there [Mishna 6]:

This is the exposition expounded by Jehoiada the priest:

the Torah says [Leviticus 5], “

It is a guilt offering; it is an offering of guilt to the Lord,”

and seemingly the verse is difficult from its beginning to its end, for from what is stated, “It is a guilt offering,” it implies that its nature and its halakhic status are those of a guilt offering, which is eaten by the priests, whereas from what is stated, “a guilt offering to the Lord,” it implies that it is entirely for the Lord. And Jehoiada the priest expounded it as follows: “I will offer a guilt offering to the Lord”:

to include,

it comes to include everything that comes on account of sin and guilt, namely,

anything derived from the surplus of sin offerings and guilt offerings is to be purchased with its value as burnt offerings; the flesh is for the Lord

, meaning burnt offerings that are offered entirely upon the altar,

and the hides are for the priests.

Thus the verse is resolved: what is stated, “a guilt offering to the Lord,” refers to the flesh being for the Lord, while what is stated, “It is a guilt offering,” refers to the hides being for the priests.

Apparently, Rabbi Shimon holds that it goes to voluntary offerings,

that the surplus of a sin offering goes to voluntary offerings, for he challenges Rabbi Yehuda: “If so, the exposition of Jehoiada the priest is nullified.” But this is difficult for Rabbi Ami: What does he teach us by stating that according to Rabbi Shimon the money goes to voluntary offerings?

And we answer:

It was necessary

to teach this to us, because

it might enter your mind

that we should say:

that

in what case

does Rabbi Shimon hold that it goes to voluntary offerings

only

in one sequence

, in a single sequence—for example, when one designates money for his sin offering, the animals become cheaper, and money remains over—-