Temurah 22b (כב:) — the Talmud in English

The essential text:

We learned:

Rava said: An animal lost at night is not considered lost.

The Gemara understood that this refers to a case where it was lost at night and found at daybreak. If so, it was lost only at the time when the second animal was consecrated, but not at the time of atonement, since the second animal certainly was not sacrificed at night. Therefore, we ask:

According to whose opinion

did Rava say this?

If you say—

if we say that he spoke

according to the Rabbis,

there is a difficulty:

Why specifically

did he speak of

an animal lost at night?

After all,

even an animal lost during the day,

and found before he achieved atonement through its fellow,

also—

does not die.

For

after all,

the Rabbis say: If it was lost at the time of consecration,

but was not lost at the time the second animal was sacrificed—for example, it was found after the second animal was consecrated but before the second animal was sacrificed—it

grazes.

If so, why did Rava say that, because it was lost at “night,” it does not die? According to the Rabbis, it does not die even without this, since it was found before atonement was achieved through the second animal, for the second animal certainly was not sacrificed at night?

And we conclude:

Rather,

Rava said this

according to Rabbi,

who holds that an animal lost at the time of consecration must die. Rava teaches us that Rabbi concedes regarding an animal lost at night that it does not die, even though it was lost at the time the second animal was consecrated. For

Rabbi said that it must die only

when it is

an animal lost during the day,

since it was lost at a time when it was fit for sacrifice, and it was rejected from sacrifice through the consecration of the second animal.

But an animal lost at night,

which could not have been sacrificed even if it had been before us—

even Rabbi concedes that it goes to grazing,

since it was not “rejected” from sacrifice. This is Rava’s novel teaching.

Alternatively,

if you wish, we can explain Rava’s statement as follows:

In fact,

he stated his ruling

according to the Rabbis.

And with what case are we dealing here?

Rava’s statement was made

with regard to an animal lost

at night and not found at daybreak, but rather

found

at the time of atonement,

even after day had dawned [or several days later], when atonement had already been achieved through another animal. Rava teaches that even according to the Rabbis it does not die, despite having been found after atonement was achieved through the other animal. For

the Rabbis said that “

an animal lost at the time of atonement

must die”

only where the beginning

—the initial stage—

of its being lost

was

during the day; but where the beginning of its being lost

was

at night—

they did not

say that it must die. The status of “lost” is established when it was lost, not when it remained lost.

The Gemara now cites statements of the amoraim defining the status of an animal “lost at the time of atonement,” regarding which the halakha was transmitted that it must die.

Abaye said: We have established,

as a principle known to us: “

Lost”

is the determining category,

and not stolen; and likewise, “

lost”

and not robbed.

If it was stolen or robbed and returned after atonement, it grazes until it develops a defect; it is then sold, and the proceeds are used for a free-will offering.

And if it was stolen or robbed and returned after atonement, it is left to graze until a blemish occurs in it, and it is sold, and the proceeds fall to voluntary offerings.

The Gemara clarifies:

What are the circumstances of an animal that is lost? Rabbi Oshaya said: Even when a sin-offering became mixed

with one animal in his flock,

it is also called “lost.” Although he sees the entire flock, since he does not recognize which animal is the one consecrated as a sin-offering through which he has already achieved atonement with another animal, it is called lost.

it is also called “lost.” Although he can see the entire flock, since he does not recognize which animal is the one consecrated as a sin-offering—and he achieved atonement through another offering—it is called lost.

And even

if a sin-offering became mixed

with one

animal

one

of non-sacred animals.

And Rabbi Yohanan said:

It was lost

behind the door!

The amoraim who transmitted Rabbi Yohanan’s statement abbreviated it and did not explain whether he intended to dispute Rabbi Oshaya or to add to his statement, as will be explained.

They raised a dilemma: What did he say

Rabbi Yohanan? Did he mean that specifically

behind the door

is

called “lost,” because

there is no one who sees it,

and it is hidden from the eyes of everyone who might see it;

but

if it became mixed with other animals

outside,

in an outdoor pasture, where it is not identifiable, nevertheless, since

there is someone who sees it,

and it is visible there, Rabbi Yohanan holds that it

is not considered lost,

even though it is not identifiable? It would follow that Rabbi Yohanan disputes Rabbi Oshaya, who holds that since it is not identifiable, it is called “lost.”

Or perhaps,

it is possible to say that Rabbi Yohanan means:

Behind the door, if he turns his face,

if the owner of the animal searches for it there,

he sees it

and can easily see it, and nevertheless Rabbi Yohanan teaches that it

is “

lost”;

and all the more so

if it went

outside,

to graze in a pasture,

where he does not see it, and does not see it at all, all the more so is it called lost. Regarding Rabbi Oshaya’s statement—that only when it became mixed among other animals and he does not recognize it is it considered lost, but if he recognizes it and it merely disappeared temporarily, so that he can find and see it, it is not called lost—Rabbi Yohanan adds that an animal lost behind the door is also called lost. What, then, did Rabbi Yohanan mean?

and he cannot see it at all, then certainly it is called lost. Regarding Rabbi Oshaya’s statement—that only when it became mixed among other animals and the owner cannot identify it is it considered lost, but if he recognizes it and it merely disappeared temporarily, so that he can find and see it, it is not considered lost—Rabbi Yoḥanan adds that an animal lost behind the door is also considered lost. What, then, does Rabbi Yoḥanan mean?

Teyku!

An alternative version

They raised a dilemma: What did he say

Rabbi Yohanan? Did he mean that specifically

behind the door

is “

lost”

because he does not see it,

and it is not visible to him;

but if it became mixed in the flock,

and became mixed among other animals,

so that he sees it,

as he sees the entire flock, it

is not considered lost,

even though he does not currently recognize it, because

we say that perhaps he will recall its identifying mark

and separate it from the flock.

And he disputes

Rabbi Oshaya, who holds that since he does not currently recognize it, it is called “lost.”

Or perhaps,

it is possible to say that

this is what

Rabbi Yohanan means: Even

an animal behind the door is considered lost.

Although, if he turns his face, he sees it,

nevertheless, it is considered lost.

And all the more so an animal lost in the flock, which he does not know,

which he does not recognize; all the more so

it is considered lost, and Rabbi Yohanan is adding to Rabbi Oshaya’s statement that an animal behind the door is also called lost.

And they do not dispute,

and he does not dispute Rabbi Oshaya’s statement that if it became mixed in the flock and he does not recognize it, it is called lost. What, then, did Rabbi Yohanan mean?

and he does not disagree with him concerning what he said: If it became mixed in the herd and he does not recognize it, it is called lost. And what is Rabbi Yohanan’s intention?

And we conclude:

Let it remain a dilemma!

The dilemma was not resolved.

Rav Pappa said: We have learned,

we received this from our teachers [another version:

it is obvious to me]:

If it was

lost from him but not lost from

the

shepherd, it is not considered lost,

since it was not lost from the shepherd.

And all the more so,

if it was

lost from the shepherd but not lost from him.

And I raise the following dilemma: If it was

lost from him and from the shepherd,

but

one

person

at the end of the world recognizes it, what is the halakha? Is it considered lost, since it was lost from him and from the shepherd, or is it not considered lost, since it is identifiable to one person?

And we conclude:

Teyku!

Rav Pappa raised a dilemma: An animal lost when the blood was in the cup

—if it was lost when the second animal was slaughtered and its blood was in the cup [the basin from which the blood is thrown on the altar]—

what is the halakha?

What is its status?

The Gemara explains: This dilemma

is according to whose opinion?

If you say:

According to Rabbi, who

who

said,

Rabbi holds that even an

animal lost at the time of consecration must die, and all the more so one lost while the second animal was being slaughtered. Moreover, one can say that this is equivalent to an animal lost at the time of atonement. Although he has not yet achieved atonement, since the principal act of atonement is the casting of the blood, one may say: “Anything destined to be cast is considered as though it had been cast.”

an animal lost when the offering was consecrated must die,” all the more so when it was lost while the second offering was being slaughtered. Indeed, one can say that this is like an animal lost at the time of atonement. Although atonement has not yet been achieved, since the essential act of atonement is the casting of the blood, one might say: “Anything destined to be cast is considered as though it has already been cast.”

And we conclude:

Rather, when he raised the dilemma,

Rav Pappa’s dilemma was

according to the Rabbis,

who hold that if it was not lost at the time of atonement, it does not die. According to their view, this is his dilemma:

Do we say: When the Rabbis say, “An animal lost

at the time of consecration

grazes,”

even if he subsequently achieved atonement through another animal, this applies specifically

before the blood

of the other animal

was received

in the cup; but here,

where it has already been received, it is possible to say that

the Rabbis hold

that “

anything destined to be cast is considered as though it had been cast,”

and the Rabbis concede that its status is that of an animal found after atonement and it must die—

or perhaps,

it is possible to say that

as long

as

—as long as—

the blood has not been cast,

and he has not yet actually achieved atonement through the other animal,

it is considered like an animal lost at the time of consecration, and it grazes. We do not say, “Anything destined to be cast is considered as though it had been cast.”

and we do not say, “Anything destined to be thrown is considered as though it had been thrown.”

The Gemara offers another explanation of Rav Pappa’s dilemma. According to it, the case does not involve an animal that was lost, after which another animal was consecrated and slaughtered in its place.

Some say: In fact,

the dilemma is

according to Rabbi, when he

raises the dilemma: The dilemma concerns the same sin-offering, and

for example, he received its blood in two cups, and one of them was lost,

and he cast the blood from the other cup.

and he cast the blood from the second cup.

The Sages disputed [Yoma 57b] the case of a sin-offering whose blood was received in four cups, and from one of them the blood was applied to the altar in the manner prescribed for a sin-offering: What is the status of the blood remaining in the other cups? One opinion holds: “One cup renders its fellow rejected,” and they became “rejected”; their status is not that of leftover blood poured onto the base of the altar, since they were “rejected,” and they are poured into the channel—the water channel that runs through the Temple courtyard, where all disqualified and rejected substances are poured—whereas the leftover blood in this cup is poured onto the base of the altar. Another opinion holds: “One cup renders its fellow leftovers,” and their blood is poured onto the base of the altar like the other leftover blood of a valid offering.

Now,

now,

according to the one who says, “

One cup renders its fellow rejected”—

you need not raise the dilemma,

and the sin-offering is certainly disqualified. For although, in the case of four cups, even though the blood of three of them was rejected and poured into the channel, nevertheless the blood of one of them was already properly applied to the four corners of the altar—

but in our case, where one cup was lost, and since even if it were to be brought before us again it would be “rejected” and poured into the channel, it follows that now that it is lost there are “two grounds for disqualification”: it is both lost and rejected. Therefore, the offering is disqualified.

The dilemma arises

in what matter for Rav Pappa?

According to the one who says, “

One cup renders its fellow leftovers,”

and the blood in the other cups is not disqualified, but has the status of valid leftover blood, which is poured onto the base of the altar—

his dilemma is:

Do we say that

this applies

only

where both of them are present,

so that the cups are before us and neither has been lost,

for wherever he wishes,

and whichever of them he chooses to cast,

he casts,

he casts it;

but here,

where one cup was lost,

that is not present

and is unavailable for casting, and the fact that it was lost gives it the status of “rejection.” Combined with the fact that it was lost, this constitutes “two grounds for disqualification,” and the offering is disqualified—

Or perhaps,

it is possible to say that

it makes no difference,

and the blood does not acquire the status of “rejection,” and the offering is not disqualified.

And we conclude:

Let it remain a dilemma.

Mishna:

Our Mishna discusses one who sets aside a sin-offering and it is lost, and one who sets aside money for a sin-offering and it is lost.

Wherever the sin-offering is to die, the same law applies to money set aside for a sin-offering: it is to “die,” meaning that it is cast into the Dead Sea and thereby lost.

a.

One who sets aside his sin-offering and it is lost, and he sacrifices

another in its place, and afterward the first is found, it shall die,

even if it is unblemished. The qualification stated [in the previous Mishna], that it dies only when it is found blemished, when it has two disadvantages, applies specifically when it is found before he sacrifices another in its place. However, if it is found after he has already sacrificed another in its place, the lost animal dies even if it is unblemished .

Likewise,

one who sets aside money to

purchase

a sin-offering with it, and it is lost, and he sacrifices a sin-offering in its place, and afterward the money is found, it is cast into the Dead Sea.

Thus far, the Mishna spoke of a case in which the sin-offering or the money was found after the second offering had been sacrificed. From this point onward, the Mishna speaks of a case in which it was found before the second offering was sacrificed.

b.

One who sets aside money for his sin-offering and it is lost, and he sets aside other money in its place, but he does not have time to purchase

[to purchase]

a sin-offering with it before the first money is found,

he shall combine the two amounts, and

he shall bring a sin-offering from both this money and that money,

since he has not yet brought a sin-offering from either of them, this money does not have the status of a sin-offering whose owner achieved atonement through another.

And the remainder,

the rest of the money,

shall go toward voluntary offerings, in accordance with the law governing the surplus of a sin-offering, which goes toward the communal voluntary offerings. However, if he did not combine the money and brought a sin-offering from one of the amounts, the other money is rejected and is cast into the Dead Sea, in accordance with the law governing sin-offering money whose owner achieved atonement through another.

Likewise,

one who

sets aside money for his sin-offering and it is lost, and he sets aside a sin-offering in its place,

and

does not have time to sacrifice it before the money is found, and the sin-offering is blemished, it shall be sold,

and he shall combine the money and

bring a sin-offering from both this money and that money,

as explained, since it does not yet have the status of a sin-offering whose owner achieved atonement through another, as he did not have time to sacrifice it,

and the remainder shall go toward voluntary offerings.

Likewise,

one who sets aside his sin-offering and it is lost, and he sets aside money in its place, but he does not have time to purchase a sin-offering with it before his sin-offering is found, and it is blemished, it shall be sold, and he shall bring a sin-offering from both this money and that money, and the remainder shall go toward voluntary offerings.

Likewise,

one who sets aside his sin-offering and it is lost, and he sets aside another in its place, but he does not have time to sacrifice it before the first is found, and both

are blemished, they shall be sold, and he shall bring a sin-offering from both this money and that money, and the remainder shall go toward voluntary offerings

.

Thus far, the Mishna spoke of money being found, or the sin-offering being found, before the second offering was sacrificed or before a sin-offering was purchased with the money. In all these cases, the Mishna speaks of the animal having been blemished, whether it is the lost animal or the animal that was not lost. From this point onward, the Mishna speaks of cases in which they were unblemished.

c.

One who sets aside his sin-offering and it is lost, and he sets aside another in its place, but he does not have time to sacrifice it before the first is found, and both are unblemished: one of them shall be sacrificed as a sin-offering and the other shall die; these are the words of Rabbi.

And the Sages say: A sin-offering dies only when it is found after

[after]

the owners achieved atonement,

and money is cast into the Dead Sea only when it is found after the owners achieved atonement.

The dispute between Rabbi and the Sages is explained in the Gemara in two ways:

Rav Huna said that Rav explains: The Sages agree that if he did not come to the court to consult regarding what should be done with the two animals, but instead took one of them—that is, he acted on his own initiative—and sacrificed it, the other shall go to die. This is because when he sacrificed one, he actively rejected the other, thereby demonstrating that he did not care about it. Moreover, even if he knowingly sacrificed the “lost” animal and achieved atonement through it, the second, “not-lost” animal dies. All the more so, if he knowingly sacrificed the second animal and the first remained, the first dies.

Rather, the dispute between Rabbi and the Sages concerns a case in which he did not sacrifice either one on his own initiative, but came to the court to consult what should be done with them. By doing so, he demonstrated that he was not actively rejecting them; on the contrary, he wanted their situation to be rectified—

In this case, the Sages hold: “They instituted a remedy with regard to consecrated animals,” and the court tells him: “Go and achieve atonement through the lost animal, and let the animal that was not lost graze.” The second animal will then go to graze, since he did not actively reject it.

Rabbi holds: They did not institute a remedy with regard to consecrated animals, and they tell him: “Go and achieve atonement through the animal that was not lost.” The first, “lost” animal then dies .

This is how the Mishna is interpreted according to Rav Huna: One who sets aside a sin-offering and it is lost, and sets aside another in its place, but does not have time to sacrifice it before the first is found, and both are unblemished—one of them shall be sacrificed “so that” the other will die. Which one is to be sacrificed? The animal that was not lost is sacrificed, and the lost animal dies. These are the words of Rabbi. And the Sages say: A sin-offering does not die absolutely , and if he comes and consults, they tell him: “Go and achieve atonement through the lost animal, and let the animal that was not lost graze.” However, when it is found after the owners have achieved atonement, then the lost animal certainly dies, since he has already sacrificed the animal that was not lost and actively rejected the lost animal. The same law applies if it was found beforehand, but he did not consult and took the lost animal on his own initiative: the animal that was not lost dies . Rabbi Abba said that Rav explains: Even if he took one of them on his own initiative and sacrificed it, Rabbi and the Sages dispute whether the second dies or grazes, and the Sages hold that the second grazes! However, the Sages agree that if he achieved atonement through the animal that was not lost, the “lost” animal dies, as explained, because it was the first one designated for sacrifice and he actively rejected it. With regard to this, the halakha was transmitted that the first, lost animal, dies . Their dispute concerns a case in which he took one on his own initiative, achieved atonement through the lost animal, and the animal that was not lost remained. The Sages hold that the animal that was not lost grazes, since it was not lost and its rejection is not considered rejection. Rabbi, however, holds: “One who sets aside [an animal] for loss is considered as though he set it aside as lost,” and the animal that was not lost likewise has the status of a lost animal. Whenever he sacrifices one of them, whether the lost one or the one that was not lost, he thereby rejects the other. Thus the Mishna is interpreted as follows: One of them shall be sacrificed—preferably, the lost one—and even then the animal that was not lost dies; all the more so if he sacrificed the animal that was not lost. These are the words of Rabbi. And the Sages say: A sin-offering dies only if he has already sacrificed one and afterward the first was found. But if he has not yet sacrificed it, he should sacrifice the lost animal, and the animal that was not lost should graze. d. One who sets aside his sin-offering and it is blemished, meaning that a blemish developed in it, shall sell it and bring another with the proceeds. It does not have the status of a sin-offering whose owner achieved atonement through another, even though it was extant when he achieved atonement through the other, because once he sells it, it is considered as though it no longer exists .

shall sell it and bring another with the proceeds.

It is not like a sin-offering whose owner achieved atonement through another offering, even though it was still present when he achieved atonement through the other offering, because once he sells it, it is regarded as though it no longer exists.

And their dispute is when he knowingly took one, obtained atonement through the lost one, and the one that was not lost remained. The Sages hold that the one that was not lost grazes, because it was not lost and its rejection is not a rejection. But Rabbi holds: “One who designates for being lost is considered as lost,” and the law of the one that was not lost is also like that of the lost one. And with the sacrifice of either one, whether lost or not lost, he rejects the other.

Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: If the second was sacrificed before the first was slaughtered, it shall die,

because

the owners have already achieved atonement,

even though it is not in the possession of its owner.

Gemara:

As explained, the Mishna is divided into a first clause and a latter clause. The first clause discusses a case in which the first animal was found after the second was sacrificed, and its law is that it dies. The latter clause discusses a case in which it was found after the second animal or the money was set aside, and before it was sacrificed [or before a sin-offering was purchased with the money]; in that case, he takes from both amounts. The latter part of the latter clause discusses a case in which the first animal was found after the second was set aside and before it was sacrificed, and it was found unblemished; Rabbi and the Sages dispute this case.

The Gemara infers a contradiction between the first clause and the latter clause. We learned in the first clause: One who sets aside a sin-offering and it is lost, sacrifices another in its place, and afterward the first is found—it dies. Let us infer: The reason that it dies is because he sacrificed another in its place; but if he

has not yet sacrificed another in its place,

and he set it aside when the first was lost, it

grazes.

Whose

Mishna is this—whose opinion does it reflect?

It is that of the Rabbis, who say

in the latter part of the latter clause: “

If it was lost at the time it was set aside, it grazes”—

Come and hear the latter clause: One who sets aside money for a sin-offering and it is lost, and sets aside money

in its place

but does not have time to purchase a sin-offering with it

before the first money is found,

he shall bring from both this money and that money, and the remainder shall go toward voluntary offerings.

Let us infer:

The reason is that he brings from both this money and that money,

because he has not yet achieved atonement;

but

if he has already

brought from one

[one of the groups of money],

the second shall be taken to the Dead Sea,

in accordance with the law governing money whose owner achieved atonement through another, despite the fact that it was lost only at the time it was set aside and was found before atonement. This latter clause

comes

according

to

the position of

Rabbi, who says: “

If it was lost at the time it was set aside, it dies.”

For according to the position of the Sages, the money would not be taken to the Dead Sea, and the sin-offering would not die, since it was not lost at the time of the sacrifice—

For according to the approach of the Sages, the money would not be taken to the Dead Sea and the sin-offering would not die, since it was not lost at the time of sacrifice—

[group of money]

from among them, the second shall be taken to the Dead Sea,

as is the law when their owners obtained atonement through another, despite the fact that it was lost only at the time of designation and was found before atonement. This end

But

is the first clause according to the Sages and the latter clause according to Rabbi?!

This works out according to Rav Huna,

for according to Rav Huna this contradiction does not necessarily reflect the opinion of everyone; it is possible to establish the latter clause even according to the Sages—

This contradiction does not apply according to everyone, and according to Rav Huna it is possible to establish the latter clause even according to the opinion of the Sages—

If it was lost at the time of designation, it dies.”

For according to the method of the Sages, the money would not go to the Dead Sea, and the sin-offering would not die, since it was not lost at the time of sacrifice—

But

is the beginning according to the Sages and the end according to Rabbi?!

This works according to Rav Huna,

this contradiction does not apply according to everyone, and according to Rav Huna it is properly possible to establish the end even according to the view of the Sages—