Temurah 22a (כב.) — the Talmud in English

Likewise,

one may not derive benefit from it, meaning that it is rabbinically prohibited to derive from it the types of benefit prohibited with regard to sacred offerings of the Lord,

and

one is not liable for misuse of consecrated property;

if one derived benefit from it, one is exempt from bringing a sacrifice for misuse of consecrated property. That is, by Torah law there is no misuse of consecrated property in its case, as explained, because its sanctity has departed from it. The Sages nevertheless initially prohibited deriving benefit from it, since it had once been sacred .

These two offerings—the one whose year elapsed and the one that was lost and found blemished—must die if their owners achieved atonement through another offering,

but if the owners have not yet achieved atonement,

and did not wish to achieve atonement through another offering, but instead wish to sell it and bring a sin-offering with the proceeds: the one that was lost and found blemished is sold immediately, since its blemish is already upon it; whereas the one whose year elapsed—

grazes until it develops a permanent blemish and is sold, and

after they have been sold,

with their proceeds he shall bring

an animal

other

for his sin-offering.

And since it grazes for the sake of its proceeds until it is sold, and its proceeds are destined to be offered, its sanctity remains upon it,

and

therefore

it effects temura and one is liable for misuse of consecrated property in its case.

Gemara:

The Gemara inquires:

What is the reason that he did not teach all of them

together,

why did he not teach all five together,

but divided them,

teaching three of them and saying “they must die,” and afterward teaching the other two?

And we answer: The

first clause,

the first three,

is definitive:

their law is unequivocal, and they always die, even if the owners did not achieve atonement,

whereas

the

latter clause is not definitive:

there is a distinction between a case in which the owners achieved atonement through another offering, in which case their law is that they must die, and one in which they did not achieve atonement, in which case their law is that they graze. Therefore, the Mishna taught them separately.

The Gemara further inquires: This Mishna was also taught verbatim in tractate Me’ila [the beginning of the third chapter].

Why must it be taught

[to teach it]

in the context of Me’ila; why must it be taught in the context of Temura?

And we answer:

The tanna taught temura here,

it was taught here because of the distinctions in the laws concerning whether it effects temura.

And since he taught temura,

and once he explained its laws with regard to temura—

he also taught,

incidentally, the distinctions in the laws concerning

misuse of consecrated property.

And when he stands

in the context of misuse of consecrated property, he teaches misuse of consecrated property; and since he taught misuse of consecrated property, he also teaches temura,

there it was taught with regard to misuse of consecrated property, and incidentally it was also taught with regard to temura.

We learned in our Mishna: “And one whose year elapsed.”

Reish Lakish said: A sin-offering whose year elapsed—

we view it as though it were standing in a cemetery

a place where a koen cannot enter after it and take it,

and it grazes

until it develops a blemish and is sold.

Explanation A sin-offering whose year elapsed does not die like a sin-offering that was lost and whose owners achieved atonement through another offering. There is a difference between a lost offering and this one. A lost sin-offering was “rejected,” with no possibility of being sacrificed, whereas this one was not rejected; rather, its owner waited to sacrifice it until its year elapsed. Even now, when he achieves atonement through another offering, he does not “reject” this one; rather, he has no possibility of sacrificing it, as though it were in a cemetery. Its law is like that of one who designates two sin-offerings for responsibility, draws one of them and achieves atonement through it: the second does not die [as explained below, 24a], because by drawing one of them he did not “reject” the other.

We challenge Reish Lakish’s novel assertion from our Mishna.

We learned: An offering whose year elapsed and which was lost and found blemished, if the owners achieved atonement

it dies.

This is a refutation of Reish Lakish,

who says that an offering whose year elapsed grazes even after its owners achieved atonement through another offering?

And we answer:

Reish Lakish could say to you: When it teaches

“

it dies”

[with regard to the lost offering]

that was found blemished,

it dies, as explained in the Mishna, since it has two defects ,

but a sin-offering whose year elapsed does not die; it grazes, in accordance with the statement of Reish Lakish. [And later the Gemara asks: If so, why did the Mishna teach “one whose year elapsed” among the sin-offerings that must die?]

And we challenge:

If

so,

if it is as Reish Lakish says, that the Mishna speaks only of an offering that was lost and found blemished—

say the latter clause: If the owners have not yet achieved atonement—

it grazes until it develops a permanent blemish.

And if,

the Mishna is speaking of an offering that was lost and found

blemished,

why should he wait before selling it until it develops a blemish?

It is already blemished and remains so,

as it already has a blemish.

Granted , if we explain that the Mishna also speaks of one whose year elapsed, it is possible to say that if he wishes to sell it and purchase another, he may not sell it without a blemish. But if the Mishna speaks only of an offering that was lost and found blemished, why did the Mishna say that he should wait until it develops a blemish?

And we answer:

Rabba said: This is what it means,

this is how the Mishna is to be understood in accordance with Reish Lakish:

An offering that was lost and found with a transient blemish, if the owners achieved atonement afterward—

it dies,

even if it was found before the owners achieved atonement and they achieved atonement afterward, since it has two defects, and a transient blemish is also a defect.

If before the owners achieved atonement—

it grazes until it develops a permanent blemish,

since as long as it does not have a permanent blemish, he cannot sell it and remove it to the non-sacred sphere; and when it develops a permanent blemish—

it is sold.

The Mishna did not say “it dies” with regard to one whose year elapsed at all, but only with regard to the lost offering.

Rava said: There are two answers to this! First, if so,

according to Rabba’s interpretation—“

he shall preserve it”

[he shall wait]

should have been taught:

the Mishna should have said this, since it already has a transient blemish, and in order to sell it [since he does not wish to achieve atonement through another offering], he “waits” for it to develop a permanent blemish. Why, then, did the Mishna not say so?

Furthermore,

what the Mishna taught,

“

one whose year elapsed”

for what halakhic purpose did it teach this,

among the sin-offerings that must die? It does not die, and it effects temura, and one is liable for misuse of consecrated property in its case. Why did the Mishna teach it when none of these laws applies to it?

Rava explains the Mishna in a manner that does not present a difficulty for Reish Lakish: The Mishna speaks of an offering whose year elapsed and which was lost, but was found unblemished before the owners achieved atonement through another offering. It therefore has two defects: first, it had been lost, and second, its year elapsed; consequently, if its owners achieved atonement through another offering, it dies. If they did not achieve atonement through another offering and wish to wait until it develops a blemish, it grazes until it develops a permanent blemish. Reish Lakish, by contrast, speaks of an offering that was not lost at all, but whose year elapsed; since it has only one defect, it does not die, but grazes even if its owners have already achieved atonement through another offering.

Rather, Rava said:

The Mishna’s statement “and that was lost,” appearing between “whose year elapsed” and “and found blemished,” applies to both, as though it had said: “whose year elapsed and was lost, and that was lost and found blemished” [the words “and was lost” being stated twice]—

And this is what it teaches,

and this is how the Mishna is understood: a.

An offering whose year elapsed and was lost,

and was found unblemished. b.

Or one that was lost and found blemished.

Both of these have two defects; therefore, if either one was found before the owners achieved atonement through another offering,

if the owners achieved atonement

through another offering after this one was found—

it dies; if before the owners achieved atonement—

it grazes,

the one whose year elapsed and that was found unblemished

until it develops a permanent blemish and is sold.

The one that was lost and found blemished is sold immediately.

And we explain:

It was necessary to teach “

was lost”

with regard to one whose year elapsed, and it was also

necessary

to teach “

was lost”

with regard to the blemished offering—that is, why must the tanna teach us both cases? After all, in both cases the offering was lost and found with another defect accompanying it, bringing it under the law of a sin-offering that must die?

inymi slovami, pochemu tannaiu nuzhno bylo soobshchit oba sluchaiа, ved v oboikh zhertva propala i byla naidena s eshche odnim nedostatkom, kotoryi v soedinenii s propazhei privodit ee k statusu umiraiushchei khatat?

For had he taught “

lost”

with regard to one whose year elapsed, I would have said: It is there that being lost is effective for it,

it benefits it,

the fact that it was lost,

to bring it to death—

because

even before it was lost,

it was not fit for its purpose,

it was not fit as a sin-offering for the matter for which it had been designated, since the verse states with regard to a sin-offering [Numbers 15], “of its first year,” and this one’s year elapsed, so it is disqualified—a bodily disqualification; therefore, with two defects it goes to its death [even though it was found while the owners had not yet achieved atonement through the second offering, for if they achieved atonement through the second and it was found afterward, it is obvious that the lost offering goes to its death]—

But in the case of a blemished offering, for if not for the blemish—

it would be fit,

it would be fit, and its disqualification is merely a deficiency; and since it was found before atonement through the second offering,

I would say

that

being lost would not be effective for it “

was lost,”

and merely because it had been lost it would not go to its death —

Therefore, the Mishna teaches us that nevertheless it dies, since it was lost and is also blemished.

And had he taught “

was lost”

with regard to the blemished offering,

I would have said:

It is there that being lost is effective for it

“was lost”

to bring it to death—

because it is not fit for sacrifice

for any offering; therefore, it dies—

But in the case of one whose year elapsed, which is fit for sacrifice,

for other offerings,

I would say:

since this defect alone is insufficient, and merely because it had been lost—

being lost would not be effective for it “

was lost,”

and it would not die [when it was found before the owners achieved atonement through another offering]—

The Mishna teaches us that it dies because of the two defects.

And we conclude:

It is necessary!

And we challenge:

Did Rava really say this,

that if an offering whose year elapsed was lost, it does not graze but dies—

but

he

said: An offering lost at night,

if a sin-offering was lost at night and another was designated in its place, and the first was found in the morning light ,

is not considered lost,

even according to Rabbi , who says that if the first offering was found after the second was designated, even before the owners achieved atonement through the second, the first dies. This statement applies when the first offering was “lost during the day,” at a time when it was fit for sacrifice. But an offering “lost at night,” when in any event it is not a time suitable for sacrifice, is not called “a sin-offering that was lost,” and it does not die if the owners achieved atonement through the second; rather, it grazes.

It follows that Rava holds that an offering “lost” at a time when it is not fit for sacrifice is not considered lost. If so, an offering whose year elapsed is likewise not fit for sacrifice, and when it was lost it was not fit for sacrifice. Why, then, does Rava hold that it dies because it has two defects? After all, it does not have the defect of being “lost”?

And we answer:

It is not comparable.

An offering whose year elapsed is not comparable to an offering lost at night. For an

offering lost

at night is not fit, neither in itself

for sacrifice

nor with regard to its value;

even if it were redeemed, it would be impossible to sacrifice at night an offering purchased with its proceeds. Therefore, it is not called “lost,” since even if it had not been lost, it would likewise not have been fit for sacrifice.

But this one,

an offering whose year elapsed:

although it is not fit in itself,

even though it is not fit to be sacrificed itself, nevertheless

it is fit with regard to its value;

if it had been sold before it was lost, its proceeds would have been fit for sacrifice. Now that it was lost, another defect has been added to it, and therefore it dies.

The Gemara brings a Mishna to challenge Rava, who says that when there is only one defect, such as that its year elapsed, the offering does not die. For

we learned in tractate Yoma [62a], with regard to the two goats of the Yom Kippur sin-offering [one for the Lord, the goat brought inside, and the other for Azazel], that if it happened that after the lots were drawn the goat designated for Azazel died, he brings two goats from the marketplace and conducts another lottery, and the goat upon which the lot for Azazel falls is sent to Azazel. Now there are before him two goats designated for the Lord, one from the first pair and one from the second pair; one of them is brought as the goat brought inside,

and

the other grazes until it develops a blemish, is sold, and its proceeds go to the free-will offerings,

and it does not have the status of a sin-offering that must die,

because a communal sin-offering does not die—

And the Gemara infers precisely: only because it is a communal sin-offering, therefore it shall graze.

That of an individual,

in such a case—

dies.

And the Gemara returns to what was stated in tractate Yoma:

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

He should offer the second goat of the second pair, because the second goat of the first pair was thereby “rejected,” when its counterpart died, and Rabbi Yoḥanan follows his own reasoning, for he holds:

living creatures can be rejected,

meaning, although it is alive, the status of “rejection” applies to it from the moment its counterpart—the goat sent to Azazel—died, and it does not return to its fitness. Therefore, he should offer the second goat of the second pair, which was not rejected.

And the Gemara explains Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement:

And when he achieves atonement—

he achieves atonement through the second goat of the second pair. And the other, the first one,

the second goat of the first pair,

would be like

as though

its year had passed.

That is, its disqualification is like the disqualification of an animal whose year had passed.

And

one should infer:

the reason

that it does not die is

that

it is

communal

in nature.

That of an individual—

dies,

even though it does not have two defects and was not lost. Thus, Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that when its year has passed alone, or when it has only one other defect, it dies.

But this is difficult for Rava, who said and explained our Mishna to mean that it dies only when it has two defects?

And we answer:

He can say to you,

Rava: Indeed! I myself hold that when there is one rejection and atonement was achieved through another animal, it dies without the defect of having been lost joining it. As for my explanation of the Mishna, which states, “and whose year has passed,” that it refers to a combination with having been lost—I explained it in accordance with the view of Reish Lakish, who says that an animal whose year has passed shall graze. And according to Reish Lakish, this Mishna from tractate Yoma is indeed difficult—

But it is still difficult, for our Mishna states, “and that was lost and found blemished.” This is difficult: Why must it also be blemished in order for it to die—that is, why are two defects required? After all, we proved from the Mishna in Yoma that an animal whose year has passed alone, or one with another single defect like it, dies. And why did our Mishna say that it does not die merely because it was lost?

We will answer this difficulty:

Rejected animals are one matter, and lost animals are another matter!

A sin-offering that was actually rejected and is no longer fit to be offered dies because of this rejection alone, without another defect joining it. Therefore, the Mishna states: “And whose year has passed…if the owners achieved atonement, it shall die.” This is not so with regard to “lost,” for that alone is insufficient to make it die.

What is the reason?

Lost animals—

one’s mind remains upon them;

he does not reject them, relying on the possibility

that perhaps they will be found,

as it is possible that they will be found. Therefore, without an additional defect joining it, it does not die, and hence the Mishna states: “And that was lost and found blemished—it dies.” Whereas

rejected animals—

do not again become fit,

for there is no possibility whatsoever that they will again become fit, such as the rejected goats of Yom Kippur and an animal whose year has passed; it dies without another defect.