Temurah 21a — the Talmud in English

An objection was raised against him:

Rabbi Avin bar Hiyya brings our Mishna to prove that Rabbi Elazar does not hold the reasoning of “fit for sacrifice.” We learned: The substitution of a guilt-offering, the offspring of a substitution,

and the offspring of its offspring, until the end of the world...

Rabbi Elazar says:

He shall bring burnt-offerings with their value.

And his wording is precise: “

with their value”—

not;

indeed, they bring their value, whereas

it

itself shall not

be sacrificed, even though the offspring of the substitution itself is “fit for sacrifice.” Is it therefore not evident that Rabbi Elazar does not hold the reasoning of “fit for sacrifice”?

Rabbi Avin bar Kahana rejects this:

What are we dealing with here?

The Mishna is speaking

of a case where it gave birth to a female

which is not fit for a guilt-offering; therefore, he shall bring a burnt-offering with its value. But, indeed, if it gives birth to a male, it itself shall be sacrificed, since it is “fit for sacrifice.”

Rabbi Avin bar Hiyya said to him: We learned in our Mishna: “the offspring of its offspring, until the end of the world,”

and

for

will it not give birth to one male until the end of the world?!

He said to him,

Rabbi Avin bar Kahana:

I will offer forced Babylonian explanations ,

I would give you a forced explanation, as is the practice of the Babylonians! Indeed! Our Mishna is speaking

of a case where it gave birth to females until the end of the world!

And the Gemara explains: From the fact that he himself said that it was a forced explanation, it follows that he knew how to offer another explanation,

and if

he had not offered him a forced Babylonian explanation—

what would he have offered him?

What is that explanation which is not forced?

The explanation is:

A male shall be sacrificed; with a female, its value shall fall to the communal freewill offerings.

Indeed! The substitution and its offspring give birth to males and females; rather, our Mishna refers only to females, while, indeed, males themselves shall be sacrificed, since they are “fit for sacrifice” .

Mishna:

Our Mishna discusses the substitution of the firstborn and the animal tithe, and their offspring.

The firstborn of a pure animal, from cattle or sheep, males only, is sacrificed through the placing of its blood and the burning of the sacrificial portions on the altar. The flesh is eaten by priests and is forbidden to non-priests.

The animal tithe, from cattle or sheep, males and females, is sacrificed through the placing of its blood and the sacrificial portions, and the flesh is eaten by the owners, and every ritually pure person is permitted to eat it. The priests have no share in it.

All sacrificial animals in which a blemish occurred are redeemed; that is, if the owner of the offering takes them for himself, he gives their value to the Temple treasury with the addition of a fifth, and with the money he brings another offering like it. But a firstborn and an animal tithe in which a blemish occurred have no redemption, and they are not permitted through shearing or work, and the money does not acquire sanctity; rather, they are eaten with their blemish by their owners—the firstborn by priests, and the tithe by everyone. For it is stated [Numbers 18]: “But the firstborn of an ox, or the firstborn of a sheep, or the firstborn of a goat, you shall not redeem.” And concerning the tithe it is stated [Leviticus 27]: “It shall not be redeemed.” Nevertheless, sanctity rests upon them even with their blemish: they are not sold in a butcher’s shop and are not weighed by the litra, as will be explained.

The substitution of the firstborn and the animal tithe, and their offspring, are not sacrificed, for it is stated concerning the firstborn [there, Numbers]: “They are holy; they shall not be redeemed,” and we expound: only they are sacrificed, but not their substitution and not their offspring. The same applies to the animal tithe

. Nevertheless, they possess the sanctity of a firstborn and an animal tithe, and it is forbidden to slaughter them outside [the Temple courtyard] without a blemish; they shall be eaten by their owners—the firstborn by a priest, and the tithe by everyone—and one may not sell them in a butcher’s shop or weigh them by the litra.

In this way, the firstborn and the animal tithe differ from all other sacrificial animals. Incidentally, the Mishna taught additional distinctions in the laws of the firstborn and the animal tithe from all other offerings.

The substitution of the firstborn and the animal tithe, and the offspring

of the substitution of the firstborn, of the animal tithe, and the substitution of the animal tithe,

and the offspring of their offspring until the end of the world—these are like a firstborn and an animal tithe

with regard to all their sanctity, but not that they are to be sacrificed, as explained; rather,

they shall be eaten with their blemish

by the owners,

and their sanctity consists in the fact that they may not be sold in a butcher’s shop or sold by the litra.

The Mishna explains:

What is the difference between a firstborn and an animal tithe and all other sacrificial animals?

1.

For all sacrificial animals,

in which a blemish occurred and which were redeemed—

may be sold

[it is permitted to sell them]

in a butcher’s shop,

a market in which meat is sold,

and slaughtered in a butcher’s shop and weighed by the litra,

a measure by which meat is weighed, even though this entails degradation, as with an ordinary transaction, and some sanctity still rests upon them, and they are forbidden through shearing and work .

Except for the firstborn and the animal tithe.

Because selling and weighing them as an ordinary transaction entails belittling sacrificial animals, it is forbidden to do so even though they would thereby be sold at a higher price, because since their value does not fall to the Temple treasury but to the owners, one may not belittle them for the sake of ordinary benefit. But other sacrificial animals in which a blemish occurred, whose redemption money falls to the Temple treasury, are sold in a butcher’s shop, because they are then sold at a higher price, and it follows that from the outset, when he redeems them, knowing that they will be sold at a higher price, he redeems them at a higher price; and the benefit of that higher price falls to the Temple treasury. Therefore, it was permitted to belittle them somewhat for the benefit of the Temple treasury.

2.

And

the rest of all sacrificial animals—

have redemption,

and when they are redeemed they become permitted for eating,

and their substitutions

have

redemption,

after a blemish has occurred in them.

Except for the firstborn and the animal tithe,

which, although a blemish occurred in them, one cannot redeem them and bring them out to ordinary status, as explained; and the same applies to their substitutions and their offspring.

3.

And

the rest of all sacrificial animals—

come from outside the Land of Israel

to be sacrificed in the Temple,

except for the firstborn and the animal tithe,

which are not brought initially from outside the Land of Israel.

And after the fact,

if they came

when they were

unblemished, they shall be sacrificed. And if

they are

blemished animals, they shall be eaten with their blemish by the owners.

Rabbi Shimon said: What is the reason

that the firstborn and the animal tithe are not brought from outside the Land of Israel like other sacrificial animals?

Because

the firstborn and the animal tithe have provision in their place,

they have a remedy outside the Land of Israel; and what is their remedy? They graze until a blemish occurs in them, and they are eaten with their blemish by their owners,

whereas

the

rest of all sacrificial animals—

they have no remedy in their place, since

even though a blemish was born in them—

they remain in their sanctity,

and they must be redeemed, and their value must be brought up, and offerings must be purchased with it and sacrificed. Since this is so, there is no benefit in waiting for them outside the Land of Israel until a blemish occurs in them, for in the end their value must be brought up. Therefore, they themselves should be brought up and sacrificed.

Gemara:

A person who inflicts a blemish on sacrificial animals is flogged, as it is stated [Leviticus 22]: “No blemish shall be in it,” and we expound [Beitza 27b] that this is a prohibition against inflicting a blemish on sacrificial animals. And the Gemara discusses one who inflicts a blemish on the substitution of a firstborn or an animal tithe—whether he is liable to lashes; the sides of the question will be explained in the Gemara.

Rava said [another version:

[an alternative version:

Rav Aha]

son of Rav Azza: They asked

in the West,

in the Land of Israel the members of the academy were uncertain:

What is the law concerning one who inflicts a blemish on the substitution of a firstborn or an animal tithe?

Do we say: Since they are not sacrificed,

as explained in the Mishna,

he is not liable,

and the prohibition against inflicting a blemish applies only where their blemish disqualifies them from sacrifice?

Or perhaps, since they became sanctified,

that they are sacred,

he is liable.

And the prohibition against inflicting a blemish applies to all sacrificial animals. What is the law?

Abaye said to him: Then let this question also be asked for you

concerning other sacrificial animals that are sacred but are not sacrificed, such as

one who inflicts a blemish on the ninth animal of the tithe,

for if he erred in counting his animals when he passed them beneath the staff in order to tithe them, and called the ninth “tenth,” its law is that it becomes sacred and is forbidden through shearing and work until a blemish occurs in it. Nevertheless, it is not sacrificed, as explained in the Mishna in Bekhorot [60a]. Why should you not ask your question concerning it?

Rather, what is different about the ninth, that you do not ask about it? Because the Merciful One excluded it

from sacrifice, as it is stated in the section of the animal tithe [Leviticus 27]: “

Tenth,”

and we expound

to exclude the ninth,

which shall not be sacrificed. Therefore, it is obvious to you that one who inflicts a blemish on it is not liable, since the prohibition against inflicting a blemish applies only to sacrificial animals that are sacrificed. If so,

here too,

with regard to the substitution of a firstborn and an animal tithe,

the Merciful One excluded them

from sacrifice, as it is stated, “

They are holy; they shall not be redeemed,”

and we expound: only

they,

the firstborn of an ox, sheep, and goat,

are sacrificed, but their substitution is not sacrificed.

And since it is not sanctified for sacrifice, the prohibition against inflicting a blemish does not apply to it.

Rav Nahman bar Yitzhak taught it

the give-and-take of Rava son of Rav Azza with Abaye

in this way,

in a different formulation. According to him, the question was concerning the ninth of the animal tithe, and Abaye resolved it for him from the substitution of a firstborn and an animal tithe:

Rava said [another version:

[an alternative version:

Rav Aha]

son of Rav Azza: They asked in the West: One who inflicts a blemish on the ninth of the animal tithe—

what

is the law concerning flogging him for it? Is he not flogged since it is not sacrificed, or perhaps he is flogged since it is sacred?

Abaye said to him,

Then let this question be asked for you concerning one who inflicts a blemish on the substitution of a firstborn and an animal tithe! Rather, what is different about the substitution of a firstborn and an animal tithe, that you do not ask about it? Because the Merciful One excluded them, as it is stated, “

Rather, why is it that you did not ask about the substitute of a firstborn animal or an animal tithe? Because the Merciful One excluded them, as it is stated:

They are holy,”

and we expound:

they are sacrificed, but their substitution is not sacrificed. The ninth of the animal tithe also—the Merciful One excluded it,

as it is stated, “

the tenth,”

and we expound:

to exclude the ninth.

Shita Mekubetzet.

We learned in our Mishna:

If they came unblemished, they shall be sacrificed.

And although initially one does not bring a firstborn or an animal tithe from outside the Land of Israel, after the fact they are accepted and sacrificed.

And he raises a contradiction,

an apparent contradiction from another Mishna. For we learned in Tractate Hallah [chapter 4, Mishna 11]: One man, whose name was

Ben Antigonus brought firstborn animals up from Babylonia, and

the priests

did not accept them from him.

It follows that they are not accepted even after the fact!

And we answer:

Rav Hisda said: It is not difficult! This

statement of the Mishna there, that they did not accept them from Ben Antigonus,

is Rabbi Ishmael.

[A0259]];

This,

what we learned in our Mishna, “and if they came unblemished, they shall be sacrificed,”

is Rabbi Akiva.

.

For it was taught,

and the Gemara brings a lengthy beraita, from which Rav Hisda inferred that Rabbi Ishmael and Rabbi Akiva disputed this law.

And so we learned:

Rabbi Yose says: Three matters in the name of three elders,

one matter from each elder.

This beraita contains four laws. Three of them are Rabbi Yose’s in the name of the elders, and they are:

A. Rabbi Ishmael discusses the matter of second tithe in the present time, after the destruction of the Temple, whether it is brought up to Jerusalem.

B. Rabbi Akiva discusses the matter of a firstborn from outside the Land of Israel while the Temple exists, whether it is brought up and sacrificed.

C. Ben Azzai discusses whether second tithe is eaten only within the walls of Jerusalem or in every place from which one standing in Jerusalem can see it.

D. “Others” [Rabbi Meir] discuss whether a firstborn becomes disqualified when its year has passed.

Second tithe, the firstborn of a pure animal, and first fruits require “bringing to the place,” that is, bringing them up to Jerusalem, to the place that the Lord will choose to cause His Name to dwell there, and it is forbidden to eat them outside Jerusalem.

As it is stated [Deuteronomy 12]: “You may not eat within your gates the tithe of your grain, your wine, and your oil, and the firstborn of your cattle and of your flocks, and all your vow-offerings that you vow, and your freewill offerings, and the offering of your hand,” and we expound: “the offering of your hand”—these are first fruits.

It is further stated [there, chapter 14], in the section of second tithe: “And you shall eat before the Lord your God in the place that He will choose to cause His Name to dwell there, the tithe of your grain, your wine, and your oil, and the firstborn of your cattle and of your flocks.”

And it is difficult, why did the Torah write the firstborn of an animal in the section of second tithe?

Moreover, the Torah had already stated that it requires bringing to the place.

Rather, the verse came to teach us an analogy between second tithe and this firstborn, to learn one from the other.

These four tannaim each expounded his exposition concerning the law for which the firstborn and second tithe were compared.

And so we learned:

Rabbi Ishmael says: I might have said

that I could say,

a person shall bring up second tithe and eat it in Jerusalem

That is, Rabbi Ishmael was not discussing the basic Torah obligation to separate terumot and tithes from produce, [A0296]]but it is clear to him that there is an obligation, because he holds that the sanctity of Eretz Yisrael was not nullified with the destruction of the Temple and the exile of Israel from its land. Rather, the entire discussion is whether it must be brought up and eaten in Jerusalem.[A0297] Shita Mekubetzet.[A0299] Ramban to Makkot there, who discusses the possibility that it is rabbinic.[A0302] the Tosafot in Zevaḥim there, which says that this matter depends on the versions of the Mishna there. According to one version, it may be eaten in all the cities of Israel; according to the second version, it has no remedy except through redemption.

in the present time?

That is, Rabbi Ishmael did not discuss the basic obligation of produce to have terumot and tithes separated by Torah law; he is certain that it is obligatory, because he holds that the sanctity of the Land of Israel was not annulled with the destruction of the Temple and the exile of Israel from their land. Rather, the entire discussion is whether it must be brought up and eaten in Jerusalem.

And ostensibly there is no need for a special derasha to say that it does not bring it up, since it can be learned by a binyan av from the firstborn:

And it is a rule

that the firstborn requires bringing to the place,

as explained,

and

also

the tithe requires bringing to the place,

and this may be learned from that:

Just as the firstborn may be eaten only in the presence of the Temple,

and this matter is clear to Rabbi Yishmael, as will be explained below,

so too the tithe may be eaten only in the presence of the Temple.

No!

The tithe cannot be learned from the firstborn by a binyan av!

For

if you said concerning the firstborn

that one cannot bring it in the present time,

since it requires the placing of the blood and the sacrificial portions upon the altar,

therefore, when there is no altar, one does not bring it.

Would you say

concerning

the tithe, for you did not say

this? And therefore one brings it up to Jerusalem, and it does not require an altar!

Rather, let the tithe be learned from the first fruits:

the first fruits require bringing to the place,

as explained,

and the tithe requires bringing to the place,

and this may be learned from that:

just as the first fruits may be eaten only in the presence of the Temple,

as it is said in the passage concerning the first fruits [Deuteronomy 26], “And you shall place it before the Lord your God,”

so too the tithe may be eaten only in the presence of the Temple.

This teaching too can be refuted:

What is distinctive about the first fruits,

the reason that they may be eaten only in the presence of the Temple,

is that they require placing

before the altar, as it is said, “And you shall place it before the Lord your God”; therefore, when there is no altar, one does not bring them.

Would you say concerning the tithe, for it does not

require placing before the altar, and if so, one must bring it up to Jerusalem?!

And since the tithe cannot be learned either from the firstborn or from the first fruits by a binyan av, let us learn it by a hekesh, and against a hekesh one cannot respond, since it is as though it were stated explicitly in the Torah,

the verse says, “

And you shall eat before the Lord your God the tithe of your grain, your wine, and your oil, and the firstborn of your cattle and your flocks.”

The verse juxtaposed

the

tithe to the firstborn,

to teach you:

just as the firstborn may be eaten only in the presence of the Temple, so too the tithe may be eaten only in the presence of the Temple,

and not in the present time.

This is Rabbi Yishmael’s derasha.

Before the Gemara brings the continuation of the beraita, it discusses: Why did Rabbi Yishmael conclude that it should be learned by a hekesh?

And let him return to the rule, and let there

be

in it a

“common aspect.”

After he refuted the possibility of learning from the first fruits because they require placing, one could say, “The firstborn proves it”: it does not require placing, and nevertheless one does not bring it up to Jerusalem, proving that it is not because of the absence of “placing” that one does not bring it up. And when one refutes: What is distinctive about the firstborn, since it requires the placing of the blood and the sacrificial portions upon the altar—one could say, “The first fruits prove it”: they do not require the placing of the blood and the sacrificial portions, proving that it is not because of the absence of the placing of the “blood and sacrificial portions” that one does not bring it up. And “the rule has returned: this one is not like that one, and that one is not like this one—the common aspect in them is that they require bringing to the place and may be eaten only in the presence of the Temple; so too I will bring the tithe, which requires bringing to the place and may be eaten only in the presence of the Temple.”

And why did the verse need to juxtapose them?

And we answer:

Rav Ashi said:

It is impossible to learn the tithe from the firstborn and the first fruits.

Because it can be refuted

What is distinctive about the common aspect in them—

the reason they may not be eaten

is that they have an aspect of the altar:

this one through the placing of the blood and the sacrificial portions, and that one through placing, and both involve the altar. Therefore, when there is no altar, it is impossible to bring them—would you say the same concerning the second tithe, which does not require an altar at all, but only “eating” in Jerusalem? And if you had not expounded the hekesh, we would not have learned that one does not bring it up to Jerusalem.

Introduction

The Sages disagreed in several places whether the sanctity of the Land of Israel was nullified when Israel was exiled from its land, or whether it continues and remains also during the exile.

Some maintain that “the first sanctity sanctified it for its time and sanctified it for the future,” meaning that the sanctity with which the land was sanctified when Israel was in the Land of Israel was sanctified forever, also during the exile. And some maintain that “it was not sanctified for the future,” and when they were exiled, the sanctity of the land was nullified.

According to the one who says, “It was sanctified for the future,” the mitzvot dependent upon the land, such as terumot, tithes, and the Sabbatical year, apply as they applied during the time of the Temple. And according to the one who says, “It was not sanctified for the future,” they are not an obligation as they were when the Temple was in existence.

The Sages also disagreed concerning the sanctity of the Temple and the Temple courts, whether it was nullified after the destruction of the Temple or not. And according to the one who says that it was not nullified, it is possible to offer certain sacrifices in the present time in the place that the Lord chose. And likewise the other laws dependent upon the sanctity of the Temple. And similarly with regard to the sanctity of the walls of Jerusalem. And even after the destruction of the Temple, the place of the city Jerusalem is called “before the Lord your God,” for example, with regard to eating second tithe.

And it is possible to say, that the two sanctities—the sanctity of the land and the sanctity of the place of the Temple and Jerusalem—are not dependent upon one another. Rather, it is possible that the sanctity of the land was nullified while the sanctity of the Temple remained; and likewise, conversely, it is possible that the sanctity of the land remained and the sanctity of the Temple was nullified.

Rabbi Yishmael, who discusses the second tithe, whether to bring it up to Jerusalem, certainly holds that the sanctity of the land was not nullified. For if it had been nullified, there would be no obligation at all from the Torah to separate terumot and tithes, and the produce would not be tevel at all. Rather, the Gemara discusses what his view is concerning the sanctity of the Temple:

And

Rabbi Yishmael, for whom it is obvious concerning the firstborn that it may not be eaten in the present time, but who discusses the second tithe, whether one must bring it up to Jerusalem,

what does he hold?

If he holds “

the first sanctity [

not specifically, but rather the sanctity with which Jerusalem was sanctified in the days of Ezra ]

sanctified it for its time and sanctified it for the future,”

then

it makes no difference whether the firstborn or the tithe: they are fit for bringing

to Jerusalem, since its sanctity remains. And it is difficult: what is his uncertainty at all? After all, the tithe too must be eaten in Jerusalem, and so must the firstborn, and why is it obvious to him that the firstborn may not be eaten, whereas he is uncertain concerning the tithe? And why does he require the derasha of the verse to exempt it, and how did he expound from the hekesh from the firstborn to exempt it? After all, the firstborn too is obligated to be eaten in Jerusalem?

And if he holds “

the first sanctity sanctified it for its time but did not sanctify it for the future,”

and nevertheless is uncertain concerning the tithe, it is difficult:

even concerning the firstborn too, should you be uncertain?

And how is it obvious to him regarding the firstborn, and from it does he learn the law of the tithe?

And if you say that this is why the firstborn is obvious to him: because its blood and sacrificial portions are placed upon the altar, and it is forbidden to eat it before the placing of the blood and sacrificial portions—if so, how did he learn the tithe from the firstborn? After all, the distinction is clear: the firstborn requires the placing of the blood and sacrificial portions with regard to the altar, whereas the tithe does not. Necessarily, even in a place where there is no impediment to eating the firstborn on account of the absence of the placing of the blood, such as where its blood was placed upon the altar while the Temple was in existence, and meanwhile the Temple was destroyed, and its meat still exists before the end of its eating time, even so it is obvious to Rabbi Yishmael that it is not “eaten” now in Jerusalem, because after the destruction one cannot fulfill with it “And you shall eat before the Lord your God.” And from it he learned concerning the tithe that it too is not “eaten” in Jerusalem, because it is not “before the Lord your God.”

And concerning this the Gemara raises a difficulty: Just as he is uncertain with regard to the tithe—perhaps nevertheless Jerusalem is still called “before the Lord your God” even now, since an altar is not needed for eating the tithe—if so, why is it clear to him with regard to “the eating of the firstborn’s meat” that it certainly is not eaten after the destruction, even if its blood was cast in accordance with the law before the destruction? After all, the eating of the firstborn can also be considered in such a case “before the Lord your God,” since an altar is not needed for eating it after the blood has been cast?

And we conclude:

Actually, he holds

that Rabbi Yishmael holds

the first sanctity sanctified it for its time, but did not sanctify it for the future.

And as for what they raised as a difficulty: if so, why is it obvious to him concerning the firstborn that it is not eaten in Jerusalem?

With what are we dealing here,

with a case in which the blood of the firstborn was cast in the presence of the Temple, and the Temple was destroyed, while its meat still exists.

And the reason that the firstborn is not eaten then is not because it is not “before the Lord your God,” but because he learns the eating of the meat from the placing of the blood, and

since, if the blood were present,

if it were necessary now, at the time of the destruction of the Temple, to place the blood upon the altar,

it would not be fit for casting [

placing]

it,

for the sanctity of the Temple had been nullified; therefore,

the meat comes and learns from the blood,

as it is said [Numbers 18], “And you shall cast their blood upon the altar, and their meat shall be yours.” And we expound: At a time when it is fit for the casting of the blood, you eat the meat, but not at a time when it is not fit for the casting of the blood.

Therefore, the meat is not eaten even though the blood had already been cast upon the altar before its destruction.

But concerning the tithe, indeed, one should be uncertain and say that it is eaten in Jerusalem; and therefore he said: It might be that a person may bring up second tithe and eat it in Jerusalem in the present time.