Temurah 21a (כא.) — the Talmud in English

He objected:

Rabbi Avin bar Ḥiyya cites our Mishna to prove that Rabbi Elazar does not accept the reasoning of “fit for sacrifice.” We learned: The substitute for a guilt-offering, its offspring, and the offspring of its offspring, forever...

and the offspring of its offspring, until the end of the world...

Rabbi Elazar says:

He shall bring burnt-offerings with their value.

And his wording is precise:

“with their value” —

yes,

indeed, one brings their value, whereas

it

itself is not

offered, even though the offspring of the substitute itself is “fit for sacrifice.” Is it therefore evident that Rabbi Elazar does not accept the reasoning of “fit for sacrifice”?

Rashi. Rabbi Avin bar Kahana rejects this:

With what are we dealing here?

The Mishna is speaking

of a case where it gave birth to a female

which is not fit to be a guilt-offering. Therefore, he shall bring a burnt-offering with its value. But, indeed, if it gives birth to a male, it itself is offered, since it is “fit for sacrifice.””

Rabbi Avin bar Ḥiyya said to him: But we learned in our Mishna: “the offspring of its offspring, until the end of the world,”

and

for

until the end of the world, will it not give birth to one male?!

Rabbi Avin bar Kahana said to him:

Rabbi Avin bar Kahana

I am offering you forced Babylonian explanations ,

I would give you a forced answer, in the manner of the Babylonians! Indeed, our Mishna is speaking

of a case where it gave birth to females until the end of the world!

Rabbeinu Gershom. And the Gemara explains: From the fact that he himself said that it was a forced answer, it follows that he knew how to offer another answer,

and if

he had not offered him a forced Babylonian explanation —

what would he have offered him?

What is the answer that is not forced?

Shita Mekubetzet according to Rashi. The answer is:

A male is offered; in the case of a female, its value falls to the fund for freewill offerings.

Indeed, the substitute, as well as its offspring, can give birth to males and females; rather, our Mishna is referring only to females. Indeed, males themselves are offered, since they are “fit for sacrifice”

Shita Mekubetzet: He would have answered him: If it was taught with regard to before atonement —[it should read] we learned— in the case of a male, its value falls to the fund for freewill offerings; in the case of a female he shall bring a burnt-offering with its value; if it was taught with regard to after atonement — a male is offered as a burnt-offering; in the case of a female, its value falls to the fund for freewill offerings. This version is very difficult, but it appears that the explanation is as follows: Since, in the case of a male, sometimes it itself is offered and sometimes its value falls to the fund for freewill offerings, whereas a female in every case grazes and its value is used for a burnt-offering, the tanna of the Mishna chose the female, since that is a “definitive matter.” In truth, in the case of a male after atonement, it itself is offered as a burnt-offering, since it is “fit for sacrifice.” Why, in truth, is it offered as a burnt-offering and not as a guilt-offering? For several reasons: a. Since atonement has already been achieved, and a person does not bring two guilt-offerings. b. Since a person does not achieve atonement through an object that comes through a transgression. c. Since it is the surplus of a guilt-offering. d. Since its mother has already been detached from the status of a guilt-offering and assigned to a burnt-offering through grazing, according to Rashi according to Torah law, whereas according to Rabbeinu Tam, according to Torah law this applies even without detachment, and rabbinically it applies through detachment [and perhaps the matter refers only if it was born after atonement was achieved?]. e. By a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai [apart from the view of the Tosafot that this halakha was not stated with regard to the offspring of a substitute]. But before atonement, it is not offered as a burnt-offering [and certainly not as a guilt-offering!] because we are concerned about interchange, meaning that he might offer the offspring as his guilt-offering, while his actual guilt-offering would not be offered, as Rashi explains in his interpretation of the necessity of the distinctions according to the alternative formulation. And although the necessity of the distinctions there was stated regarding whether it dies or not, nevertheless, it is possible to say that the reasoning of the decree against interchange applies also to the question of whether it is offered or not, as explained in the Shita Mekubetzet [in the previous page, letter 27, in the omissions]. Apparently, this is the reasoning of the Gaon of Vilna [letter 1]. And this is how my master, the Rema understood the Tosafot [on the previous page], s.v. “with their value.” In any event, it is still not explained why, before atonement, its value falls to the fund for freewill offerings, and why, in the case of a female before atonement, he brings a burnt-offering with its value, whereas after atonement its value falls to the fund for freewill offerings. Furthermore, Rabbi Elazar does not accept the view that “its value falls to the fund for freewill offerings.” The matter still requires explanation. Mishna:

Our Mishna discusses the substitute for the firstborn and the animal tithe, and their offspring.

A firstborn of a kosher animal, whether cattle or flock, only a male, is offered through the placement of its blood and the burning of its sacrificial portions on the altar. Its meat is eaten by priests and is forbidden to non-priests.

The animal tithe, whether cattle or flock, males and females, is offered through the placement of its blood and its sacrificial portions, and its meat is eaten by its owners; it is permitted for any ritually pure person to eat it. The priests have no share in it.

All consecrated animals that develop a blemish are redeemed. That is, if the owner of the offering takes the animal for himself, he gives its value to the consecrated fund, adding a fifth, and with that money he brings another offering of the same type. But a firstborn and an animal tithe that develop a blemish cannot be redeemed; nor are they permitted for shearing or labor; and their value does not acquire sanctity. Rather, they are eaten by their owners in their blemished state: the firstborn by priests, and the tithe by anyone. As it is stated with regard to the firstborn [Numbers 18]: “But the firstborn of an ox, or the firstborn of a sheep, or the firstborn of a goat, you shall not redeem.” And with regard to the tithe it is stated [Leviticus 27]: “It shall not be redeemed.” Nevertheless, sanctity takes effect upon them even in their blemished state: they may not be sold in a butcher’s shop or weighed by the pound, as will be explained.

The substitute for the firstborn and the animal tithe, and their offspring, are not offered, as it is stated with regard to the firstborn [Numbers, there]: “It shall not be redeemed; they are holy,” and we expound: only they are offered, but not their substitutes and not their offspring. The same law applies to the animal tithe .

Nevertheless, they possess the sanctity of a firstborn and an animal tithe. It is forbidden to slaughter them outside the Temple courtyard while they are unblemished; they are eaten by their owners—the firstborn by a priest, and the tithe by anyone—and they may not be sold in a butcher’s shop or weighed by the pound.

In this respect, the firstborn and the animal tithe differ from all other consecrated animals. Incidentally, the Mishna teaches additional distinctions between the firstborn and the animal tithe and all other sacrifices.

The substitute for the firstborn and the animal tithe, and the offspring

of the substitute for the firstborn, and of the animal tithe, and the substitute for the animal tithe,

and the offspring of their offspring, until the end of the world—these have the status of a firstborn and an animal tithe

with regard to all their sanctity, but they are not offered, as explained; rather,

they are eaten in their blemished state

by their owners,

and their sanctity means that they may not be sold in a butcher’s shop or weighed by the pound.

Rashi and the Bartenura wrote “and they are redeemed.” The Tosafot Yom Tov wrote that this is imprecise and that they do not require redemption. The Ḥok Natan wrote likewise. According to the emendation of the Gaon of Vilna [letter 2], Rashi’s words are understood according to their simple meaning. The Mishna explains:

What is the difference between a firstborn and an animal tithe and all other consecrated animals?

a.

All consecrated animals

that developed a blemish and were redeemed

may be sold

[it is permitted to sell them]

in a butcher’s shop,

a market where meat is sold,

and slaughtered in a butcher’s shop, and weighed by the pound,

a weight used for weighing meat, even though this entails treating them in a mundane manner, like ordinary animals, and they still retain some sanctity and are forbidden for shearing and labor .

Except for a firstborn and an animal tithe.

Because selling and weighing them as one does ordinary animals constitutes disrespect toward consecrated property, it is forbidden to do so, even though they would thereby be sold at a higher price. Since the proceeds do not go to the consecrated fund but to the owners, one may not treat them disrespectfully for the sake of ordinary benefit. But other consecrated animals that developed a blemish, whose redemption proceeds go to the consecrated fund, may be sold in a butcher’s shop, because they are then sold at a higher price. Thus, when one initially redeems them, knowing that they will be sold at a higher price, one redeems them at that higher price, and the benefit of that increased value goes to the consecrated fund. Therefore, it was permitted to treat them with a measure of disrespect for the benefit of the consecrated fund.

Rashi in Beitza [28b]. b.

And

the rest of all consecrated animals

can be redeemed,

and once redeemed they are permitted to be eaten,

and their substitutes

also have

redemption,

after they develop a blemish.

Except for a firstborn and an animal tithe,

which, even after they develop a blemish, cannot be redeemed and rendered non-sacred, as explained; the same applies to their substitutes and their offspring.

c.

And

the rest of all consecrated animals

come from outside Eretz Yisrael

to be offered in the Temple,

except for a firstborn and an animal tithe,

which should not initially be brought from outside Eretz Yisrael.

After the fact,

if they came while

while they were

unblemished, they are offered. And if

they are

blemished, they are eaten in their blemished state by their owners.

Rabbi Shimon said: What is the reason

that a firstborn and an animal tithe are not brought from outside Eretz Yisrael like other consecrated animals?

Rashi explains it. It is likewise explicit in the Sifrei, cited above in the Rashash wrote that apparently one must say that Rabbi Shimon follows his own view, “for he expounds the reason of the verse,” since below [on the second side] we derive this from a verse, through an analogy with the tithe of grain. Nevertheless, the Rashash concludes that it is unnecessary to say that this is an exposition based on “the reason of the verse,” because there, in the Sifrei, it is stated that the Torah contains an amplification and a limitation concerning this matter. Because of this “reasoning” of Rabbi Shimon, the Sages assigned the amplification to include other consecrated animals in the law requiring bringing them to Eretz Yisrael, and the limitation to exclude a firstborn and an animal tithe. That is, this is not reasoning that provides the rationale for a Torah law, but rather reasoning that explains the exposition of the verses. But Maimonides, in his commentary on the Mishna, explains Rabbi Shimon’s words as referring to the distinction concerning redemption: a firstborn and an animal tithe are not redeemed, whereas all other consecrated animals are redeemed. And this is his language: Rabbi Shimon came to explain why, when a blemish develops in a firstborn or an animal tithe, they have no redemption, whereas all other consecrated animals are redeemed. He said that the reason is that a firstborn and an animal tithe that become unfit can still be enjoyed as they are, since they are eaten by their owners in their blemished state—that is, the firstborn by a priest and the tithe by an Israelite—and therefore they do not require redemption. Other consecrated animals, if they were not redeemed, would be rendered useless, since they would not be fit for sacrifice and it would not be permitted to eat them, as consecrated property leaves its status only through redemption. Rabbi Shimon’s reason here is sound. According to him, it is clear that Rabbi Shimon follows his view that he expounds the reason of the verse. Because

the firstborn and the animal tithe have provision in their place,

they have a remedy outside Eretz Yisrael. What is their remedy? They graze until a blemish develops in them, and they are eaten by their owners in their blemished state.

And

whereas

all other consecrated animals

have no remedy in their place, since

even though a blemish develops in them, they

still retain their sanctity.

They must be redeemed, their proceeds must be brought up, and other sacrifices must be purchased with them and offered. Since this is so, there is no benefit in waiting for them outside Eretz Yisrael until a blemish develops in them, because in the end their proceeds must be brought up. Therefore, the animals themselves should be brought up and offered.

Gemara:

A person who inflicts a blemish on consecrated animals is flogged, as it is stated [Leviticus 22]: “No blemish shall be in it.” And we expound [Beitza 27b] that this is a prohibition against inflicting a blemish on consecrated animals. The Gemara discusses one who inflicts a blemish on the substitute for a firstborn or an animal tithe: Is he liable to lashes? The alternatives of the dilemma will be explained in the Gemara.

Rava

[an alternative version:

Rav Aḥa]

bar Rav Azza said: They asked

in the West,

in Eretz Yisrael the members of the academy were uncertain:

What is the law concerning one who inflicts a blemish on the substitute for a firstborn or an animal tithe?

Do we say that, since they are not offered,

as explained in the Mishna,

he is not liable,

and the prohibition against inflicting a blemish applies only where the blemish disqualifies the animal from being offered?

Or perhaps, since they have become consecrated,

that is, they are sacred,

he is liable.

The prohibition against inflicting a blemish applies to all consecrated animals. What is the law? the decree of the verse is that they are not offered. See the novellae of the Brisker Rav, which explains this reasoning.

Abaye said to him: You should also have this dilemma

concerning other consecrated animals that are sacred but are not offered, such as

one who inflicts a blemish on the ninth animal of the animal tithe,

where, if he erred in counting his animals when he passed them beneath the rod in order to tithe them and called the ninth “tenth,” the law is that it becomes consecrated and is forbidden for shearing and labor until a blemish develops in it. Nevertheless, it is not offered, as explained in the Mishna in Bekhorot [60a]. Why do you not formulate the dilemma with regard to it?

Rather, what is different about the ninth, concerning which you do not formulate the dilemma? It is because the Merciful One excluded it

from being offered, as it is stated in the passage concerning the animal tithe [Leviticus 27]:

“tenth,”

and we expound

to exclude the ninth,

so that it is not offered. Therefore, it is obvious to you that one who inflicts a blemish on it is not liable, since the prohibition against inflicting a blemish applies only to consecrated animals that are offered. If so,

here too,

with regard to the substitute for a firstborn and an animal tithe,

the Merciful One excluded them

from being offered, as it is stated:

“They shall not be redeemed; they are sacred,”

and we expound: only

they,

the firstborn of an ox, sheep, or goat,

are offered, but their substitutes are not offered.

And since it is not sacred for offering, the prohibition against inflicting a blemish does not apply to it.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak taught

the give-and-take between Rava bar Rav Azza and Abaye

thus,

in a different formulation. According to him, the dilemma concerned the ninth of the animal tithe, and Abaye resolved it for him from the substitute for a firstborn and an animal tithe:

Rava

[an alternative version:

Rav Aḥa]

the son of Rav Azza said: They asked in the West: One who inflicts a blemish on the ninth of the animal tithe —

what is the law

with regard to being flogged for it? Is he not flogged because it is not offered, or perhaps he is flogged because it is consecrated?

Abaye said to him, You should also have this dilemma: one who inflicts a blemish on the substitute for a firstborn and an animal tithe?

You should also have asked about one who inflicts a defect on the substitute of a firstborn animal or an animal tithe!

Rather, what is different about the substitute for a firstborn and an animal tithe, concerning which you do not formulate the dilemma? It is because the Merciful One excluded them, as it is stated:

“They are sacred,”

and we expound:

they are offered, but their substitutes are not offered. Likewise, the ninth of the animal tithe was excluded by the Merciful One,

as it is stated:

“the tenth,”

and we expound

to exclude the ninth.

Shita Mekubetzet.

We learned in our Mishna:

If they came unblemished, they are offered.

And although, ideally, a firstborn and an animal tithe are not brought from outside Eretz Yisrael, after the fact they are accepted and offered.

And he raises a contradiction,

an apparent contradiction from another Mishna. For we learned in Tractate Ḥalla [chapter 4, Mishna 11]: One man, whose name was

Ben Antigonus brought firstborn animals up from Babylonia, and

the priests

did not accept them from him.

It follows that they are not accepted even after the fact!

And we answer:

Rav Ḥisda said: It is not difficult! This

statement, that the Mishna there says that they did not accept them from Ben Antigonus, is the opinion of

Rabbi Ishmael

;

whereas

the statement we learned in our Mishna, “and if they came unblemished, they are offered,” is the opinion of

Rabbi Akiva

.

As it was taught, and the Gemara cites a lengthy beraita from which Rav Ḥisda infers that Rabbi Ishmael and Rabbi Akiva disagree about this halakha.

Rashi and the Tosafot there, and on the completion of their words. In the explanation here, the discussion has not been expanded beyond the matters that the commentators here discuss.

And so we learned:

Rabbi Yosei says: Three matters in the name of three elders,

one matter from each elder.

This beraita contains four halakhot. Three of them were stated by Rabbi Yosei in the name of the elders, as follows:

a. Rabbi Ishmael discusses the matter of second tithe in the present era, after the destruction of the Temple, and whether it must be brought up to Jerusalem.

b. Rabbi Akiva discusses the matter of a firstborn from outside Eretz Yisrael while the Temple is standing, and whether it is brought up and offered.

c. Ben Azzai discusses whether second tithe may be eaten only within the walls of Jerusalem, or in any place from which a person standing in Jerusalem can see it.

d. “Others” [Rabbi Meir] discuss whether a firstborn becomes disqualified when its first year has passed.

Second tithe, a firstborn of a kosher animal, and first fruits require “bringing to the place”—that is, bringing them up to Jerusalem, to the place that God will choose to have His Name dwell there—and it is forbidden to eat them outside Jerusalem.

As it is stated [Deuteronomy 12]: “You may not eat within your gates the tithe of your grain, your wine, and your oil, and the firstborn of your cattle and of your flock, and all your vow offerings that you vow, and your freewill offerings, and the offering of your hand.” And we expound: “the offering of your hand”—this refers to first fruits.

It is further stated [there, chapter 14], in the passage concerning second tithe: “And you shall eat before the Lord your God, in the place that He will choose to have His Name dwell there, the tithe of your grain, your wine, and your oil, and the firstborn of your cattle and your flock.”

And this is difficult, for why did the Torah write the law of the firstborn animal in the passage concerning second tithe? the Malbim.

Furthermore, the Torah had already stated that it requires bringing to the place.

Rather, the verse comes to teach us an analogy between second tithe and this firstborn, so that each may teach us about the other.

These four tanna’im each expounded his own exposition concerning the particular halakha for which the firstborn and second tithe were linked.

And so we learned:

Rabbi Ishmael says: Could it be

that I might say,

a person should bring up second tithe and eat it in Jerusalem in the present era?

That is, Rabbi Ishmael was not discussing the basic Torah obligation to separate terumot and tithes from produce, but it is clear to him that there is an obligation, because he holds that the sanctity of Eretz Yisrael was not nullified with the destruction of the Temple and the exile of Israel from its land. Rather, the entire discussion is whether it must be brought up and eaten in Jerusalem. Shita Mekubetzet. Ramban to Makkot there, who discusses the possibility that it is rabbinic. the Tosafot in Zevaḥim there, which says that this matter depends on the versions of the Mishna there. According to one version, it may be eaten in all the cities of Israel; according to the second version, it has no remedy except through redemption.

in the present era?

That is, Rabbi Yishmael was not discussing the basic Torah obligation to separate terumot and tithes from produce, but it is clear to him that this obligation applies, because he holds that the sanctity of Eretz Yisrael was not nullified by the destruction of the Temple and the exile of the Jewish people from their land. Rather, the entire discussion concerns whether it must be brought up and eaten in Jerusalem.

Apparently, there is no need for a special derivation to state that it is not brought up, since this can be learned by a binyan av from a firstborn animal:

and the rule

is that a firstborn animal requires being brought to the designated place,

as explained,

and

also

a tithe requires being brought to the designated place,

and this can be learned from one to the other:

Just as a firstborn animal may be eaten only in the presence of the Temple,

and this matter is clear to Rabbi Yishmael, as will be explained below,

so too, a tithe may be eaten only in the presence of the Temple.

No!

One cannot learn the law of a tithe from that of a firstborn animal by means of a binyan av!

For

if you say with regard to a firstborn animal

that it cannot be brought nowadays,

since it requires the application of its blood and the sacrificial portions on the altar,

therefore, when there is no altar, it cannot be brought.

Can you say

with regard to

a tithe, that you did not say

this? Therefore, one brings it up to Jerusalem, and it does not require an altar!

Rather, let us learn the law of a tithe from first fruits:

first fruits require being brought to the designated place,

as explained,

and a tithe requires being brought to the designated place,

and this can be learned from one to the other:

Just as first fruits may be eaten only in the presence of the Temple,

as it is stated in the passage concerning first fruits [Deuteronomy 26], “And you shall place it before the Lord your God,”

so too, a tithe may be eaten only in the presence of the Temple.

This derivation too can be refuted:

What is there to say about first fruits

—the reason that they may be eaten only in the presence of the Temple—

is that they require placing

before the altar, as it is stated: “And you shall place it before the Lord your God.” Therefore, when there is no altar, they cannot be brought.

Can you say with regard to a tithe, that it does not

require placing before the altar? If so, it should be brought up to Jerusalem?!

And since the law of a tithe cannot be learned either from a firstborn animal or from first fruits by means of a binyan av, let us learn it by means of a juxtaposition; and a juxtaposition cannot be refuted, since it is as though it were stated explicitly in the Torah,

the verse states: “

And you shall eat before the Lord your God the tithe of your grain, your wine, and your oil, and the firstborn of your cattle and your flocks.”

The verse juxtaposed

the law of

a tithe with that of a firstborn animal,

to teach you:

Just as a firstborn animal may be eaten only in the presence of the Temple, so too, a tithe may be eaten only in the presence of the Temple,

and not nowadays.

This is Rabbi Yishmael’s derivation.

Before the Gemara cites the continuation of the beraita, it discusses why Rabbi Yishmael concluded that the law should be learned by juxtaposition.

Why not reconsider the din, and not

be

derive it by means of

“the common denominator”?

After having refuted the possibility of learning from first fruits because they require placing, one could say: “A firstborn animal proves otherwise”; it does not require placing, and nevertheless one does not bring it up to Jerusalem. This demonstrates that the reason it is not brought up is not the absence of “placing.” And when it is refuted by saying: “What is there to say about a firstborn animal? It requires the application of blood and sacrificial portions on the altar,” one could say: “First fruits prove otherwise”; they do not require the application of blood and sacrificial portions, demonstrating that the reason it is not brought up is not the absence of the application of “blood and sacrificial portions.” Then, “the din returns: This one is not like that one, and that one is not like this one; the common denominator between them is that they require being brought to the designated place and may not be eaten except in the presence of the Temple. I too will bring a tithe, which requires being brought to the designated place and may not be eaten except in the presence of the Temple.”

And why was it necessary for the verse to juxtapose them?

And we answer:

Rav Ashi said:

It is impossible to learn the law of a tithe from a firstborn animal and first fruits.

Because it can be refuted

What is there to say about the common denominator between them

—the reason they may not be eaten

is that they each have an aspect involving the altar:

the one through the application of blood and sacrificial portions, and the other through placing, and both involve the altar. Therefore, when there is no altar, they cannot be brought. Can you say this with regard to second tithe, which does not require an altar at all, but only “eating” in Jerusalem? Had you not expounded the juxtaposition, we would not have learned that it should not be brought up to Jerusalem.

Introduction

The Sages disagreed in several places over whether the sanctity of the Land of Israel was nullified when Israel was exiled from its land, or whether it continues to exist even during the exile.

Some hold that “the first sanctity sanctified it for its time and sanctified it for the future,” meaning that the sanctity with which the land was sanctified when Israel was in the Land of Israel was established forever, including during the exile. Others hold that “it was not sanctified for the future,” and that when Israel was exiled, the sanctity of the land was nullified.

According to the one who says that it was “sanctified for the future,” the mitzvot dependent upon the Land apply, such as terumot, tithes, and the Sabbatical Year, just as they applied during the time of the Temple. According to the one who says that it “was not sanctified for the future,” they are not obligatory in the same manner as when the Temple was in existence.

The Sages also disagreed as to whether the sanctity of the Temple and its courtyards was nullified after the destruction of the Temple. According to the one who says that it was not nullified, it is possible to offer certain offerings nowadays in the place that the Lord chose, as well as to apply other laws dependent upon the sanctity of the Temple. The same applies with regard to the sanctity of the walls of Jerusalem. Even after the destruction of the Temple, the site of the city of Jerusalem is called “before the Lord your God,” for example, with regard to eating second tithe.

It is possible to say, that these two sanctities—the sanctity of the Land and the sanctity of the site of the Temple and of Jerusalem—are not dependent upon one another. Rather, it is possible that the sanctity of the Land was nullified while the sanctity of the Temple remained, and conversely, it is possible that the sanctity of the Land remained while the sanctity of the Temple was nullified.

Rabbi Yishmael, who discusses whether second tithe must be brought up to Jerusalem, certainly holds that the sanctity of the Land was not nullified. For if it had been nullified, there would be no Torah obligation at all to separate terumot and tithes, and the produce would not be tevel at all. Rather, the Gemara discusses his view concerning the sanctity of the Temple:

And

Rabbi Yishmael, who takes it as obvious that a firstborn animal may not be eaten nowadays, but discusses whether second tithe must be brought up to Jerusalem,

what is his position?

If he holds that

the first sanctity

(not specifically the first sanctity, but rather the sanctity with which Jerusalem was sanctified in the days of Ezra )

sanctified it for its time and sanctified it for the future,

then

it makes no difference whether it is a firstborn animal or a tithe; they are fit to be brought

to Jerusalem, since its sanctity remains. This is difficult: What is the basis of his uncertainty at all? Surely both a tithe and a firstborn animal must be eaten in Jerusalem, so why is it obvious to him that a firstborn animal may not be eaten, while he is uncertain about a tithe? Why does he require a derivation from the verse to exempt it, and how did he derive its exemption by juxtaposition with a firstborn animal? After all, a firstborn animal too must be eaten in Jerusalem.

And if he holds that

the first sanctity sanctified it for its time but did not sanctify it for the future,

and nevertheless is uncertain with regard to a tithe, this too is difficult:

Should you not even be uncertain about a firstborn animal?

How, then, is it obvious to him with regard to a firstborn animal, and from it does he derive the law of a tithe?

And if you say that the reason the matter is obvious to him with regard to a firstborn animal is that its blood and sacrificial portions are placed on the altar, and it is forbidden to eat it before the blood and sacrificial portions are offered, if so, how did he learn the law of a tithe from a firstborn animal? The distinction is obvious: A firstborn animal requires the application of blood and sacrificial portions on the altar, whereas a tithe does not. Necessarily, even in a case in which there is no impediment to eating the firstborn animal due to the absence of the application of its blood—for example, its blood was offered on the altar while the Temple was still standing, and meanwhile the Temple was destroyed, while its flesh still remains before the time allotted for its eating has ended—even so, Rabbi Yishmael considers it obvious that it may not now be “eaten” in Jerusalem, because after the destruction one cannot fulfill with it the verse, “And you shall eat before the Lord your God.” From this he derives that a tithe likewise may not be “eaten” in Jerusalem, because it is not “before the Lord your God.”

Concerning this the Gemara asks: Just as with regard to a tithe he is uncertain—perhaps Jerusalem is nevertheless still called “before the Lord your God,” since eating a tithe does not require an altar—why is it clear to him with regard to “eating the flesh of a firstborn animal” that it certainly may not be eaten after the destruction, even if its blood was properly sprinkled before the destruction? After all, eating a firstborn animal can likewise be considered, in such a case, “before the Lord your God,” since no altar is needed for eating it after its blood has been sprinkled?

And we conclude:

In fact, he holds

that Rabbi Yishmael holds that

the first sanctity sanctified it for its time but did not sanctify it for the future.

And as for the question: If so, why is it obvious to him with regard to a firstborn animal that it may not be eaten in Jerusalem?

Here, what are we dealing with?

For example, the blood of the firstborn animal was sprinkled while the Temple was standing, the Temple was destroyed, and its flesh still remains.

The reason that the firstborn animal may not be eaten at that point is not that it is not “before the Lord your God.” Rather, he derives the eating of the flesh from the offering of the blood, and

since, if the blood were present,

if it were necessary now, at the time of the Temple’s destruction, to offer the blood on the altar,

it would not be fit for sprinkling

[offering]

it

because the sanctity of the Temple had been nullified, therefore,

the flesh comes and is derived from the blood,

as it is stated [Numbers 18]: “And you shall sprinkle their blood on the altar, and their flesh shall be yours.” And we expound: When it is fit for the sprinkling of the blood, you may eat the flesh, but not when it is not fit for the sprinkling of the blood.

Therefore, the flesh may not be eaten even though its blood had already been sprinkled on the altar before its destruction.

With regard to a tithe, however, there is indeed room for uncertainty and for saying that it may be eaten in Jerusalem; therefore, he said: Perhaps a person may bring up second tithe and eat it in Jerusalem nowadays.