Temurah 20b — the Talmud in English

for there is no

designation of an asham

upon its mother,

for we have not found a female in an asham.

But concerning a female for an olah, where there is

a designation of an olah

upon its mother,

in the bird-olah,

even Rabbi Shimon agrees,

as explained. And if so, what comparison is there between an asham and an olah?

And furthermore

there is a difficulty:

we have heard Rabbi Shimon say

if one designated a female

for his olah, it effects temura.

It is explicit that concerning an olah Rabbi Shimon holds that bodily sanctity descended upon it, at least so that it may not be sold without a blemish, as explained, because he holds like Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah.

And the question returns: how may the females be sold for the needs of shelamim, even according to Rabbi Shimon?

And we conclude:

Rabbi Yohanan

said to him:

Rabbi Yehoshua follows the other tanna [ [כתנא אחר]as another tanna]

as another tanna ]

according to Rabbi Shimon—

as it was taught: Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: even for his olah it does not effect temura!

According to this opinion, sanctity does not descend upon it at all, even though it has upon it the “designation of an olah” in the bird-olah. Therefore, bodily sanctity does not take effect upon the females when one consecrates his possessions without specification—and they may be sold for the needs of shelamim.

Mishna:

Our Mishna discusses an asham, the temura of an asham, and the offspring of its temura, and an asham whose owners died or obtained atonement, what is to be done with them. And the rule has already been explained: everything that in the case of a sin-offering dies [the offspring of a sin-offering, the temura of a sin-offering, a sin-offering whose owners died, a sin-offering whose owners obtained atonement, and a sin-offering whose year passed]—in the case of an asham grazes . And Rabbi Eliezer holds that they do not graze, but die, according to the law of a sin-offering.

Rather, the tannaim in our Mishna disputed, according to the opinion that they go to grazing, what is to be done with their value after a blemish befalls them and they are sold.

The temura of an asham,

whether male or female,

the offspring of a temura,

if he exchanged a female for an asham, and it gave birth,

its offspring

of that offspring,

and

likewise

the offspring of its offspring, to the end of the entire world—

they shall graze

until they become blemished, and they shall be sold, and their value shall fall

to a freewill offering.

For a communal freewill offering, for the collection boxes that were in the Temple, from which communal olot were offered when the altar was free of offerings .

Rabbi Eliezer [

says: They shall die.

says: They are left to die.

For he holds that an asham is like a sin-offering with regard to all its laws .

Rabbi Elazar [

says: He shall bring,

says: He shall bring,

the owner of the asham himself,

olot with its value,

and it shall not fall to a communal freewill offering, because he holds that surpluses go to an individual’s freewill offering. And further on the Mishna will explain what is the difference between the Sages and Rabbi Elazar.

An asham whose owners died, and

likewise an asham

whose owners obtained atonement

through another, for example, when it was lost—

it shall graze

until it becomes blemished, and it shall be sold, and its value shall fall to a freewill offering.

Rabbi Eliezer says: They shall die.

And Rabbi Elazar says: He shall bring an olah with its value.

And the Gemara will explain why they needed to dispute in both cases, both concerning the temura and its offspring, and concerning the death of the owners and their obtaining atonement.

Now the Mishna explains what is the difference between the words of the Sages and the words of Rabbi Elazar:

But is not a freewill offering also an olah! And what is the difference between the words of Rabbi Elazar and the words of the Sages?

Rather, when it—

this olah purchased with the value of the asham upon which a blemish had fallen—

comes as an obligation

which is imposed upon the individual to offer it—

he places his hands upon it,

with both his hands before slaughter, like every individual offering ,

and he brings the libations, and its libations are from his own funds; and if he is a kohen,

the one bringing it as an individual offering—

its service and its hide

of this olah

are his,

he himself offers it and takes the hide, even though he is not from the watch whose week this is —

And when it is a freewill offering,

for a communal olah—

he does not place his hands upon it,

for there is no placing of hands for a communal offering ,

and he does not bring libations for it,

but

its libations are from the community,

from consecrated funds, and likewise

even though

the owner of the asham who sold it

is a kohen—

its service and hide belong to

the men of the watch,

for it is a communal offering.

And these laws apply to the dispute between Rabbi Elazar, who holds that he himself shall bring an olah with its value, and the Sages, who hold that its value shall fall to a communal freewill offering.

Gemara:

The Gemara explains why the Mishna brought the dispute of Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages twice, both concerning the temura of the offspring of an asham and concerning the death of its owners or their obtaining atonement.

And it is necessary,

the Mishna needed to bring their dispute in both cases!

For if it had taught us

the latter clause,

an asham

for which its owners obtained atonement we might have said:

in this Rabbi Eliezer says

“They shall die”—

because he decreed

in the case of an asham

after atonement,

when he has already obtained atonement through another,

on account of before atonement,

if he were told to bring an olah with its value, he might err and say so even concerning an asham before atonement—

For example: he designated a second asham because the first was lost, and it was found, and both stand before him; one of them is superfluous, and he sent it to graze, and a blemish fell upon it. All this occurred before he obtained atonement—he might err and say that the value of that one which grazed and upon which a blemish fell goes to an olah [and his error results from his knowing that after atonement its value falls to an olah]. And this is an error, since as long as he has not obtained atonement through the other, its value remains for an asham —

But concerning,

the first clause,

the temura of an asham and the offspring of its temura,

where there is no reason to decree lest he err, since these go to grazing even if he has not yet obtained atonement through another,

say—

there is room to say that Rabbi Eliezer

agrees with the Sages

that it grazes—

Therefore the Mishna teaches us that he does not agree, and that concerning them too he holds that they die. Since Rabbi Eliezer held this not on account of a decree, but because he holds that an asham is like a sin-offering in all its aspects .

And

on the other hand,

if it had taught us there,

in the first clause, concerning the temura of the offspring of an asham, we might have said that only

in this do the Sages say,

that it grazes, because there is no reason to decree concerning them after atonement on account of before atonement—

But concerning an asham,

in the latter clause, where its owners obtained atonement,

say

the Sages

agree with Rabbi Eliezer,

to decree after atonement on account of before atonement. Therefore it teaches us that they do not agree and do not decree.

And we conclude:

It is necessary !

One of the surpluses taught in our Mishna is the offspring of the temura of an asham, and they also disputed concerning it: according to the Sages, it grazes [and its value falls either to an individual’s freewill offering or to a communal freewill offering], and according to Rabbi Eliezer, it dies. The following Gemara discusses this dispute concerning the offspring.

Rabbi Nachman said in the name of Rabbah bar Avuha: The dispute

of Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages is

after atonement,

after the owner of the asham obtained atonement through his asham, which he consecrated initially for his obligation; then the offspring is superfluous and becomes a “surplus,” and the Sages of the Mishna disputed what is to be done with it—

But before atonement,

and the asham was lost and the offspring remained with him —

according to everyone, it itself shall be offered as an asham .

Rava said: There are two answers to the matter! One: a person does not obtain atonement through a thing that comes through a transgression ,

and with temura he transgressed “he shall not exchange it and he shall not substitute,” and its offspring is a “thing that comes through a transgression”; how is it possible that he should bring it for his asham? And although we learned [in this chapter] that the temura of an olah and shelamim are offered, that is because an olah and shelamim do not come for atonement; this is not so with an asham. How can he obtain atonement through the offspring of the temura?

And furthermore, did

not

Rav Hanania teach [

Rabbi Hiyya]

Rabbi Ḥiyya ]

to support Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi!

Above [18a], Rabbi Eliezer said in the Mishna that the offspring of shelamim shall not be offered as shelamim, but is placed in a cell and dies, on the grounds that if he delays it for offering, there is a decree lest he raise from it herds upon herds. And the Sages dispute with him and do not decree. And there Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said that concerning the offspring of an offspring the Sages did not dispute, and they hold like Rabbi Eliezer, that it dies.

And there Rabbi Ḥananya [or Rabbi Ḥiyya] brought a beraita, stated in which was:

“The first offspring

is sacrificed,

but

the second offspring is not sacrificed,”

and this beraita is certainly according to the Sages, for they are the ones who hold that “the first offspring is sacrificed,” and they say in the beraita that “the second offspring is not sacrificed”; this is support for the words of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi—

And now Rava raises an objection: is not “the offspring of a temura” like “the second offspring” ? And even the Sages agree [even with regard to a peace-offering!] that it should die, and all the more so according to Rabbi Eliezer . And how did Rav Naḥman say that it is “according to everyone,” and that even according to Rabbi Eliezer the guilt-offering is sacrificed?

Because of Rava’s difficulties, the Gemara retracts and brings Rav Naḥman’s statement in a different formulation. According to all opinions, he should not offer it as a guilt-offering, because “a person cannot attain atonement through something that comes through a transgression.” And if he offers it, he should offer it as a burnt-offering, which does not come for atonement.

And we conclude:

Rather, if it was stated,

if Rav Naḥman indeed said so,

this is how it was stated:

Rav Naḥman said that Rabbah bar Avuha said: The dispute

between Rabbi Eliezer, who says that it should die, and the Sages, who say that it should graze, applies

before atonement,

and then Rabbi Eliezer holds that “it should die,” because since he has not yet attained atonement, there is concern that he may err and offer the offspring as his guilt-offering, for his atonement; and it will turn out that he has transgressed two prohibitions: one, that he offered something unfit to be offered [for “a person cannot attain atonement through something that comes through a transgression”], and the other, that he did not offer his guilt-offering. And why might he err in this? Since he leaves it for the purpose of grazing and the occurrence of a blemish—

And because of this concern Rabbi Eliezer said that they should place it in an enclosure and it should die. And concerning these matters the Sages disagree, and hold that since it itself is not sacrificed as a burnt-offering, but its value is sacrificed, there is no concern that, if it grazes, he may exchange it and bring it as his guilt-offering—

But after atonement,

when there is no concern that he may bring the offspring as a guilt-offering, since he has already attained atonement and has no need for a guilt-offering, the Sages agree that it need not be killed, but rather—

it itself is sacrificed as a burnt-offering ,

in accordance with the law of a guilt-offering that was set aside for grazing, which is sacrificed as a burnt-offering .

And we raise an objection: how did Rav Naḥman say that according to Rabbi Eliezer it is sacrificed as a burnt-offering and is not killed,

yet

is

the beraita brought by Rabbi Ḥananya to support Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi,

as explained, that according to Rabbi Eliezer the offspring of a temura should die, since its law is like that of the offspring of an offspring?

And we conclude:

It is difficult!

As a continuation of the Gemara’s discussion concerning the offspring of the temura of a guilt-offering, the Gemara now discusses the case where one set aside a female animal as a guilt-offering and it gave birth: is that offspring itself sacrificed as a burnt-offering?

And it is clear that the discussion is according to Rabbi Elazar, who holds in the earlier Mishna [18b], concerning one who set aside a female animal as a burnt-offering and it gave birth, that it itself is sacrificed as a burnt-offering. For according to the view of the Sages there, who hold that it is not sacrificed but grazes, all the more so in the case of one who set aside a female animal as a guilt-offering and it gave birth: if, even with regard to a burnt-offering, where the designation “burnt-offering” applies to the mother, the Sages hold that it is not sacrificed, all the more so with regard to a guilt-offering. Rather, according to Rabbi Elazar there is room to discuss the matter: for it may be said that Rabbi Elazar holds this only with regard to a burnt-offering, since the designation “burnt-offering” applies to its mother, unlike a guilt-offering. Or it may be said that his reason with regard to a burnt-offering is: “since it is fit to be offered,” meaning: for anything for which it can be offered, it itself, corresponding to the sanctity with which its mother was sanctified, is offered; and indeed its mother is unfit, since she is female and is fit neither for a burnt-offering nor for a guilt-offering—nevertheless, the offspring, which is male, is fit, and the mother’s rejection does not apply to the offspring .

And earlier [19b] the Gemara already discussed this question, and there the Gemara concluded that in the case of one who set aside a female animal as a guilt-offering, its offspring is not sacrificed as a guilt-offering. And the Gemara’s conclusion there is that if it is not sacrificed as a guilt-offering, even though its mother was sanctified as a guilt-offering, all the more so it is not sacrificed as a burnt-offering .

Rabbi Avin bar Ḥiyya asked Rabbi Avin bar Kahana: [If one] set aside a female animal as a guilt-offering

and it gave birth—

what is the law as to whether its offspring may be sacrificed as a burnt-offering?

And

before the Gemara brings what Rabbi Avin bar Kahana resolved for him, the Gemara raises an objection:

Let him resolve it from

the words of

Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Ḥanina, who said [19b]:

“Rabbi Elazar admits

in the case of one who set aside a female animal as a guilt-offering that its offspring is not sacrificed as a guilt-offering,”

and all the more so it is not sacrificed as a burnt-offering, as explained . And what is his question?

And we answer:

He did not hear it;

Rabbi Avin did not hear the words of Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Ḥanina. That is to say, he does not hold so .

What

—whether it is sacrificed as a burnt-offering or not?

He said to him,

Rabbi Avin bar Kahana to Rabbi Avin bar Ḥiyya:

Its offspring is sacrificed as a burnt-offering!

As will be explained.

And Rabbi Avin bar Ḥiyya raises an objection to him:

What is this,

what reason is there to say so? Is it not that

Rabbi Elazar made his statement only concerning one who set aside a female animal as a burnt-offering,

because

there is

the designation “burnt-offering”

upon its mother—

but with regard to a guilt-offering, where there is no

designation “burnt-offering”

upon its mother—

even Rabbi Elazar admits

that the son itself is not sacrificed. And how did he resolve that the son is sacrificed as a burnt-offering?

He said to him,

Rabbi Avin bar Kahana:

Rabbi Elazar’s reason is not because the designation “burnt-offering” is upon its mother, but because it is

fit to be offered,

and therefore the son is sacrificed as a burnt-offering;

and this too,

and the same law applies to a guilt-offering—the offspring

is fit to be offered.