Temurah 20b (כ:) — the Talmud in English

for there is no "

designation of an asham"

upon its mother,

since we never find a female animal designated as an asham.

But concerning a female designated as an olah, where there is "

a designation of an olah"

upon its mother,

in the case of a bird olah,

even Rabbi Shimon concedes,

as explained. If so, what comparison is there between an asham and an olah?

Furthermore,

there is another difficulty:

we have heard Rabbi Shimon say

that if one designated a female animal

for his olah, it effects temura.

It is therefore explicit that, with regard to an olah, Rabbi Shimon holds that it acquired kedushat haguf, at least insofar as it may not be sold without a disqualifying blemish, as explained, because he follows the view of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya.

The question therefore returns: How can the females be sold for the purpose of acquiring shelamim, even according to Rabbi Shimon?

And we conclude:

He said to him,

Rabbi Yoḥanan:

Rabbi Yehoshua follows the view of another tanna [

as another tanna ]

in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon—

as it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: Even for his olah it does not effect temura!

According to this opinion, no sanctity descended upon it at all, despite the fact that, in the case of a bird olah, it bears “the designation of an olah.” Therefore, kedushat haguf does not take effect upon the females when one consecrates his property without specifying a particular offering, and they may be sold for the purpose of acquiring shelamim.

Mishna:

Our Mishna discusses an asham, the temura of an asham, and the offspring of its temura, as well as an asham whose owners died or obtained atonement through another offering, and what is to be done with them. The general rule has already been explained: Whatever, in the case of a ḥatat, is left to die [the offspring of a ḥatat, the temura of a ḥatat, a ḥatat whose owners died, a ḥatat whose owners obtained atonement, and a ḥatat that passed its year]—in the case of an asham, is left to graze . Rabbi Eliezer holds that they are not left to graze; rather, they are left to die, as is the law with regard to a ḥatat.

Rather, the tannaitic authorities in our Mishna disagree, according to the opinion that the animals are sent to graze, as to what is to be done with their monetary value after they develop a blemish and are sold.

The temura of an asham,

whether male or female,

the offspring of the temura,

if one exchanged a female animal for an asham and it gave birth,

its offspring

of that offspring,

and

likewise

the offspring of its offspring, until the end of all generations—

are left to graze

until they become blemished, and they are sold, and the proceeds are allocated

for voluntary offerings.

For the communal voluntary offering, placed into the collection boxes that were in the Temple, from which communal olot were offered when the altar was free of other offerings .

Rabbi Eliezer [

ben Hyrcanus ]

says: They are left to die.

Because he holds that an asham is like a ḥatat with regard to all its laws .

Rabbi Elazar [

ben Shamua ]

says: He shall bring,

the owner of the asham himself,

an olah with its proceeds,

and the proceeds do not go to the communal voluntary offering, because he holds that surplus offerings go to an individual’s voluntary offering. The Mishna will later explain the difference between the opinion of the Sages and that of Rabbi Elazar.

An asham whose owners died, and

likewise an asham

whose owners obtained atonement

through another offering, for example, because the original offering had been lost—

is left to graze

until it becomes blemished, and it is sold, and its proceeds are allocated for a voluntary offering.

The reading of the Mishna.

Rabbi Eliezer says: They are left to die.

And Rabbi Elazar says: He shall bring an olah with its proceeds.

The Gemara will explain why it was necessary for them to disagree in both cases: both with regard to the temura and offspring, and with regard to the death of the owners or their obtaining atonement.

The Mishna now explains the difference between the statement of the Sages and that of Rabbi Elazar:

But is not a voluntary offering also an olah? And what is the difference between the statement of Rabbi Elazar and that of the Sages?

Rather, when it—

this olah purchased with the proceeds of the asham that developed a blemish—

comes as an obligatory offering

that the individual is required to offer—

he performs semikha upon it,

with both hands before the slaughter, as with every individual offering ,

and he brings the libations, and its libations are from his own funds; and if he is a kohen,

who offers it as an individual offering,

its service and its hide

of this olah

belong to him;

he himself offers it and takes the hide, even though he is not from the priestly division whose week of service it is —

But when it is a voluntary offering,

for a communal olah—

he does not perform semikha upon it,

because semikha is not performed upon a communal offering ,

and he does not bring libations for it;

rather,

its libations are from communal funds,

from consecrated money; and likewise

even though

the owner of the asham who sold it

is a kohen—

its service and its hide belong to

the men of the division,

since it is a communal offering.

These laws apply equally according to Rabbi Elazar, who holds that he himself brings an olah with its proceeds, and according to the Sages, who hold that its proceeds go to the communal voluntary offering.

Gemara:

The Gemara explains why the Mishna cites the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages twice: both with regard to the temura and offspring of an asham, and with regard to an asham whose owners died or obtained atonement.

And it was necessary—

the Mishna needed to state their dispute in both cases!

For if it had taught us

the latter clause,

an asham

whose owners obtained atonement one might have said:

In this case Rabbi Eliezer says "

they are left to die"—

because he decreed

with regard to an asham

after atonement,

when atonement had already been achieved through another offering,

because of the case before atonement;

if he were told to bring an olah with its proceeds, he might mistakenly conclude that this is also permitted with an asham before atonement—

For example: He designated a second asham because the first had been lost, and then the first was found, so that both stood before him. One of them was surplus, and he sent it to graze, and it developed a blemish. All this occurred before he obtained atonement. He might mistakenly say that the proceeds of the one that was sent to graze and then developed a blemish go toward an olah [his mistake resulting from his knowing that, after atonement, its proceeds go toward an olah]. This is a mistake, because as long as he has not obtained atonement through the other offering, its proceeds remain designated for an asham —

But concerning,

the first clause,

the temura of an asham and the offspring of its temura,

where there is no reason to decree lest he err, since these are sent to graze even if he has not yet obtained atonement through another offering,

one might say

that Rabbi Eliezer

agrees with the Sages

that it is left to graze—

The Mishna therefore teaches us that he does not agree with them, and that in these cases too he holds that they are left to die. Rabbi Eliezer held this not because of a decree, but because he holds that an asham is like a ḥatat in every respect .

And,

on the other hand,

if it had taught us there,

in the first clause, concerning the temura and offspring of an asham, one might have said that only

in this case the Sages say

that it is left to graze, because there is no reason to decree after atonement because of the case before atonement—

But concerning an asham,

in the latter clause, where the owners obtained atonement,

one might say that the

Sages

agree with Rabbi Eliezer that a decree should be issued after atonement because of the case before atonement. Therefore, the Mishna teaches us that they do not agree and do not issue such a decree.

to decree after atonement on account of before atonement. Therefore it teaches us that they do not agree and do not decree.

And we conclude:

It is necessary !

One of the surplus offerings listed in our Mishna is the offspring of the temura of an asham, and they also disagree with regard to it: according to the Sages, it is left to graze [and its proceeds go either to an individual’s voluntary offering or to the communal voluntary offering], while according to Rabbi Eliezer, it is left to die. The following Gemara discusses this dispute concerning the offspring.

Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuha said: The dispute

between Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages

is after atonement,

after the owner of the asham achieved atonement through the asham that he initially consecrated for his obligation, at which point the offspring became surplus and acquired the status of “surplus”; and the Sages of the Mishna disagree as to what is to be done with it—

But before atonement,

when the asham was lost and the offspring remained with him —

everyone agrees that he himself is offered as an asham .

Rashi. And from Rashi’s language in several places it appears that according to Rabbi Eliezer, their death is truly a law of the Torah. See his words in Shevuot [there] and Pesahim [73a]. And according to Tosafot Yom Tov, the continuation of the Gemara concerning the offspring will be well understood. wrote, “if the first was lost.” His reason is straightforward, since he has no need for two asham offerings. [This resolves the comment of the Gerdama is thereby resolved.] Rabbeinu Gershom holds that Rabbi Eliezer issued a decree after atonement on account of before atonement, and this is the Gemara’s reasoning at the beginning of the sugya. And according to another Jerusalem wording, he issued a decree because of “confusion.” This implies that it is a rabbinic law. Below, the give-and-take of the Gemara according to Rabbeinu Gershom will be explained. wrote: “But both are standing before him—the asham itself and the offspring of its temura—and everyone agrees that he himself, the offspring, may be offered if he wishes.” Summary: Rabbah innovates three points concerning the offspring before atonement, according to Rashi. And from Rashi’s language in several places it appears that according to Rabbi Eliezer, their death is truly a law of the Torah. See his words in Shevuot [there] and Pesahim [73a]. And according to Tosafot Yom Tov, the continuation of the Gemara concerning the offspring will be well understood. it itself shall be offered. And the Gemara discusses these matters below. It shall be offered as an asham And concerning this Tosafot. discuss that Rabbi Eliezer, who says that they die, agrees that it grazes.

Rava said: There are two refutations of this! First, a person cannot achieve atonement through something that comes through a transgression .

By making temura, one transgresses “He shall not exchange it and he shall not substitute it,” and its offspring is “something that comes through a transgression.” How, then, could he bring it for his asham? And although we learned [in this chapter] that the temura of an olah and shelamim are offered, that is because an olah and shelamim do not come to provide atonement, whereas an asham does. How, then, can he achieve atonement through the offspring of the temura?

Furthermore, did

not

Rav Ḥananya teach [

another version:

Rabbi Ḥiyya ]

in support of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi!

Above (18a), Rabbi Eliezer said in the Mishna that the offspring of shelamim may not be offered as shelamim; rather, it is placed in an enclosure and dies, because if it were kept until it could be offered, there would be a decree lest herds upon herds be raised from it. The Sages disagree with him and do not issue this decree. And there Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said that, with regard to the offspring of an offspring, the Sages did not disagree; they hold like Rabbi Eliezer, that it dies.

And there Rabbi Ḥananya [or Rabbi Ḥiyya] cited a beraita [folio b] in which it is stated:

The first offspring

is sacrificed,

but

the second offspring is not sacrificed,

and this beraita is certainly in accordance with the opinion of the Sages, for they are the ones who hold that “the first offspring is sacrificed,” and they state in the beraita that “the second offspring is not sacrificed.” This supports the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi—

Rava now raises an objection: Is not the “offspring of a temura” in our case analogous to “the second offspring” , and even the Sages agree [even in the case of a peace-offering!] that it must die, and all the more so according to Rabbi Eliezer , so how did Rav Naḥman say that “everyone agrees” that, even according to Rabbi Eliezer, the guilt-offering should be sacrificed?

Because of Rava’s difficulties, the Gemara retracts its earlier statement and cites Rav Naḥman’s teaching in a different formulation. According to all opinions, one may not sacrifice it as a guilt-offering, because “a person does not achieve atonement through an object that comes through a transgression.” And if one sacrifices it, one should sacrifice it as a burnt-offering, which does not come for atonement.

And we conclude:

Rather, if it was stated

if Rav Naḥman indeed said this,

this is what was stated:

Rav Naḥman said that Rabbi Abba bar Avuha said: The dispute

between Rabbi Eliezer, who says that it must die, and the Sages, who say that it should be left until it develops a blemish, applies

before atonement,

and Rabbi Eliezer then holds that “it must die,” because, since atonement has not yet been achieved, there is concern that he may mistakenly sacrifice the offspring as his guilt-offering, in order to achieve atonement through it. He would then transgress two prohibitions: first, he would sacrifice an object that is unfit to be sacrificed [since “a person does not achieve atonement through an object that comes through a transgression”]; and second, he would fail to sacrifice his guilt-offering. And why would he make such a mistake? Because he leaves it for the purpose of grazing until it develops a blemish—

And because of this concern Rabbi Eliezer said that it should be placed in an enclosure and allowed to die. The Sages disagree with regard to this and hold that, since it itself is not sacrificed as a burnt-offering, but rather its monetary value is sacrificed, there is no concern that, if it is left to graze, he might exchange it and bring it as his guilt-offering—

But after atonement,

when there is no concern that he might bring the offspring as a guilt-offering, since he has already achieved atonement and has no need for a guilt-offering, the Sages agree that it need not be killed. Rather—

it itself is sacrificed as a burnt-offering,

in accordance with the law of a guilt-offering that has been redirected to grazing, which is sacrificed as a burnt-offering .

And we raise an objection: How could Rav Naḥman say that, according to Rabbi Eliezer, it should be sacrificed as a burnt-offering and not killed,

when

Rabbi Ḥananya

cited a beraita to support Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi,

as explained, that according to Rabbi Eliezer the offspring of a temura must die, since its law is that of the offspring of an offspring?

And we conclude:

It is difficult!

As a continuation of the Gemara’s discussion of the offspring of a temura of a guilt-offering, the Gemara now discusses a case in which one designated a female animal as a guilt-offering and it gave birth: Is the offspring itself sacrificed as a burnt-offering?

It is clear that the discussion follows the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who holds in the Mishna above [18b] that, in the case of one who designated a female animal as a burnt-offering and it gave birth, it itself is sacrificed as a burnt-offering. For according to the opinion of the Sages there, who hold that it should not be sacrificed but should be left to graze, all the more so in the case of one who designated a female animal as a guilt-offering and it gave birth: If, even with regard to a burnt-offering, where the designation “burnt-offering” applies to the mother, the Sages hold that it should not be sacrificed, all the more so in the case of a guilt-offering. Rather, according to Rabbi Elazar, the matter requires examination: One could say that Rabbi Elazar holds this way only with regard to a burnt-offering, since the designation “burnt-offering” applies to its mother, but not with regard to a guilt-offering. Or one could say that his rationale with regard to a burnt-offering is “since it is fit to be sacrificed,” meaning that for whatever it can be sacrificed, it itself is sacrificed, corresponding to the sanctity with which its mother was consecrated. Indeed, its mother is unfit, since she is female and unfit both for a burnt-offering and for a guilt-offering; nevertheless, the offspring, which is male, is fit, and the disqualification of the mother does not apply to the offspring .

Earlier [19b], the Gemara had already discussed this question, and there it concluded that, in the case of one who designated a female animal as a guilt-offering, her offspring is not sacrificed as a guilt-offering. The conclusion of the Gemara there is that if it is not sacrificed as a guilt-offering, despite the fact that its mother was consecrated as a guilt-offering, all the more so it is not sacrificed as a burnt-offering .

Rabbi Avin bar Ḥiyya asked Rabbi Avin bar Kahana: If one designated a female animal as a guilt-offering

and it gave birth—

what is the law regarding whether her offspring may be sacrificed as a burnt-offering?

And

before the Gemara presents Rabbi Avin bar Kahana’s resolution of the question, the Gemara raises an objection:

Let him resolve it from

the words of

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, who said [19b], “

Rabbi Elazar concedes

that, in the case of one who designated a female animal as a guilt-offering, her offspring is not sacrificed as a guilt-offering,” and all the more so it is not sacrificed as a burnt-offering, as explained .

What, then, is he asking? And we answer:

“He did not hear it”—

Rabbi Avin did not hear the statement of Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Ḥanina. That is, he does not accept it .

meaning that Rabbi Avin had not heard the statement of Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Hanina. In other words, he does not accept that ruling .

What is the law,

What is the ruling—

He said to him,

Rabbi Avin bar Kahana to Rabbi Avin bar Ḥiyya:

Her offspring is sacrificed as a burnt-offering!

As will be explained.

Rabbi Avin bar Ḥiyya challenges him:

What is this—

what rationale is there for saying so? Is it not the case that

Rabbi Elazar spoke only with regard to one who designated a female animal as a burnt-offering,

because

there is

“

the designation ‘burnt-offering’

applies to its mother”—

but with regard to a guilt-offering, where there is no

“

the designation ‘burnt-offering’

applies to its mother,” even Rabbi Elazar concedes that the offspring itself should not be sacrificed. How, then, did he resolve the question by saying that the offspring may be sacrificed as a burnt-offering?

He said to him,

Rabbi Avin bar Kahana:

Rabbi Elazar’s rationale is not that the designation “burnt-offering” applies to its mother, but rather that it is

fit to be sacrificed,

and therefore the offspring is sacrificed as a burnt-offering.

And this too,

and the same applies to a guilt-offering—the offspring

is fit to be sacrificed.