Temurah 16b (טז:) — the Talmud in English

The Gemara discusses the statement of Rabbi Shimon:

But can one derive the possible from the other possible?!

The fact that these three sin offerings do not apply to a communal sin offering is not a halakha; rather, the reason they do not apply to the community is that it is “impossible” for them to exist in a communal context—not with regard to their being left to die, and not even with regard to their being sacrificed. If so, how does Rabbi Shimon derive the other two cases from them, when it is “possible” for those cases to exist in a communal context?

For Reish Lakish said: Four

sin offerings that are left to die

were designated for them

by one halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai, while another halakha was given concerning the fifth, that it should be left to graze. But they forgot which one was the fifth that should be left to graze. Therefore, because of the uncertainty,

they established all five as

cases that were treated stringently, and all of them are left to die.

Since all four sin offerings that are left to die were stated in one halakha, it is obvious that they were stated in a single manner—either with regard to communal sin offerings or with regard to individual sin offerings.

The Gemara answers the question in two ways: in one explanation Reish Lakish answers it, and in the other Rabbi Natan answers it. The essence of their answers is one explanation: the halakha was not transmitted separately for each case—that is, one halakha for the offspring of a sin offering, another halakha for an animal substituted for a sin offering, and likewise for the other sin offerings. Rather, the Sages listed them together, until they numbered five sin offerings. Instead, the halakha was given concerning all of them, as will be explained, as a single unit. This was the wording of the halakha: These sin offerings and those sin offerings— their law is that they are left to die, according to Reish Lakish, or that they are left to graze, according to Rabbi Natan.

And since this is so, and since several of them do not apply to communal offerings, it is clear that this general halakha was given only with regard to an individual sin offering!

It follows that this is not a derivation of one matter from another, of the “possible” from the “impossible.” Rather, it is merely a clarification that this halakha, which includes all the sin offerings, applies only to individual sin offerings. From now on, the concealed element within the halakha can be derived from the explicit element within it.

The Sages in the generation of Joshua therefore concluded from this,

and

said:

If it could enter your mind

that all four of them also apply

to communal offerings,

how could this be said? After all,

these

four cases,

are they applicable to communal offerings at all?!

It is obvious that among them are three that do not apply to communal offerings! And even if we say that the one that is left to graze is one of those three that do not apply to communal offerings—namely, the offspring of a sin offering, an animal substituted for a sin offering, and one whose owners died—in any event, the other two that do not apply to communal offerings are included among the four whose law is that they are left to die.

Rather, you are forced to say

that since among the four there are three, or two, that do not apply to communal offerings, this halakha was transmitted only with regard to individual sin offerings. From now on,

the concealed

element—the halakha that one of them is left to die—can also be derived

from the explicit

element: from the one or two among the four that do apply to communal offerings, and nevertheless the “explicit” halakha was transmitted as applying only to an individual offering.

In brief: There are not four sin offerings that apply to communal offerings, and therefore the halakha was certainly transmitted with regard to an individual sin offering! And the halakha was stated “explicitly” to teach that even the case that does apply to communal offerings applies only to an individual offering.

This is Reish Lakish’s explanation of Rabbi Shimon’s reasoning. Rabbi Natan, however, offers a different approach.

Rabbi Natan says: One

of the five

was designated for them

to be left to die, by one halakha! And by a second halakha, the other four were designated to be left to graze! But they forgot which one was to be left to die and which were to be left to graze,

and they established it as five

and, because of the uncertainty, the Sages established all five and treated them stringently, so that their law was that they were to be left to die.

Before Rabbi Natan completes his answer according to his approach, the Gemara raises a difficulty:

Why did they establish all five and treat them stringently on account of one of them?

After all, the five sin offerings are divided into two “series.” One series consists of an offering whose owners achieved atonement and one whose year passed; these apply both to individual and communal offerings. The second series consists of the offspring of a sin offering, an animal substituted for a sin offering, and one whose owners died; these apply only to an individual offering—

And now, although they had forgotten which one was to be left to die, in any event

let us see

it was possible to ascertain, regarding the fifth one concerning which the halakha was transmitted that it should be left to die,

with regard to which series was it taught to them

to which “series” it belongs:

whether to an individual

that is, whether it belongs to the “series” of the three that apply only to an individual,

or to the community

or to the series of the two that apply also to communal offerings—

And if they remembered that the one to be left to die belonged to the series of those that apply both to an individual and to the community, one of the two, they would decree that only the other one in that series be left to die, while the three in the other series would retain their halakha that they are left to graze and not left to die—even in the case of an individual offering! And if they remembered that it belonged to the series that applies only to an individual, one of the three, they would decree that only the other two in that series be left to die, while the two in the other series would retain their halakha that they are left to graze and not left to die. Why, then, did they decree that all five be left to die?

And we answer:

They forgot two things!

They forgot to which “series” it belonged, and they also forgot which one it was! Therefore, they decreed that all five be left to die.

The Gemara now concludes Rabbi Natan’s explanation:

And

since they had forgotten everything, therefore

it was difficult for them

Those Sages who lived in the days of Joshua were uncertain about this: Was the halakha stated also with regard to communal offerings? And they decided the matter based on the following reasoning:

If it could enter your mind

that the halakha that four of them are left to graze was stated also

with regard to communal offerings,

how could this be possible?

Are these applicable to communal offerings at all?

Can all four of them apply to communal offerings? After all, three of them do not apply to communal offerings, and at the very least two of them do not apply to communal offerings, as explained.

Rather, conclude from this: The concealed is derived from the explicit: whatever is

the

explicitly stated with regard to an individual offering

specifically

and not with regard to a communal offering,

even though among them there is one or two that apply to communal offerings.

So too, the concealed—

with regard to an individual offering and not to a communal offering.

This is Rabbi Shimon’s reasoning. Rabbi Yehuda, however, disagrees with him on this point and maintains that although among the four there are some that do not apply to communal offerings, nevertheless they were not transmitted as a single unit, either with regard to an individual offering or with regard to both an individual and a communal offering. Rather, whichever of them can apply to a communal offering is left to die, even though some of them do not apply to communal offerings.

Mishna:

After explaining the distinction between an individual offering and a communal offering, the Mishna explains the distinction between temura and ordinary consecrated offerings—that is, an animal that was consecrated with its initial sanctity.

There is a stringency of consecrated offerings over temura, and a stringency of temura over consecrated offerings.

The Mishna explains:

The stringency of consecrated offerings over temura:

a.

Consecrated offerings effect temura, but temura does not effect temura,

as explained above in the Mishna [12a] and in the Gemara [13a], because it is stated [Leviticus 27]: “and its substitute,” and we expound: but not the substitute of its substitute.

b.

The community and partners may consecrate offerings, but they may not effect temura,

as explained above in the Mishna [13a].

c.

And they may consecrate limbs and fetuses,

but they may not effect temura,

as explained above [10b], that it is impossible to designate an unconsecrated limb as a temura, by saying that this limb is the substitute for the animal; and this is Rabbi Yehuda’s method. Likewise, it is impossible to designate an unconsecrated fetus as consecrated.

One who consecrates an unblemished animal, and afterward a blemish develops in it, gives it a stringent sanctity: even if it is redeemed, it has only the status of being permitted for consumption, and it is forbidden to shear it or work with it. But one who consecrates a blemished animal, whose “blemish preceded its consecration,” gives it a lesser sanctity; it leaves the realm of consecration through redemption, and it is permitted to be shorn and worked.

This is not so with one who substitutes a blemished unconsecrated animal for an unblemished consecrated animal: the former assumes the stringent sanctity of one who consecrates an unblemished animal, and it does not leave the realm of consecration to permit shearing and work. Its sanctity is not lesser, as is that of one who consecrates a blemished animal.

The stringency of temura over consecrated offerings:

a.

The sanctity

that is, the sanctity of temura

takes effect upon an animal with a permanent blemish.

b.

It does not leave the realm of consecration

to be shorn or worked.

This is because the Torah revealed with regard to temura that even if the blemish preceded its consecration, the sanctity of temura takes effect upon it, as it is stated [there]: “the good with the bad and the bad with the good.” “Bad” refers to a blemished animal, as explained above [9a].