Temurah 13b — the Talmud in English

Rabbi disagrees and holds that it is not necessary to exclude all of these from the analogy to animal tithe. For it is possible to exclude a communal offering and partners from what is stated, “He shall not exchange it and he shall not substitute it,” in the singular, as explained in the Mishna. And it is likewise possible to exclude consecrated property for the repair of the Temple from “offering,” as explained above; and the matter that does not come as an obligation will be explained below as having been excluded because it is a communal offering.

Therefore

Rabbi says: Why did animal tithe emerge

from the general rule, so as to be discussed with regard to “substitution of its name” and “substitution of its body”?

That is,

animal tithe emerged from all other consecrated offerings through a “new matter,” called “substitution of its name.” For if a person erred while counting the flock and passing them beneath the staff, and called the one that emerged tenth “ninth,” and called the one that emerged eleventh “tenth”—all of them become consecrated!

This one that emerged tenth is consecrated with the sanctity of animal tithe, since it emerged tenth, despite his having called it “ninth.”

This one that emerged eleventh is consecrated with the sanctity of a peace-offering, since he called it “tenth,” even though the calling was in error, for it is not tenth. And this law is derived [Bekhorot 60b] from what the Torah said in the passage concerning tithe [there], “And every tithe,” and it is a special innovation concerning animal tithe, and it does not apply to all consecrated offerings. This is what is called “substitution of its name.”

And since animal tithe emerged to be discussed through the new matter, “substitution of its name,” we might have said that one has in it only its innovation; therefore, it has no law whatsoever of “substitution of its body” [which is the ordinary substitution, in which one places an unconsecrated animal beside a consecrated animal and says, “This is the substitute for this”; it is called “substitution of its body” to distinguish it from “substitution of its name”]. As will be explained below in the Gemara, “A matter that emerged to be discussed through a new matter has in it only its innovation.” Therefore, the Torah returned it to the general rule of all consecrated offerings and wrote concerning it “substitution of its body.”

To tell you,

incidentally the beraita explains what differences in law there are between “substitution of its name” and “substitution of its body” with regard to animal tithe.

a

. Substitution of its name is offered,

as a peace-offering. For we derive [Bekhorot 61a] from what is stated in the passage concerning peace-offerings [Leviticus 3], “If it is from the cattle,” to include the “eleventh” among peace-offerings—

whereas

substitution of its body is not offered

at all [unlike other substitutions, which are offered with the sanctity of the offering for which they were substituted], but it grazes until a blemish occurs in it, and it is eaten by its owners, as explained below in the Mishna [21a]. And above [5b] this was derived through a gzera shava from the firstborn.

b.

Substitution of its name is redeemed,

it is redeemed when a blemish occurs in it, for it is a peace-offering, and peace-offerings are redeemed.

Whereas

substitution of its body is not redeemed

when it has a blemish, and its redemption does not become invested with sanctity [unlike other blemished consecrated offerings, whose redemption becomes invested with sanctity and which thereby become unconsecrated]. As it is written [there], in the passage concerning tithe: “It and its substitute shall be holy; it shall not be redeemed.”

c.

Substitution of its body takes effect upon a matter that is fit

for offering,

and upon a matter that is unfit

for offering, such as a blemished animal, just as tithe takes effect upon a blemished animal, as it is stated [there], “He shall not inspect whether it is good or bad.” And what sanctity takes effect upon a blemished animal? That it is eaten with the sanctity of tithe: it may not be slaughtered in a butcher shop and may not be weighed by the litra, as explained above [5b].

And

whereas

substitution of its name takes effect only upon a matter that is fit,

and not upon a blemished animal. For it is a peace-offering, and its law is like that of other consecrated offerings, which do not become completely consecrated when they were consecrated while blemished.

And now the Gemara returns to the essence of Rabbi’s statement: Since the Torah innovated in animal tithe the law of “substitution of its name,” we might have said that it has no law of “substitution of its body” [and therefore the Torah needed to return and state in its regard the law of substitution of its body]:

They said,

is it so that

because the Merciful One multiplied [that is, the Torah multiplied]

and made its law more stringent

in that it has “substitution of its name”—

is it thereby diminished,

so that its law should be inferior [more lenient] to that of other consecrated offerings, and it should not have the law of “substitution of its body”?! And we answer:

Yes!

Because

we say: Whatever it multiplied,

the law that the Torah innovated in its regard—

it multiplied; and whatever it did not multiply—

it did not multiply!

And the Gemara asks:

But from where could this be inferred?!

From where do you have grounds to state this reasoning? Is it not one of the hermeneutical principles through which the Torah is expounded? And the question returns: Why did the Torah return and write the law of substitution of its body concerning tithe?

And we answer:

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: Because it was a matter that came to be discussed through a new matter—

and one has in it only its innovation.

Therefore the Torah needed to multiply in its regard also “substitution of its body” .

We learned in a beraita that Rabbi Shimon learned from animal tithe that only a matter that comes as an obligation makes substitution. The Gemara explains what is a matter that comes as an obligation, and what it comes to exclude.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said to Rava: According to Rabbi Shimon, who says “a matter that comes as an obligation”—

is it only

an obligatory burnt-offering,

such as the burnt-offering of a leper, one who experienced a flux, or a woman after childbirth,

that makes substitution, whereas a voluntary burnt-offering

which one vowed as a gift—

does not

make substitution?!

He said to him,

Rava:

A voluntary burnt-offering also,

since he accepted it upon himself

to offer it therefore

makes substitution—

And it was necessary

to exclude not a voluntary burnt-offering

, but to

exclude

a burnt-offering that comes from surplus funds,

such as: a guilt-offering that was detached from being offered [the substitution of a guilt-offering, the offspring of a guilt-offering, and so on], whose law is that it grazes until it develops a blemish, and it is sold, and from its proceeds a burnt-offering is offered. And similarly, one who set aside money for his sin-offering or guilt-offering, and the money remained over, brings a burnt-offering with that money, as explained below [23b]—

And concerning that burnt-offering, which is not an obligation, Rabbi Shimon said that it does not make substitution, because it was excluded by animal tithe, which comes as an obligation.

The tannaim disputed [below, 20b] concerning that surplus money—what is done with it. The Sages hold: It is placed into collection boxes [boxes that were in the Temple courtyard where consecrated money was placed, one box for each purpose, and the eighth box was designated for surplus money of a sin-offering and guilt-offering], and from it they purchase a “communal burnt-offering.” Whereas Rabbi Elazar holds: The owners themselves bring a burnt-offering with it, not as an obligatory burnt-offering, but as a gift, and it is a “private burnt-offering.”

Therefore the Gemara clarifies:

What does Rabbi Shimon hold,

who excludes a burnt-offering that comes from surplus funds from the law of substitution?

If he holds like the one

who says that surplus funds go to a communal gift-offering,

there is a difficulty:

It is obvious that it does not make substitution, for there is no substitution in

an

offering of the community,

so why is it necessary to exclude it through a separate exposition?!

Rather, Rabbi Shimon holds like the one who says that surplus funds go to a private gift-offering.

Therefore it was not excluded because there is no substitution in a communal offering, but because it does not come as an obligation.

And we ask:

Who is the one from whom you heard this reasoning,

who teaches us this reasoning? Is it not

Rabbi Elazar

who is the one , and this is difficult:

We have heard him explicitly,

for we heard him say explicitly that he holds

it makes substitution—

As it was taught,

for we learned in a beraita:

A burnt-offering that comes from surplus funds makes substitution;

these are

the words of Rabbi Elazar?

And we answer: Indeed,

, Rabbi Shimon—

agrees with him in one matter,

he agrees with Rabbi Elazar concerning one law,

and disagrees with him in one matter,

and disagrees with him concerning another law—

he agrees

with him in one matter,

in that Rabbi Elazar holds

that surplus funds go to a private obligation. And he disagrees with him in one matter, for Rabbi Elazar holds: A burnt-offering that comes from surplus funds makes substitution,

because it is a private offering,

whereas

он,

he,

Rabbi Shimon himself,

holds: It does not make substitution,

because it is not a matter that comes as an obligation, and it was excluded from the analogy to animal tithe.

We learned above [9a] that Rabbi Yoḥanan holds, according to Rabbi Shimon, that concerning an offering for which substitution was made, one does not return and make substitution for it. And there the Gemara lengthened its discussion concerning the dilemmas of Rabbi Avin according to this position. One of the forms of the dilemma is as follows: One set aside a guilt-offering with which to achieve atonement, and substitution was made for it, and it was already impossible to return and make substitution for it, but it was lost and he achieved atonement through another offering; then it was found again, and this guilt-offering was detached to become a burnt-offering. The dilemma is whether one returns and makes substitution for it, since it is a different sanctity and its sanctity changed from guilt-offering to burnt-offering, and with regard to that new sanctity of a burnt-offering no substitution had yet been made; or whether, because substitution had already been made for it in that same body, one does not return and make substitution for it.

And now, according to the conclusion of our Gemara, this is difficult: What is the dilemma at all? Surely one does not make substitution for it according to Rabbi Shimon, because it is “a burnt-offering that comes from surplus funds”!

If so,

that one does not make substitution for a burnt-offering that comes from surplus funds—

this

that Rabbi Avin posed as a dilemma: One set aside a guilt-offering with which to achieve atonement, it became blemished, and he exchanged it for another

and achieved atonement [that is, alternatively, it did not become blemished, but was lost and he achieved atonement]

то есть если животное не получило порока, а потерялось и человек искупил свою вину другой жертвой,

with another guilt-offering, and this one was detached to become a burnt-offering—

what is the law: may he return and make substitution for it?

And this is difficult:

According to whose position,

according to the position of which tanna did Rabbi Avin pose his dilemma?

If you say according to Rabbi Shimon,

according to whose view Rabbi Yoḥanan said that one does not return and make substitution with one body and one sanctity—

how can this be said? For Rabbi Shimon

learned from animal tithe,

he learned from the analogy to animal tithe that a burnt-offering that comes from surplus funds does not make substitution at all. So what is his dilemma?

And we answer:

This is what Rabbi Avin was asking as a dilemma: If you find

if there is

a tanna who stands like Rabbi Shimon,

who holds like him [according to Rabbi Yoḥanan],

who says that one does not make substitution and return and make substitution

with one body and one sanctity,

and

also

holds like Rabbi Elazar, who says that a burnt-offering that comes from surplus funds—

makes substitution,

according to that tanna there is a dilemma:

what is the law: may he return and make substitution for it?

The first dilemma is

concerning “two bodies and one sanctity,”

that is: one set aside a guilt-offering with which to achieve atonement, made substitution for it, and it became blemished, and he exchanged it for another—

what?

Does one return and make substitution for it, since it is another body, or does one not return and make substitution since it is one sanctity?

And if you should say

that since it is

one sanctity, one does not

make substitution,

but rather,

the dilemma is

concerning “two sanctities and one body,”

that is, he achieved atonement through another guilt-offering, and the first, which had been lost, was found and detached to become a burnt-offering—

what?

Does one return and make substitution for it, since it is a different sanctity, or does one not return and make substitution since it is one body?

And we conclude:

Let it remain a dilemma!

The dilemma shall remain and was not resolved!

We shall return to you, Tractate Temura, Chapter ‘All Make Substitution’