Temurah 13b (יג:) — the Talmud in English

Rabbi disagrees and maintains that it is not necessary to exclude all these from the analogy to animal tithe. For the communal offering and the offering of partners can be excluded on the basis of the wording “He shall not exchange it and he shall not substitute it,” which is in the singular, as explained in the Mishna. Likewise, sanctified objects designated for the repair of the Temple can be excluded from the word “offering,” as explained above; and the matter that does not come as an obligation will be explained below as having been excluded because it is a communal offering.

Therefore,

Rabbi says: Why did animal tithe emerge

from the general category, so that it should be subject to “substitution of its name” and “substitution of its body”?

That is,

animal tithe emerged from all other sacred offerings through a “new matter,” known as “substitution of its name.” If the person counting the flock as he passes them under the rod made a mistake and called the one that emerged tenth “ninth,” and called the one that emerged eleventh “tenth,” they are all sacred!

The one that emerged tenth is sacred with the sanctity of animal tithe, since it emerged tenth, despite his having called it “ninth.”

The one that emerged eleventh is sacred with the sanctity of a peace-offering, since he called it “tenth,” even though he called it so by mistake, as it was not tenth. This law is derived [Bekhorot 60b] from what the Torah says in the passage concerning tithe [there]: “And every tithe.” It is a special innovation concerning animal tithe, and does not apply to all sacred offerings; this is what is called “substitution of its name.”

And since animal tithe emerged to be judged by this new matter, “substitution of its name,” one might have said that one has only the scope of its innovation, and therefore the law of “substitution of its body” does not apply to it at all [this is the ordinary substitution, in which one places a non-sacred animal beside a sacred animal and says, “This is in place of that”; it is called “substitution of its body” to distinguish it from “substitution of its name”]. As the Gemara will explain below, “A matter that emerged to be judged by a new matter has only the scope of its innovation.” Therefore, the Torah restored it to the general category of all sacred offerings and wrote with regard to it the law of “substitution of its body.”

To tell you,

the beraita incidentally explains what differences in law there are between “substitution of its name” and “substitution of its body” in animal tithe.

a.

Substitution of its name may be offered,

as a peace-offering. For we derive [Bekhorot 61a] from what is stated in the passage concerning peace-offerings [Leviticus 3], “If his offering is from the cattle,” that the “eleventh” is included among peace-offerings—

whereas

substitution of its body may not be offered

at all [unlike other substitutions, which are offered with the sanctity of the offering for which the substitution was made]. Rather, it grazes until it develops a blemish, and then it is eaten by its owners, as explained below in the Mishna [21a]. Above [5b], this is derived by means of a gzera shava from the firstborn.

b.

Substitution of its name may be redeemed,

that is, it may be redeemed when it develops a blemish, since it is a peace-offering, and peace-offerings may be redeemed.

Whereas

substitution of its body may not be redeemed

when it has a blemish, and its redemption does not acquire sanctity [unlike other blemished sacred offerings, whose redemption acquires sanctity and which thereby become non-sacred]. As it is written [there] in the passage concerning tithe: “It and its substitute shall be sacred; it may not be redeemed.”

c.

Substitution of its body takes effect upon an animal fit

for offering,

and upon an animal unfit

for offering, such as one with a blemish, just as animal tithe takes effect upon an animal with a blemish, as it is stated [there]: “He shall not inspect whether it is good or bad.” What sanctity takes effect upon an animal with a blemish? It is eaten with the sanctity of tithe: it may not be slaughtered in a butcher shop or weighed by the pound, as explained above [5b].

And

whereas

substitution of its name takes effect only upon an animal fit,

and not upon one with a blemish. For it is a peace-offering, and its law is like that of other sacred offerings, which do not attain complete sanctity when consecrated while they have a blemish.

The Gemara now returns to the central point of Rabbi’s statement: Since the Torah innovated in the case of animal tithe the law of “substitution of its name,” one might have said that the law of “substitution of its body” does not apply to it [and therefore the Torah had to repeat that the law of substitution of its body applies to it]:

They said,

but

because the Torah increased [that is, the Torah included] and made stringent in its case

that it has “substitution of its name”—

was it thereby diminished,

so that its law would be inferior [more lenient] than that of other sacred offerings, and the law of “substitution of its body” would not apply to it?! And we answer:

Yes!

Because

we say: Whatever the Torah increased—

the law that the Torah innovated in its case—

it increased; and whatever the Torah did not increase—

it did not increase!

The Gemara analyzes this:

But from where could you derive this?!

From where do you have grounds to state this logical principle? It is not one of the hermeneutical principles by which the Torah is expounded. The question therefore returns: Why did the Torah repeat the law of substitution of its body with regard to animal tithe?

And we answer:

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: Because it was a matter that came to be judged by a new matter—

and it has only the scope of its innovation.

Therefore the Torah had to include the law of “substitution of its body” as well.

We learned in a beraita that Rabbi Shimon derived from animal tithe that only an offering that comes as an obligation effects substitution. The Gemara explains what is considered an offering that comes as an obligation, and what the statement comes to exclude.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said to Rava: According to Rabbi Shimon, who says, “an offering that comes as an obligation”—

is it only

an obligatory burnt-offering,

such as the burnt-offering of a leper, a zav, or a woman after childbirth,

that effects substitution, whereas a voluntary burnt-offering,

which a person volunteered as a gift,

does not

effect substitution?!

He said to him,

Rava:

A voluntary burnt-offering also,

once he accepted it upon himself

to offer it, therefore

effects substitution—

And it was necessary

to exclude a voluntary burnt-offering

, but to

exclude

a burnt-offering that comes from surplus funds,

such as a guilt-offering that was detached from its offering [the substitute for a guilt-offering, the offspring of a guilt-offering, and the like], whose law is that it grazes until it develops a blemish, is sold, and a burnt-offering is offered with its proceeds. And similarly, if one set aside money for his sin-offering or guilt-offering and money remained over, he brings a burnt-offering with that money, as explained below [23b]—

And it is concerning that burnt-offering, which is not an obligatory offering, that Rabbi Shimon said that it does not effect substitution, because it was excluded through the analogy to animal tithe, which comes as an obligation.

The tannaim disputed [below, 20b] what is done with that surplus money. The Sages maintain: It is placed into the collection boxes [boxes in the Temple courtyard into which consecrated money was deposited, each box having a particular designation; the eighth box was designated for surplus money from sin-offerings and guilt-offerings], and with it they purchase a “communal burnt-offering.”

Rabbi Elazar, however, maintains: The owners themselves bring a burnt-offering with it—not as an obligatory burnt-offering, but as a gift; and it is a “private burnt-offering.” The Gemara therefore clarifies:

What does Rabbi Shimon hold,

when he excludes a burnt-offering that comes from surplus funds from the law of substitution?

If he holds like the one

who says that surplus funds go to the communal voluntary offerings,

the difficulty is:

It is obvious that it does not effect substitution, for there is no substitution with regard to a

communal

offering,

so why is it necessary to exclude it through a separate derivation?!

Rather, Rabbi Shimon holds like the one who says that surplus funds go to private voluntary offerings.

Therefore, it was not excluded because substitution does not apply to a communal offering, but because it does not come as an obligation.

And we ask:

Who is the one from whom you heard this opinion,

that is, who teaches us this view?

Rabbi Elazar

is the one , but this is difficult:

We have heard him explicitly,

for we heard him state explicitly that he holds

that it effects substitution—

As it was taught

in a beraita:

A burnt-offering that comes from surplus funds effects substitution;

these are

the words of Rabbi Elazar?

And we answer: Indeed,

, Rabbi Shimon

agrees with him in one matter,

that is, he agrees with Rabbi Elazar concerning one law,

but disagrees with him in another,

and disputes him concerning another law:

He agrees

with him in one matter,

in that Rabbi Elazar maintains

that surplus funds go to private obligations. But he disagrees with him in one matter, for Rabbi Elazar maintains: A burnt-offering that comes from surplus funds effects substitution,

because it is a private offering,

whereas

he,

Rabbi Shimon himself,

, maintains: It does not effect substitution,

because it is not an offering that comes as an obligation, and it was excluded through the analogy to animal tithe.

We learned above [9a] that Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains, in the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, that once an offering has had a substitution made for it, one may not make another substitution for it. The Gemara there elaborated on the questions of Rabbi Avin according to this view. One form of the question concerns a person who designated a guilt-offering to achieve atonement through it, and a substitution was made for it, so that it was no longer possible to make another substitution for it; but it was then lost and he achieved atonement through another offering, after which it was found and this guilt-offering was detached for a burnt-offering. The question is whether one may again make a substitution for it, since it now has a different sanctity and its sanctity changed from that of a guilt-offering to that of a burnt-offering, and no substitution has yet been made for that new sanctity of a burnt-offering; or whether, since a substitution was already made for this very animal, one may not again make a substitution for it.

Now, according to the conclusion of our Gemara, this is difficult: What was the question in the first place? Surely, according to Rabbi Shimon, one may not make a substitution for it because it is “a burnt-offering that comes from surplus funds”!

If so,

that one may not make a substitution for a burnt-offering that comes from surplus funds—

this

is what Rabbi Avin asked: If one designated a guilt-offering to achieve atonement through it, it developed a blemish, and he redeemed it onto another animal

and achieved atonement [that is, alternatively, it did not develop a blemish, but was lost and he achieved atonement through another offering],

and this one was detached for a burnt-offering—

what is the law: May he again make a substitution for it?

This is difficult:

According to whose view,

that is, according to which tanna did Rabbi Avin raise his question?

If you say it is according to Rabbi Shimon,

according to whom Rabbi Yoḥanan said that one may not make a substitution and then make another substitution involving the same body and the same sanctity—

how can this be said? Rabbi Shimon

derived it from animal tithe:

he derived from the analogy to animal tithe that a burnt-offering that comes from surplus funds does not effect substitution at all. What, then, was his question?

And we answer:

This is what Rabbi Avin was asking: If you find

that there exists

a tanna who follows Rabbi Shimon,

who holds like him [according to Rabbi Yoḥanan],

that one may not make a substitution and then make another substitution

with the same body and the same sanctity,

and

also

holds like Rabbi Elazar, who says that a burnt-offering that comes from surplus funds

does effect substitution,

according to that tanna the question must be asked:

What is the law: May he again make a substitution for it?

The first question is

concerning “two bodies and one sanctity,”

namely, one designated a guilt-offering to achieve atonement through it, made a substitution for it, it developed a blemish, and he redeemed it onto another animal—

what

is the law? May one again make a substitution for it, since it is a different body, or may one not again make a substitution for it, since it has one sanctity?

And if you should say

that since it has

one sanctity, one may not

make a substitution,

rather,

his question concerns

“two sanctities and one body,”

namely, he achieved atonement through another guilt-offering, and the first, lost animal was found and detached for a burnt-offering—

what

is the law? May one again make a substitution for it, since it now has a different sanctity, or may one not again make a substitution for it, since it is the same body?

And we conclude:

Let it remain a question!

The question shall remain unresolved, and it was not resolved!

We will return to you, chapter ‘All Effect Substitution’