Temurah 13a (יג.) — the Talmud in English

The Sages hold that a bet ha-peras is made over

three fields.

That is, the field in which there was a grave, and one field on this side and one field on that side, on its two sides, but not on all four sides surrounding it. For example, if it is the practice of the people of the valley to plow their fields from east to west, the bet ha-peras extends to the field to the east and to the field to the west, as follows:

And if their practice is to plow from north to south, the bet ha-peras extends to the north and to the south, as follows:

This is because we are concerned that the plow may have dragged the earth of the bet ha-peras, together with the bones of the deceased, in that direction. But it does not extend to all four sides, because it is not the practice to plow both lengthwise and widthwise—

and those two fields become a bet ha-peras only up to the place where he plowed,

and

not beyond the measure of

“two furrows,”

one furrow in this direction and one furrow in that direction.

That is, the field in which the grave was plowed is entirely a bet ha-peras, since we do not know where in the field the grave had been. And since we must be concerned that the grave may have been at the edge of the field, from which point the bones of the deceased were dragged into the adjoining field, that field likewise becomes a bet ha-peras from that point onward for the measure of “a full furrow.” All this applies only on the sides in the direction in which the plow travels—east and west, or north and south—as explained .

The Gemara clarifies:

And how much

is the measure of

“a full furrow”? —

One hundred cubits,

for the Sages estimated that bones can be dragged by the plow up to this distance.

As we learned [

there, mishna 1]:

One who plows over a grave—

this person makes a bet ha-peras.

Up to

what distance does he make it? A full furrow,

which is

one hundred cubits.

We learned in our Mishna:

And there is no teruma after teruma.

The Gemara discusses this:

Whose opinion is expressed in the Mishna?

Whose Mishna is it?

It is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva!

As we learned

Partners

in produce

who separated teruma one after the other—

Rabbi Eliezer says: The teruma of both of them—

is teruma,

since both of them have a share in the produce, and each one separated teruma for himself.

Rabbi Akiva says: The teruma of neither of them is teruma,

not even that of the first, since the second went back and separated teruma after him, thereby indicating that he does not agree with the first one’s teruma. It follows that the first separated teruma “without the knowledge of his fellow,” that is, without his consent, and one who separates teruma without the owner’s knowledge—his teruma is not teruma. Likewise, the teruma of the second is not teruma, because the first, by separating his teruma, indicated that he was not pleased with the second’s teruma.

And the Sages say: If the first separated the requisite measure

of teruma, which is one-fiftieth—

the teruma of the second is not teruma,

since the first has already exempted the produce ,

But if he did not separate

the first

the requisite measure,

for example, he separated with a begrudging eye, which is one-sixtieth—

the teruma of the second is teruma.

It follows that our Mishna, which states that the teruma of the second is not teruma , is the Mishna of Rabbi Akiva .

We learned in our Mishna:

And a temura does not effect another temura.

The Gemara discusses this:

What is the reason?

The verse states [Leviticus 27]: “And it shall be, he and his temura

,”

and we expound:

“His temura”—

but not the temura of his temura.

We learned in our Mishna:

And an offspring does not effect temura.

The reason is:

The verse states [

there]: “And it shall be

he

and his temura,” and we expound:

“He,”

meaning only a consecrated animal,

effects

temura, but not an offspring .

We learned in our Mishna:

Rabbi Yehuda says: An offspring does effect temura.

This is because

the verse states [

there]: “And it shall be, he and his temura

shall be

holy,” and we expound the superfluous word

“shall be”

—

to include an offspring.

The Gemara clarifies:

And the Rabbis,

what do they derive from the superfluous word “shall be”?

And we answer:

To include an inadvertent act as equivalent to an intentional act,

such that if he effected temura inadvertently—for example, he intended to say, “The black ox that leaves my house shall be a temura,” but said “the white ox”—its temura is a temura.

And although in such a case, if he “consecrated” an offering, it would not become consecrated, because it would be a mistaken consecration, nevertheless, with regard to temura, the temura takes effect. This is learned from the word “shall be.”

Mishna:

Bird-offerings and meal-offerings do not effect temura.

As only “animal” is stated. [Leviticus 27]: “And if he shall indeed substitute animal for animal.”

Leviticus 27]: “And if he shall indeed substitute an animal for an animal.”

The communal offerings and the offerings of partners do not effect temura,

because

it is stated [

there]:

“He shall not exchange it, nor substitute another for it,”

in the singular. And we expound:

An individual effects temura, but the community and partners do not effect temura.

Consecrated property for the repair of the Temple

does not effect temura,

because it is stated [there], “offering,” and consecrated property for the repair of the Temple is not called an offering, as will be explained in the Gemara. These are the words of the first tanna .

Rabbi Shimon agrees that consecrated property for the repair of the Temple does not effect temura. However, he holds that it is impossible to exclude it by means of “an offering,” because in his view consecrated property for the repair of the Temple is called an offering. He excludes it through another derivation. It is as follows:

After the Torah wrote the laws of temura [verses 9–10], it returned and wrote [verses 32–33] the law of temura with regard to animal tithe. This is what is written there: “And every tithe of cattle and flock, whatever passes under the rod, the tenth shall be holy to the Lord. He shall not inspect whether it is good or bad, and he shall not exchange it; and if he shall indeed substitute it, then it and its substitute shall be holy; it may not be redeemed.” Therefore:

Rabbi Shimon said: But does

animal tithe

of cattle

not belong to

all the consecrated offerings that effect temura?

And why was it singled out,

why did the Torah repeat and specify the law of temura with regard to it?

To draw an analogy to it,

so that we may learn from it with regard to the other consecrated offerings,

to tell you:

Just as animal tithe

is an individual offering,

and an animal belonging to partners is exempt from animal tithe, as explained in tractate Bekhorot [56b], and it effects temura, so too every individual offering effects temura;

excluded

[excluded]

are communal offerings

and those of partners.

And just as animal tithe is consecrated for the altar,

and effects temura, so too all consecrated property for the altar.

Excluded is consecrated property for the repair of the Temple.

Gemara:

We learned in our Mishna: Consecrated property for the repair of the Temple does not effect temura.

The Gemara cites a beraita in which consecrated property for the repair of the Temple is excluded from the laws of temura through a derivation.

The Sages taught: Could it be that consecrated property for the repair of the Temple effects temura? The verse states [there]: “And if it is an animal that they offer from it as an

offering

to the Lord... he shall not exchange it nor substitute another for it.” And we expound:

to the Lord ... he shall not exchange it or substitute it.” And we derive:

Those that are called ‘an offering’

effect temura;

excluded is consecrated property for the repair of the Temple, which is not called an offering.

We challenge this:

And

does it

not

call it an offering?!

But it was taught

in another beraita, from which it appears that it is called an offering.

That beraita was taught with regard to slaughtering consecrated animals outside the Temple courtyard . The Torah states [Leviticus 17]: “Any man of the House of Israel who slaughters an ox, lamb, or goat in the camp [outside the courtyard. Rashi] or who slaughters it outside the camp, and does not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting to offer it as an offering to the Lord before the Sanctuary of the Lord... that man shall be cut off from among his people.”

There the beraita derives from the word “offering” that one is liable to receive karet only for slaughtering consecrated animals outside the courtyard, but not for slaughtering non-sacred animals in the courtyard.

The beraita raises the following objection there:

If the word

“offering” is written for this derivation, that is, how do we know that the Torah wrote “offering” for this derivation, and why do we not derive:

I would understand even consecrated property for the repair of the Temple

that if one slaughtered it outside, he is liable to receive karet, for consecrated property for the repair of the Temple

is called an offering?

And from where do we know that it is called an “offering

? As in the verse

concerning the spoils of the war against Midian [Numbers 31]:

“And we shall bring forward an offering to the Lord

of the man who found an article of gold—a bracelet, a bangle, a ring, and a clasp,” and these articles are certainly nothing other than consecrated property for the repair of the Temple?

The verse states: “And he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting,”

and we expound:

Anything that comes to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting,

namely, consecrated property for the altar,

one is liable for it on account of slaughtering outside; and anything that does not come to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting,

such as consecrated property for the repair of the Temple, which is presumed to consist of animals with blemishes—

one is not liable for it on account of slaughtering outside.

This concludes the beraita. The Gemara concludes:

Apparently,

it is evident from the words of the beraita that consecrated property for the repair of the Temple

is called

[is called]

“an offering,”

so how was it excluded by the word “offering” stated with regard to temura?

And we answer:

Rabbi Hanina said: It is not difficult! This

beraita, with regard to slaughtering outside, which holds that consecrated property for the repair of the Temple is called an offering, is the opinion of

Rabbi Shimon,

who in our Mishna excludes consecrated property for the repair of the Temple by analogy to animal tithe and not by the word “offering,” because in his view it is indeed called an “offering.”

This,

whereas the beraita that excludes it from temura on the basis of the word “offering,” is the opinion of

the Rabbis,

who in our Mishna hold that it was excluded because it is not called an “offering.”

According to Rabbi Shimon it is called an offering; according to the Rabbis it is not called an offering.

We challenge this:

And

does it

not

call it an offering?!

But it is written

there, concerning the spoils of the war against Midian:

“And we shall bring forward an offering to the Lord”?

And we answer:

It is called “an offering of the Lord,”

but

“an offering to the Lord,”

whose meaning is an offering brought for the sake of the Lord in the courtyard,

it is not called.

The Gemara cites a beraita in which Rabbi Shimon derives his teaching from the fact that the Torah repeated the law of temura with regard to animal tithe after it had already stated it with regard to the other consecrated offerings, as explained in our Mishna, and the derivation of Rabbi.

The Sages taught:

With regard to animal tithe, the Torah states:

“He shall not inspect whether it is good or bad, and he shall not exchange it.”

And this is subject to the following difficulty:

Why is this stated? Is it not already stated: “He shall not exchange it, nor substitute another for it, good for bad,” and so forth?

And animal tithe is included among all the consecrated offerings.

Rather,

since it is stated: “He shall not exchange it, nor substitute another for it,”

if the Torah had written only this verse, it would have implied that every temura of consecrated property is prohibited:

an individual offering, a communal offering, an offering for the altar, an offering for the repair of the Temple, and something brought as an obligation,

as will be explained below. And since this would have been implied, therefore

the verse states: “He shall not inspect,”

to exclude a communal offering, consecrated property for the repair of the Temple, and something that is not brought as an obligation.

And how is this derived from “do not inspect”?

Rabbi Shimon said: Wasn’t tithe included

among all sacred offerings

and why was it singled out? To tell you: Just as tithe is an individual’s offering

is,

and an altar offering

is,

and something brought as an obligation

is,

and something not brought in partnership

is [as explained in the Mishna], and it effects temura.

So too, every individual offering, altar offering, and something brought as an obligation

and something not brought in partnership,

effects temura. Thus communal offerings, offerings of partners, consecrated property for Temple maintenance, and anything not brought as an obligation were excluded.