Sukkah 43a (מג.) — the Talmud in English

and carry it four cubits through the public domain.

And

that same concern

is the reason

for the decree concerning

the shofar.

And that is

also

the reason

for the decree concerning

the Megilla,

whereby the Sages prevented fulfillment of these mitzvot on Shabbat because of the concern that people might carry them through the public domain in order to go to an expert to learn.

And we object:

If so,

since there is concern lest one carry it four cubits through the public domain, then

the first day

of the festival when it falls on Shabbat

also

should be subject to this concern, and they should decree that the lulav not be taken in the Temple on that day.

And we answer: On the

first

Festival day that falls on Shabbat, there is no concern that people will come to carry the lulav through the public domain, because

the Sages have instituted for him

that he should take it only

in his home, and not take it in the Temple. By virtue of this decree, they will remember not to carry it through the public domain.

and not take it in the Temple. Through this decree, he will remember not to carry it in the public domain.

And we object:

That works after the institution,

when there is properly no need to decree against the first Festival day that falls on Shabbat, since he remembers not to take it out by virtue of the institution that he takes it at home and not in the Temple.

But

before

the court instituted this

institution,

that he should take it at home and not in the Temple—

what can be said?

Why did they permit taking it in the Temple and not fear that he might carry it through the public domain, as they feared on the Shabbat of the intermediate days?

Since this distinction has been rejected, the Gemara offers another distinction:

Rather,

the

first

Festival day, on which the mitzva of taking the lulav is important because

it exists—

there is a mitzva of lulav on it—

by Torah law

also

outside the Temple,

therefore

the Sages did not decree concerning it

not to take it on Shabbat [initially they decreed neither in the Temple nor outside it].

But

these,

the other days,

which do not exist—

there is no obligation to take the lulav on them

by Torah law outside the Temple,

but only in the Temple—since they are less important than the first day,

the Sages decreed concerning them

that the lulav not be taken in the Temple on Shabbat, because of the concern lest one take it in his hand, go to an expert to learn, and carry it four cubits through the public domain.

And we object:

If so,

since initially the Sages did not decree against taking the lulav in the Temple on the first Festival day that fell on Shabbat because of the importance of the lulav on that day, as it was taken by Torah law even outside the Temple,

then

now,

in the present time,

also they should not decree that it may not be taken when the first Festival day falls on Shabbat, because of its importance. For on the first day the lulav is taken by Torah law even outside the Temple.

we should not decree against taking it on the first Festival day that occurs on Shabbat, because of its importance. After all, on the first day the lulav is taken by Torah law even outside the Temple.

And we answer:

We,

we who live in Babylonia,

do not know the establishment of the new month with certainty,

as we do not know with certainty when the first day is, since it is possible that the court in Eretz Yisrael intercalated the month of Elul, in which case the first Festival day falls only on the following day, and the mitzva of lulav does not apply on this Shabbat.

Since it is not certainly the first Festival day, the Sages decreed for the people of Babylonia not to take the lulav on Shabbat because of the concern lest one carry it through the public domain.

And we object: If so,

they,

the people of Eretz Yisrael,

who know the establishment of the new month with certainty,

and know that the mitzva of lulav by Torah law does apply on that day even outside the Temple—

let it override

Shabbat, so that they should take the lulav on the first Festival day when it falls on Shabbat even in the present time. For on a Shabbat when the mitzva of lulav applies by Torah law outside the Temple, the Sages did not decree against taking it.

And we answer:

Indeed, so!

The people of Eretz Yisrael should take the lulav on this Shabbat even in the present time.

In fact, the Gemara will explain below [44a] that even in Eretz Yisrael they do not take the lulav on Shabbat except during the time when the Temple was standing.

The Gemara brings proof that this is indeed the practical practice of the people of Eretz Yisrael.

For we learned in one

Mishna, our Mishna:

On the first Festival day of Sukkot when it falls on Shabbat—

all the people bring their lulavim to the Temple Mount.

And we learned in another

Mishna, in the previous chapter [41b]: On the first Festival day of Sukkot when it falls on Shabbat, all the people bring their lulavim on the eve of Shabbat

to the synagogue.

To avoid a contradiction between the two baraitot, we must distinguish between the Temple period and the period afterward: during the Temple period they brought their lulavim on the eve of Shabbat to the Temple, whereas after its destruction they brought their lulavim on the eve of Shabbat to the synagogue.

Infer from this: Here—

during the time when the Temple was standing,

they brought their lulavim to the Temple.

Here—

during the time when the Temple was not standing,

they brought their lulavim to the synagogue.

And we conclude: Indeed,

infer from this

that the people of Eretz Yisrael take the lulav on the first Festival day when it falls on Shabbat even after the Temple was destroyed, and the Sages did not decree against their taking it.

And we raise a difficulty: The lulav,

which exists by Torah law

on the first Festival day even

outside the Temple—

from where do we know this?

And we answer: From this

as it was taught:

It is written in the portion of Emor [Leviticus 23]: “And you shall take for yourselves on the first day the fruit of a beautiful tree, date-palm branches, a branch of a braided tree, and willows of the brook.”

The beraita expounds the wording of the verse: “

And you shall take”—

there must be taking in the hand of each and every person. “

For yourselves”—

from your own property.

To exclude a borrowed or stolen one. “

On the day”—

This is an apparent redundancy. The verse could have said merely “on the first,” and this extra word teaches that on every day on which one takes the lulav,

even on Shabbat. “

First”—

It implies

even outside the Temple,

since the verse did not say that the mitzva applies in the Temple. “

The first”—

It teaches that the definite article limits the meaning: the verse did not permit this on every Shabbat [based on the amplification from “on the day,”] but only on the first Festival day. From here we learn

the exclusion expressed by the definite article, to say that Scripture did not permit every Shabbat [from the inclusion of “on the day”], but only the first Festival day. And from here we learned

that

the lulav

overrides only the first Festival day

[when it falls on Shabbat]

alone.

The Gemara explains the beraita:

The Master said: “

On the day”—

even on Shabbat.

Now,

taking the lulav involves no labor at all; it is merely

handling

a branch,

nothing more.

And is it possible that

the verse was needed to permit

the

handling

of a branch on Shabbat?

Rava said: It is needed—

the verse did not need to permit ordinary taking,

but rather the implements needed for the lulav,

such as cutting it from a tree while attached, which is labor prohibited by Torah law.

And this is according to that tanna:

As it was taught: The lulav and all that is needed for it—

override Shabbat; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer.

The Gemara explains:

What is Rabbi Eliezer’s reason

for permitting labor on Shabbat even when it is not part of the mitzva itself, but merely preparation for fulfilling the mitzva of lulav?

The verse says “

on the day,”

and this word is redundant [the verse could have said merely “on the first”]. From this redundancy Rabbi Eliezer derives that the implements needed for the lulav may be prepared on every day,

even on Shabbat.

The Gemara explains the dispute between the Sages and Rabbi Eliezer:

And the Sages,

who disagree with Rabbi Eliezer—

this redundancy of

“

on the day,”

what do they do with it?

They need it

to teach that taking the lulav is only

by day and not at night.

And Rabbi Eliezer,

who derives from “on the day” permission for the implements needed for the lulav, from where does he derive

by day and not at night—

from where does he know it?

He derives it from the end of the verse.

He learns it from the conclusion of the verse, which discusses taking the lulav in the Temple, where it is written: “

And you shall rejoice before the Lord your God for seven days.”

The meaning of the verse is as follows:

Days, but not nights!

And the Sages: If

we were to learn

from there,

from the “days” in this verse,

I might have thought the opposite:

I might derive that

one should learn that taking the lulav is also a mitzva at night, by applying a

gzera shava of

“days, days”

from

dwelling in a

sukkah,

where the same expression is stated: “You shall dwell in sukkot for seven days.”

Therefore I might say:

Just as there,

in the mitzva of dwelling in a sukkah, the meaning of

“days”

is days

and even nights,

so here,

with regard to taking the lulav,

also,

I might say:

Days, and even nights.

This still requires explanation:

And the fact that the mitzva of dwelling in a

sukkah

itself

applies also at night—

from where do we know it?

After all, the verse says, “You shall dwell in sukkot for seven days,” which in its simple meaning means days and not nights.

The Gemara brings a beraita explaining the source of the obligation to dwell in a sukkah at night.

As the Sages taught:

It is written [Leviticus 23]: “

You shall dwell in sukkot for seven days.”

This is how the “days” in the verse are to be expounded: “

Days”—

and even nights!

Lest you say: From where

do you say that “days” means

“

days and even nights”?

Or is it not so,

and perhaps the verse means

only

the opposite—“

days but not nights”?

And

indeed,

there is a logical basis for learning by a binyan av that the mitzva of sukkah applies only by day and not at night. For:

It is stated here,

with regard to the sukkah, “

days,”

and it is stated with regard to the lulav, “

days.”

Just as there,

with regard to the lulav,

days but not nights,

as it is stated, “on the first day”—

so here,

with regard to the sukkah,

days but not nights.

Your answer is:

Or turn

[perhaps you should turn and go]

to this approach,

which teaches that the mitzva of sukkah applies also at night:

It is stated here,

with regard to the sukkah, “seven

days,”

and it is stated with regard to

Aaron and his sons’ dwelling in the Temple during the days of the

inauguration: “Seven

days.”

days.”

Just as there,

during the days of the inauguration, Aaron and his sons dwelled in the Temple for seven

days and even nights—

so here,

with regard to the sukkah, one must dwell in it for seven

days, and even nights.

The proof that dwelling in a sukkah should be compared with the days of the inauguration rather than with the lulav is that

it is evident to which it is comparable—whether the mitzva of sukkah resembles the lulav or the days of the inauguration.

Behold, one

For

we derive the law of the sukkah, which is

a matter whose mitzva

is practiced throughout

the entire day,

all day

long,

from

the days of the inauguration, when the mitzva of Aaron and his sons’ dwelling in the Tabernacle during the days of the inauguration was

a matter whose mitzva

applied throughout

the entire day.

And the lulav cannot refute the sukkah, since the lulav is

a matter whose mitzva lasts one hour,

only one hour,

at the time of taking, once a day, whereas the mitzva of sukkah continues throughout the entire day.

Lest you say that, on the other hand, one might argue:

Or turn to this approach: We derive the sukkah, which is

a matter whose mitzva

is

practiced

for all generations,

from the lulav, which is also

a matter whose mitzva is practiced for all generations.

And the seven days of the

inauguration cannot refute this,

for they do not

they

apply for all generations!?

Your answer is:

The verse teaches,

through a gzera shava between the sukkah and the seven days of the inauguration [and not through a binyan av]: