Sukkah 31a (לא.) — the Talmud in English

The Gemara explains:

Even initially

—before it was bound—

it was also called a hosha'na,

because it was customary to bind it as a hosha'na during the festival.

The Sages taught: A stolen sukka, and one who roofs a sukka in the public domain,

thereby depriving the public of the use of the area,

Rabbi Eliezer deems invalid

for the reason that will be explained shortly,

but the Sages deem valid.

Rav Naḥman said: The dispute

between Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages is only

when one overpowered another and expelled him from his sukka,

the sukka of the person whose property it was, built on the latter’s land,

and Rabbi Eliezer follows his own reasoning, as he said: A person does not fulfill his obligation with another’s sukka,

even when the other lent it to him. As it is written: “You shall make the Festival of Sukkot for yourself,” and we derive: It must be from your own property [see above, 27b]. Therefore, in either event, he does not fulfill his obligation with this sukka.

For

if land can be stolen,

meaning that the law of theft applies to land, as it does to other movable property that remains in the thief’s possession by means of the “acts of acquisition through theft,” then

it is a stolen sukka,

and Rabbi Eliezer derives from the phrase “you shall make for yourself” that a stolen or borrowed sukka is excluded.

And alternatively, if land cannot be stolen,

as it always remains in the possession of its owners, nevertheless

it is a borrowed sukka,

and according to Rabbi Eliezer a person does not fulfill his obligation with another’s sukka. [The issue discussed here is based on the verse in the Torah (Leviticus 5:21): “When a person sins and trespasses against the Lord and denies his fellow with regard to a deposit or a loan ... or anything about which he swears falsely.” The Gemara in tractate Bava Kamma 117b disagrees about how this verse is expounded. Some expound it by means of “inclusion, exclusion, and inclusion,” according to which the verse is understood to include everything, teaching that the laws of theft apply to every type of theft except documents. According to this view, the law of theft applies even to land. Others expound the verse by means of “a generalization, a specification, and a generalization,” according to which the verse includes everything similar to the specification, excluding land, slaves, and documents.]

The basis of this issue is what is stated in the Torah (Leviticus 5:21): “When a person sins and commits a trespass against the Lord and denies his fellow concerning a deposit or a loan, etc., or concerning anything about which he swears falsely.” The Gemara in tractate Bava Kamma 117b disputes how this verse is expounded: Some expounded it by “generalization, limitation, and generalization,” for we hold that the intent of the verse is to include everything, meaning that the laws of theft apply to all types of theft except documents. According to him, the law of theft applies also to the theft of land. And some expounded the verse by “generalization, specification, and generalization,” for we hold that the intent of the verse is to include everything similar to the specification—to exclude land, slaves, and documents]

Although Rabbi Eliezer explicitly held there that the law of theft applies to land, the Gemara wished to reconcile his words in every possible way: Even if he held that land cannot be stolen, a person nevertheless does not fulfill his obligation with it until it is entirely his.

And

if

the Rabbis follow their own reasoning,

that is,

because

they disagreed with Rabbi Eliezer’s position and

said: A person fulfills his obligation with another’s sukka

that was lent to him,

and

they likewise disagreed with Rabbi Eliezer concerning stolen land and held that

land cannot be stolen, and

consequently a person fulfills his obligation with this sukka, since

it is a borrowed sukka.

But

if he

stole wood and roofed his sukka with it,

everyone agrees that he owes the victim only

the

value of the wood,

while the wood itself is acquired by the thief through a change in the object and a change in its designation, and it is entirely his.

Alternatively, it may be explained that because of the ordinance for penitents, the Sages exempted the thief from dismantling his structure and returning the wood itself to the owners, so that he would not be deterred from repenting.

The Gemara proves:

From where

do we know that Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages disagree concerning these two laws—stolen land and the disqualification of a borrowed sukka? Perhaps they disagree in a case where one steals wood and makes a sukka from it, and their dispute concerns the law of a change in the object or the ordinance for penitents.

As it is taught

in the beraita: “A stolen sukka and one who roofs in the public domain,” which indicates that the case of a stolen sukka is

analogous to

one who roofs in

the public domain: Just as

one who roofs in

the public domain has land that is not his,

so too, the

sukka that is

stolen

also

refers to a case where

the land is not his,

namely, where he overpowered another and expelled him from a sukka built on that person’s land.

There was a certain elderly woman

whose wood was stolen by the servants of the Exilarch and used to roof the Exilarch’s sukka.

She came before Rav Naḥman and said to him,

to Rav Naḥman:

The Exilarch and all the Sages of the house of the Exilarch are sitting in a stolen sukka!

She cried out,

demanding that they return the wood they had stolen from her,

but Rav Naḥman paid no attention to her.

She said to him,

that elderly woman said to Rav Naḥman:

Woman

—a woman—who is the descendant of great men,

whose father had

that is, Abraham our forefather, since she was one of his descendants,

three hundred and eighteen servants,

as it is written [Genesis 14:14]: “And Abram heard that his brother was taken captive, and he armed his trained men, born in his house, three hundred and eighteen,”

cries out before you, and you pay no attention to her?

Rav Naḥman said to them: She is a shrill woman

—she is noisy—

and she is entitled only to the value of the wood.

That is, the servants of the Exilarch are not required to dismantle the sukka and return the wood itself that they stole from her; they need only return its value. The reason is the ordinance concerning a roof beam. The Sages instituted that when a thief stole a roof beam and set it into the top of his roof, he need not dismantle his structure and return the beam itself; he gives the victim its value, because of the ordinance for penitents, so that if we forced him to return the stolen beam, he would refrain from repenting. Therefore, the members of the Exilarch’s household had already acquired the wood itself and, according to everyone, fulfilled their obligation with this sukka.

Ravina said: In the case of this roofing beam

—a beam placed on the roof of his house for shade—

that was stolen, the Sages made an ordinance for him,

that the thief should give its value rather than the beam itself,

because of the ordinance concerning a roof beam.

That is, one should not say that since this sukka is a temporary structure and dismantling it would not entail a substantial loss, he must dismantle his sukka and return the beam itself. Rather, the ordinance concerning a roof beam applies even to a sukka: Since he requires it for the fulfillment of his mitzva, the Sages treated it like a permanent structure that need not be dismantled because of the ordinance for penitents.

The Gemara asks: What does this teach us, that the ordinance for penitents applies even to a sukka?

It is obvious,

since

how is this different from

the case stated above, that if one stole

wood

and roofed his sukka with it, he owes him only its value?!

The Gemara explains:

Lest you say

that specifically with regard to

wood

this ordinance was instituted, since

it is common

and readily available for purchase in the marketplace, and the victim can take the money he receives and use it to purchase other wood,

but this

roofing beam

is not so common

to purchase in the marketplace with money, unlike ordinary wood. Therefore the Gemara might have said:

I would say no—he may not merely return its value; rather, he is obligated to dismantle his sukka and give him the beam itself.

It teaches us

that even in such a case he returns only its value.

And

this applies

when the victim demands it

within

the

seven

days of the festival, when the sukka is needed for the fulfillment of his mitzva. But if he demands it

after

the

seven,

or if the victim agrees to wait until after the seven days,

the beam returns

to being

itself,

since he will lose nothing by dismantling his sukka.

And if he joined

the stolen beam

with mortar

—with clay—it is like any other permanent structure,

and even after the seven

days of the festival

he gives him its value,

and is not obligated to give him the beam itself.

A tanna

taught: A lulav that is

dry is invalid,

but

Rabbi Yehuda deems it valid.

Rava said: The dispute concerns a lulav. The Rabbis maintain: We compare the lulav to the etrog: Just as an etrog requires

that it be

“beautiful,”

as it is stated: “And you shall take for yourselves on the first day the fruit of a beautiful tree, branches of date palms, and so on,”

so too, the lulav

that is adjacent to it in the verse

requires

that it be

“beautiful.” And Rabbi Yehuda maintains: We do not compare the lulav to the etrog.

That is, had the Sages transmitted to us that the etrog and lulav were juxtaposed in the verse in order to compare one to the other, we would do so. [But he did not derive this juxtaposition on his own, since apart from a kal va-chomer, one may not independently derive laws through the thirteen hermeneutical principles by which the Torah is expounded.]

But with regard to an etrog, everyone agrees that “beautiful” is required,

since this matter is explicit in the verse concerning an etrog.

The Gemara asks:

But with regard to the lulav, does Rabbi Yehuda not require hadar?

But was it not taught

in our Mishna with regard to a lulav whose leaves have separated:

Rabbi Yehuda says: He should bind it at the top. What is the reason? Is it not because Rabbi Yehuda requires

Rabbi Yehuda

hadar

also with regard to the lulav?

The Gemara rejects this:

No,

the law of hadar was never stated with regard to the lulav. And the reason Rabbi Yehuda required that a lulav whose leaves have separated be bound at the top is

as the reason is taught

in the beraita:

Rabbi Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Tarfon:

It is stated in the verse

“kafot temarim,”

and the Sages learned from here that the lulav must be

kafot

an expression of binding and tying, as we find in tractate Makkot 22b: “He binds his two hands to the post”

and

therefore,

if it was separated, he should bind it.

The Gemara asks again:

And

if

he does not require

Rabbi Yehuda

hadar

with regard to the lulav,

was it not taught: One may bind the lulav

that is, the three species—the lulav, hadas, and arava—

only with its own species; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. What is the reason?

Is it not because he requires hadar?

And it is not beautiful to bind it with other species?

The Gemara rejects this:

No,

that is not the reason for the disqualification, as

Rava said:

that

even with siv

a fiber that grows around the palm, resembling the leaves of vines—

and even with the base of the palm trunk,

that is, the bark of the palm, one may bind it. Although these do not resemble the lulav in appearance, one binds the lulav with them. This shows that the essential concern is that the binding be of the same species as the lulav, and not its appearance; therefore, the reason for the disqualification is certainly not hadar.

Rather, what is the reason for Rabbi Yehuda’s

disqualifying

there

a binding that is not of the same species as the lulav?

It is

because he holds that the lulav requires binding,

and therefore the binding itself is also part of the mitzva.

And if one brings

that binding from

another species,

then

there would be five species

in the fulfillment of the mitzva, and he would violate bal tosif. [That is, according to the one who says that the lulav does not require binding, the binding is not part of the mitzva itself. Therefore, even if it is of another species, one does not violate bal tosif, since the prohibition of bal tosif applies only when one seeks to fulfill the mitzva with more than the Torah commanded, such as by using five strings in tzitzit. But with things that are not related to the mitzva, the prohibition of bal tosif does not apply.]

And with regard to the etrog, does Rabbi Yehuda require hadar?

And was it not taught: With regard to the four species of the lulav, just as one may not subtract from them

so one may not add to them.

If he did not find an etrog, he should bring neither a quince

quince

nor a pomegranate nor anything else

[the novel point of this ruling will be explained below].

These four species, if they were

withered

[they dried somewhat, but some moisture remained in them],

are fit. But if they are completely dry—

they are invalid.

Rabbi Yehuda says: Even

the

completely dry

are fit after the fact.