Sukkah 31a — the Talmud in English

The Gemara answers:

Even initially

[even before it was bound]

they also called the myrtle a hoshana,

on account of the fact that they are accustomed to bind it as a hoshana during the festival.

The Sages taught: A stolen sukka, and one who roofs in the public domain,

thereby depriving the public of passage,

Rabbi Eliezer invalidates,

for the reason that will be explained shortly,

and the Sages validate.

Rav Naḥman said: The dispute

between Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages is only

when one overpowers his fellow and drives him out of his sukka,

which was built on the land of the dispossessed person,

and Rabbi Eliezer follows his own reasoning, for he said: A person does not fulfill his obligation with his fellow’s sukka,

even when he borrowed it from him. As it is written: “The festival of sukkot you shall make for yourself,” and we expound: It must be from your own [see above, 27b]. Therefore, in either event, he does not fulfill his obligation with this sukka.

For

if land can be stolen,

so that the law of theft applies to land, as with other movable property that remains in the possession of the thief through the “acts of acquisition of theft,” then

it is a stolen sukka,

and Rabbi Eliezer expounded from that which is written, “you shall make for yourself,” to exclude a stolen and borrowed sukka.

And alternatively, if land cannot be stolen,

as it always remains in the possession of its owner, nevertheless

it is a borrowed sukka,

and according to Rabbi Eliezer a person does not fulfill his obligation with his fellow’s sukka. [

The basis of this issue is what is stated in the Torah (Leviticus 5:21): “When a person sins and commits a trespass against the Lord and denies his fellow concerning a deposit or a loan, etc., or concerning anything about which he swears falsely.” The Gemara in tractate Bava Kamma 117b disputes how this verse is expounded: Some expounded it by “generalization, limitation, and generalization,” for we hold that the intent of the verse is to include everything, meaning that the laws of theft apply to all types of theft except documents. According to him, the law of theft applies also to the theft of land. And some expounded the verse by “generalization, specification, and generalization,” for we hold that the intent of the verse is to include everything similar to the specification—to exclude land, slaves, and documents]

And although Rabbi Eliezer explicitly held there that the law of theft applies to land, the Gemara wished to reconcile his words in every respect: even if he held that land cannot be stolen, nevertheless one does not fulfill his obligation with it until it is entirely his.

And

if

the Rabbis followed their own reasoning

and held

that

they disagreed with Rabbi Eliezer’s position and

said: A person fulfills his obligation with his fellow’s sukka

that was lent to him,

and

they likewise disagreed with Rabbi Eliezer concerning stolen land and held that

land cannot be stolen, and

consequently a person fulfills his obligation with this sukka, since

it is a borrowed sukka.

But

if he

stole wood and roofed with it

his sukka,

according to everyone he owes him

the dispossessed person

only the value of the wood,

while the body of the wood is acquired by the thief through a change in the object and a change of name, and it is entirely his.

Or it may be explained differently: Because of the enactment for those who repent, the Sages exempted the thief from dismantling his construction and returning the body of the wood to the owners, so that he would not refrain from returning in repentance.

And the Gemara proves:

From where

do you know that Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages disagree concerning these two laws—concerning the theft of land and the invalidity of a borrowed sukka? Perhaps they disagree concerning one who steals wood and makes a sukka from it, and their dispute concerns the law of a change in the object or the enactment for those who repent?

From the fact that it teaches

in the beraita: “A stolen sukka, and one who roofs in the public domain,” it implies that the case of a stolen sukka is

analogous to

one who roofs in

the public domain: Just as

one who roofs in

the public domain—the land is not his,

so too

the sukka

that is stolen

also

deals with a case in which

the land is not his,

namely, that he overpowered his fellow and drove him out of his sukka made on his land.

That certain elderly woman

from whom the servants of the Exilarch had stolen wood and with which they roofed the sukka of the Exilarch,

came before Rav Naḥman and said to him

to Rav Naḥman:

The Exilarch and all the Sages of the house of the Exilarch are sitting in a stolen sukka!

She cried out,

demanding that they return to her the wood that they had stolen from her,

but Rav Naḥman paid no attention to her.

She said to him

that certain elderly woman to Rav Naḥman:

A woman

[a woman] of distinguished lineage is she,

for her ancestor

namely, Abraham our forefather, since she was one of his descendants,

had three hundred and eighteen servants,

as it is written [Genesis 14:14]: “And Abram heard that his brother was taken captive, and he armed his initiates, those born in his house, three hundred and eighteen,”

and she cries out before you, and you pay no attention to her?

Rav Naḥman said to them: She is a screamer

[she is a noisy woman],

and she has only the value of the wood.

That is, the servants of the Exilarch are not obligated to dismantle the sukka and return to her the body of the wood that they stole from her; rather, they must return only its value. The reason is the “roof-beam enactment,” by which the Sages enacted for a thief who stole a roof beam and set it in the top of his roof that the thief need not dismantle his construction and return the roof beam itself; rather, he gives the dispossessed person its value, because of the enactment for those who repent. If we compel him to return the beam that he stole, he will refrain from returning in repentance. Therefore the members of the house of the Exilarch had already acquired the body of the wood and fulfill their obligation with this sukka according to everyone.

Ravina said: This roof beam used for a sukka

[a beam placed atop his roof for shade]

that was stolen—the Sages made an enactment for it,

that the thief should give its value and not the beam itself,

because of the roof-beam enactment.

That is, it should not be said that since this sukka is a temporary structure and dismantling it does not constitute a substantial loss, he should dismantle his sukka and return the beam itself to him. Rather, the roof-beam enactment was stated with regard to a sukka as well: because it is needed by him for the fulfillment of his mitzva, the Sages treated it as a permanent structure that he need not dismantle because of the enactment for those who repent.

And the Gemara asks: What does this teach us, that the enactment for those who repent was stated with regard to a sukka as well?

It is obvious,

for

how is this different from

that which we said above, that if he stole

wood

and roofed his sukka with it, he owes him only its value?!

The Gemara explains:

Lest you say:

Specifically with

wood

was this enactment stated, since

they are common

and available for purchase in the marketplace, and the dispossessed person can take the money he received and buy other wood with it.

But this

roof beam used for a sukka

is not common

enough to purchase in the marketplace with money, like ordinary wood. Therefore the Gemara might have thought:

Let us say no:

he should not return only the money; rather, he is obligated to dismantle his sukka and give him the beam itself.

It teaches us

that even in such a case he returns only its value.

And

this applies

when the dispossessed person demands it

within

[during]

the seven

days of the festival, when the sukka is needed by him for the fulfillment of his mitzva. But if he demands it

after

[after]

the seven,

or if the dispossessed person agrees to wait until after the seven,

then

the beam

returns to its original status

since he will lose nothing if he dismantles his sukka.

And if he joined it

the thief joined that beam

with clay

[with mud], it is like any other permanent structure,

and even after the seven

days of the festival

he likewise gives him its value,

and he is not obligated to give him the beam itself.

A tanna taught:

A lulav that is

dry is invalid,

and

Rabbi Judah validates.

Rava said: The dispute is with regard to a lulav. For the Rabbis hold: We compare the lulav to the etrog: Just as an etrog requires

[needs] that it be

“beautiful,”

as it is stated: “And you shall take for yourselves on the first day the fruit of a beautiful tree, branches of date palms, etc.,”

so too the lulav

that is adjacent to it in the verse

requires

that it be

“beautiful.” And Rabbi Judah holds: We do not compare the lulav to the etrog.

That is, had the Sages transmitted to us that they placed the etrog and the lulav adjacent in the verse in order to compare one to the other. [And he did not expound this adjacency on his own, since apart from a kal va-chomer, a person does not expound on his own using the thirteen principles by which the Torah is expounded].

But with regard to an etrog, according to everyone “beautiful” is required,

for with regard to an etrog this matter is explicit in the verse.

The Gemara raises an objection:

And regarding the lulav, does Rabbi Judah not require hadar?

And was it not taught

in our Mishna concerning a lulav whose leaves have separated,

Rabbi Judah says: He shall bind it from above. What is the reason? Is it not because he requires

Rabbi Judah

hadar

also regarding the lulav?

The Gemara rejects this:

No,

the law of hadar was never stated regarding a lulav. And the reason Rabbi Judah required that a lulav whose leaves have separated be bound from above is

as the reason is taught

in the beraita:

Rabbi Judah says in the name of Rabbi Tarfon:

It is stated in the verse

“bound date palms,”

and the Sages learned from here that the lulav must be

bound

—an expression of binding and tying, as we find in Tractate Makkot 22b: “He binds his two hands to the pillar”—

and

therefore

if it was separated, he shall bind it.

The Gemara returns and raises an objection:

And

if

he does not require

Rabbi Judah

hadar

regarding a lulav,

was it not taught: One does not bind the lulav,

that is, the three species—the lulav, myrtle, and willow

except with its own species, the words of Rabbi Judah. What is the reason?

Is it not because he requires hadar?

And it is not beautiful to bind it with other species?

The Gemara rejects this:

No,

this is not the reason for the disqualification. The proof is

for Rava said:

that

even with fiber

that grows around the palm, resembling grapevine leaves,

and even with the root of the palm

that is, the bark of the palm—they bind it with these, even though their appearance does not resemble that of a lulav; they bind the lulav with them. Thus, the principal concern is that the binding be of the species of the lulav, and not because of its appearance. If so, certainly the reason for the disqualification is not hadar.

Rather, what is the reason for Rabbi Judah’s

disqualifying

there

a binding that is not of the species of the lulav?

It is

because he holds: a lulav requires binding,

and therefore the binding itself is also part of the mitzva,

and if he brings

that binding from

another species,

then

there are five species

in the fulfillment of the mitzva, and he violates “Do not add.” [That is, according to the one who says that a lulav does not require binding, the binding is not part of the body of the mitzva; therefore, even though it is of another species, he does not violate “Do not add,” since the prohibition of “Do not add” applies only when one comes to fulfill the mitzva with more than the Torah commanded, such as five threads in tzitzit. But regarding things that are not of the matter of the mitzva, the prohibition of “Do not add” does not apply.]

And regarding an etrog, does Rabbi Judah require hadar?

And was it not taught: Regarding the four species that are in the lulav, just as one may not subtract from them

so one may not add to them.

If he did not find an etrog, he may not bring either a quince

quince

or a pomegranate or anything else

—the novelty contained in this law will be explained below.

These four species, if they were

wilted

—they dried somewhat, but some moisture remained in them—

are valid. But if they are dry

they are invalid.

Rabbi Judah says: Even

the

dry ones

are valid after the fact.