Sukkah 30a (ל.) — the Talmud in English

because

fulfilling the mitzva of lulav with a stolen lulav

is a mitzva performed through a transgression.

As it is stated

with regard to an invalid offering [Malachi 1:13]:

“And you bring what is stolen and the lame

[the limping]

and the sick,

and you bring the offering; should I accept it from your hand?”

Tosafot asked: Why did the Gemara need this reason? It could have said that it is a mitzva performed through a transgression! They answered that the disqualification of a mitzva performed through a transgression applies only when the transgression enabled him to perform the mitzva, as with a stolen lulav: had he not stolen it, he would not have had it with which to perform the mitzva. But with a lulav from an ashera, there is no connection between the transgression committed with regard to it and fulfillment of the mitzva.

The verse equated the

stolen offering,

to an offering

of a lame animal [the animal limping because of a defect in its leg].

The implication is:

just as an offering that

is lame has no remedy

ever, since this is a permanent blemish,

so too a

stolen offering

has no remedy

ever,

whether before the owners’ despair

the victim of the theft [that is, before its owners have despaired of recovering it]

or whether after the owners’ despair,

such as when they heard him say, “Woe over the loss of money”; it is never fit for sacrifice.

Although with regard to acquisition the robber acquires the object through the owners’ despair, and thereafter is no longer obligated to return the object itself, but only its value [according to the one who maintains that despair effects acquisition], as explained in tractate Bava Kamma, 68a, nevertheless, with regard to an offering it is invalid.

The Gemara asks:

It is understandable that before the owners’ despair

it is invalid, because

“When a person brings an offering from among you,”

the Merciful One stated [Leviticus 1:2], and “from among you” means that the offering must be your own;

but this offering is not his.

But after the owners’ despair, the robber has already acquired it

through despair,

so why is it invalid for sacrifice?

Rather, is it not

necessarily the case that we learn that it is invalid

because it is a mitzva performed through a transgression,

since this offering was stolen while in his possession?

And Rabbi Yohanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yohai: What is the meaning of that which is written [Isaiah 61:8]:

“For I, the Lord, love justice; I hate robbery in an offering”?

This may be compared to a flesh-and-blood king who was passing through the customs house.

He said to his servants: Pay the customs duty to the customs officials!

His servants said to him:

But the entire customs duty belongs to you,

so why should you pay the duty? The money will return to you in any event?!

He said to them: Let all travelers learn from me and not evade the customs duty.

So too, the Holy One, blessed be He, said: I am the Lord; I hate robbery in an offering.

That is, I am the Lord, and I hate the robbery contained in the burnt offerings that you bring to Me, even though everything belongs to Me, as it is stated: “The earth and all that fills it belong to the Lord”;

Let My children learn from Me and evade robbery.

It was also stated:

the reason a stolen lulav is invalid on the remaining days of the festival is that it is a mitzva performed through a transgression:

Rabbi Ami said:

A

dry lulav is invalid because it lacks “beauty.” Therefore, Rabbi Ami said that a dry lulav is invalid because it is not beautiful, and consequently this law applies only on the first day [since the verse is expounded with regard to what follows it]. But a stolen lulav is invalid throughout all seven days because it is a mitzva performed through a transgression.

“Stolen” is unfit, because it constitutes a mitzva performed through a transgression.

The Gemara adds: The statement that Rabbi Yohanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai—that a stolen lulav is unfit even on the other days of the festival because it constitutes a mitzva performed through a transgression—is not accepted by everyone. Rather,

it disagrees with

[unclear: isolated letter]

Rabbi Yitzḥak’s view.

For Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Naḥmani said that Shmuel said: They taught

that a stolen lulav is unfit

only on the first day of Yom Tov. But on the second day of Yom Tov,

that is, on the other days of the festival,

since one fulfills

his obligation

with a

lulav

that was borrowed,

since the mitzva of lulav on the other days of the festival is only rabbinic, and the Sages did not require that the lulav be specifically one’s own, as explained above, the same applies, that one

also fulfills his obligation with a

lulav

that was stolen.

Thus, it is clear that he did not take into consideration the fact that this is a mitzva performed through a transgression.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak raised an objection

to Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Naḥmani from our Mishna, in which we learned:

A stolen or dried-out lulav is unfit.

And it implies:

A borrowed one is fit.

But one must examine:

When

is the Mishna speaking?

If you say it is speaking of the first day of Yom Tov

of the festival,

is it not written, “for yourselves,”

and do we not interpret this to mean:

It must be from your own property

?

And this

borrowed lulav

is not his

[it does not belong to him]; if so, why did the Mishna not also mention that a borrowed lulav is unfit for use?

Rather, is it not

the case discussed in the Mishna

the second day of Yom Tov,

whose obligation is rabbinic, and one fulfills his obligation with a borrowed lulav,

and

even so

it teaches

that a

stolen lulav is unfit?!

Rava said: Actually,

our Mishna is speaking

of the

first

day of Yom Tov of the festival. And one should not infer from the fact that our Mishna did not mention a borrowed lulav that it is fit even on the first day of Yom Tov. On the contrary, if a stolen lulav is unfit, then certainly a borrowed one is unfit,

and

our Mishna follows the formulation of

“It states a matter that is not obvious”:

That is,

it is not necessary to say

[this is obvious] that a

borrowed

lulav is unfit, because

it is not his,

and we interpret “for yourselves” to mean: It must be from your own property.

But with regard to a stolen one, say

[I might have thought]:

Ordinary theft,

since the person from whom it was stolen knows of the theft, as the robber took it from him by force, certainly involves

the owner’s despair, and

therefore

it is considered as belonging to him,

the robber,

and

he fulfills his obligation with it even on the first day, concerning which “for yourselves” is stated.”

It teaches us,

that the person from whom an item was stolen does not ordinarily despair of recovering it; rather, he still hopes to take it from the robber through the court, and the robber does not acquire it.

Rav Huna said to those peddlers

[peddlers who travel among the towns] who sold myrtles:

When you purchase myrtles from a gentile,

when you acquire myrtles from gentiles in order to sell them for the mitzva of lulav,

do not cut them yourselves

from the gentiles’ fields,

but let them cut them

—let the gentiles cut them from the ground—

and give

[and hand them over]

to you

[to you] once they have already been detached.

What is the reason?

Because

ordinary gentiles are land usurpers

from Jews

and

there is concern that the land on which these myrtles grow was stolen property in their possession,