Sukkah 24a (כד.) — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Yehuda, Rabbi Yosei, and Rabbi Shimon prohibit it,

because perhaps the wine flask will burst, and he will not be able to make the designation retroactively, with the result that he would be drinking tevel.

We have thus learned that Rabbi Yehuda is concerned about death [the bursting of the flask], whereas Rabbi Meir is not concerned about it. This resolves the contradiction between the Mishna and the beraita concerning teruma, as to whether one must be concerned about death: This statement is the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and that statement is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

The difficulty now arises: According to Abaye, Rabbi Yehuda is the one who is concerned about death, whereas Rabbi Meir is not concerned; but concerning an animal that one made into a wall for a sukka, Abaye said that Rabbi Meir is the one who is concerned about death, whereas Rabbi Yehuda is not concerned?!

And we answer:

Reverse

Abaye’s resolution of the contradiction between the Mishna and the beraita concerning teruma, and say as follows:

Rabbi Meir is concerned about death,

and the beraita is in accordance with his opinion,

and Rabbi Yehuda is not concerned about death,

and the Mishna is in accordance with his opinion. Abaye compared the case not to the law of “one who purchases wine,” but to the case of “one who made an animal into a wall for a sukka”

As it is taught in a beraita: If one made an animal into a wall for a sukka, Rabbi Meir invalidates it,

because he is concerned about death,

whereas Rabbi Yehuda deems it fit,

because he is not concerned about death.

We nevertheless wonder:

The contradiction between Rabbi Meir

in the case of “one who purchases wine,” where he is not concerned about the flask bursting,

and Rabbi Meir

in the case of “one who made an animal into a wall for a sukka,” where he is concerned about death?!

Rabbi Meir could say to you: Death is common, whereas the bursting of a flask is not common,

as

it is possible that he entrusts it to a watchman.

The difficulty nevertheless arises:

The contradiction between Rabbi Yehuda

in the case of “one who purchases wine from among the Samaritans,” where he is concerned even about the flask bursting,

and Rabbi Yehuda

in the case of “one who made an animal into a wall for a sukka,” where he is not concerned even about death?!

And we answer:

The reason for Rabbi Yehuda

in the case of “one who purchases wine from among the Samaritans”

is not that he is concerned about the flask bursting, but rather that he does not accept

retroactive designation,

and the matter will not be clarified when he makes the designation later—that the log measures that he designated became teruma from the outset. Therefore, it is prohibited to drink, lest the teruma have taken effect on different log measures, with the result that he would be drinking teruma.

We wonder:

But

is it so that

Rabbi Yehuda is not concerned about the flask bursting,

and the reason that he prohibited the wine in the case of “one who purchases wine from among the Samaritans” is that there is no retroactive designation?!

But from what is taught in the latter clause: They said to Rabbi Meir, “Do you not concede that perhaps the flask will burst, with the result that retroactively this person will be drinking tevel?” And he said to them,

Rabbi Meir:

“When it bursts”

we will consider the matter—that is, there is no need to be concerned about this

— Does it not follow that Rabbi Yehuda is concerned about the flask bursting?!

And we answer:

There, it is Rabbi Yehuda who says to Rabbi

Meir: “As for me, I do not accept retroactive designation; but according to you, who do accept retroactive designation, do you not concede that perhaps the flask will burst?”

He said to him: “When it bursts.”

We nevertheless wonder:

But

is it so that

Rabbi Yehuda is not concerned about death?!

But we learned in the Mishna: Rabbi Yehuda says: They also prepare another wife for him

for the High Priest on the eve of Yom Kippur

lest his wife die,

and the Torah states: “And he shall effect atonement”—the High Priest on Yom Kippur—“for himself and for his household,” meaning his wife?!

And we answer:

Was it not stated concerning this: Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: They instituted an additional stringency with regard to the atonement

of Yom Kippur, so that Rabbi Yehuda was concerned there about death, even though ordinarily he is not concerned about death.

We wonder:

According to the one who says

that the reason of Rabbi Meir, who holds that one may not make an animal into a wall for a sukka, is

lest the animal die,

the animal, and

according to the one who says

that his reason is

lest the animal flee,

the animal—in either case, it follows that

according to Torah law it is a fully valid partition, and it was the Sages who issued a decree concerning it—

And

if so,

since the prohibition is rabbinic,

according to Rabbi Meir, the animal should become impure

as an animal

as a gollel—

and

why then did we learn: Rabbi Yehuda deems it impure on account of gollel, whereas Rabbi Meir deems it pure?!

For this is a leniency, since he was lenient in holding that the animal does not become nullified and become a gollel; and since the matter is merely rabbinic, what reason is there to be lenient with regard to gollel?!

Rather, Rav Aḥa bar Yaakov said

that there is another reason for Rabbi Meir’s opinion:

Rabbi Meir holds: Any partition

that stands by means of wind [by means of wind],

such as the breath of a living creature,

is not a partition,

since its essential stability is provided by something intangible.

Some say: Rav Aḥa bar Yaakov said: Rabbi Meir holds that any partition not made by human hands is not a partition,

and the breath of a living creature is likewise not made by human hands, since a person does not have the breath in his power to inflate it [the wording of Rashi].

And we explain:

What is the practical difference between them

between the two formulations of Rav Aḥa bar Yaakov?

The practical difference between them is in a case where one positioned

the wall of the sukka

on an inflated flask [he supported the wall on an inflated balloon]—

For

For

according to the one who says: A partition

that

stands by means of wind is not a partition, then

this one too

stands by means of wind,

and it is invalid—

whereas

according to the one who says:

a partition that

is not made by human hands

is not a partition—