Sukkah 24a — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Judah, Rabbi Yose, and Rabbi Shimon prohibit,

because of concern lest the wine-flask burst, and he will not come to the status of berera, and it will turn out that he is drinking tevel.

We have thus learned that Rabbi Judah is concerned about death [the bursting of the flask], whereas Rabbi Meir is not concerned about this; and through this the contradiction between the Mishna and the beraita concerning teruma, whether it is concerned about death, is resolved, for this one is Rabbi Meir and that one is Rabbi Judah.

And now this is difficult: according to Abaye, Rabbi Judah is the one who is concerned about death, whereas Rabbi Meir is not concerned; but concerning an animal that he made into a wall for a sukka, Abaye said that Rabbi Meir is the one who is concerned about death, while Rabbi Judah is not concerned?!

And we answer:

Reverse

Abaye’s resolution of the contradiction between the Mishna and the beraita concerning teruma, and this is what he said:

Rabbi Meir is concerned about death

and the beraita follows his view,

and Rabbi Judah is not concerned about death

and the Mishna follows his view; and Abaye did not compare it to the law of “one who purchases wine,” but rather to “he made it into an animal-wall for a sukka”—

For it was taught: If he made an animal into a wall for a sukka, Rabbi Meir disqualifies it

because he is concerned about death,

and Rabbi Judah declares it fit,

because he is not concerned about death.

And still we are astonished:

The difficulty from Rabbi Meir

of “one who purchases wine,” who is not concerned about the bursting of the flask,

against Rabbi Meir

of “he made it into an animal-wall for a sukka,” who is concerned about death?!

Rabbi Meir can say to you: Death is common; the bursting of the flask is not common,

because

it is possible that he entrusted it to a watchman.

And still this is difficult:

The difficulty from Rabbi Judah

of “one who purchases wine from among the Cuthites,” who is concerned even about the bursting of the flask,

against Rabbi Judah

of “he made it into an animal-wall for a sukka,” who is not concerned even about death?!

And we answer:

The reason of Rabbi Judah

regarding “one who purchases wine from among the Cuthites”

is not because he is concerned about the bursting of the flask, but because he does not hold of

berera,

and it will not become clarified when he separates it later that those log measures which he separated had become teruma from the outset; therefore it is prohibited to drink, lest the teruma have taken effect upon another log measure, and it will turn out that this person is drinking teruma.

And we ask:

And

is it so that

Rabbi Judah is not concerned about the bursting of the flask,

and the reason that he prohibited it in “one who purchases wine from among the Cuthites” is because there is no berera?!

But from what it teaches in the latter clause: They said to Rabbi Meir, “Do you not concede that perhaps the flask will burst, and it will turn out that this person is retroactively drinking tevel?” And he said to them,

Rabbi Meir:

When it bursts

we will consider the matter, meaning: there is no need to be concerned about this—

Does it not follow that Rabbi Judah is concerned about the bursting of the flask?!

And we answer:

There, it is Rabbi Judah who says to Rabbi

Meir: “According to my view, I do not hold of berera; but according to your view, that you do hold of berera, do you not concede that perhaps the flask will burst?”

He said to him: “When it bursts.”

And still we are astonished:

And

is it so that

Rabbi Judah is not concerned about death?!

But we learned: Rabbi Judah says: They also prepare another wife for him

for the High Priest on the eve of the Day of Atonement,

lest his wife die,

and the Torah said: He shall atone—the High Priest on the Day of Atonement—for himself and for his “house,” which is his wife?!

And we answer:

It was stated concerning this: Rav Huna, son of Rav Joshua, said: They instituted an additional level of stringency in the atonement

of the Day of Atonement, for there Rabbi Judah was concerned about death, even though generally he is not concerned about death.

And we ask:

Whether according to the one who says

that the reason of Rabbi Meir, who holds that one does not make an animal into a wall for a sukka, is because

perhaps the animal will die,

the animal, or

whether according to the one who says

that his reason is because

perhaps the animal will flee,

the animal—in either case it follows that

by Torah law it is a proper partition, and it was the Sages who decreed concerning it—

And

rather, from now on,

since it is only rabbinic,

according to Rabbi Meir, let the animal become impure

as an animal

because of golel—and

why then did we learn: Rabbi Judah declares it impure because of golel, and Rabbi Meir declares it pure?!

And this is a leniency that he applied, that it does not become nullified and become a golel; and since it is merely rabbinic, what reason is there to be lenient concerning golel?!

Rather, Rav Aha bar Yaakov said

another reason for Rabbi Meir’s words:

Rabbi Meir holds: Every partition

Rabbi Meir holds: Any partition

that stands through wind

[by means of wind], such as a living creature,

is not a partition,

since its essential standing is through something that has no substance.

There are those who say: Rav Aha bar Yaakov said: Rabbi Meir holds: Every partition that is not made by human hands is not a partition,

and even a living creature is not made by human hands, for a person does not have wind in his hand with which to inflate it [the language of Rashi].

And we explain:

What is the difference between them,

between the two formulations of Rav Aha bar Yaakov?

There is a difference between them where he placed

the wall of the sukka

upon an inflated flask [he supported the wall upon an inflated balloon]—

For

according to the one who says: A partition

that

stands through wind is not a partition, behold,

this too

stands through wind,

and it is disqualified—

whereas

according to the one who says: A partition that

is not made by human hands

is not a partition—

this one was made by human hands, and therefore it is a valid partition.

is not a partition—