Sukkah 14a (יד.) — the Talmud in English

But did we not learn [

Kelim 25:9 ]:

All utensils

that require processing and finishing, and therefore are not considered utensils with regard to contracting the ritual impurity of utensils until their work has been completed,

become subject to

receiving

impurity through thought.

That is, a thought concerning the utensil, designating it for any purpose, determines the nature of the utensil. Therefore, as soon as the work of the utensil has been completed for the purpose designated for it, it is fit to contract impurity.

For example, if one processed leather and decided to designate it for a table, it is a utensil and contracts impurity, since it is already fit to serve as a table. However, if he designated it for straps for sandals, in which case the leather requires additional work of cutting and fitting, it does not contract impurity until it is fit to serve as a strap for a sandal.

And they do not emerge from their state of impurity,

that is, if one initially designated an item for a particular purpose that requires no additional work, and it was fit to contract impurity, and then he came to change its designation to another purpose requiring additional work in order to make it fit for that purpose, the utensil does not emerge from its status as subject to contracting impurity through thought, even before it has become impure,

except through a change in its physical form.

For example, if he began to cut it slightly, which is the beginning of the work for the new purpose to which he has now designated it, that act nullifies its previous designation. The leather does not contract impurity until its work for that purpose has been completed.

For this is the general principle:

An act removes

even

an act immediately.

That is, even if from the outset he performed an act with it demonstrating that the utensil was designated for its first purpose—for example, he designated leather for a table and cut it around its edges to beautify it—he can remove it from the status of being subject to contracting impurity through an act demonstrating that the utensil’s designation has changed.

And

all the more so, an act removes

a thought immediately.

But

thought does not remove an item either from the status created by an act or from the status created by a thought.

Since that is so, why should thought alone, designating the handles for roofing, be effective to remove the handles from the status of being subject to contracting impurity that descended upon them when they were designated for food?!

And if you would say: This matter applies

when we say that thought does not remove an item from a status created by thought, specifically with

significant utensils,

which are important, and once the name “utensil” has been bestowed upon them through his initial thought, that name does not depart through thought, but only through a change in physical form,

but handles, which are for the purpose of eating,

and are not so important—say

that through thought it takes effect,

and the status of being subject to contracting impurity descended upon them,

and through thought it departs,

and they emerge from that status.

The Gemara rejects this:

But did we not learn

in an explicit Mishna in tractate Uktzin that handles of food do not emerge from the status of contracting impurity through mere thought? For we learned [

Uktzin 1:5 ]:

all handles of food,

that one trampled [

below, the amoraim dispute the interpretation of this expression ]

in the threshing floor,

those handles [

which are straw as wide as a handle near the heads of the ears of grain ]

are pure,

that is, the law of handles with regard to contracting impurity no longer applies to them,

and Rabbi Yosei deems them impure. The Gemara explains:

Granted, according to the one who says that “trampled”

means

he untied their bundles

of sheaves, and by doing so he revealed that he does not need the handle, since the primary purpose of the handle is to enable the ears of grain to be tied,

it works out well.

For one can say that handles are not as significant as food, and therefore mere thought removes them from the status of handles of food and renders them pure even without an act. After all, it is explained in this Mishna that by untying the bundle—which is nothing more than a revelation of intent and mere thought—the previous thought is nullified.

But according to the one who says, what is the meaning of “trampled”? It means that he actually trampled them,

crushing the handles under the feet of animals or with a utensil, which is a significant act,

what can be said?

It is evident that even handles do not emerge from the status of being subject to contracting impurity through mere thought; an actual act is required. Likewise, when one cut them for food and they became subject to contracting impurity, and afterward reconsidered and designated them for roofing, they do not emerge from the status of contracting impurity through mere thought alone.

The difficulty again arises: What is the reason of the first tanna, who holds that the branches of figs attached to the figs are fit for roofing and are not subject to the law of handles, despite the fact that he cut them for food?

The Gemara answers:

Here too,

the earlier beraita concerning branches of figs is speaking of one who

actually trampled

the handles through an act, and did not merely reconsider and designate them for roofing. Therefore, the handles do not contract impurity, and there is no need for the straw to exceed the handles.

The Gemara asks:

If so, what is the reason of the others,

who hold that the handles of figs are unfit for roofing and that the straw must also exceed the handles? The handles do not contract impurity, since he trampled them, and a change in physical form certainly removes an item from a status created by thought?!

The Gemara answers:

They say [

they hold ]

in accordance with Rabbi Yosei.

For we learned [

there ]

Rabbi Yosei deems

the handles impure even after he trampled them.

The Gemara nevertheless asks:

What is this?

What is the meaning of this answer?

Granted, there,

with regard to handles of food that he trampled,

the reason of Rabbi Yosei,

who deems the handles impure even after he trampled them, is because

they remain fit for the purpose stated by Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish.

That is, the handles have a use even after he trampled them, and it is convenient for him that they remain attached to the food. When he trampled them, he did not intend to nullify them and detach them from the food, but rather to soften them. And this is as Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish explains:

As Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Since they remain fit

the ears of grain, by means of the handles,

to turn them

from one place to another

with a pitchfork,

and without the handles it is not convenient to turn the ears of grain, since they are small and thin and fall between the teeth of the pitchfork, for this reason their status as handles was not nullified, and they remain fit to contract impurity.

But here,

when he needs them only for roofing,

for what are they fit?

For what are the handles fit after he trampled them? Since that is so, the trampling constitutes a complete nullification of the handles and removes them from their impurity.

The Gemara answers: The reason of the others, who did not distinguish between handles of food and produce cut for roofing, is that even when he reconsidered and designated them for roofing, they

remain fit

for use

when he dismantles the sukka, to grasp them by their stalks.

When he dismantles his sukka, he will grasp them by their straw, and the heads of the ears of grain will be removed together with the handles. Since they hold in accordance with Rabbi Yosei, that even after one tramples them they retain the status of handles, as long as the handles remain useful for some purpose, therefore even when produce is cut for roofing their status as handles is not removed.

The substance of the matter: All handles of food that one trampled in the threshing floor are pure. And Rabbi Yosei deems them impure.

What is the meaning of “trampled”?

Rabbi Yohanan said: It means that he actually trampled them,

Rabbi Elazar says: He untied their bundles.

The Gemara explains:

Granted, according to Rabbi Elazar, who says that “trampled”

means

he untied their bundles; this is

the reason

that Rabbi Yosei deems them impure:

since untying their bundles is not a sufficiently significant act to nullify the status of handles.

But according to Rabbi Yohanan, who says that “trampled” means that he actually trampled them,

crushing them under the feet of animals,

why does Rabbi Yosei deem them impure?

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Since they remain fit

the ears of grain

to turn them

by means of the handles

with a pitchfork,

a pitchfork.

And since he said, “Since they remain fit to turn them with a pitchfork,” the Gemara also cites this statement:

Rabbi Elazar said: Why are the prayers of the righteous likened to a pitchfork?

As we find [Genesis 25]: “And Isaac entreated the Lord opposite his wife, because she was barren,” and He “was entreated” by him.

In order

to tell you: Just as this pitchfork turns the grain in the threshing floor from one place to another, so too the prayers of the righteous turn the attribute of the Holy One, blessed be He, from the attribute of harsh judgment to the attribute of mercy.

Mishna:

The previous mishnayot explained which species are unfit for roofing by Torah law. The Mishna now discusses species that are fit for roofing, but are unfit only because of their form, for the reason that will be explained below:

One may roof with boards, [

the Gemara will explain the width of the boards under discussion in the Mishna ],

the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.

But Rabbi Meir prohibits.

The Gemara will explain the reason for their dispute.

If one placed upon it

on the roof of the sukka, at its side, adjacent to one of the walls,

a board four handbreadths wide

with which one may not roof, [ as will be explained below in the Gemara ], and the end of the board terminates within four cubits of the wall, it is

fit.

Although this board is invalid for roofing, it does not interrupt between the adjacent wall and the area of the sukka, since invalid roofing invalidates from the side only at four cubits. When it is less than this measure, we apply the principle of “bent wall.” That is, the invalid roofing is considered part of the wall, as though the wall had bent and extended until it reached the valid roofing.

Provided that one does not sleep beneath it

beneath the board, since it is invalid roofing.

Gemara:

Rav said

to explain the dispute between the tannaitic authorities in our Mishna:

The dispute

between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda is

with regard to boards that have

a width of

four

handbreadths, as most roofs of houses are made from such boards.

Rabbi Meir

prohibits roofing with them, because

he holds that there is a decree concerning a roof.

For if we deem these boards fit for roofing, one might say: Why should I trouble myself to roof with these boards? The roof of my house is also made from such boards, and I can sit beneath it. If he does so, he will be found to have negated the mitzva of sukka, since his all-year home is unfit for dwelling in as a sukka, as the Sages expounded: “Sukka,” the Merciful One said, and not one’s all-year home.

And Rabbi Yehuda does not hold of the decree concerning a roof,

and he was not concerned that if one permits him to roof with these boards, he might come to sit beneath the roof of his house.

But with regard to boards that do not have

a width of

four

handbreadths,

everyone agrees that it is fit,

since most roofs of houses are not made from such narrow boards, and there is no concern that he might come to sit beneath the roof of his house.

And Shmuel said: It is when they do not have

a width of

four

handbreadths that there is a

dispute

between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yehuda permitted roofing with them, since most roofs of houses are not made from them. Rabbi Meir is stringent and prohibits roofing even with them, since a minority of people make the roofs of their houses from them, and there is still concern that one might err and sit beneath the roof of his all-year home.

But

if

they have

a width of

four

handbreadths, since most roofs of houses are made from them,

everyone agrees

that this sukka is

invalid.

The Gemara challenges Shmuel, who holds that their dispute concerns boards that

do not have four

handbreadths, implying that Rabbi Meir is stringent even with regard to extremely thin boards:

And

is it the case that

even

with regard to boards that are

less than three

handbreadths wide Rabbi Meir prohibited them?

But they are merely reeds,

and if they are unfit for roofing, we find no valid roofing at all!

Rav Pappa said:

This is what

Shmuel

means:

If they have

a width of four handbreadths,

everyone agrees that it is invalid,

but if their width is

less than three

handbreadths,

everyone agrees that it is fit. What is the reason? They are merely reeds.

When do they disagree?

Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree

from

a width of

three

handbreadths

until

a width of

four

handbreadths. And this is the explanation of their dispute:

One master,

Rabbi Yehuda,

holds: Since they do not possess

the boards, in their width, the

measure of an area [

a domain ], which is four handbreadths, as we find with regard to domains on Shabbat, therefore

we do not decree

that they are unfit for roofing due to the decree concerning a roof, since they are not significant enough for a roof to be made from them.

And the other master,

Rabbi Meir,

holds: Since they have departed from the law of lavud,

for if they were removed from their places, we would not regard the air in their places as nonexistent, as though the valid roofing were adjacent to one another by virtue of the law of “lavud,” since this law applies only up to three handbreadths, therefore the board covering that air is significant and resembles a roof. Consequently,

we decree

that one may not roof with them, lest he err and sit beneath the beams of his house.

We learned in a Mishna

at the conclusion of our Mishna [and the Gemara has now assumed that this halakha is accepted by everyone]:

If one placed upon it

on the roof of the sukka, beside it and close to the wall,

a plank four handbreadths wide,

it is

valid, provided that one does not sleep beneath it

the plank.

The Gemara raises a difficulty:

This works well according to Shmuel, who says that when they are less than four handbreadths wide

the planks

are the subject of the dispute

between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda;

but when they are four

handbreadths wide,

everyone agrees that it is invalid

for the sukka beneath it.

That is why one may not sleep beneath it,

since this plank is four handbreadths wide.

But according to Rav, who says that when they are four handbreadths wide they are the subject of the dispute,

and according to Rabbi Yehuda even planks four handbreadths wide are valid for roofing,

but when they are less than four, everyone agrees that it is valid,

then

according to Rabbi Yehuda

there is a difficulty:

why may one not sleep beneath it?

It is valid roofing, even though it is four handbreadths wide!

The Gemara answers:

Do you think

that this halakha

is accepted by everyone,

and that Rabbi Yehuda also agrees with it?!

That is not so. Rather,

the conclusion refers only to Rabbi Meir,

who invalidates a plank that is four handbreadths wide; therefore, one may not sleep beneath it.

Come and hear a proof

from what we learned there: If one placed atop his sukka

two sheets,

each of which by itself was not large enough to invalidate the sukka on account of invalid roofing—and these sheets are unfit for roofing because, being suitable to contract the ritual impurity of garments, they are susceptible to ritual impurity—they

combine

if they are next to one another, to reach the measure of four handbreadths that invalidates the sukka in its middle [but at the side it is not invalidated until four cubits, since they are considered a “bent wall,” as explained above].