Sotah 25a — the Talmud in English

And Shmuel said: I say this even according to Rabbi Yoshiya.

Although she is not entirely his wife, the verse came and included her for drinking. And on the contrary, there is a proof for my words

from the fact that the verse was required to include her, it follows

that you learn from this

that she is not his wife at all!

They raised a dilemma before them: [a woman] who transgresses the religion—

a woman who does not conduct herself modestly, such as one who goes out into the street with uncovered hair and the like, and the law is that her husband divorces her without giving her a ketuba: does she

require

the

warning

in order

to cause her to forfeit her ketuba,

so that only after they warned her and she did not return from her conduct does she forfeit her ketuba,

or does she not require

a warning, but even without a warning she forfeits her ketuba?

And the Gemara explains the sides of the dilemma:

Do we say: since she is one who transgresses the religion, she does not require a warning?

Or perhaps she requires a warning, for if she retracts, she will retract.

It is possible that she will repent, and then she does not forfeit her ketuba.

Come and hear

a proof from that which we learned in the Mishna:

A betrothed woman and a shomeret yavam do not drink and do not collect a ketuba.

And we must infer:

It is drinking that she does not drink; but as for warning, he may warn her.

The betrothed man and the yavam may warn her and caution her not to seclude herself with others, even though the kinui will not ultimately bring her to drinking if she transgresses the kinui.

And

for what purpose

is this kinui effective?

Is it not in order to cause her to forfeit her ketuba,

for if she secludes herself, she forfeits the ketuba?

But this woman who secluded herself with other men is one who transgresses the religion, and nevertheless, were it not for the kinui and the warning, she would not have forfeited her ketuba.

Infer from it that one who transgresses the religion requires a warning in order to cause her to forfeit her ketuba.

Abaye said: No!

The kinui comes only

to forbid her to him

if she secludes herself; but in order to cause her to forfeit her ketuba, she does not require a warning.

Rav Pappa said:

The kinui comes in order

to make her drink when she is married,

so that if she secludes herself after the marriage, she drinks on the basis of the kinui that was made while she was betrothed.

As it was taught: One does not give kinui to a betrothed woman in order to make her drink while she is betrothed, but one gives kinui to a betrothed woman in order to make her drink when she is married.

Rava said: Come and hear

to resolve the question whether she requires a warning or not:

We learned in the Mishna:

A widow to a High Priest, a divorcee or a ḥalutza to an ordinary priest, a woman of illegitimate birth and a netina

to an Israelite, an Israelite woman to a man of illegitimate birth or a netin, do not drink and do not collect a ketuba.

And we infer:

It is drinking that she does not drink.

But as for warning, he may warn them.

And for what purpose

is the kinui effective?

Is it in order to forbid them to him?—

They are already forbidden and remain so,

for they are already forbidden to him now even without the kinui?

Rather, is it not in order

to

cause them to forfeit their ketubot!

Thus, in order to cause her to forfeit her ketuba, a warning is required.

Rav Yehuda of Diskarta said: No!

The kinui does not come to cause her to forfeit her ketuba, but

to forbid her to the paramour as to the husband,

for if she secludes herself with that man, she becomes forbidden to marry the paramour [the man with whom she secluded herself] even after her husband dies or divorces her.

For we learned: Just as she is forbidden

the sota

to her husband, so she is forbidden to the paramour.

Rabbi Ḥanina of Sura said: Come and hear

from that which we learned in the Mishna:

And these are those for whom the court gives kinui: one whose husband became deaf, or became insane, or was imprisoned in the prison.

And they said this not in order to make her drink, but to disqualify her from her ketuba.

Infer from it:

One who transgresses the religion

requires a warning

in order to cause her to forfeit her ketuba, for explicitly we learned that the kinui comes to disqualify her from her ketuba.

And we conclude:

Infer from it!

And we discussed it:

And all of them,

the amoraim above, who sought to resolve the dilemma from our Mishna,

for what reason did they not say [it] from this,

why did they not prove it from here?

And we answer:

Perhaps there it is different, for she has no fear of her husband at all,

she does not fear him since he became deaf or insane or is in prison, and it is therefore not such a great act of licentiousness if she transgresses the religion, and consequently she requires a warning. But an ordinary woman, whose husband is with her, and who transgresses the religion, has a greater element of licentiousness, and perhaps she does not require a warning in order to cause her to forfeit her ketuba.

They raised a dilemma before them:

A woman who is

one who transgresses the religion, and the

her

husband wishes to retain her,

for he does not desire to divorce her: does he

retain her or does he not retain her?

And these are the sides of the dilemma:

Do we say that it is only

only

upon the husband’s insistence that the Merciful One made it dependent,

as it is written, “and he was jealous of his wife,”

and this

husband

does not insist,

and since he does not insist, he is permitted to retain her?

Or perhaps, since he insists, he insists!

Since it is the normal way for a husband to insist upon this, it is considered, against his will, to be insistence, and he is forbidden to retain her?

Come and hear

a proof from that which we learned in the Mishna:

And these are those for whom the court gives kinui: one whose husband became deaf, or became insane, or was imprisoned in the prison.

And if you say that if

her

the husband wishes

the

husband to retain her, he retains her,

the following difficulty arises: is it possible that

the court would do something that perhaps is not pleasing to the husband!?

Perhaps he wishes to retain her despite the fact that she transgresses the religion and secludes herself with men, whereas now, through the kinui of the court, she becomes forbidden to him if she secludes herself. How can we become the husband’s agents in something that he does not desire? Surely one may not cause a person a loss in his absence!

Rather, certainly he is forbidden to retain her, and in any event she becomes forbidden to him.

And we reject this: The husband is always permitted to retain her if he wishes; rather,

as a general matter, since she is one who transgresses the religion, it is pleasing to him

to his wife to remove her, and this is not a loss for him.

They raised a dilemma before them: A husband who waived his kinui,

who gave her permission to be secluded with the one concerning whom he gave her kinui: is

his kinui waived,

and even if she secluded herself she does not become forbidden to him, since through the waiver he nullified the kinui?

Or is it not waived?

And these are the sides of the dilemma:

Do we say: The Merciful One made it dependent upon the husband’s kinui, and this husband has indeed waived his kinui.

Or perhaps, since he gave her kinui initially, he cannot waive it?

Come and hear

from that which we learned in the Mishna:

And these are those for whom the court gives kinui: one whose husband became deaf, or became insane, or was imprisoned in the prison.

And if you say that a husband who waived his kinui—his kinui is waived,

the following difficulty arises: is it possible that

we would do something from which the husband will come

when he leaves the prison, and

waive it!?

This would constitute a slight to the court, since the husband would nullify their kinui! Rather, certainly he cannot waive his kinui.

And we reject this: The husband can always waive and nullify the kinui; rather,

as a general matter, a person agrees with the judgment of the court,

and he will not come to waive it, but if he wishes to waive it, it is waived.

Come and hear

from that which we learned in the Mishna in the first chapter:

And they give him

the court of his city

two Torah scholars,

so that they accompany him on the road to Jerusalem, to the Great Court,

lest he come upon her

the husband

on the way,

for she is forbidden to him.

And if you say that a husband who waived his kinui—his kinui is waived,

what is the concern?

He should waive her kinui,

the husband should waive his kinui,

and have intercourse with her,

for the matter would then be permitted to him?

Rather, certainly he cannot waive his kinui.

And we reject this: On the contrary, from there there is a proof that he can waive his kinui! For

what is different about Torah scholars—

why is it specifically Torah scholars who must be sent with him? It is because

they are learned,

they know the law

that if he wishes

the husband

to have intercourse, they say to her: Waive

it;

your kinui, and have intercourse with her.

Come and hear: Rabbi Yoshiya said: Zeira related three things to me from the people of Jerusalem:

a.

A husband who waived his kinui—his kinui is waived.

b.

And an elder who rebels, whom the court wished to pardon

for having rebelled against their word,

they pardon him,

and he is not punished by strangulation.

c.

And a wayward and rebellious son whom his father and mother wished to pardon, they pardon him,

and he is not stoned.

And when I came to my colleagues in the South, they conceded to me concerning two, but concerning an elder who rebels they did not concede to me

that the court can pardon him, in order

that controversy not increase in Israel.

Infer from it: A husband who waived his kinui—his kinui is waived.

And we conclude:

Infer from it!

Rav Aḥa and Ravina disagree concerning it:

One said:

Only if the husband waived it

before seclusion, it is waived,

but if he waived it

after seclusion, it is not waived,

for she has already become forbidden to him.

And one said:

Even

after seclusion as well, it is waived.

The Gemara’s conclusion is:

And it is reasonable according to the one who says that it is not waived.

From what [do we know this]?

From the fact that the Rabbis replied to Rabbi Yose,

from the response of the Rabbis to Rabbi Yose we learn this.

For it was taught: Rabbi Yose says: Her husband is trusted concerning her,

that he will not have intercourse with her on the way, and there is no need to give him two Torah scholars,

by a kal va-chomer:

And just as concerning a menstruant woman, for whom the punishment is karet, her husband is trusted concerning her,

and there is no need to guard him,

a sota, who is

only

under a prohibition,

against her husband,

is it not all the more so

that she requires no guarding?

They said to him,

the Sages:

No! If you say concerning a menstruant woman

that she requires no guarding, the reason is

that she has a permitted time,

after she immerses; therefore his inclination does not overpower him.

Can you say this concerning a sota, who has no permitted time

if she is found impure, and there is greater concern that his inclination may overpower him?

And if you say that also

even

after seclusion it is waived for her,

then

you can find

also concerning a sota

that she has a permitted time: if he wishes, he waives his kinui and has intercourse with her?

Rather, infer from it,

that

after seclusion it is not waived.

Therefore, when the husband takes her to Jerusalem after seclusion, she no longer has a permitted time.

And we conclude:

Infer from it!

We learned in the Mishna:

If their husbands died before they drank, the House of Shammai

say that they collect their ketuba, since they do not drink. And the House of Hillel say that they either drink or collect their ketuba.

And we discussed it:

Over what do they disagree,

the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel?

And we answer:

The House of Shammai hold: A document that stands to be collected is considered as collected.

A creditor who has a debt document against the debtor, and the debtor has mortgaged his property to him, the holder of the document is considered to have possession of these properties to a greater degree than the debtor. Here, the woman is the holder of the ketuba document, and she is considered to have possession of the properties mortgaged for the ketuba; the husband’s heirs are the claimants, and the one who seeks to take from his fellow bears the burden of proof. Therefore, they must bring proof that she committed adultery in this seclusion, and so long as they have not brought proof, the woman collects her ketuba.