Sotah 16a (טז.) — the Talmud in English

Isi ben Yehuda says: To include the ground of

Shiloh, Nov, and Gibeon

the eternal House

[the Temple that was in Jerusalem], because the verse states: “And from the dust that will be on the ground of the Tabernacle”; we have therefore learned this with regard to the Tabernacle, but with regard to the Temple we did not know it.

Isi ben Menaḥem—

he follows the first beraita mentioned above—and

says: It is not necessary

to derive the ground of the eternal House from the word “ground,” for:

And if with regard to lesser impurity,

that is, if with regard to the lesser prohibition of impurity—namely, entering the Tabernacle while impure in body, for which there is no court-imposed death, but only karet—

the verse did not distinguish

between the Tabernacle and the eternal House.

With regard to the impurity of a married woman,

the

more severe

offense—for which one is liable to a court-imposed death—

is it not certainly the case

that the Torah equated the Temple with the Tabernacle, so that dust may be taken from there to test her and to remove the impurity from within them?

And

if so, what is the meaning of

“on the ground of the Tabernacle”?

It teaches

that he may not bring

dust

from his container

into a vessel and bring it into the Sanctuary, and suffice with that. Rather, he must take dust from the floor of the Tabernacle. If there is no loose dust there, he brings dust from outside, places it on the ground of the Tabernacle, and takes it from there and puts it into the water.

In the beraita cited in tractate Ḥullin, chapter “Covering the Blood” [88b], we learned: One may cover [the blood of an animal or bird after slaughter] only with dust; this is the statement of Beit Shammai. Beit Hillel say: We find that ashes are called dust, as it is stated: “And they shall take for the impure person from the dust of the burning of the sin-offering.”

The reason Beit Shammai hold that one may cover the blood only with dust and not with ashes is that ashes are called “dust of burning,” but ordinary dust is not called [simply] “dust,” as explained in the Gemara there.

They raised a dilemma:

If

there is no

dust

that he can put into the water of the sotah,

what is the law regarding putting

ashes in its place

?

The Gemara explains the dilemma:

According to Beit Shammai—

you need not raise the question!

There is no room for uncertainty, because he certainly may not put ashes, for

Beit Shammai

say:

We do not find that ashes are called dust,

and for this reason they hold that the blood may be covered only with dust, as the verse says, “And he shall cover it with dust.” The same applies with regard to a sotah: since the verse says, “And from the dust,” he may not put ashes in its place.

When you raise the question,

it is according to Beit Hillel, who say: We find that ashes are called

“dust,”

as it says, “And they shall take for the impure person from the dust of the burning of the sin-offering,” and for this reason they permit covering even with ashes—

what

is the law concerning ashes with regard to the dust of a sotah?

The Gemara explains the sides of the dilemma:

Should we say:

Even though

ashes

are called

“dust,”

nevertheless,

here,

with regard to a sotah,

“on the ground of the Tabernacle”

is written.

Although it is not necessary for him to bring the dust from the ground of the Tabernacle, since all dust is included by the phrase “that will be,” nevertheless the Torah said “from the ground of the Tabernacle” in order to teach that the dust must be like the ground of the Tabernacle, excluding ashes.

Or perhaps: This

“on the ground of the Tabernacle”

is written to teach

only what follows from the view of Isi ben Yehuda, and it is only according to Isi ben Menaḥem that it comes

[it comes], as explained in the beraita above, each according to his position.

And as for the fact that the Torah says “and from the dust,” we find that ashes are called “dust.”

Come and hear

a proof that ashes are not fit for a sotah—

from

what Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Yishmael:

In three places, a halakha

that was stated to Moses at Sinai

contradicts Scripture!

It undermines the standing [meaning] of the verse and uproots it from its plain meaning.

a. With regard to covering the blood,

the Torah said,

“And he shall cover it”

“with dust,”

but

if

the halakha

transmitted to Moses at Sinai were that the blood may be covered

with anything

that causes plants to grow.

b. With regard to a nazirite,

the Torah said,

“A razor

shall not pass over his head,”

but

if

the halakha

transmitted to Moses at Sinai were that the nazirite is prohibited

with regard to anything

that removes the hair at its root, like a razor.

c. With regard to a bill of divorce,

the Torah said,

“And he shall write for her”

“a scroll

of severance,” implying that he must write the bill of divorce on parchment, whereas

the halakha

transmitted to Moses at Sinai is that

on anything

on which the bill of divorce is written, it is valid, even on an olive leaf or a cow’s horn.

The Gemara explains its proof from this beraita that ashes are not fit for a sotah, for:

If it is so,

if there is a halakha that ashes too are fit to be placed into the water of a sotah,

Rabbi Yishmael should count

Rabbi Yishmael

this one as well

[he should also have mentioned the ashes of a sotah among the matters in which the halakha transmitted to Moses at Sinai overturns the meaning of Scripture]!? And we reject this:

He taught,

Rabbi Yishmael taught three matters

and omitted

other matters that he did not mention. Therefore, it must be said that the ashes of a sotah are also among the matters that Rabbi Yishmael did not mention.

But the Gemara asks:

And what did he omit,

what further matter did Rabbi Yishmael omit, such that it may be said

that this

—the ashes of a sotah—also

was omitted?

For it is not the practice of a tanna to omit only one matter!

And we explain:

Rabbi Yishmael omitted

Rabbi Yishmael

the leper,

with regard to his second shaving, at the end of his counting period. Although we cannot learn from the Torah that he must shave his entire body, a halakha comes and contradicts Scripture, obligating the leper to shave all the hair of his body, until he becomes smooth like a gourd.

As it was taught:

It is stated in the passage concerning the leper [Leviticus 14:8], with regard to his first shaving, which he performs at the end of the “days of his confinement,” when he is healed from the leprous affliction: “And the one who is being purified shall wash his garments, shave all his hair, bathe in water, and become pure; afterward he may enter the camp, but he shall remain outside his tent for seven days.” This implies that he shaves all the hair on his body, until he becomes like a gourd.

But concerning the second shaving that the leper performs at the end of the seven days [after he has been healed, reentered the camp, and remained outside his tent; ibid., verse 9], it is stated: “

And it shall be on the seventh day that he shall shave all his hair, his head and his beard and his eyebrows; and he shall shave all his hair.”

And this is how the verse speaks of the leper’s second shaving: “

And it shall be on the seventh day; he shall shave all his hair.” “

All his hair”—this is

a general statement. “

His head, his beard, and his eyebrows”—

this is

a specific statement. “

And he shall shave all his hair”—

the verse returned

to

a general statement.

This is the principle of “a general statement, a specific statement, and a general statement”:

When there is a general statement, a specific statement, and a general statement, you may derive

to include

only what resembles the specific statement. What

the

specific statement

—the head, beard, and eyebrows—

explicitly

is

a place where hair gathers and is visible

to the eye,

so too every place

that is

a place where hair gathers and is visible

to the eye is the only place that the leper must shave.

Before the Gemara finishes explaining what Rabbi Yishmael omitted, it first explains the beraita itself:

What does he include

[which hair is included by virtue of the general statement because it resembles the specific statement]?

He includes the hair of the legs,

that is, the pubic hair, which is a place where hair gathers and is visible [when a person is unclothed].

What does he exclude

[which hair is excluded by virtue of the specific statement because it does not resemble it]?

He excludes:

a. The hair

of the armpit,

which is a place where hair gathers, but is not visible.

b.

And

the hair

of the entire body

[the hair of the entire body, apart from the places mentioned], which is not a place where hair gathers, although it is visible to the eye.

Here the Gemara returns to explain what Rabbi Yishmael omitted:

From Scripture we would have excluded every place that is not both a gathering of hair and visible,

but

if

the halakha

transmitted to Moses at Sinai contradicts Scripture and states that even in the second shaving he

shaves

until he becomes

like a gourd.

For

so

we learned

in tractate Nega’im:

When he came

the priest

to shave the leper all around

[to shave him entirely] at the first shaving,

he passes a razor over all his flesh,

making him like a gourd.

And it teaches in the latter clause

of that same Mishna:

“And on the seventh day”

—of his counting period—

“he shaves him with the second shaving like the first shaving!”

Thus, at that time too he must shave all the hair of his body until he becomes like a gourd, just as he does at the first shaving.

It follows that Rabbi Yishmael omitted even the leper’s second shaving: Scripture does not require him to shave like a gourd, whereas the halakha contradicts Scripture and obligates him to shave like a gourd.

Since Rabbi Yishmael omitted the shaving of the leper, we may say that he also omitted ashes for the water of a sotah.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said:

The shaving of a leper is not an omitted matter!

Since

when Rabbi Yishmael counts

Rabbi Yishmael counts only

a halakha

that

contradicts

the

Scripture,

that is opposed to an explicit verse, such as “dust,” “razor,” or “scroll.”

But

this

—the leper [our version reads:

it contradicts a rabbinic derivation,

and some versions read:

it contradicts an exposition]!

That is: The halakha does not contradict something stated explicitly in Scripture, but rather something derived through expositions of the written verses. For ultimately the Torah says, “And it shall be on the seventh day that he shall shave all his hair”; it is only that the specific statement that follows interprets and limits it, and this is not an explicit verse but an exposition.

Rav Pappa said

another reason why the leper is not an omitted matter:

when Rabbi Yishmael counts among the matters in which the halakha contradicts Scripture, he counts only

among the matters in which the halakha undermines the verse, he counts only a

a halakha

that

contradicts

Scripture

and uproots

it, as in the three matters mentioned in his statement.

But

this

—the leper—the halakha

contradicts and adds to

Scripture: Scripture does not obligate him to shave like a gourd, and the halakha comes and adds that he must shave until he becomes like a gourd.

When the Torah uses an inclusive expression [such as “he shall shave all his hair”], as well as a detailed expression concerning specific items [such as “his head, his beard, and his eyebrows”], this matter can be expounded in two ways:

The first: according to the hermeneutical principle of “generalization and specification,” for when a generalization is written and afterward a specification, and then it again returns and writes a generalization, “you may derive”—to include within the Torah’s law—only things similar to the specification”.

The second: according to the hermeneutical principle of “inclusions and exclusions,” for when an inclusion [an inclusive expression] is written and afterward an exclusion [a detailed expression], and then an inclusion [an inclusive expression] is again written, then: inclusion, exclusion, and inclusion includes everything. Nevertheless, the exclusion serves to exclude one matter.

Rabbi Ishmael and Rabbi Akiva disputed this matter throughout the Torah, for Rabbi Ishmael expounds according to “generalizations and specifications,” whereas Rabbi Akiva expounds according to “inclusions and exclusions”.

Rav Ashi said

another reason that a metzora is not considered to have been left over:

This teaching

concerning “three places,”

whose is it? —

It is Rabbi Ishmael’s

for Rabbi Yohanan said these matters in the name of Rabbi Ishmael—

For

he indeed

expounds

throughout the Torah

“generalizations and specifications”,

and according to his approach, in truth the metzora does not need a second shaving, shaving everything bald like a gourd, as explained: according to the principle of “generalization, specification, and generalization,” the hair located in a place that is not a concentration of hair or is not visible is excluded.