Shevuot 43a (מג.) — the Talmud in English

As the Sages taught:

it is stated at the beginning of the passage concerning an unpaid bailee, with regard to the bailee’s liability to take an oath: “

When a man gives money or vessels to his fellow for safekeeping,” and the Gemara expounds:

“When a man gives to his fellow”—

a generalization; “money or vessels”—

a detail; “for safekeeping”—

it returned and generalized!

And every

generalization, detail, and generalization—you derive from the generalization only that which is similar to the detail. Just as the detail explicitly refers to a movable item whose substance itself has monetary value, so too every item that is movable and whose substance itself has monetary value!

This excludes land, which is not movable; it excludes slaves, who were compared to land; and it excludes documents, which, although movable, do not themselves have monetary value.

But with regard to

consecrated property—“

When a man gives to

his fellow,” it is written

with regard to the obligation of double payment, to exclude consecrated property.

We also learned in the Mishna:

A paid bailee does not pay:

From where do we derive this?

As the Sages taught:

The Torah says, in the passage concerning a paid bailee:

“When a man gives to his fellow”—

a generalization; “a donkey, an ox, or a sheep”—

a detail; “and every animal for safekeeping”—

it returned and generalized.

A generalization, detail, and generalization:

you derive from the generalization only that which is similar to the detail. Just as the detail explicitly refers to a movable item whose substance itself has monetary value, so too every item that is movable and whose substance itself has monetary value!

This excludes land, which is not movable; it excludes slaves, who were compared to land; and it excludes documents, which, although movable, do not themselves have monetary value.

But with regard to

consecrated property—“

When a man gives to

his fellow,” it is written

with regard to the obligation of double payment, to exclude consecrated property.

We learned in our Mishna:

Rabbi Meir says: There are items that are like land but are not like land.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: Since Rabbi Meir maintains that one takes an oath concerning something attached to the ground, although one does not take an oath concerning the ground itself,

by inference

you learn

that Rabbi Meir maintains that anything attached to the ground is not considered land!

And that is why one takes an oath concerning it.

This is difficult:

When

Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disputed

with regard to

grapevines

laden

why did they dispute specifically with regard to laden vines?

Let them dispute with regard to stripped vines

—empty grapevines—and what is the difference between laden and stripped vines?

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said:

Here, they dispute with regard to grapes that are destined to be cut off,

Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis.

For Rabbi Meir maintains

that since these grapes are destined to be cut off and no longer require the ground,

they are considered like grapes that have already been cut off.

Therefore, their status is that of movable property and not land, and one takes an oath concerning them.

But

if

the Rabbis maintain

that although the grapes are destined to be cut off, they are nevertheless still attached to the ground and

are not considered like grapes that have already been cut off,

and therefore one does not take an oath concerning them.

We learned in our Mishna:

One takes an oath only concerning an item whose measure or weight

or number is specified.

Abaye said: They taught

that he is exempt from an oath

only

in a case

where the claimant said to him

the defendant:

A house

full of produce

without specification

I entrusted to you—that is, he did not specify which quantity filling a house he had entrusted to him.

But

if

he said to him: “I entrusted this house, full of

produce, to you,” he must take an oath concerning it, because the claimant’s

claim is definite.

His claim is known and precisely defined.

Therefore, if the defendant found that the house was not full of produce, he must take an oath under the law of one who admits to part of a claim, even though the defendant’s admission is not precise, since he does not say, for example, “up to the notch.”

Rava said to him: If so,

that it is entirely irrelevant that the defendant’s admission is not precise,

then,

instead of teaching in the latter clause: “This one says up to the notch, and that one says up to the window, he is liable,”

let it distinguish and teach the matter itself,

with regard to a house that is full, and let it say as follows:

In what case is this statement said,

that the defendant is exempt from an oath? Only when the claimant claims that

“I entrusted to you

a house full [without specification].”

But

if he said:

“I entrusted this house, full

of produce, to you”—

he is liable.

Why, then, did the Mishna change the manner of the defendant’s admission?

Rather, Rava said: Actually, he is liable only when the claimant claims from him

the matter

an item whose measure, weight, or number is specified,

and he admits to him

the defendant

an item whose measure, weight, or number is specified.

Both the claim and the admission must be precise and clear.

It was taught in accordance with Rava’s opinion,

that both the claim and the admission must be defined and specified:

“I have a kor of produce in your possession.” And the other says: “You have nothing in my possession”—

he is exempt

from a Torah oath, but is liable to the rabbinic oath of inducement.

“I have a large lamp in your possession.”

And the other says:

“You have nothing in my possession except a small lamp”—

he is exempt

from the oath of one who admits to part of a claim, because the admission is not of the same type as the claim. The admission concerning a small lamp is not an admission concerning part of the large lamp; rather, he admitted to an entirely different lamp.

“I have a large belt

[a belt]

in your possession.”

And the other says:

“You have nothing in my possession except a small belt”—he is exempt

from a Torah oath, since he did not admit to that which the claimant claimed from him.

But if he said to him: “I have a kor of produce in your possession,” and the other said: “You have nothing in my possession except a lethekh”

[half a kor],

he is liable

to a Torah oath, since he admitted to part of the claim.

And similarly, if he said to him:

“A lamp containing

a measure of

ten litra is in your possession.”

And the other says:

“You have nothing in my possession except

a lamp

containing five litra”—he is liable

to take an oath by Torah law.

The general principle is: He is never liable

to take an oath unless

the claimant claims from him an item whose measure, weight, or number is specified, and he admits to him an item whose measure, weight, or number is specified.

The Gemara infers from this:

“The general principle”—what does it come to include?

[What additional matter does the beraita teach by means of this general principle that we did not learn previously?] Is it

not intended to include “this house full”?

That even when the claim is definite, he is exempt from an oath, since the admission was not definite: He answered him, “You take what you deposited,” as Rava stated.

The Gemara raises a difficulty against the beraita:

And what is different about a large lamp and a small lamp

that they were excluded from an oath, because

what he claimed, he did not admit to him, and what he admitted to him, he did not claim from him?

If so,

if the case under discussion is one in which he claimed a lamp

containing ten

litra and he admitted to him a lamp

containing five

litra, why is he liable to take an oath? Let us say

also

here:

“What he claimed, he did not admit to him, and what he admitted to him, he did not claim from him”!

Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak said: Here we are dealing with a lamp made of segments,

a lamp made of segments that can be disassembled into separate segments and can be assembled to contain either ten litra or five litra.

And it follows

that

when the defendant admits to five litra, he

is admitting to part of it.

He is admitting to part of the ten-litra claim, and this is not an admission concerning a different lamp.

The Gemara raises a difficulty:

If so,

if the case concerns a lamp made of segments, and therefore when he admits to five litra he admits to part of the large lamp,

then, with regard to

a belt,

also

let it teach

that the beraita is speaking of a belt concerning which he can admit to part of it, just as we established the case with regard to the lamp.

And let us establish

that the case concerns

a belt made of strips,

a belt composed of separate pieces sewn together with thread: He claims from him a belt ten cubits long, and he admits to a belt five cubits long, which could be cut from the larger one. Why, then, does the beraita distinguish between a lamp, with regard to which the one who admits is liable, and a belt, with regard to which he is exempt?

Rather,

necessarily, the reason that we do not establish the beraita in this manner is

that a belt made of strips is not taught

in the first clause of the beraita, when the tanna stated that one who admits to a small lamp when a large lamp was claimed is exempt from an oath, since an ordinary belt does not divide into sections.

Here too,

when the tanna taught in the first clause that one who admits to a small lamp when a large lamp was claimed is exempt from an oath,

he did not teach a lamp made of segments!

Rather, he was speaking of an actual large lamp and an actual small lamp, each made from a single piece.

It follows that the latter clause concerning ten litra and five litra cannot be established with regard to a disassembling lamp. Rather, just as the first clause spoke of an ordinary lamp, so too here it is speaking of an ordinary lamp, and the difficulty returns: What he claimed, he did not admit to him, and what he admitted to him, he did not claim from him?!

Rather, Rabbi Abba bar Memel said: A lamp differs

from a belt.

Since he can scrape it down

and reduce the lamp

and bring it to

a weight of

five litra.

It follows that he admitted to part of that very lamp, whereas in the case of a belt such a circumstance is impossible, since its ends are recognizable and it cannot be reduced.

And with regard to a large lamp and a small lamp, it is likewise not possible to scrape down a large lamp and make it small, since only the weight of the lamp can be reduced, but its form cannot be changed from that of a large lamp into that of a small lamp.

Mishna:

a.

One who lends money to his fellow against collateral, and the collateral is lost

[and the lender becomes liable to pay the value of the collateral].

If

he said to him

the lender said to the borrower:

“I lent you a sela against it,”

against the collateral,

“and a shekel”

which is half a sela

was

the collateral

worth.

Thus, you now owe me one shekel, which is the difference between the loan and the collateral.

And the other,

the borrower,

says: “No; rather, you lent me a sela against it, and it was worth a sela,”

the collateral

was worth,

and consequently I owe you nothing—

he is exempt

from payment and from taking an oath.

b. But if the lender said to him:

“I lent you a sela against it, and it was worth a shekel,” and the other said: “No; rather, you lent me a sela against it, and it was worth three dinars”

[which are three quarters of a sela],

“it was worth”

the collateral—and thus the borrower admitted to him one dinar out of the two dinars that he claims from him—

he is liable

to take the oath of one who admits to part of a claim concerning the second dinar.

c. And if the borrower claims against the lender because the lender lost the collateral, and the borrower says to him:

“You lent me a sela against it, and two”

[two sela],

“it was worth”

the collateral, and consequently you owe me one sela,

and the other

the lender

says: “No; rather, I lent you a sela against it, and it was worth a sela,”—

the lender is exempt

from payment and from taking an oath.

d. But if the borrower said to the lender:

“You lent me a sela

against it, and two”

[two sela, which are eight dinars]

“it was worth”

the collateral,

and the other

the lender

says: “No; rather, I lent you a sela against it, and it was worth five dinars”—he is liable

the lender is liable to take a Torah oath under the law of one who admits to part of a claim, since he admitted that the collateral was worth one dinar more than the loan. Therefore, he takes an oath concerning the remainder of the borrower’s claim.

e.

And who takes the oath,

in the second case above in our Mishna, when the lender says, “I lent you a sela against it, and the collateral was worth a shekel,” and the borrower admits to part of the claim and maintains that the collateral was worth three dinars—

the one who has the deposit in his possession.

That is, the lender is the one who takes the oath, because the Sages obligated the lender to take an oath in place of the borrower,

lest this one take an oath

the borrower, that the collateral was worth three dinars,

and the other take out

the lender

the deposit

the collateral in his possession, and it would turn out that the borrower had taken a false oath.

[Perhaps the borrower was not exact in evaluating the value of the collateral and would thereby be disqualified, on account of a false oath, from serving as a witness or taking an oath; or perhaps the lender would take out, after causing the borrower to take a false oath, the deposit, and it would turn out that the borrower’s oath had been in vain. Rashi and Tosafot].