Shevuot 43a — the Talmud in English

For the Sages taught:

It is stated at the beginning of the passage concerning an unpaid bailee, regarding the bailee’s liability to take an oath: "

When a man gives to his fellow silver or vessels to guard," and the Gemara expounds: ![](pamud.bmp "

Precise page location")

“When a man gives to his fellow” —

a general statement; “silver or vessels” —

a specification; “to guard” —

it returned and made a general statement!

And every

general statement, specification, and general statement—you may judge the general statement only as similar to the specification. Just as the specification explicitly refers to a movable object whose substance has monetary value, so too every object that is movable and whose substance has monetary value!

Excluded are land, which is not movable; excluded are slaves, which were equated with land; excluded are promissory documents, which, although they are movable, do not themselves have monetary value.

But concerning

sacred property — “

When a man gives to his

fellow, it is written”

regarding the liability for double payment, to exclude sacred property.

We further learned in the Mishna:

A paid bailee does not pay:

From where do we know this?

For the Sages taught:

The Torah said in the passage of Mishpatim, regarding a paid bailee:

“When a man gives to his fellow” —

«Когда человек передаёт своему ближнему» —

a general statement. “A donkey or an ox or a sheep” —

a specification. “And every animal to guard” —

it returned and made a general statement.

A general statement, specification, and general statement,

you may judge the general statement only as similar to the specification. Just as the specification explicitly refers to a movable object whose substance has monetary value, so too every object that is movable and whose substance has monetary value!

Excluded are land, which is not movable; excluded are slaves, which were equated with land; excluded are promissory documents, which, although they are movable, do not themselves have monetary value.

But concerning

sacred property — “

When a man gives to his

fellow, it is written”

regarding the liability for double payment, to exclude sacred property.

We learned in our Mishna:

Rabbi Meir says: There are things that are like land but are not like land.

And the Gemara asks: From the fact that Rabbi Meir holds that one takes an oath concerning that which is attached to land, although one does not take an oath concerning the land itself,

by inference

you learn this,

that Rabbi Meir holds that everything attached to land is not like land!

And for that reason one takes an oath concerning it.

And it is difficult:

Before Rabbi Meir and the Sages differed

Rabbi Meir and the Sages

with regard to

grapevines

laden

why do they differ specifically with regard to laden vines?

Let them differ with regard to stripped vines

[empty grapevines], and what is the difference between laden and stripped vines?

Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Ḥanina said:

Here, they differ with regard to grapes that are standing ready to be cut,

Rabbi Meir and the Sages.

For Rabbi Meir holds,

since these grapes are standing ready to be cut and no longer require the land—

they are considered like grapes already cut.

Therefore, their legal status is that of movable property and not of land, and one takes an oath concerning them.

And

whereas

the Sages hold

that although they are standing ready to be cut, nevertheless they are still attached to the land and

are not considered like grapes already cut,

and therefore one does not take an oath concerning them.

We learned in our Mishna:

One takes an oath only concerning a matter of measure and weight

and number.

Abaye said: They taught

that he is exempt from an oath

only

in a case

where he said to him

the claimant:

A house

full of produce

without specification

I gave over to you—that is, he did not define which full house of produce he deposited with him.

But

if

he said to him: This house is full

of produce I deposited with you, he is liable to take an oath concerning it, for the claimant’s

claim is known.

His claim is known and defined.

Therefore, if he found that the house was not full of produce, the defendant is liable to take an oath according to the law of one who admits to part of the claim—even though the defendant’s admission is not defined, since he does not say “up to the peg,” or the like.

Rava said to him: If so,

that it does not matter at all that the defendant’s admission is not defined,

if so,

rather than teach in the latter clause: This one says up to the peg, and that one says up to the window, he is liable—

let him differ and teach it with regard to that very matter,

with regard to the full house itself, and let it be stated as follows:

In what case are these words stated,

that the defendant is exempt from an oath? Only when he claims from him,

“I gave you

a full house

but

if he said:

“This house is full

of produce I gave you”—

he is liable.

And why did the Mishna change the manner of the defendant’s admission?

Rather, Rava said: In fact, he is never liable until the claimant claims from him

the matter

by measure, by weight, or by number,

and he admits to him

the defendant

in a matter of measure, weight, or number.

Both the claim and the admission must be defined and clear.

It was taught in accordance with Rava,

that both the claim and the admission must both be defined and specified:

“A kor of produce is in your possession.” And the other says: “You have nothing in my possession”—

he is exempt

from a Torah oath, but liable to a rabbinic oath of heset.

“I have a large lamp in your possession.”

And the other says

“You have nothing in my possession except a small lamp”—

he is exempt

from an oath of one who admits to part of the claim, because the admission is not of the same type as the claim: the admission concerning a small lamp is not an admission to part of the large lamp. Rather, he admitted to an entirely different lamp.

“I have a large belt

[a belt]

in your possession.”

And the other says

“You have nothing in my possession except a small belt”—he is exempt

from a Torah oath, for he did not admit to what he was claimed.

But if he said to him: “I have a kor of produce in your possession,” and the other says: “You have nothing in my possession except a lethekh”

[half a kor]

he is liable

to a Torah oath, for he admitted to part of the claim.

And likewise, if he said to him:

“A lamp of

the measure of

ten liters is in your possession.”

And the other says:

“You have nothing in my possession except

a lamp

of five liters; he is liable

to take an oath according to the Torah.

The general principle is: He is never liable

to take an oath except

until he is claimed concerning a matter of measure, weight, or number, and he admits to him concerning a matter of measure, weight, or number.

And the Gemara infers from this:

“The general principle”—what does it come to include?

[What additional matter does the beraita teach through this general principle that we did not previously learn?] Is it

not meant to include “This house is full”?

For even though the claim is defined, he is exempt from an oath, since the admission was not defined, for he answered him, “What you deposited, you are taking,” and this proves Rava’s words!

And the Gemara asks against the words of the beraita:

And what is different about a large lamp and a small lamp

that they were excluded from an oath, because

“what he claimed, he did not admit to him, and what he admitted to him, he did not claim”?

If so,

that the matter concerns a case in which he claimed from him a lamp

of ten

liters and he admitted to him a lamp

of five

liters, why is he liable for an oath? Let us say

also

here—also here:

“What he claimed, he did not admit to him, and what he admitted to him, he did not claim”?!

Rabbi Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak said: Here we are dealing with a lamp made of segments,

for a lamp made of segments comes apart into segments, and it is possible to assemble it as one of ten liters or as one of five liters.

And it follows

that

when the defendant admits to five liters,

he is admitting to him from it.

From the claim of ten liters, and this is not an admission concerning another lamp.

And the Gemara asks:

If so,

that we are dealing with a lamp made of segments, and therefore when he admits to five liters he is admitting to part of the large one,

if so, with

a belt,

also

let it teach

that the words of the beraita concern a belt concerning which he can admit to part of it, just as we established with regard to the lamp.

And let us establish

that it is dealing

with a segmented belt,

with a belt made of pieces sewn together by thread, and he claims from him a belt of ten cubits and he admits to him a belt of five that can be cut from the larger one. And why did the beraita distinguish between a lamp, with regard to which the one who admits is liable, and a belt, with regard to which he is exempt?

Rather,

necessarily, since we do not establish the words of the beraita in this manner, it is because

a segmented belt it did not teach

in the first clause of the beraita, when the tannay stated that one who admits to a small lamp in response to a claim for a large lamp is exempt from an oath, since an ordinary belt is not divided.

Here too,

when the tannay taught in the first clause the exemption from an oath in the case of a large lamp and a small lamp,

he did not teach one made of segments!

Rather, he spoke of an actual large lamp and an actual small lamp, made from a single piece.

It follows that it is impossible to establish the latter clause of ten liters and five liters with a lamp that comes apart. Rather, just as the first clause spoke of an ordinary lamp, so too here it is speaking of an ordinary lamp, and the question returns: after all, what he claimed, he did not admit to him, and what he admitted to him, he did not claim?!

Rather, Rabbi Abba bar Memel said: A lamp is different

from a belt.

Since he can scrape it

to reduce the lamp

and bring it to

a weight of

five liters.

It follows that he admitted to him to part of that very same lamp, whereas with a belt such a possibility does not exist, since its ends are recognizable and it cannot be reduced.

And with a large and small lamp as well, it is not possible to scrape a large lamp and make it small, since only the weight of the lamp can be reduced, but its form cannot be changed from a large lamp to a small lamp.

Mishna:

a.

One who lends money to his fellow against collateral, and the collateral was lost

[and the lender became liable to pay the value of the collateral].

If

he said to him

the lender to the borrower:

“I lent you a sela against it,”

against the collateral,

“and a shekel”

which is half a sela—

was

the collateral

worth.

And it follows that you now owe me a shekel, which is the difference between the loan and the collateral.

And the other,

the borrower,

says: “No, rather, you lent me a sela against it, and a sela it was

the collateral

worth,”

and consequently I owe you nothing—

he is exempt

the borrower from payment and from an oath.

b. But if the lender said to him:

“I lent you a sela against it, and it was worth a shekel,” and the other says: “No, rather, you lent me a sela against it, and three dinars

[which are three quarters of a sela]

it was worth,”

the collateral, and it follows that the borrower admitted to him to one dinar out of the two dinars that he is claiming from him,

he is liable

the borrower for an oath of one who admits to part of the claim concerning the second dinar.

c. And if the borrower brought a claim against the lender because the lender lost the collateral, and the borrower says to him:

“You lent me a sela against it, and two”

[two sela],

“it was worth,”

the collateral, and it follows that you owe me a sela.

And the other,

the lender,

says: “No, rather, I lent you a sela against it, and it was worth a sela”—

he is exempt

the lender from payment and from an oath.

d. But if the borrower said to the lender:

“You lent me a sela

against it, and two”

[two sela, which are eight dinars]

“it was worth,”

the collateral,

and the other

the lender

says: “No, rather, I lent you a sela against it, and it was worth five dinars; he is liable,”

the lender is liable to take a Torah oath according to the law of one who admits to part of the claim, since he admitted that the collateral was worth one dinar more than the loan. Therefore, he takes an oath concerning the remainder of the borrower’s claim.

e.

And who takes the oath,

in the second case above in our Mishna, when the lender says, “I lent you a sela, and the collateral was worth a shekel,” and the borrower admits to him to part of the claim and claims that the collateral was worth three dinars—

the one who has the deposit in his possession.

That is, the lender is the one who takes the oath, because the Sages required the lender to take an oath in place of the borrower,

lest this one take an oath,

the borrower, that the collateral was worth three dinars,

and the other take out

the lender

the deposit

the collateral under his control, and it would be found that the borrower took a false oath.

[And perhaps the borrower was not precise in assessing the value of the collateral and would thereby be disqualified through a false oath from testimony and from taking an oath, or perhaps the lender would take out the deposit after causing the borrower to take a false oath, and it would be found that the borrower’s oath was in vain. Rashi and Tosafot].