Shevuot 42a — the Talmud in English

He said to him

the borrower:

And

if

I did not repay you

this debt by giving you for it merchandise of

one hundred kavs ![](pamud.bmp "

precise page location")

of afatzai [material for processing hides]

a material used for processing hides,

which stood [whose price was]

what their price was

at six six?

six zuz?

Each kav was worth six zuz, and it follows that I repaid you with those one hundred kavs of afatzai a sum of six hundred zuz that I owed you.

He said to him

the lender:

No! At four four

zuz

they stood

each of these kavs of afatzai.

And therefore, even according to your words, that you gave me the afatzai, you repaid me only the value of four hundred zuz, and you still owe me two hundred.

Two witnesses came

to testify about the price of the afatzai, how much it was worth at the time that he gave it to him, and they said:

Indeed, at four four

zuz for each kav

they stood!

And it follows that he repaid only four hundred. The lender stands and claims the two hundred remaining in his debt. Whereas the borrower says: I repaid you everything. Indeed, if I did not repay you with afatzai, I repaid you with money. In any event, I repaid you everything!

Rava said:

The borrower is not now believed to say, “I repaid you everything,” since he

has been established as a liar!

For two witnesses contradicted his claim that he repaid him with afatzai at a value of six zuz per kav.

And since he has been established as a liar, he is no longer believed to claim, “I repaid,” concerning this monetary debt, and the claimant prevails as the law requires, and the borrower shall pay the remaining two hundred.

Rami bar Hama said:

He has not been established as a liar in a case such as this, because

you said—

anything that is not imposed upon a person, he does not keep in mind,

and this borrower was not required to remember in what manner he repaid him; rather, he remembered the matter of the repayment in general, and did not descend to the details.

And therefore, when he was sued, he stated an estimated price, thinking that this was the rate [since in any event the principal repayment was through the afatzai].

He said

to him

Rava: The fixing of the market rate

the fixedness of the selling price

people remember well,

and it follows that he lied in his claim [since he was contradicted by witnesses], and therefore he was established as a liar concerning this money.

There was one who said to his fellow: Give me one hundred zuz that I have outstanding against you

that you owe me

and here is the document

as proof of your debt.

He said to him

the defendant:

I repaid you

in the presence of witnesses.

He said to him

the claimant: Those very zuz that you repaid me—

they are side-debt monies,

I received them from you for repayment of another debt that you owed me. But the debt in this document—you have still not repaid.

Rav Naḥman said: The document has been impaired,

its power to collect this debt has been invalidated, since the lender admitted to some repayment and is not believed to say, “You repaid only side-debt monies.”

Rav Pappa said: The document has not been impaired,

for the lender did not admit to repayment of this document.

And the Gemara challenges:

According to Rav Pappa,

who holds that the document has not been impaired,

what is different

this case

from that one who said to his fellow—

Give me one hundred zuz that I have outstanding against you

as a loan

and here is the document

as proof of your debt.

He said to him

the defendant:

Did you not give me money for oxen?

Did you not give me this money so that I would buy oxen with it, slaughter them, sell their meat, and divide the profit?

And

his fellow further claimed to him: Not only did you give me the money so that I would buy oxen with it, but

you came and sat at the meat market.

You came and sat at the place where they butcher the meat and sell it to purchasers,

and you received your zuz

from the proceeds of selling the oxen’s meat!

And he said to him

the claimant:

Those

zuz that I took from the proceeds of the meat, I did not take them for my investment in the oxen, but

they are side-debt monies,

I took them from you for another debt that I had against you,

and Rav Pappa said: The document has been impaired.

That document written concerning the money given for the purchase of the oxen has been impaired, and the defendant need not repay.

And it is difficult: What is different above, concerning a lender, where Rav Pappa held that the claimant is believed to claim, “Those are side-debt monies”?

The Gemara answers: This is different,

there,

since he said

the defendant

“You gave me money for oxen,”

and the claimant admitted to him that he gave him the money for the purchase of oxen. And he also said to him,

“And you took from the oxen,”

you took from the money from the sale of the meat, and the claimant also admitted this to him, except that he claims that he took the proceeds of the oxen’s meat as repayment of another debt; and since this is so,

the document has been impaired

the document.

But

here, concerning a debt document, even though the lender admitted to repayment,

with regard to a promissory note, although the creditor admitted receiving payment,

perhaps they are side-debt monies,

and he admitted to repayment for another debt. For there is no proof at all that the repayment was for this debt.

What has become of the matter

concerning the dispute between Rav Naḥman and Rav Pappa regarding the claim of side-debt monies?

Rav Pappi said: The document has not been impaired,

the document has not been impaired if the lender admitted to it and said that it was side-debt monies.

Rav Sheshet son of Rav Idi said: The document has been impaired!

And the halakha—

the document has been impaired!

And this applies

that the document has been impaired and the lender is not believed, only where

he repaid him

the borrower to the lender

in the presence of

witnesses,

but

he did not mention the document to him,

the borrower did not mention to the lender that he had a document with him, which he had to return—and only in this manner is he not believed, since there are witnesses that he repaid him properly.

But,

he repaid him between himself and himself

between them, without witnesses, the lender is believed.

For

migo,

since

he could

the lender

say, “There were never any such matters,”

and my debt was not repaid at all,

he can also say

that this repayment that you repaid me—

they are side-debt monies,

whereas the document in my possession has not yet been repaid.

And

this law is

like

the incident

of Avimi son of Rav Abbahu,

who repaid his debt not in the presence of witnesses and did not take his document, and afterward the lender claimed that he had been repaid for another debt and he was forced to repay him a second time.

That

borrower

who said to his fellow,

the one who lent to him:

You are believed by me whenever you say to me, “You did not repay me!”

You are believed by me whenever you say that I did not repay you and did not receive anything from me, whereas I will not be able to say against you that I repaid you.

And he told him this at the time of the loan and in the presence of witnesses, so that this credibility would have force.

He went

the borrower

and repaid him

his debt

in the presence of witnesses.

And now the lender claims that he was not repaid, and claims that he is believed concerning this, by virtue of the credibility that the borrower gave him at the time of the loan and in the presence of witnesses.

Abaye and Rava both said

the lender is believed even against the testimony of the two witnesses that he repaid him, because

he trusted him!

And this credibility overcomes the testimony of the witnesses, since this is the meaning of his credibility: that only he would be believed concerning the repayment, excluding even witnesses, who would not be believed like him.

Rav Pappa challenged him: Granted

indeed

that he trusted him

the borrower trusted the lender

more than himself,

more than he trusted himself, for he told him in advance that so long as the lender said that he had not repaid, he would be believed against him.

However,

more than witnesses—

did he trust him!?

Surely the meaning of his words was not to give the lender absolute credibility even more than two witnesses; therefore he is exempt from repaying him a second time.

That

borrower

who said to his fellow

the one who lent to him:

You are trusted by me as two people

like two people

whenever you say, “I did not repay.” He went

the borrower

, and repaid him in the presence of three

in the presence of three. And now the lender claims that he did not repay him.

Rav Pappa said: He trusted him as two, he did not trust him as three,

for he gave force to the lender’s credibility only as two and no more. Therefore, when there are three who say contrary to the lender, the three are believed against the lender, since he, the lender, is believed only as two.

Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua said to Rav Pappa: Say that the Sages said that we follow the majority of opinions

and preference is given to the greater number of people’s opinions, and we believe three more than two—

This applies

only

with regard to assessment,

that is, when one wishes to assess and appraise the value of an object, how much it is worth, and a few people say that it is worth one amount, whereas the majority say that its value is different;

then

the more numerous they are

more numerous

the more expert they are.

It is more likely that the value of the thing is as the majority says.

But with regard to testimony,

when the borrower trusted the lender as two witnesses,

one hundred are like two and two are like one hundred.

It does not depend on the number of people who say that he repaid or did not repay, but depends on the force of credibility that the Torah gave to witnesses!

And in this there is no distinction between two and one hundred. Therefore, once the borrower trusted the lender as two, he gave him the force of credibility of two witnesses, and there is no difference between two and three.

Another version: That

borrower

who said to him

to his fellow

the lender—

You are trusted by me as two people whenever you say, “I did not repay.”

He went

the borrower

and repaid him in the presence of three.

Rav Pappa said:

He trusted him as two; he did not trust him as three!

Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua challenged him—

Two are like one hundred, and one hundred are like two.

But

if he said to him

the borrower to the lender: You are believed by me

as three, and he went

and

the borrower repaid him in the presence of four

the lender is no longer believed.

For

since he descended

the borrower

to

the number of

opinions,

that is, to a number of people such that he trusts the lender only as that number, he did not trust him as witnesses, since concerning witnesses there is no practical difference between two and three, and the borrower was precise about the number of opinions. He gave the lender’s claim the force of only three “opinions”—

He descended to opinions!

And therefore, if he repaid him in the presence of four “opinions,” the four opinions are superior to the three, and the lender is not believed against them.

We learned in our Mishna:

One does not administer an oath concerning the claim of a deaf-mute

a mentally incompetent person, or a minor. And one does not administer an oath to a minor.

And the Gemara discusses: What is the reason that one does not administer an oath concerning their claims?

The verse says

in the passage concerning one who admits to part of a claim:

“When a man gives his fellow money or vessels to guard—

and the master of the house shall draw near to the powers [for an oath]”—

And we expound from here that only the giving of an adult obligates an oath, but the giving of a minor does not,

and

because

the giving of a minor

is considered

nothing!

And therefore, even if the minor makes a certain claim [with certainty] that he gave his fellow a loan or a deposit [and even if he makes this claim after he becomes an adult], and the other admits to him partially, the defendant is not obligated to swear, because the giving that the minor gave him is nothing.

We further learned in the Mishna:

But one does administer an oath to a minor and to consecrated property!

And the Gemara challenges:

But you said at the beginning—

one does not administer an oath concerning the claim of a deaf-mute, a mentally incompetent person, or a minor?!

Rav said:

the latter clause, which says that one takes an oath concerning the claim of a minor, is speaking of

a

manner in which

there came

the minor and claims

by

the force of

his father's claim.

For example, a minor heir came and claimed that his father had given the defendant a loan or a deposit. And since there is no deficiency in the giving by his father, as the giving of a minor, and now the minor comes and claims by the force of his father's inheritance, therefore the defendant is obligated to take an oath concerning his claim.

But the first clause speaks of the minor coming with his own claim, concerning an object that he gave, and concerning this the defendant does not take an oath, since the giving of a minor is not considered anything.

And

this that the latter clause says that one takes an oath concerning the claim of a minor who comes with the claim of his father is according to the method of

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov.

But according to the Rabbis, one does not take an oath concerning the claim of a minor in any case, even when he comes with the claim of his father.

For it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: Sometimes a person takes an oath

a partial-admission oath

concerning his own claim,

and not concerning the claim of the claimant.

How

does he take an oath concerning his own claim?

He said to him

he lent to the son of the creditor, without the son having claimed against him:

“I have a maneh belonging to your father in my possession, and I fed him a half.”

I borrowed one hundred from your father, and returned to him only fifty [which are part of the claim, like a slice cut from the whole loaf], and I still owe fifty,

he takes an oath

a partial-admission oath.

And this is what it means that he takes an oath concerning his own claim! [

And therefore, according to Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, one must also take an oath concerning the claim of a minor who comes with the claim of his father, for the claim of a minor is no weaker than that of one who makes a partial admission and takes an oath concerning his own claim, when there is no claimant at all, and nevertheless he takes an oath concerning it. Therefore, also the claim of a minor by virtue of his father's giving obligates an oath].

And the Sages say:

A person never takes an oath concerning his own claim, for

he is merely like one who returns a lost object,

who admitted without being claimed against,

and is exempt.

That is, the Sages instituted that one who finds a lost object and returns it to its owner, if the loser claims against the finder, asserting that there was more in the lost object than what the finder returned to him, the finder does not take an oath, for the sake of the preservation of the world. For if the finder were required to take an oath, he would not return a lost object.

And the same law applies concerning one who takes an oath regarding his own claim: if we obligate one who makes a partial admission on his own initiative to take an oath, he will again not admit even to part of the claim.

And therefore, according to the Sages, one does not take an oath even concerning the claim of a minor. Since there is no substance to the claim of a minor, and it is as though there is no claimant at all, and he is exempt from an oath for the sake of the preservation of the world, therefore our Mishna must be established according to the method of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov.

And the Gemara asks:

But does Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov not hold,

does he not hold the enactment that the Sages enacted, that

one who returns a lost object is exempt

from an oath for the sake of the preservation of the world?

Rav said:

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov is speaking

of a case in which

an orphan

a minor

claimed against him, and therefore his partial admission of the minor's claim is not considered like one who returns a lost object, since he did not admit on his own initiative, but only after the minor claimed against him. Yet, nevertheless, he is still considered one who takes an oath concerning “his own claim,” since the claim of a minor [even when he comes with the claim of his father] does not obligate an oath on account of the minor's claim.

And the Gemara raises an objection: A minor!? How can it be possible to establish the words of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov as referring to a case in which a minor claimed against him?

But you said: One does not take an oath concerning the claim of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor?!

And the Gemara answers:

Actually,

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov is speaking of a case in which an

adult claimed against him.

And why do they call him “a minor,”

as the Gemara says that the matter concerns “a minor who comes with the claim of his father”? Because

even an adult, with regard to matters of his father—

is a minor!

That is, although he is an adult, since he is not expert in his father's affairs, his claim is considered like the claim of a minor, who is not expert in his claims; therefore Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov regarded the oath of the defendant against such a claim as one who “takes an oath concerning his own claim.”

However, nevertheless, according to his view, one who makes a partial admission to this claim is not considered “one who returns a lost object,” since, in any event, his admission came only after the claim of an adult.

And the Gemara is astonished:

If so,

that the matter concerns an adult who comes with the claim of his father, why does Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov regard one who takes an oath concerning this claim as one who takes an oath concerning

“his own claim”?

Is not the claim of the adult

“the claim of others”?!

And the Gemara explains that this was Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov's intention when he said: Sometimes a person takes an oath concerning

the claim of others and his own admission.

And he phrased it as “sometimes he takes an oath concerning his own claim,” because the obligation of the oath in this manner, in which an adult claims against him with the claim of his father, does not arise by virtue of the claimant's claim in itself, but on account of the defendant's admission.