Shevuot 40a (מ.) — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara proves this:

Know:

apart from the claimant who claims a litra of gold, where the claim is specifically for that item, the entire Mishna discusses a case in which he claims its monetary equivalent,

as it teaches

in the

latter clause

of our Mishna:

“A gold dinar

is

in your possession; you have only a silver dinar in your possession,”

or

a trisit

or

a pundeyon

or

a peruta

—all of these are types of coins—

he is liable,

because

“all are one type of coin!”

And from here the Gemara proves:

Granted, if you say that he claims the equivalent,

he claims it,

for that reason he is liable,

since he admits to part of the value of the dinar.

But if you say that it teaches specifically,

what is taught,

why is he liable

to take an oath? For if he claimed specifically a gold dinar and the defendant admitted specifically to a silver dinar, his admission is not of the same type as the claim! Rather, it is necessarily the case that our Mishna speaks of one who claims its “equivalent,” and not of one who claims a specific item. And this proves Rav’s position.

Rabbi Elazar said:

This is not proof of Rav! For in fact our Mishna speaks of one who claims a specific item, and not of one who claims its equivalent.

However, in this case, where he claimed a gold dinar and the defendant admitted to a silver dinar, it is speaking

of a claim concerning a dinar as currency.

That is, he did not claim the weight of the dinar, but rather the coin minted as a dinar. Therefore, when the defendant admitted that he owed him a silver dinar, or a trisit, or the like, his admission concerned a silver-dinar coin or some other coin. This admission is consequently considered an admission of the same type as the claim, since both the claim and the admission concern one category—that of currency. Coins constitute one type.

And it teaches us

the tanna of our Mishna

that a peruta is included within the category of coins!

And therefore he is liable when he admits to a peruta.

This is also precise:

It can also be inferred that the case in our Mishna concerns one who claims gold coins, and not the value of gold, [and therefore, when he admits to a silver-dinar coin, this is an admission of the same type as the claim of the gold coin],

as it teaches

concerning the reason for the ruling that he must take an oath—

“all are one type of coin!”

And since this is so, there is no distinction between the types of coins, and all are considered one type for purposes of both the claim and the admission.

The Gemara raises an objection:

And Rav,

who interpreted our Mishna as referring to one who claims the equivalent—why does it teach, “all are one type of coin”? Is it not speaking of one who claims the equivalent? If so, the admission and the claim are of one type with regard to their value, and not because they are one type of coin?

Yet the wording of the Mishna, “all are one type of coin,” indicates that the case concerns a specific item. For this reason the Mishna must explain that coins have a distinct status because all are one type of coin. This is difficult according to Rav! The Gemara answers: Rav interpreted the words of the Mishna, “all are one type of coin,” to mean

“all have the legal status of one type of coin,”

and the tanna of our Mishna teaches us that even a peruta, the smallest of the coins, has the legal status of an admission that renders him liable for the oath of one who admits to part of a claim,

And the Gemara discusses proof in support of Shmuel:

And Rabbi Elazar,

who interpreted the latter clause of our Mishna in accordance with Shmuel, that the case concerns a specific item,

shall we say that, since the latter clause follows Shmuel, he explains

the words of the Mishna as teaching “specifically,” with the case referring to one who claims a dinar as currency?

It follows that the

first clause, “

Two silver coins are in your possession; you have only a peruta in your possession, and you are exempt,”

also follows Shmuel’s opinion,

that the Mishna teaches “specifically.” In the first clause, the exemption is only because the copper peruta to which he admitted was not of the same type as the two silver coins claimed by the claimant. But if he had claimed the equivalent of two silver coins, he would be liable to take an oath. Since he is exempt, this proves that Shmuel’s interpretation is correct: Our Mishna teaches “specifically.”

The Gemara rejects this:

No! The latter clause

necessarily speaks of a claim for

a specific item, since it teaches, “all are one type of coin,”

and the Mishna itself indicated that it teaches “specifically.”

But the

first clause

can be interpreted either

in accordance with Rav or in accordance with Shmuel,

since the first clause does not compel us to interpret it according to either one of them.

It can be interpreted in accordance with Shmuel, as explained. And it can be interpreted in accordance with Rav by saying that in the first clause he claims the equivalent, and the reason he is exempt is that Rav holds that the claim must be at least two silver coins plus a peruta. Therefore, since he claims only two silver coins, he is exempt.

The Gemara below brings a proof in support of Rav or Shmuel: Do the two silver coins mentioned in the Mishna refer to a claim that must consist of two silver coins [including the admission and the denial], as Shmuel says, or are the two silver coins referring only to the denial, while the claim as a whole must be more than two silver coins, as Rav says?

Come and hear:

This beraita is taught in the Tosefta.

“A gold dinar—

a gold one [that is, a gold dinar minted as a coin]

is

in your possession.”

And the defendant says:

“You have only a silver dinar in your possession”—

he is liable

because all are one type of coin!

And the Gemara infers from the wording of the beraita:

The reason is that he said to him, “a gold one,”

and for that reason he is liable, since his intention is certainly a coin,

“and all are one type of coin”; but

if he said

simply

“a gold dinar,” as in the case taught in our Mishna, he intended

the equivalent

of a gold dinar. And this is what the claimant

says to him

the defendant.

Since it is established from the latter clause of the Mishna that it discusses the equivalent, the first clause likewise discusses the equivalent of two silver coins. The reason that he is exempt from the oath—when he claims two silver coins and the defendant admits to a peruta—is that he claimed only two silver coins. This proves Rav’s position: In order to be liable for an oath, the claim must be for two silver coins plus a peruta, so that the denial will amount to two silver coins! And it disproves Shmuel.

Rav Ashi said: This is what it means

the tanna of this beraita:

The beraita did not speak of one who claims from another and says to him, “A gold dinar—a gold one—is in your possession.” Rather, the beraita means to say that

anyone who says, “a gold dinar,”

is

as

though he

says

and claims:

“The equivalent of a gold dinar—a gold one—is owed to me,”

and he did not claim from him anything but a gold dinar.

That is, although he claims a gold dinar, he does not intend gold, but rather a gold dinar minted as a coin. Therefore, if the defendant admits to a silver dinar, it is of the same type as the claim, since all are one type of coin.

If so, no proof can be brought in support of Rav, since this beraita too speaks of one who makes an unqualified claim, and not of one who explicitly claims a minted dinar. Our Mishna likewise speaks of an unqualified claim. The reason that one who admits to a peruta is exempt is a different one.

The Gemara brings another proof:

Rabbi Ḥiyya taught this in support of Rav:

The lender claimed from him:

“A sela is in your possession.”

The borrower replied:

“You have only a deficient sela in my possession,”

lacking

two silver coins—

he is liable

to take an oath, since he admits to part of the claim.

But if he said, “You have only a sela

lacking a ma’a,”

one

he is exempt. Since he did not deny two silver coins! This proves Rav’s position, that apart from the admission, the denial must be two silver coins.

because he did not deny two silver coins. This proves Rav’s statement that, apart from the admission, the denied portion must be two silver coins.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said in the name of Shmuel: They taught

that there is no oath for a claim of less than two silver coins

only

when the liability arises

from the lender’s claim and the borrower’s admission,

which is the oath of one who admits to part of a claim.

But

when there is

a lender’s claim and

not an admission by the borrower, but rather the borrower denies and denies the entire claim, while there is

the testimony of one witness

supporting the lender’s words, which obligates the borrower in an oath mandated by Torah [the oath imposed by one witness] in order to refute the witness’s testimony, then

even if the lender claims

from him

only a peruta, he is liable

to take an oath! The entire requirement that the claim be for two silver coins according to Shmuel, and for two silver coins plus a peruta according to Rav, applies only to the oath of one who admits to part of a claim.

What is the reason? -

As it is written: “One witness shall not rise up against a man for any iniquity or for any sin,”

and we derive:

It is only for any iniquity or for any sin that he does not rise up,

that is, a lone witness cannot establish liability for punishments for Torah transgressions.

But he does rise up to

obligate him in

an oath!

And it was taught in a beraita: Wherever two witnesses obligate him to make a monetary payment, one witness obligates him to take an oath

and two witnesses obligate him even with regard to a peruta. For witnesses obligate him monetarily, and even an object worth a peruta is considered money. Therefore, a single witness likewise obligates him to take an oath with regard to a peruta.

And Rav Naḥman said that Shmuel said: If one claimed

that the other owed him

wheat and barley, and the other admitted to him with regard to one of them

whether wheat or barley,

he is liable

for the oath of one who admits to part of the claim!

Rabbi Yitzḥak said to him: Well said, and Rabbi Yoḥanan likewise said

like you! The Gemara discusses this: From the fact that Rabbi Yitzḥak mentioned only Rabbi Yoḥanan and did not mention that Reish Lakish had also joined him and agreed with him,

is it to be inferred

that we should say and prove

that Reish Lakish disagreed with him?

For Rabbi Yitzḥak attended Rabbi Yoḥanan’s lesson together with Reish Lakish, and he would have known whether Reish Lakish disagreed with Rabbi Yoḥanan or not?

The Gemara rejects this: There is no proof of this.

There are those who say:

The reason he did not mention the words of Reish Lakish is that

he was lingering with him

Reish Lakish

and kept silent before him

until Rabbi Yoḥanan finished all his words, and only then would he respond and disagree with him. In the meantime, Rabbi Yitzḥak left the beit-midrash and did not hear Reish Lakish’s opinion. It is possible that after Rabbi Yoḥanan finished his words, Reish Lakish agreed with him.

And there are those who say: He was drinking it

Reish Lakish was drinking water at the time Rabbi Yoḥanan stated this law

and kept silent before him

because he was in the middle of drinking in the beit-midrash, and therefore Rabbi Yitzḥak could not bring proof from his silence.

Let us say that this supports

Rav Naḥman’s statement in the name of Shmuel, who said that if one claimed wheat and barley from another and the other admitted to one of them, he is liable.

The proof is from the following:

If one claimed wheat from another and the other admitted to him with regard to barley, he is exempt, and Rabban Gamliel obligates him.

Since according to Rabban Gamliel, the admission need not be of the same type as the claim.

Let us infer from the words of the Rabbis, who exempt him:

The reason is specifically that he claimed wheat and admitted to him with regard to barley

that he is exempt. But

here

if he claimed from him both

wheat and

both

barley, and he admitted to him with regard to one of them, he is liable!?

This proves Rav Naḥman’s statement in the name of Shmuel.

The Gemara rejects this:

No!

This is not proof of his statement. Rather,

the same law applies even if

he claimed from him

wheat and barley

and he admitted to him with regard to one of them;

he is also exempt,

And the reason that they disagree

the Rabbis and Rabban Gamliel

with regard to

his having claimed from him

wheat

and his having admitted to him with regard to barley, and that they did not disagree concerning one who claimed from him both wheat and barley, is in order

to inform you of the force of Rabban Gamliel,

who obligates him to take an oath even when the admission is not at all of the same type as the claim.

Come and hear [

concerning the statement of Rav Naḥman in the name of Shmuel]:

If one claimed utensils and land,

then

if he admitted to the utensils and denied the land,

or he admitted

to the land and denied the utensils -

he is exempt,