Shevuot 40a — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara proves it:

Know:

apart from the one who claims a litra of gold, for only there is the claim specifically [for that item], our entire Mishna discusses a case in which he claims its value,

as it teaches

in the

conclusion

of our Mishna:

“A gold dinar

I have in your possession,”

[and he says,] “You have nothing in your possession of mine except a silver dinar”

or

a terisit

or

a pundeyon

or

a peruta

[all these are types of coins] —

he is liable,

because

“they are all one type of coinage!”

And from here the Gemara proves:

If you say that he claims its value,

he claims it,

for this reason he is liable,

since he admits to part of the value of the dinar.

But if you say that it teaches specifically,

it teaches,

why is he liable

to take an oath? For if he claimed from him specifically a gold dinar, and he admitted to him specifically a silver dinar, is his admission not of the same type as the claim?! Rather, necessarily, our Mishna is speaking of one who claims its “value,” and not of one who claims it “specifically.” And it proves [the view of] Rav.

Rabbi Elazar said:

This is no proof for Rav! For in truth, our Mishna is speaking of a case in which he claimed it specifically, and not of one in which he claimed its value,

but in this case, in which he claimed a gold dinar and he admitted to him a silver dinar, it is speaking

of one who claimed a dinar in coins.

That is, he did not claim the weight of the dinar, but the coin minted as a dinar. Therefore, when he admitted to him a silver dinar, or a terisit and the like, his admission was in a silver-dinar coin or in any other coin. And this admission is considered an admission of the same type as the claim, since the claim and the admission refer to one type—to a coin. And the coins are one type.

And it teaches us

the tanna of our Mishna

that a peruta is included within coinage!

And therefore he is liable when he admits to a peruta.

It is also precise

to infer that the subject of our Mishna is when he claims gold coins and not the value of gold, [and therefore, when he admits to a silver-dinar coin, this is an admission of the same type as the claim concerning the gold coin,

as it teaches

as the reason for the law that he is liable to take an oath—

“they are all one type of coinage!”

And since this is so, there is no distinction between the types of coins, and everything is considered one type with regard to the claim and the admission.

The Gemara objects:

But Rav,

who established the words of our Mishna as referring to one who claims its “value,” why does it teach, “they are all one type of coinage”? Is it not speaking of one who claims its value? Therefore, the admission and the claim are of one type with regard to their values, and not because they are one type of coinage?

But from the words of the Mishna, “they are all one type of coinage,” it is proven that it is speaking specifically. And for this reason the Mishna must explain that coins have a different law because they are all one type of coinage. This is difficult according to Rav. And the Gemara answers: Rav explained the words of the Mishna, “they are all one type of coinage,” as meaning:

“They all have the law of one type of coinage,”

and the tanna of our Mishna teaches us that even a peruta, the least of the coins, has the law of an admission that renders him liable for the oath of one who admits to part of the claim,

And the Gemara discusses proving [the view of] Shmuel:

And Rabbi Elazar,

who established the words of the conclusion of our Mishna according to the view of Shmuel, that it is speaking of “specifically,”

shall we say that, since the conclusion is according to Shmuel, he explains

the words of the Mishna as teaching “specifically,” and that it is speaking of one who claims from him a dinar in coins,

then the

beginning

—“I have two silver [coins] in your possession; you have nothing in my possession except a peruta; he is exempt”—

also holds like Shmuel,

that it teaches “specifically.” And in the beginning, the exemption is only because the copper peruta to which he admitted was not of the same type as the two silver [coins] concerning which the claimant made his claim. But if he had claimed from him the value of two silver [coins,] he would have been liable for an oath; and since he is exempt, it is proven according to Shmuel that our Mishna teaches “specifically.”

The Gemara rejects this:

No! The conclusion

necessarily speaks of a claim made

specifically, for it teaches, “they are all one type of coinage,”

and the Mishna itself indicated that it teaches “specifically.”

But the

beginning

can be established either

according to Rav or according to Shmuel,

since there is no necessity from the beginning to establish it according to either of them. It can be established according to Shmuel, as explained. And it can be established according to Rav, that in the beginning he claims its value, and the reason that he is exempt is that Rav holds that the claim must be at least two silver [coins] and a peruta. Therefore, since he claims from him only two silver [coins], he is exempt. [The Gemara below brings a proof according to Rav or according to Shmuel: whether the two silver [coins] mentioned in the Mishna refer to a claim that must be two silver [coins] [including the admission and the denial], as Shmuel says, or whether the two silver [coins] are only the denial, while the claim as a whole must be more than two silver [coins], as Rav says.]

It can be interpreted in accordance with Shmuel, as explained. And it can be interpreted in accordance with Rav: the claimant in the first clause claims something of equivalent value, and the defendant is exempt because Rav holds that the claim must be at least two silver coins plus a peruta. Therefore, since he claims only two silver coins, the defendant is exempt.

The Gemara below brings a source to determine whether the two silver coins mentioned in the Mishna refer to a claim that must amount to two silver coins, including both the admission and the denial, as Shmuel says, or whether the two silver coins refer only to the denied portion, while the claim as a whole must be worth more than two silver coins, as Rav says.

Come and hear: [This beraita is taught in the Tosefta.]

This

“A gold dinar—

a golden one

[a gold dinar minted as a coin]

I have in your possession.”

And the defendant says:

“You have nothing in my possession except a silver dinar”—

he is liable

because they are all one type of coinage!

And the Gemara infers from the wording of the beraita:

The reason is that he says to him, “a golden gold [dinar],”

and for this reason he is liable, for certainly his intention is to a coin,

“and they are all one type of coinage”; but

if he said

without specification

“a gold dinar,” as in the case taught in our Mishna, then his intention was

the value of

a gold dinar. And this is what the claimant

says to him

—the defendant.

And since it is proven from the conclusion of the Mishna that it discusses “value,” the beginning also discusses the value of two silver [coins]. And the fact that he is exempt from an oath—where he claims from him two silver [coins] and he admits to a peruta—is because he claimed from him only two silver [coins]. And it proves according to Rav’s words, that in order to become liable for an oath the claim must be two silver [coins] and a peruta, so that the denial will be two silver [coins]. And it proves not according to Shmuel.

Rav Ashi said: This is what it says

the tanna of this beraita:

The beraita did not speak of one who claims from him and says to him, “A golden gold dinar I have in your possession.” Rather, the intention of the beraita is to say that

anyone who says, “a gold dinar,”

is

as

though he

says

and claims:

“A golden gold dinar is the debt,”

and he claimed from him only a gold dinar.

That is, although he claimed from him a gold dinar, his intention is not to gold, but to a gold dinar minted as a coin. Therefore, if he admitted to him a silver dinar, it is of the same type as the claim, for they are all one type of coinage.

If so, there is no proof according to Rav, since this beraita too spoke of one who claims “without specification,” and not of one who explicitly says that he claims a minted dinar. And our Mishna also speaks “without specification.” And the reason that one who admits to a peruta is exempt is a different reason.

The Gemara brings another proof:

Rabbi Hiyya taught it to support Rav:

The lender claimed from him:

“A sela I have in your possession.”

The borrower answered him:

“You have nothing in my possession except a deficient sela

less

two silver [coins]”—

he is liable

for an oath, since he admits to part [of the claim].

But if he said, “You have nothing in my possession except a sela

deficient by a ma'a

one—

he is exempt.

Because he did not deny two silver ma'ot! And it proves Rav’s words, that the denial, apart from the admission, must be two silver [coins].

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said in the name of Shmuel: They taught

that there is no oath for less than a claim of two silver [coins]

only

when the liability comes

through the lender’s claim and the borrower’s admission,

which is the oath of one who admits to part [of the claim].

But

when there is

a lender’s claim and

not a borrower’s admission, but the borrower denies and denies everything, yet there is

the testimony of one witness

in accordance with the lender’s words, which obligates the borrower in a Torah oath [the oath due to one witness] in order to deny the witness’s words, then

even if the lender did not claim from him

more than

a peruta, he is liable

to swear! And the entire law that the claim must be two silver [coins] according to Shmuel, and two silver [coins] and a peruta according to Rav, was stated only concerning the oath of one who admits to part [of the claim].

What is the reason? -

As it is written: “One witness shall not arise against a man for any iniquity or for any sin,”

and we interpret:

It is for any iniquity or for any sin that he does not arise

a single witness by himself, to impose punishments for transgressions from the Torah.

But he does arise to

obligate him in

an oath!

And it was taught: Wherever two obligate him to pay money, a single witness obligates him to take an oath

and two witnesses obligate him even for a peruta. For witnesses obligate him to pay money, and even something worth a peruta is money. Therefore, a single witness also obligates him to take an oath concerning a peruta.

And Rav Nahman said in the name of Shmuel: If he claimed from him

that he owed him

wheat and barley, and he admitted to him one of them

wheat or barley—

he is obligated

to take the oath of one who admits to part of the claim!

Rabbi Yitzhak said to him: Correct, and Rabbi Yohanan likewise said

like you! And the Gemara considers: From the fact that Rabbi Yitzhak mentioned only Rabbi Yohanan and did not mention that Resh Lakish also joined him and agreed with him—

by implication,

shall we say and prove that

Resh Lakish disagreed with him?

For Rabbi Yitzhak participated in Rabbi Yohanan’s lesson together with Resh Lakish, and he would have known whether he disagreed with Rabbi Yohanan or not?

And the Gemara rejects this: This cannot be proved.

There are those who say:

The reason he did not mention Resh Lakish’s words is that

Resh Lakish would wait before him

Resh Lakish

and remain silent

until Rabbi Yohanan finished all his words, and only then would he reply and disagree with him. In the meantime, Rabbi Yitzhak left the beit-midrash and did not hear Resh Lakish’s view. And it is possible that after Rabbi Yohanan finished his words, he agreed with him.

And there are those who say: Resh Lakish was drinking from it

Resh Lakish was drinking water at the time Rabbi Yohanan stated this law

and remained silent

because he was in the middle of drinking in the beit-midrash, and therefore Rabbi Yitzhak could not bring proof from his silence.

Let us say that it supports him

Rav Nahman in the name of Shmuel, who said that if he claimed from him wheat and barley and he admitted to him one of them, he is obligated.

And the proof is from this:

If he claimed wheat from him and he admitted to him barley, he is exempt; and Rabban Gamaliel obligates him.

Since according to Rabban Gamaliel, it is not necessary that the admission be of the same type as the claim.

And let us infer from the words of the Rabbis who exempt:

The reason is that if he claimed wheat from him and he admitted to him barley

that he is exempt. But

here,

if he claimed from him both

wheat and

also

barley, and he admitted to him one of them, he is obligated!?

And this proves the statement of Rav Nahman in the name of Shmuel.

And the Gemara rejects:

No!

This is not proof of his statement. Rather,

the same law applies even if

he claimed from him

wheat and barley

and he admitted to him one of them,

he is likewise exempt,

And the reason that they disagree

the Rabbis and Rabban Gamaliel

concerning

his having claimed from him

wheat

and admitted to him barley, and they did not disagree concerning his having claimed from him both wheat and barley, is in order

to inform you of the strength of Rabban Gamaliel,

who obligates him to take an oath even when the admission is not at all of the same type as the claim.

Come and hear [

concerning the statement of Rav Nahman in the name of Shmuel]:

If he claimed utensils and real estate,

then

if he admitted to the utensils and denied the real estate.

Or he admitted

to the real estate and denied the utensils—

he is exempt,