Shevuot 39b (לט:) — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara answers:

There

in the case of other transgressions in the Torah, it is speaking of a situation in which

they have the ability

the others have the ability

to protest

against the transgressor,

but they did not protest

against him. Therefore, they are punished for this sin, for failing to protest. However, they are not punished for his transgression. Whereas in the case of a false oath, the entire world is punished on his account, even those who had no ability to protest.

And now, after we have learned in the beraita that because of a false oath his family is punished and the entire world is also punished, and likewise we learned that in every family in which there is a tax collector, everyone is punished because they shield him, and we also learned that with regard to other transgressions, when they have the ability to protest but do not protest, the verse “And each man will stumble over his brother” applies to them and they are all punished, the question arises:

What difference is there

in the case of other transgressions

between the wicked members of his family and wicked people elsewhere,

since all are punished, and in what way is his family punished more?

And likewise, one must ask:

What difference is there between the righteous members of his family

who were unable to protest and therefore should not be punished

and righteous people elsewhere,

since in the case of a false oath everyone is punished, including both the righteous members of his family and righteous people elsewhere?

The Gemara explains:

He,

the transgressor himself,

in the case of other transgressions, [not in the case of the transgression of an oath,] is judged

according to his own judgment.

According to the judgment that is his due.

And the wicked members of the family

of his family, in the case of other transgressions, are punished

with a severe judgment,

though not as severely as the transgressor himself.

And

likewise,

wicked people elsewhere

in the case of other transgressions

are judged with a lenient judgment.

However,

the righteous

who were unable to protest

here,

meaning the righteous members of his family,

and here,

meaning righteous people elsewhere,

are exempt.

However,

with regard to an oath: he and the wicked members of the family —

are judged

according to his judgment,

according to the judgment of the one who took the oath

! And wicked people elsewhere —

with a severe judgment! And the righteous here

of his family

and here

elsewhere — are judged

with

the lenient

judgment and punishment!

It was further stated in the beraita:

If he says, “I will not take an oath,” —

they release him immediately

and, as explained above, send him away immediately from the court, so that he will not reconsider and retract his statement.

And if he says, “I am prepared to take an oath,” —

those standing there say to one another: “Please withdraw from the tents of these wicked men!”

It follows from the fact that they use the plural expression “these wicked men” that the statement refers to both litigants. Therefore, the Gemara asks:

Granted, that one who is taking the oath

is called a wicked man,

and is included in “withdraw,”

he is properly included among those concerning whom it is said: “Please withdraw from the tents of these wicked men.”

But that one,

the claimant,

who causes him to take an oath,

who administers the oath to the defendant

, why

is he included in “withdraw”? After all, he has come only to claim his debt!?

The Gemara answers:

As it is taught in a beraita: Rabbi Shimon ben Tarfon says: “The oath of the Lord shall be between them” -

This teaches that the oath applies

and its punishment

to both of them.

The claimant is also guilty of the desecration of the Divine Name resulting from the defendant’s false oath. His guilt lies in the fact that he was not careful to entrust his money to a trustworthy person, and therefore caused the defendant to be brought to the point of taking a false oath!

It was further stated in the beraita:

And when they administer the oath to him, they say to him: “Know that you are not taking the oath according to your own understanding

you are taking the oath!”

The Gemara explains:

Why must he be told this?

And it answers:

Because of Rava’s reed!

Because of an incident that occurred involving Rava, as follows:

There was a man who was obligated to take an oath to another person because of a monetary claim that the latter had against him. When the defendant came to swear that he was exempt from the claimant’s demand, the defendant first placed money equal to the amount of the claim inside a hollow reed. Before taking the oath, the defendant handed the reed to the claimant, without the latter knowing that the reed in his possession was filled with money. He immediately swore that he had repaid the debt! After taking the oath, the defendant intended to take back the reed and the money, but the claimant hastened to throw down the reed, and the money was revealed!

For this reason, and because of other possible forms of deception of this kind, the court makes clear to the defendant that he is taking the oath according to the understanding of the court and according to the understanding of the Omnipresent, Who knows the truth!

We learned in our Mishna:

The oath administered by the judges requires a claim of two silver ma'a.

Rav said:

The wording of the Mishna, “a claim of two silver ma'a,” does not refer to the claimant’s demand being for two silver ma'a. Rather,

the denial of

the

claim

the defendant’s denial, when he admits to part of the claim, must be for an amount of at least

two silver ma'a.

This is in addition to his admission, which must be at least the value of a peruta in order to obligate him to take the oath of one who admits to part of a claim.

It follows that the claimant’s demand must be for at least two silver ma'a and a peruta, so that it includes the two silver ma'a, which are the amount denied, and an additional peruta, which he admits.

And Shmuel said: The claim itself

that the claimant presents must be

two silver ma'a.

But with regard to the defendant’s denial, even if he denied only one peruta and admitted the rest, or admitted only one peruta and denied the rest, he is obligated to take the oath of one who admits to part of a claim.

Rava said: The Mishna is precise

the wording of our Mishna is precise,

in accordance with Rav. And

whereas

the verses

the verse is precise,

in accordance with Shmuel,

as in Shmuel’s statement.

The Mishna is precise in accordance with Rav, as it teaches,

for we learned in our Mishna:

“The claim is two silver ma'a, and the admission is worth a peruta.”

But “the denial of the claim —

a peruta,” it does not teach!

And if the law were in accordance with Shmuel’s statement, the Mishna should have mentioned that the denial must be at least one peruta [just as it states with regard to the admission: “the admission is worth a peruta”].

This proves that it is in accordance with Rav, that the Mishna’s statement “the claim is two silver ma'a” refers to the denial of the claim, which must be at least two silver ma'a. Whereas the claimant’s demand must be two silver ma'a plus a peruta.

And

there is further proof in accordance with Rav:

We also learned

in Tractate Bava Metzia: There are five perutot [five monetary laws that depend on the value of a peruta].

The admission

to part of the claim

of a peruta,

and so on. But Shmuel’s law, that the

denial

may be at least

a peruta —

is not taught;

it is not mentioned in this Mishna. This proves that the denial must be two silver ma'a, and only with regard to the admission is the law stated in terms of a peruta!

And

whereas from the

verses

the proof is

in accordance with Shmuel, as it is written

at the beginning of the passage concerning the oath of one who admits to part of a claim:

“When a man gives money or vessels to another to safeguard.”

The verse equates money with vessels, teaching you:

Just as vessels

must be

two

since “vessels” is written in the plural, and the minimum of a plural is two, so that there can be a denial and an admission to part of the claim

, so too, money is two.

Two silver coins, so that there can be a denial and an admission to part of the claim.

And we also derive:

Just as money is something of significance,

as the Sages assessed that the silver ma'a mentioned in the Torah is something of significance,

so too, all

claims that are not for money [such as a claim for movable property] must be claims for

something of significance

like two silver ma'a!

And

this verse, “When a man gives,” which is stated with regard to giving—that is, when a person gives another person money or vessels, and the latter admits to part and denies the rest—

The Merciful One says

that in this case, the one who admits to part of the claim is obligated to take an oath. As it is written: “Which he says

‘For this is it’”

that he admits to part of “this”—that is, from the claim of two silver ma'a mentioned at the beginning of the passage—and then he becomes obligated to take an oath!

This proves that it is in accordance with Shmuel, that the giving mentioned in the Torah—“When a man gives to another”—refers to two silver ma'a. With these two silver ma'a, the defendant admits to part and denies the rest, thereby becoming obligated to take an oath, even if the denial is for less than two silver ma'a.

Apparently, this presents a difficulty for Rav, since the verse is precise in accordance with Shmuel.

He answers,

Rav:

“This” does not refer to the two silver ma'a mentioned at the beginning of the passage, to say that he admits to part of them.

Rather,

that “

this

” is needed to

teach the very law of

admission to part of a claim.

When the defendant admits to something, that is, to “this”—to part of the claim—he is obligated to take an oath. In truth, however, the claim must always be for two silver ma'a and a peruta, so that the denial will be at least two silver ma'a.

And Shmuel

proves that “this” refers to the claimant’s claim of two silver ma'a, of which the defendant admits to part.

And the proof is as follows: If the verse had contained only “this,” one could indeed say in accordance with Rav, that from this we derive the law of one who admits to part of a claim, and that it is impossible to derive Shmuel’s ruling from it.

But

it is written “it is” and it is written “this.”

The intention of the verse is to teach us

that if he denied part

of the two silver ma'a described at the beginning of the passage

, and admitted to part

of those two silver ma'a —

he is liable.

And Rav,

who holds that “this” does not refer to the claim mentioned at the beginning of the passage, but that “this” teaches the very law of admission to part of a claim, what will he do with the word “it is,” and why was it written?

He answers:

One teaches admission to part of a claim, and the other teaches admission of the same type as the claim.

That is, “this”—the admission to part of the claim that we derive from “this”—must be of the same type as “it is” [of the claim], and “it is” does not refer to the two silver ma'a at the beginning of the passage. Rather, it merely teaches that the admission must be of the same type as the claim.

And Shmuel

said: Indeed, “it is” and “this” are both needed for one who admits to part of a claim and for admission of the same type as the claim, as Rav says.

If so, the difficulty for Shmuel is: From where do we know that the claimant’s demand must be for two silver ma'a?

Rather, Shmuel will answer:

Is it not self-evident,

without a special derivation from a verse,

you can infer from it,

as I said, that we do not require a denial of two silver ma'a, but even a lesser amount suffices.

And why?

For

after all,

the claim is deficient

from the outset: He claimed two silver ma'a, and this is the claim mentioned in the Torah—that he claims two silver ma'a from him and he admits to part; consequently, his denial is for less than two silver ma'a?

[It must necessarily be that the Torah speaks in this manner, and it is impossible for the denial to be two silver ma'a, since the claim itself mentioned in the Torah is for two silver ma'a. This is therefore a difficulty for Rav.]

Rather, Rav will say to you: I can prove that

“money”

mentioned at the beginning of the passage does not refer to the claimant’s demand. Rather,

when it came,

when the Torah mentioned the word “money”

, initially,

at the beginning of the passage,

it came with regard to the denial!

The Torah stated that the denial must be for two silver ma'a, and not that the claimant’s demand must be for that amount.

The proof of this is:

If so,

according to Shmuel, that it refers to the claim, why is it necessary to write it at all?

Let the Merciful One write: “When a man gives vessels to another to safeguard,” and I would say:

—

in the