Shevuot 39b — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara answers:

there

in the other transgressions of the Torah, it is speaking when

they have it in their power

in the hands of the others

to protest

against the transgressor,

but they did not protest

against him. Therefore, they are punished for this sin—that they did not protest. However, they are not punished for his transgression. But in the case of a false oath, the entire world is punished on his account, even those who did not have it in their power to protest.

And now, after we learned in the beraita that because of a false oath his family is punished and the entire world is also punished, and likewise we learned that every family in which there is a tax collector is all punished because they cover up for him, and likewise we learned that regarding the other transgressions, when they have it in their power to protest but did not protest, we apply to them, “And each man shall stumble over his brother,” and all are punished, the question arises:

What difference is there

in the other transgressions

between the wicked of his family and the wicked of the world at large,

for all are punished, and in what way is his family punished more?

And likewise, one must ask:

What difference is there between the righteous of his family

who were unable to protest, and therefore they should not be punished,

and the righteous of the world at large,

for in the case of a false oath all are punished, even the righteous of his family and the righteous of the world at large?

And the Gemara explains:

He,

the transgressor himself,

in the other transgressions, [not in the transgression of an oath,] is judged

не в нарушении, связанном с клятвой, ]

according to his law.

According to his own judgment, which is due to him.

And the wicked of the family

of his family, in the other transgressions, are punished

with a severe judgment

but not like the transgressor himself.

And

so too,

the wicked of the world at large

in the other transgressions

are judged with a lenient judgment.

However,

the righteous

who were unable to protest

here,

that is, the righteous of his family,

and here,

that is, the righteous of the world at large,

are exempt.

However,

in the case of an oath: he and the wicked of the family—

are judged

according to his law,

according to the judgment of the one who swore,

but the wicked of the world at large—

with a severe judgment! And the righteous here

of his family

and here

of the world at large—are judged

with the

and with the punishment

lenient!

It was further stated in the beraita:

If he said, “I shall not swear,”—

they release him immediately

[as was explained above: they send him immediately from the court, so that he will not regret it and retract his words]

and if he said, “Behold, I shall swear,”—

those standing there say to one another, “Withdraw now from the tents of these wicked men!”

And it is implied from their saying, in the plural expression, “these wicked men,” that the statement is directed toward both litigants. Therefore, the Gemara asks:

Granted, that one who is swearing

is called a wicked man

and is included in “withdraw,”

he is properly included among those concerning whom it is said, “Withdraw now from the tents of these wicked men.”

But the other one,

the claimant,

who is causing him to swear,

the one making the defendant swear,

why

is he included in “withdraw”? After all, he came only to claim his debt!?

And the Gemara answers:

As it is taught in a beraita: Rabbi Shimon ben Tarfon says: “The oath of the Lord shall be between them” -

This teaches that the oath takes effect

and its punishment

upon both of them.

For the claimant too is guilty of the profanation of the Divine Name resulting from the defendant’s false oath. And his guilt consists in the fact that he was not particular to entrust his property to a trustworthy person, and therefore caused the defendant to come to swear a false oath!

It was further stated in the beraita:

And when they make him swear, they say to him: “Know that you are not swearing according to your own understanding”

you are swearing!

And the Gemara explains:

Why do I need to say this to him?

And it answers:

Because of Rava’s reed!

Because of an incident that occurred with Rava. And as follows:

There was a man who was liable to swear to his fellow because of a monetary claim that he had against him. When the defendant came to swear that he was exempt from the claimant’s demand, the defendant preceded and placed money equal to the amount of the claim inside a hollow reed. Before the oath, the defendant entrusted the reed to the claimant, without the latter knowing that the reed in his hand was full of money. He immediately swore that he had repaid him the debt! After he swore, the defendant intended to take back the reed with the money, but the claimant preceded him and threw down the reed, and the money was revealed!

And because of this, and also because of other possibilities of deception like this, the court makes clear to the defendant that he is swearing according to the understanding of the court and according to the understanding of the Omnipresent, who knows the truth!

We learned in our Mishna:

The oath of the judges: the claim is two silver coins.

Rav said:

The words of the Mishna, “the claim is two silver coins,” are not referring to the claimant’s demand being for two silver coins. Rather,

the denial of

the

claim,

which the defendant denies after admitting part of the claim, is what must be for an amount that is at least

two silver coins.

And this is in addition to his admission, which must be at least one peruta, in order to become liable for the oath of one who admits part of a claim.

It follows that the claimant’s demand must be for at least two silver coins and one peruta, so that it includes the two silver coins, which are the amount of the denial, and an additional peruta, which he admits.

And Shmuel said: The claim itself

which the claimant asserts—is what must be

two silver coins.

But the defendant’s denial—even if he denied only one peruta and admitted the rest, or admitted only one peruta and denied the rest—he is liable for the oath of one who admits part of a claim.

Rava said: The Mishna is precise

the wording of our Mishna is precise,

in accordance with Rav. And

if

the verses,

the verse is precise,

in accordance with Shmuel,

like the words of Shmuel.

The Mishna is precise in accordance with Rav, for it teaches,

as we learned in our Mishna:

“The claim is two silver coins, and the admission is worth one peruta.”

But “the denial of the claim—

one peruta,” it does not teach!

And if the law were according to Shmuel’s words, the Mishna should have mentioned this law—that the denial must be at least one peruta [just as concerning the admission it says, “the admission is worth one peruta”].

And it is proven from this in accordance with Rav, that the words of the Mishna, “the claim is two silver coins,” were stated concerning the denial of the claim, which must be at least two silver coins. But the claim itself must be two silver coins plus one peruta.

And

there is another proof in accordance with Rav:

We also learned

in tractate Bava Metzia: There are five perutot [five monetary laws that depend upon one peruta].

The admission

of part [of the claim]

of one peruta

and so on. But Shmuel’s law, that the

denial

can be at least

one peruta—

it does not teach

it is not mentioned in this Mishna. And it is proven that the denial must be two silver coins, while only concerning the admission is the law of one peruta stated!

And

if from the

verses

we are precise

in accordance with Shmuel: for it is written

at the beginning of the passage concerning the oath of one who admits part of a claim:

“When a man gives money or vessels to his fellow to guard.”

The verse equated money with vessels, to teach you:

Just as vessels

must be

two

[for “vessels” is written in the plural, and the minimum of a plural is two], in order that there be here a denial and an admission of part [of the claim],

so too, money is two.

Two silver coins, so that there will be here a denial and an admission of part [of the claim].

And likewise we learn:

Just as money is something of significance,

for the Sages assessed that the silver coin mentioned in the Torah is something of significance,

so too, everything

the claims that are not of money [such as when he claims movable property] must be claims concerning

something of significance

like two silver coins!

And

this verse, “When he gives,” which was stated concerning giving—that is, when a person gives his fellow money or vessels, and the latter admits part and denies part—

The Merciful One says

that in this case, the one who admits part [of the claim] becomes liable for an oath. As it is written,

“For he is this,”

that he admits part from “this.” That is, from the claim of the two silver coins mentioned at the beginning of the passage, and then he becomes liable for an oath!

And it is proven in accordance with Shmuel that the giving mentioned in the Torah, “When a man gives to his fellow,” speaks of two silver coins. And concerning these two silver coins, the defendant admits part and denies the rest, and through this he becomes liable for an oath—even if the denial is less than two silver coins.

Apparently, this is difficult for Rav. For from the verse it is precise in accordance with Shmuel,

and

Rav

answers: “This” does not refer to the two silver coins mentioned at the beginning of the passage, to say that he admits part of them.

Rather,

that “

this

” is needed for

teaching the very law of

admission of part of the claim.

When the defendant admits something—that is, “this,” part of the claim—he becomes liable for an oath. And in truth, the claim must always be for two silver coins and one peruta, so that the denial will be at least two silver coins.

And Shmuel

proves that “this” refers to the claimant’s claim of two silver coins, of which the defendant admits part.

And the proof is: If only “this” had been written in the verse, it would indeed have been possible to say as Rav says—that from this we derive the law of one who admits part of a claim, and it would not be possible to derive from this the words of Shmuel.

But

it is written, “he is,” and it is written, “this.”

And the intention of the verse is to teach us

that if he denied part

of the two silver coins explained at the beginning of the passage

, and admitted part

of those two silver coins—

he is liable.

And Rav,

who holds that “this” does not refer to the claim mentioned at the beginning of the passage, but that “this” is stated concerning the very admission of part [of the claim], what will he do with “he is,” and for what purpose was it written?

And he answers:

One [expression is] for admission of part of the claim, and one [expression is] for admission of the same type as the claim.

That is, “this,” the admission of part that we learn from “this,” must be of the same type as “he is” [of the claim], and “he is” does not refer to the two silver coins at the beginning of the passage. Rather, it merely says that the admission must be of the same type as the claim.

And Shmuel

said: Indeed, “he is” and “this” are needed for one who admits part and for admission of the same type as the claim, as stated and in accordance with Rav’s words.

And if so, it is difficult for Shmuel: From where does it follow that the claimant’s claim must be for two silver coins?

Rather, Shmuel will answer:

It is not inferred automatically,

without a special derivation from a verse;

you have learned it from there,

as I say, that we do not require a denial of two silver coins, but even less.

And why?

For

after all,

the claim is lacking

the initial [amount]. For he claimed two silver coins, and this is the claim mentioned in the Torah: he claims two silver coins from him and he admits part, and consequently his denial is less than two silver coins?

[And necessarily, this is the manner in which the Torah speaks, and it is impossible for the denial to be two silver coins, since the claim itself mentioned in the Torah is for two silver coins. And this is a difficulty for Rav.]

Rather, Rav says to you: I have proof that

я могу доказать, что

“money”

mentioned at the beginning of the passage does not refer to the claimant’s demand. Rather,

when it came,

when the Torah mentioned the word “money,”

at the outset,

at the beginning of the passage,

it came for the denial!

And concerning the denial the Torah stated that it must be for two silver coins, and not concerning the claimant’s demand.

And the proof of this is:

If so,

according to Shmuel, that it was stated concerning the claim, why is it at all necessary to write it?

Let the Merciful One write, “When a man gives vessels to his fellow to guard,” and I would say:

“What is the meaning of ‘vessels—two’?” -

“Also, all [other claims]—two!”

And a monetary claim was likewise included in this, that it must be [for] two silver coins, for everything must be [in the amount of] two.

And if so,

why do I need the silver that the Torah wrote? -

Rather, inevitably,

that

if it is not needed

if there is no need to mention it

for

the matter of the

claim, since the claim we learn from “vessels,”

since the requirement concerning a claim is learned from “utensils”—

apply it to denial! -

It is therefore needed for the matter of the denial. And it teaches us that the denial itself must be at least [the value of] two silver coins!

And Shmuel would say to you: [Regarding this proof of Rav, that “silver” is to be learned from “vessels,” and that the word “silver” is superfluous,]

по поводу этого доказательства Рава, что «серебро» выводится из «сосудов» и слово «серебро» является избыточным,

if the Torah had written “vessels”

alone

and had not written “silver,”

I would have said

as follows:

what is [the meaning of] “vessels”? -

two; also all [other things]—two,

and this is all that we would learn from the verse.

But

that the thing that he claims from him should be

a significant thing

like two silver coins,

not

would we know that we

require

this, that the thing he claims from him be defined as a significant thing.

And we would say: Just as in a claim concerning vessels it is sufficient that he claim any two vessels, [as explained in the Gemara below, 40b, that whenever he claims two vessels and he admits to him concerning one of them, he is liable, even if they have no value, such as needles,] and it is unnecessary that there be a measure of significance,

it teaches us

“silver” that every claim which is not a claim concerning a vessel must be a significant thing, and [be] like two silver coins.

It follows that the word “silver” in the verse is not superfluous. And inevitably, it was stated for the purpose of the claim, that it be [for] two silver coins, in accordance with the words of Shmuel and not Rav.

We learned:

He claimed from him: a thing worth

two silver coins

that

I have with you,

and he answered him:

“You have nothing with me except

a thing worth

a peruta” -

he is exempt!

What is the reason

he is exempt?

Is it not because the claim is lacking?

Is it not because the amount of the claim is lacking?

For the claim was less than two silver coins and a peruta, and it is insufficient to obligate an oath, and it is proven in accordance with Rav’s words, that the claim must be at least two silver coins and a peruta,

and a refutation of Shmuel!

Shmuel can say to you -

Do you think

that the claim mentioned in the Mishna concerning two silver coins means only a claim for a thing

worth

two silver coins?

It teaches [that he claims] two silver coins specifically,

and not that he claims the actual two silver coins?

No, it teaches [that they are] two silver coins,

specifically,

and when a person claims from his fellow two silver coins, as brought in the Mishna, his intention is to claim the silver itself, and not its value and worth. And the defendant who admitted to him [concerning] a copper peruta admitted to an actual copper peruta and not its value,

And if so, when he claimed from him two actual silver coins and he admitted to him concerning an actual copper peruta, this admission is an admission not of the type of the claim,

for

what he claimed

was silver coins

he did not admit to him, and what he admitted to him

was copper

he did not claim.

For he had claimed from him the type of silver coins. Therefore he is exempt. And not because a claim for only two silver coins is insufficient to become liable for an oath through it. And if so, this cannot prove [the position of] Rav and not [the position of] Shmuel.

And concerning this the Gemara asks:

If so,

that the matter concerns one who claims silver specifically and not its value,

say the latter clause

of our Mishna:

The claimant said:

“I have two silver coins and a peruta with you.”

The defendant answered him:

“You have nothing with me except a peruta” -

he is liable!

And the Gemara discusses:

Granted, if you say

that in all the cases brought in the Mishna, he was claiming from him

the worth

of the amount specified in the claim, and not claiming the money itself, therefore

for this reason he is liable,

because his admission concerning a peruta is not specifically concerning a copper peruta, but concerning a peruta’s worth.

But if you say [he claims it] specifically,

he claims silver and he admits to him specifically [concerning] copper,

why is he liable

for an oath? For

what he claimed

two silver coins

and a peruta, he did not admit to him. And what he admitted to him

concerning a copper peruta

he did not claim,

in the claim of the two silver coins,

And the Gemara answers:

Is that a reason!?

Is this an argument and a proof? For your words apply

only to Shmuel.

And he follows his own position.

For

Rav Naḥman said in the name of Shmuel: If he claimed wheat and barley from him, and he admitted to him concerning one of them -

he is liable.

For the admission need not be concerning all the types of the claim, but only concerning part of it. Therefore, here, where he claimed from him two silver coins and a copper peruta, and he admitted to him concerning a copper peruta, he admitted to him concerning part of the types of the claim. And this admission makes him liable for an oath.

And the Gemara proves this:

This too is logically evident,

as Shmuel established the words of our Mishna, that he claims from him specifically silver coins and not silver’s value.

From the fact that it teaches

in the

latter clause

of our Mishna:

“I have a litra of gold with you. You have nothing with me except a litra of silver” -

he is exempt!

Granted, if you say it teaches [the claim] specifically, for this reason he is exempt,

because since he claims gold specifically, and he admits to him concerning silver specifically, it follows that his admission is not of the type of the claim, ,

but if you say [he claims] the worth

of a litra of gold from him, and he admitted to him [concerning] the worth of a litra of silver, this is difficult:

why is he exempt

from an oath?

For

a litra

of gold, [whose] worth

is very much

more

is

than a litra of silver; and since he claimed [its] worth and he admitted to him [concerning] its worth, he admitted concerning part of the amount of the claim, and this admission is an admission concerning part of the type of the claim. And it is compelled from here that our Mishna refers to claims specifically according to what he claims, and not according to their value.

And from now on:

Rather, since in the latter clause he claims

gold

specifically

and not the worth of gold, it follows that in the

first clause as well

it concerns one who claims [it] specifically and not [its] worth, and it is written in the first clause of our Mishna: “I have two silver coins with you; you have nothing with me except a peruta,” since he claimed silver

specifically,

and not its value.

And it follows that the reason for exempting him is that he did not admit concerning the type of the claim, and not because his denial was not [for the value of] two silver coins.

And it implies that if he claims from him the worth of two silver coins and the other admits to him [concerning] a peruta’s worth, he will be liable for the oath of one who admits to part [of the claim].

And from now the Gemara asks:

Shall we say that this is a refutation of Rav,

who said that even if he claims from him the worth of two silver coins and he admits to him [concerning] a peruta’s worth, he does not become liable for an oath, because his denial was not [for the value of] two silver coins!? Yet we have proved that if he claims from him the value of two silver coins and he admits to him [concerning] a peruta’s worth, he becomes liable—and this is not in accordance with Rav!?

And the answer is:

Rav can say to you:

In truth,

the entire Mishna

deals with one who claims from him

the worth

and he is not claiming the silver coins themselves.

Rather, if so, it must be understood: Why, when he claims from him a litra of gold and he admits to him [concerning] a litra of silver, is he exempt?

And the answer is:

“A litra” of gold is different,

because the claimant mentioned in his words the weight of the gold; one who mentions a weight intends the thing itself and not its value, for value is measured by the denomination of a coin and not by weight.

But if he claimed two silver coins, his intention is [to claim] the worth of two silver coins. And the reason that he is exempt in the case brought in the first clause, where he claimed from him two silver coins and he admitted to him [concerning] a peruta, is that his denial was not [for the value of] two silver coins.