Shevuot 34b (לד:) — the Talmud in English

And the witnesses see him from outside

how he counts out the money beside him, but the defendant did not notice them, as they were seeing him from outside,

what

is his legal status?

Rav Hamnuna said

to Rav Yehuda:

But he,

the defendant,

what

does he

claim?

If he says: It never happened,

and you never counted out money for me,

behold,

he has

been established as a liar

by his denial. And he is no longer believed even under oath against the claimant.

And if he says: Yes, take

the money that you counted out for me,

and take what belongs to me,

for you repaid your debt with this money, or you returned the deposit that I had entrusted to you! If so,

when the witnesses come,

who were standing outside,

what has been established?

After all, they do not know what happened; they merely saw the counting out of the money!?

Rav Yehuda said

to Rav Hamnuna:

Hamnuna—

come inside!

You are worthy of entering the beit midrash, for you sharpen the understanding of your teacher.

There was a certain man who said to another: I counted out a maneh for you beside this pillar. He said to him: I never passed beside this pillar! Two witnesses came and testified against him

that

he had urinated beside this pillar—

Reish Lakish said: He has been established as a liar!

Rav Naḥman challenged this: This law

is Persian

[the Persians rule this way]

! Did he say, “I never passed

beside this pillar”? After all, he did not pass

in this matter,

he said to him; that is, in the manner you described—that I counted out a maneh for you beside this pillar—I was never there.

Some say: There was a certain man who said to another: “I counted out a maneh for you beside this pillar.” He said to him: “I never passed beside this pillar!” Witnesses emerged and testified that he had urinated beside this pillar—

Rav Naḥman said—

he has been established as a liar!

Rava said to Rav Naḥman:

He has not been established as a liar merely because he was contradicted. For

with regard to anything that a person does not have to keep in mind, he does it—

and he does not pay attention to it!

[A person is not required to take note of where he urinates, and therefore he does not remember such places.]

We learned in a beraita:

Rabbi Shimon says: He is liable here, and he is liable for

the

oath of the deposit.

Just as there, the verse speaks only of a monetary claim, so here too it speaks only of a monetary claim!

They laughed at this in the West,

They were astonished at Rabbi Shimon’s derivation that the verse speaks only of a monetary claim, through the gezeira shava “sin”–“sin” from the oath of the deposit.

And we analyze this:

What was the laughter?

And we answer:

For he teaches

in Rabbi Shimon’s statement that one cannot derive the oath of testimony from the oath of the deposit by means of a kal va-chomer, but must resort to a gezeira shava, because there is a refutation of the kal va-chomer:

What is true of the deposit is that one who was adjured is not equated with one who swore, nor one who acted intentionally with one who acted inadvertently.

And the laughter in the West was directed at this claim, because it is not a claim at all.

For

since

behold,

one who adjured himself

in the oath of

testimony—for Rabbi Shimon, from where does he derive it? He derives it from the deposit

by means of a binyan av [because the oath of testimony is stated in the Torah only in the form of one adjured by others, as it is written: “and he hears the voice of the oath”]. If so,

the oath of the deposit, too, one who was adjured by others is derived

by means of a binyan av

from testimony.

Thus the refutation of the kal va-chomer—“what is true of the oath of the deposit is that one who was adjured is not equated with one who swore”—no longer applies, since through the binyan av, one who was adjured is also equated with one who swore in the oath of the deposit!

And we challenge this:

What was the laughter?

From where do we know that Rabbi Shimon derived one who adjured himself in testimony from the deposit?

Perhaps Rabbi Shimon

did not derive one who adjured himself in testimony by means of a binyan av from the deposit. Rather,

by means of a kal va-chomer

from the oath of testimony itself

he derives it:

If one who was adjured

by others is liable

for the offering for the oath of testimony, then one who was adjured

by himself—is it not all the more so

that he is liable?!

Rather, the laughter

of the people of the West was directed

at the distinction between intentional and inadvertent. For he teaches

[in Rabbi Shimon’s statement, as an additional refutation of the kal va-chomer from the deposit]:

What is true of the deposit is that one who was adjured is not equated with one who swore, nor one who acted intentionally with one who acted inadvertently!

And this was the laughter:

Since, from where does he derive that in the case of testimony an intentional act

is liable,

because “and it is hidden” is not written with regard to it, so too,

in the oath of the deposit,

“and it is hidden” is not written,

so why should an intentional act there not also be treated like an inadvertent one?!

Rav Huna said to the people of the West: What was the laughter? Perhaps

the rule

that an intentional act is not like an inadvertent one with regard to the deposit

Rabbi Shimon derives from sacrilege.

He derives a gezeira shava between the oath of the deposit, with regard to which it is stated, “and he commits a sacrilege,” and sacrilege involving consecrated property, with regard to which it is stated, “when he commits a sacrilege.” He derives from it that just as in the case of sacrilege the verse distinguishes between an inadvertent act and an intentional act, and an offering is required only for an inadvertent act, so too, in the oath of the deposit there is a distinction between an inadvertent act and an intentional act, and an offering is required only for an inadvertent act.

The people of the West answered him:

Indeed,

this derivation from sacrilege itself was the subject of the

laughter.

For

once he derives the oath of the deposit from sacrilege

and distinguishes in it between an inadvertent act and an intentional act,

let him derive it

by the gezeira shava “sin”–“sin”

from

the oath of

testimony, in which the verse does not distinguish between an inadvertent act and an intentional act.

Rav Huna answered them:

It is more reasonable—

he should have derived it from sacrilege, since

the derivation of

sacrilege from sacrilege

is preferable.

They answered him:

On the contrary,

he should have derived it from testimony, since it is preferable to derive

“sin” from “sin.”

He answered them:

It is more reasonable—

he should have derived it from sacrilege, since—

a.

Sacrilege.

In both of them the term “sacrilege” is stated.

b.

Universal.

Both apply universally, whereas testimony applies only to those fit to testify.

c.

Deriving benefit.

In both cases they derive benefit from the transgression: the one who commits sacrilege involving consecrated property, and the one who denies money while taking an oath. But the witness who takes the oath does not derive benefit.

d.

Fixed.

In both cases their offerings are fixed, whereas the offering for the oath of testimony varies according to the person’s means.

e.

An added fifth.

In both cases they are liable for an added fifth, whereas there is no liability for an added fifth in the case of the oath of testimony.

f.

And a guilt-offering.

In both cases they are liable for a guilt-offering, whereas the offering required for the oath of testimony is a sin-offering.

The people of the West challenged Rav Huna:

On the contrary, he should have derived it from testimony, since—

a.

Sin.

In both of them the term “you sin” is stated.

b.

An ordinary person.

In both, the claim is made by an ordinary person, not with regard to consecrated property.

c.

An oath.

Both concern an oath.

d.

Its claim and its denial.

In both cases the liability is created through a claim and a denial.

e.

And oaths.

In both, oaths are mentioned.

Rav Huna answered them:

Those

of sacrilege

are more numerous

[six as opposed to five].

In light of this, the challenge arises:

Rather, what was the laughter?

When Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav

Yehoshua, came from the academy, they said: This was the laughter—

since Rabbi Shimon,

ultimately,

derives by a gezeira shava

“sin”–“sin” from the deposit to testimony,

he derives

that the oath of testimony applies only to a monetary claim. And if Rabbi Shimon accepts this gezeira shava, one can also derive from it in the opposite direction—from testimony to the deposit—that one who was adjured is equated with one who swore, and an intentional act with an inadvertent one. If so,

why does he need to refute

the kal va-chomer with the claim,

“What is true of the deposit is that one who was adjured is not equated with one who swore, nor one who acted intentionally with one who acted inadvertently,”

when he could have derived through the gezeira shava that in the oath of the deposit as well, one who was adjured is equated with one who swore, and an intentional act with an inadvertent one?!

And we are astonished:

What was the laughter? Perhaps when Rabbi Shimon raised

this refutation, it was specifically

before the gezeira shava was established for him,

as Rabbi Shimon initially sought to derive the law by means of a binyan av and a kal va-chomer, and demonstrated that it could not be derived in that manner. Therefore, the derivation of a gezeira shava was necessary. Rabbi Shimon’s intention was initially to explain why a gezeira shava was needed and why we could not derive the law through an analogy based on a common feature. But

after the gezeira shava was established for him,

he no longer

raised

this refutation. Rather, he too derived through the gezeira shava that in the oath of the deposit one who was adjured is liable like one who swore, and an intentional act is like an inadvertent one.

And we challenge this:

Does he not

raise this refutation after the gezeira shava has been established for him?!

But Rava bar Eiti said to the Sages: Who is the tanna

who teaches that

the intentional violation of the oath of the deposit cannot be rectified through atonement,

and an offering is brought only when one swore inadvertently?

It is Rabbi Shimon,

who says that in the oath of the deposit an intentional act is not treated like an inadvertent one. This proves that even in the final conclusion Rabbi Shimon raises this refutation, and does not derive that one who was adjured is like one who swore, and that an intentional act is like an inadvertent one, through the gezeira shava from testimony! And we answer:

Perhaps

only

the distinction between an intentional and an inadvertent act does Rabbi Shimon refute,

as

he derives it

for the oath of the deposit

from sacrilege,

and because

those

features that resemble sacrilege

are more numerous. But he does not refute the equation of one who was adjured with one who swore.

Rather, he derives it through the gezeira shava “sin”–“sin” from the oath of testimony, and one who was adjured is liable like one who swore in the oath of the deposit as well.

But if so—if he derives the distinction between an inadvertent and an intentional act in the oath of the deposit through a gezeira shava from sacrilege because the features resembling sacrilege are more numerous—this is difficult [and this was the laughter]:

Let

the oath of

testimony, too, be derived from the deposit

by means of the gezeira shava “sin”–“sin,”

that an intentional act is not like an inadvertent one

in the oath of testimony as well. And let us say:

Just as with the deposit, an inadvertent act is—yes, while an intentional act is—not, so too with testimony, an inadvertent act is—yes, while an intentional act is—not. Why should this not be derived, just as the deposit is derived from sacrilege!?