Shevuot 34b — the Talmud in English

And the witnesses see him from outside

how he counts the money beside him, but the defendant did not notice them, because they were seeing him from outside,

what

is his law?

Rav Hamnuna said to him

to Rav Yehuda:

But he,

the defendant,

what

is he

claiming?

If he says: “These things never happened,”

and you never counted money to me,

behold,

he

has been established as a denier

through his denial. And he is no longer trustworthy even with an oath against the claimant.

And if he says: “Yes, take,”

the money that you counted to me,

and take what is mine,

for you repaid your debt with this money, or you returned the deposit that I had deposited with you—if so,

when the witnesses come

who stood outside,

what has happened?

For they do not know what occurred; they only saw the counting of the money!?

He said to him

Rav Yehuda to Rav Hamnuna:

Hamnuna—

you, enter!

You are the one fit to enter the beit-midrash, for you make your teacher wiser.

There was a certain man who said to his fellow: “I counted a maneh to you beside this pillar.” He said to him: “I never passed beside this pillar!” Two witnesses came and testified concerning him

regarding this

that he urinated beside this pillar—

Reish Lakish said: He has been established as a denier!

Rav Naḥman raised an objection against him: This law—

it is Persian

the Persians rule thus—

Who says, “I never passed

beside this pillar,” when in fact I did not pass

in this matter

he said to him; that is: in the manner that you said, that I counted a maneh to you beside this pillar, I was never there.

Some say: There was a certain man who said to his fellow: “I counted a maneh to you beside this pillar.” He said to him: “I never passed beside this pillar!” Witnesses emerged concerning him that he had urinated beside this pillar—

Rav Naḥman said—

he has been established as a denier!

Rava said to Rav Naḥman:

He has not been established as a denier when he was contradicted. For

anything that does not weigh upon a person, he does—

and it is not in his awareness!

A person is not required to pay attention to where he urinates, and therefore he does not remember these places.

We learned in a beraita:

Rabbi Shimon says: He is liable here and liable for

the

oath of deposit

just as there, it speaks only of a monetary claim, so here too, it speaks only of a monetary claim!

They laughed at it in the West,

they wondered at what Rabbi Shimon taught: that Scripture speaks only of a monetary claim, through a gzera shava, “he sins”—“he sins,” from the oath of deposit.

And we raised it as a difficulty:

What is the laughter?

And we answered:

For he teaches

in Rabbi Shimon’s words that one cannot derive the oath of testimony from the oath of deposit by a kal va-chomer, but one must arrive at a derivation through a gzera shava, because there is a refutation of the kal va-chomer—

What is there concerning a deposit? For there he did not make one adjured like one who swore, nor one who acted deliberately like one who acted unintentionally.

And concerning this claim was the laughter in the West, because it is no claim at all.

For

now,

behold,

one adjured by his own mouth

in the

oath of testimony—for Rabbi Shimon, from where does he derive it? He derives it from the oath of deposit

by an av binyan [for the oath of testimony is stated in the Torah only in the form in which he is adjured by others, as it is written, “and he hears the voice of an oath”]. And if so, the oath of

deposit likewise, one adjured by others is derived

by an av binyan

from testimony.

And if so, the refutation of the kal va-chomer, “What is there concerning the oath of deposit, for there he did not make one adjured like one who swore,” will no longer apply, for through the derivation by an av binyan, in the oath of deposit too there will be one adjured like one who swore!

And we raise a difficulty:

And what is the laughter?

From where do we know to say that Rabbi Shimon derived one adjured by his own mouth in testimony from the oath of deposit?

Perhaps Rabbi Shimon

did not derive one adjured by his own mouth in testimony by an av binyan from the oath of deposit. Rather,

by a kal va-chomer

from the oath of testimony itself

he brings it—

if one adjured

by others is liable

for the offering of the oath of testimony, one adjured

by his own mouth, is it not all the more so

that he is liable?!

Rather, the laughter

of the people of the West was

concerning “one who acted deliberately like one who acted unintentionally.” For he teaches

in Rabbi Shimon’s words, in an additional refutation of the kal va-chomer from the oath of deposit:

What is there concerning a deposit? For there he did not make one adjured like one who swore, nor one who acted deliberately like one who acted unintentionally!

And this was the laughter:

Now, from where does he derive that one who acted deliberately concerning testimony

is liable,

because “and it is hidden” is not written concerning it; here too,

concerning the oath of

deposit, “and it is hidden” is not written,

so why should there not also be in it one who acted deliberately like one who acted unintentionally?!

Rav Huna said to the people of the West: And what is the laughter? Perhaps

the law

that one who acted deliberately is not like one who acted unintentionally concerning the oath of deposit—

Rabbi Shimon derived it from sacrilege,

he derived a gzera shava between the oath of deposit, concerning which it is said, “and he commits a trespass,” and sacrilege concerning consecrated property, concerning which it is said, “when he commits a trespass”; and he derived from it that just as in sacrilege Scripture distinguished between an unintentional act and a deliberate act, and made one liable for an offering only for an unintentional act, so too in the oath of deposit there is a distinction between an unintentional act and a deliberate act, and he is liable for an offering only for an unintentional act.

And the people of the West answered him:

And this,

this derivation from sacrilege, was itself the

laughter.

For

when he derived the oath of deposit from sacrilege

and distinguished in it between an unintentional act and a deliberate act,

let him derive it

by the gzera shava “he sins”—“he sins”

from

the oath of

testimony, in which He did not distinguish between an unintentional act and a deliberate act.

And Rav Huna answered them:

It stands to reason—

he should have derived it from sacrilege, for

the derivation

“trespass” from “trespass”

is preferable.

They answered him:

On the contrary,

he should have derived it from testimony all the more so, for there is the derivation of

“he sins” from “he sins.”

And he answered them:

It stands to reason—

he should have derived it from sacrilege, for—

a.

Trespass.

In both of them “trespass” is stated.

b.

In all.

Both apply universally, whereas testimony applies only to those fit to testify.

c.

Benefited.

Both benefited from the transgression—the one who committed sacrilege with consecrated property and the one who denied money through an oath—whereas the witness who swears does not benefit.

d.

Fixed.

The offering of both is fixed, whereas the offering for the oath of testimony varies according to means.

e.

A fifth.

Both are liable for a fifth, whereas for the oath of testimony there is no liability for a fifth.

f.

And he is guilty.

Both are liable for a guilt-offering, whereas the liability for the oath of testimony is a sin-offering.

The people of the West raise an objection to Rav Huna:

On the contrary, he should have derived it from testimony, for—

a.

Sin.

In both of them “he sins” is stated.

b.

An ordinary person.

In both, the claim is made by an ordinary person and not concerning consecrated property.

c.

With an oath.

Both concern an oath.

d.

Its claim and its denial.

In both, the liability is created through a claim and a denial.

e.

And oaths.

In both, oaths are stated.

And Rav Huna answers them:

These

of sacrilege

are more numerous

[six as opposed to five].

And in light of this, the difficulty arises:

Rather, what is the laughter?

When Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav

Yehoshua, came from the house of Rav, they said: This was the laughter—

now Rabbi Shimon,

in the conclusion,

a gzera shava

“he sins”—“he sins” from the oath of deposit to testimony

he derives,

that the oath of testimony applies only to a monetary claim; and if Rabbi Shimon has this gzera shava, it should also be possible to derive from it in the other direction, from testimony to the oath of deposit, that one adjured is like one who swore and one who acted deliberately is like one who acted unintentionally. And if so,

why does he need to refute

the kal va-chomer

“What is there concerning a deposit? For there he did not make one adjured like one who swore, nor one who acted deliberately like one who acted unintentionally,”

when he should have derived through the gzera shava that in the oath of deposit too he made one adjured like one who swore and one who acted deliberately like one who acted unintentionally!?

And we wonder:

And what is the laughter? Perhaps when he refutes

this refutation, Rabbi Shimon means specifically

before the gzera shava is established for him,

for initially Rabbi Shimon came to derive it by an av binyan and by a kal va-chomer, and demonstrated that it is impossible to derive it in this manner. Therefore the derivation of a gzera shava was required. And Rabbi Shimon’s intention initially was to explain why we need a gzera shava, and why we should not derive it by an analogy from another matter. But

after the gzera shava was established for him,

he

no longer refuted

this refutation. Rather, he too derived through the gzera shava that in the oath of deposit one adjured is liable like one who swore and one who acted deliberately is like one who acted unintentionally.

And we raise a difficulty:

And did he not

refute this refutation after the gzera shava had been established for him?!

But Rava bar Itei said to the Sages: Who is the tanna

who teaches

that the deliberate act of the oath of deposit cannot be atoned for,

and they bring an offering only if he swore unintentionally?

It is Rabbi Shimon,

who says that in the oath of deposit he did not make a deliberate act like an unintentional act. And it is proven that even in the conclusion Rabbi Shimon refutes this refutation, and does not derive that one adjured is like one who swore and that one who acted deliberately is like one who acted unintentionally by a gzera shava from testimony! And we answer:

Perhaps

only

“one who acted deliberately like one who acted unintentionally” he refutes,

Rabbi Shimon,

for he derives it

for the oath of deposit

from sacrilege,

and because

these

that resemble sacrilege

are more numerous. But “one adjured like one who swore” he does not refute.

Rather, he derives it by the gzera shava “he sins”—“he sins” from the oath of testimony, and one adjured is liable like one who swore also in the oath of deposit.

Rather, if it is so—that he derives the distinction in the oath of deposit between an unintentional act and a deliberate act by a gzera shava from sacrilege because these are more numerous—this is difficult [and this was the laughter]—

then let

the oath of

testimony return and let him derive it from the oath of deposit,

by the gzera shava “he sins”—“he sins,”

that a deliberate act is not like an unintentional act

also in the oath of testimony. And let us say:

Just as concerning the deposit: an unintentional act, yes; a deliberate act, no—so too concerning testimony: an unintentional act, yes; a deliberate act, no. Just as he derives the oath of deposit from sacrilege!?